Chapter I. Introduction

The question of the nature and maintenance of identity in non-Buddhist, non-Christian Karen communities is an important one for several reasons. Despite the long history of Karen studies, it is a phenomenon that is not well understood; it is only comparatively recently that the beginnings towards its understanding have been made with reassessments of studies on the Karen.^[2]

The question raises several related issues, analytical and ethnographic, of some complexity. These issues involve the relation between ethnicity, or ethnic identity, and cultural distinctiveness or, as I would put it, the “identity of a culture”. Quite simply, the relation concerns the correspondence between processes: the construction and maintenance of identity in the context of intergroup relations, and the constituted distinctiveness (or identity) and continuity of a culture within a group, to the extent that it assumes a separate identity vis-a-vis other groups. They also involve religion which, together with language, appear to be important variables in Karen community life and identity. For instance, although the Karen have various religious traditions, nevertheless, it appears that they are undeniably Karen in one way or another. The diversity, or eclecticism, of Karen religious beliefs is very much taken for granted; yet, it is remarkable that very little detailed information is available on the religious systems of Karen communities, especially those which are non-Buddhist and non-Christian.

In the contemporary literature on the Karen, these issues are most clearly to be seen in two key essays by Keyes and Lehman in the volume Ethnic Adaptation and Identity, edited by Keyes (1979), which is specifically concerned with “The Karen on the Thai Frontier with Burma”.

In his introductory essay, Keyes examines the relationship between cultural distinctiveness, ethnic identity and structural oppositions between groups by which ethnic boundaries may come into being.

Keyes takes the view, the utility of which is well established in studies of ethnicity, that ethnicity is an emergent phenomenon (see, for example, Mitchell 1974) in the context of intergroup relations. However, Keyes argues, contra Barth (1969), that rather than culture which acts to define ethnic groups, it is ethnic identity which provides the defining cultural characteristic of ethnic groups (1979a:4). He also adds that the cultural expressions or symbolic formulations of ethnic identity may be found in, for example, myth, religious beliefs, ritual, folk history, folklore and art. By this, I take it that ethnicity provides the context within which these “expressions” or “formulations” assume a distinctiveness as diacritica of an ethnic identity. This is a view which is expressed more succinctly in another paper where he outlines a theoretical approach to ethnic change: “An ethnic identity thus becomes a personal identity after an individual appropriates it from a cultural source, that is, from the public display and traffic in symbols” (1981:10).

Keyes also goes on to point out that while “the cultural distinctiveness an ethnic identity provides is a necessary condition for the existence of an ethnic group, it is not a sufficient condition” (1979a:4). The other condition without which an ethnic group cannot be said to exist is the “structural opposition” between groups in terms of which there is a structural differentiation in the competition for scarce resources such that members of the same group share a “common interest situation” as well as a “common cultural identity”. The resources in question may take a variety of forms, for example, productive resources, access to power or the reproductive capacities of women, and so forth. Accordingly, ethnic identification and adaptation (or change) also involves the element of relative advantage in the membership of groups. Keyes concludes with the observation that any examination of ethnic group relations should therefore treat both the cultural definition of groups and the structural oppositions between groups as problematical (1979a:8).

While there undoubtedly have been movements between Karen and other non-Karen ethnic groups (see, for example, Wijeyewardene, in press), the fact that there are Karen who remain quite unambiguously Karen would, thus, indicate that it is advantageous for them to do so. This in itself is entirely possible as part of the dynamics of ethnicity. Or, as Wijeyewardene also points out — in discussing Karen political strategies in the context of the Theravada Buddhist states of Thailand and Burma — “distinctiveness is sometimes more important than assimilation”. Lehman has provided an answer as to why distinctiveness might be preferable to assimilation where the Karen are concerned. He says:

Karen might just as well have become, and in fact many are, Buddhists, but it is clear that their interests do not lie that way. For that way their choice is to try to acculturate to the Burmans, which would mean, given their relatively backward and remote habitat, being predictably poor Burmans and thus relative failures at the very levels of aspiration they would be adopting. In fact it can be argued that one of the very reasons for an historical and continued Karen identity is that peoples in relatively poor areas are often better off in their own eyes if they maintain cultural styles and aspirations distinct from those of their richer neighbours. (1979:248).

This, I suggest is precisely the case with, for example, the Palokhi Karen. In the context of their particular circumstances, it is advantageous for them to “make use” of the economic opportunities in a larger Northern Thai milieu while at the same time remaining separate. Indeed, I would further suggest that this very separation provides, “in their own eyes”, the assurance of a certain degree of independence from the very socio-economic system that they are linked with. At this cognitive level it is the belief in their own distinctiveness which is important in the positive value placed on a Karen identity. The point to note, however, is that at this level they are predisposed towards a certain view because they are “Karen”. There is, in other words, a certain tautology in Lehman’s observations. I shall return to this later.

