The authors of the ‘Little Children Are Sacred’ report have been extremely critical of the legislation. For example, Pat Anderson says that there is no recommendation in their report that coincides with the legislation (Marr & Peatling 2007). Mr Brough responded to this by saying: ‘I was astounded that the report’s authors provided no recommendations designed to immediately secure communities and protect children from abuse.’ This accusation is more than a little unfair since a report to the NT government based on limited terms of reference cannot assume that the Commonwealth might provide additional resources to secure communities.

The other initiatives may have positive effects on community functioning, and possibly even Indigenous disadvantage, but the connections of the initiatives to child abuse have not always been demonstrated definitively. While there is considerable evidence on what needs to be done to respond to Indigenous child abuse — Radio National’s The Health Report presented a summary of the evidence-based response to child abuse (Swan 2007) — the overall lack of evidence on which to link various aspects of the intervention to child abuse is a major impediment to constructing effective policy options.

There are many possible criticisms of the legislation. Space constraints limit me to focusing on just a couple. Interested readers are referred to the transcript of the one-day Senate hearing where many of the arguments were rehearsed^[3] and to Altman and Hinkson (2007) who present robust criticisms of the intervention from more than 30 authors — around half of whom are Indigenous contributors.

Some of the most cogent criticism has come from a former Liberal Minister for Indigenous Affairs, Fred Chaney, in his 2007 Vincent Lingiari Lecture (2007). Indigenous people will be subject to a level of micromanagement that is unprecedented elsewhere in Australian society. Chaney highlights the suspension of the provisions of the 1975 Racial Discrimination Act and the interference in Indigenous property rights as being of particular concern. He highlights how the lack of meaningful consultation has almost guaranteed that there will be resistance (both passive and active) to the implementation of the policy.

Frank Quinlan, Executive Director of Catholic Social Services Australia, has argued that overseas evidence suggests that no beneficial outcomes flow from financial sanctions unless intensive support programs are also provided. It has also been pointed out, on the basis of evidence from US food-stamp programs, that the new welfare rules would affect only ‘a small number’ of families (Lane 2007). Yet the fixed costs of such interventions, such as recruiting and training case workers, and point-of-sale machines to read entitlement cards, are high (Blank 2002). Furthermore, the fixed costs of quarantining welfare payments in Australia are likely to be high (relative to the US) because of diseconomies of scale.

Linking child abuse and neglect to the welfare quarantining provisions may also have perverse consequences. Notification of abuse and neglect is often voluntary and it is possible that there will be a decline in reported child abuse and neglect if families are reluctant to suffer the social consequences of welfare/income management — even if the actual incidence of child abuse and neglect is not reduced. This is not a problem in itself, but it may have perverse consequences to the extent that support for families in need is affected.

Few commentators would argue that restricting alcohol consumption is not fundamental to tackling child abuse and dysfunctional Indigenous communities. Nevertheless, the Police Federation of Australia argues that the new liquor controls will make law enforcement difficult because there will be two competing legislative frameworks in place: the Commonwealth’s new rules, and the existing Territory legislation (Hall 2007). The Federation also argues that by opening up the permit system in the larger public townships and connecting roads, law enforcement efforts to address the ‘rivers of grog’ will become more difficult. Enforcement issues are critically important, as many Indigenous communities already have bans on alcohol consumption. Prohibition is especially difficult to enforce when there are non-Indigenous communities nearby with access to alcohol (that is, there is an incentive for a ‘sly grog’ market to develop).

Compulsory acquisition leases in townships are a direct intervention into Indigenous property rights. Legitimate questions have been raised about the just-compensation provisions for the compulsory acquisition. The changes to the permit system can also be construed as tampering with Indigenous property rights, as many communities (Oenpelli, for example) rely on the income earned from issuing permits.

As part of the intervention, Mal Brough also announced that all CDEP employment in the NT will be replaced by ‘real jobs’ (Altman & Hinkson 2007: p.331).^[4] While some commentators question how meaningful the term ‘real job’ is, the major unresolved issue is where these new jobs might come from and who might finance such positions. Several NT schemes have already closed, with a concomitant loss of governance capacity for administering community-level initiatives. Brough had previously indicated that he wants the state to deliver development directly to Indigenous families and individuals, thus bypassing mediating institutions and representative structures (Altman & Hinkson 2007: p.315). While these policy thrusts are not intrinsically inconsistent, the federal government is likely to have difficulty in developing the organisational capacity to deal directly with Indigenous people and their families — especially given the problems recently experienced in hiring and retaining Indigenous employees (Commonwealth of Australia 2006).

The most substantial criticism of the intervention is that it is an assault on Indigenous choice and, ironically, responsibility. The NT intervention is clearly paternalistic as it imposes a new set of constraints on what Indigenous people can do, both inside the welfare system and elsewhere. The intervention has been promoted on the grounds that it will assist in re-establishing norms in Indigenous communities and hence in enhancing social responsibility. In contradistinction, it has also been argued that depriving people of personal responsibility may not be the best way to increase the capacities and willingness of individuals to exercise this responsibility (Quinlan 2007).

This section has outlined some ex ante criticisms and evaluations of the NT intervention, which may or may not turn out to be valid. Given that the intervention is controversial and contestable, it is particularly important to establish a credible and accountable framework for evaluating the resulting outcomes.