This brings us to further considerations in the relationship between the cultural distinctiveness and ethnic identity of the Karen, namely, change, the role of religion, and the status of an indigenous Karen religious tradition. In his discussion of this aspect of Karen ethnic identity, Keyes considers various examples most of which are drawn from the work of others. They are presented to illustrate the principle that in intergroup situations, it is the cultural belief held by the Karen themselves about what makes them distinctive that is relevant to the definition of Karen identity (1979a:10-3). His observations about religion, however, reveal what is the most outstanding gap in the ethnography of the Karen.

At the beginning of his introduction, Keyes quotes a short passage by Father Vincentius Sangermano written at the end of the eighteenth century dealing with Karen living amongst the Burmese and Mon. In this passage, Sangermano observes that the Karen still retain their language, dress and so on and “what is more remarkable, they have a different religion” (Sangermano, quoted in Keyes 1979a:1). Commenting on the relationship between religion and Karen ethnic identity, Keyes says:

Whether or not the Karen claim that a certain religion distinguishes Karen from non-Karen is not quite the issue, though it is interesting that it has not emerged in the ethnography of the Karen. It may be language or some other feature; it is only the belief, or claim, that some cultural feature or other is so that is relevant to actor-definitions of ethnic identity.

The main difficulty here is the lack of documentation, in contemporary studies, on a distinctive Karen religion (which Sangermano found so remarkable in his time) as well as the status of the “different religions” which Keyes refers to. This has led Hinton to state, quite categorically, that “There is no distinctive Karen religion” on the grounds that, in the region, “religions are very fluid” and that the Karen are “eclectic in religious matters” (1983:161-2). Although Hinton’s general observations about religion in Northern Thailand are correct, his conclusion is precipitate. Where the Karen are concerned, to take religion as a world religion, a syncretic mix of a world religion with spirit beliefs, or a hodge-podge of various spirit beliefs is to miss the point in many respects. The point is whether or not there is, among the Karen communities which do not espouse Christianity or Buddhism in one form or another, a religious system.^[3] The issue is, admittedly, problematic in the border areas of Thailand and Burma where a great many Karen communities have been exposed to Buddhism and Christianity. Nevertheless, the likely existence of what might be regarded as an indigenous Karen religious tradition should not be overlooked.

On the basis of a 1977 survey by the Tribal Research Centre (Chiang Mai), Kunstadter (1983:25) indicates that 42.9 per cent of the Sgaw Karen surveyed were “animists”, 38.4 per cent were Buddhists, 18.3 per cent were Christian while 0.2 per cent were Muslims and another 0.2 per cent belonged to other, unclassified religions. In the case of Pwo Karen, 37.2 per cent were “animists”, 61.1 per cent were Buddhists and 1.7 per cent were Christian. Too great a reliance should not be placed on these statistics, but I refer to them to point out that, even as rough approximations, they indicate the existence of a substantial number of Karen who do not see themselves as being Christian or Buddhist. This, of course, raises the obvious question of what is the nature of their “animistic” religion?

Christianity and Buddhism (whatever their forms including syncretic Karen millenial cults) are quite obviously religious traditions which the Karen have adopted and have the status of religions amongst the Karen, but they immediately beg the question of what sort of religion existed prior to Karen conversion. “Spirit and ancestor worship” and the “tattooing cult”, on the other hand, are problematic issues in the Karen ethnography. Though “spirit and ancestor worship” are undoubtedly part of Karen religious traditions, they are aspects of the religious life of the Karen which suffer from several misconceptions. As I have shown elsewhere (1984), the so-called “ancestor worship” is a variable phenomenon and its significance differs, in all likelihood, from community to community. It cannot be construed to be a religion in itself, though in some cases it may be regarded as a cult. As for the “tattooing cult”, little enough is known about it, and to regard it as a religion would be a hasty and premature conclusion indeed.^[4]

The central problem as I see it here, however, is the question of religious conversion and whether anything may be said about the sociological relationship between, if not an identifiable then, at least, a posited “Karen religion” and Karen identity.

This is an issue which is implied in Lehman’s discussion of Karen conversion to Christianity and why it may be advantageous for the Karen to do so rather than to convert to Christianity. He is, in fact, concerned with the relationship between cultural change and change in ethnic identity in general. Taking religious conversion to Christianity as a case in point, his conclusion is that cultural change expressed as religious conversion is nothing short of a change in ethnic identity:

There are two points in these observations which warrant serious consideration.

First, these examples of religious, cultural, and ethnic change, when placed in their historical context, have the following implications: providing that intergroup relations do not change, Karen cultural distinctiveness or identity is directly related to an indigenous, non-Christian, non-Buddhist religion; furthermore, assuming again that intergroup relations do not change, the maintenance of Karen cultural identity is directly related to continuity of such a Karen religion. Although Lehman does not discuss the nature of indigenous Karen religion, it is quite clear that he implicitly acknowledges it must exist. More generally, it is also apparent that he sees religion as a critical aspect in cultural distinctiveness or identity. This is a point which I take up again later.

Second, religion is implicated in cultural change as part of the modification of ethnic identity in the context of changing intergroup relations. The central issue is the relationship between religious, cultural and ethnic change.

The point, I suggest, may be expressed more generally, if somewhat simplistically, in another way. Karen ethnic identity however it may be defined or arrived at as a consequence of processes in intergroup relations has to do with cultural distinctiveness or identity as it is constituted within the community. Or, to paraphrase Keyes’ observations noted earlier: ethnic identities are appropriated from cultural sources (which, I would add, are themselves part of the lived experience of the community) to become personal and hence group identities. Furthermore, change in one means a change in the other. This is the critical issue in the relationship between ethnic identity and cultural identity and, I suggest, it constitutes the thrust of Lehman’s remarks. But, Lehman also emphasises the role of religion.

The importance that Lehman gives to religion is worth noting. Although cultural distinctiveness or identity may be associated with any feature or sets of features, religious systems are important for many reasons in various societies. However their general social and cultural significance, to take one anthropological definition of religion as a cultural system, is that they are “a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic” (Geertz 1966: 4). Whatever else religion may entail, it clearly involves cognitive processes where, as Geertz and Geertz have said (in another context), “a way of seeing is also a way of not seeing” (1964). It is for this reason that if the Karen place a positive value on their identity in relation to others, it is tautological, as I noted before. However, given the importance of religion in predisposing individuals in a society towards particular ways of looking at things, including themselves and others, it does mean that a great deal of their culture and their behaviour may be understood by investigating their religion in its own right. Religious systems, however, are also important for another reason. They possess considerable symbolic content; they are part of the “traffic in symbols” which are the means by which ethnic identities may be appropriated from cultural sources.

In reviewing the discussions of Karen identity by Keyes and Lehman, what I wish to stress is that, first, it is essential to make a distinction between ethnic identity and cultural identity and, second, it is necessary to establish the relationship between ethnic identity, cultural identity, and religion which is clearly an important factor in the maintenance or change of these identities. Where ethnic identity, cultural identity and religion are concerned, cultural distinctiveness is necessary to ethnic identity but ethnicity itself is an emergent phenomenon in the context of integroup relations. Furthermore, cultural identity is closely associated with religion in cognitive and experiential terms, and religious change amounts to cultural change which may be taken as a response to changing intergroup relations. There is, in other words, a dialectical relationship between ethnic identity and cultural identity in which religion is an operative factor.

The general observations, and these points in particular, made by Keyes and Lehman are instructive. But, they raise two major problems.

First, current understandings of what might be regarded as the non-Buddhist, non-Christian religious tradition of the Karen are limited indeed because little is known about it. Accordingly, although the dynamics of ethnic adaptation are clear enough, the relationship between a Karen religion, a Karen cultural identity and their continuity are still a problematic issue in the case of non-Christian, non-Buddhist Karen who possess an unambiguous Karen ethnic identity. The fact of the matter, quite simply, is that we really do not know enough about it.

This thesis is an attempt to explore precisely this issue on the basis of the ethnography of the Palokhi Karen.

I propose to deal with this in terms of the following question: how do the Palokhi Karen maintain their cultural identity, given that they have a religion which is distinctively their own, in the context of fundamental economic relations which extend beyond their own domain of life and control, and an awareness of their incorporation within a larger polity?

Following Keyes and Lehman, I accept that ethnicity in general is constructed as part of the process of intergroup relations. I also take the view that religion is essential to a cultural identity and, hence, an ethnic identity. In the case of the Palokhi Karen, I begin with the assumption that they possess a distinctive religion of their own and take the relationship between this religion and cultural identity as the central concern of this study. I have not attempted to substantiate my claims about what constitutes the religion of the Karen in general and the Palokhi Karen in particular; the rest of this thesis will be evidence and justification enough for my assertion.

The second problem, a more general one, which arises from Keyes’ and Lehman’s observations is this: if Karen ethnic identity is an emergent or situational phenomenon, and if at the level of the actors themselves ethnic groups are defined by some set of “cultural traits” (Lehman 1979: 235, 247) or “commonsense constructs” (Mitchell 1974:22-4), what then is it that is “Karen” about these instances of ethnic adaptation? To take one example if, as Lehman argues, religious and cultural change amount to a change in ethnicity, in what way or ways are Christian, Buddhist and “animist” Karen “Karen”? The problem is, ultimately, an analytical one, namely, that if we take ethnicity too far as an analytical concept, what we are left with is a much too relativistic notion of ethnic identity in which the only irreducible element is the cultural distinctiveness of this identity. The answer to this question, I suggest, can only be arrived at through an answer to the first question and I, therefore, take up this issue at the end of this study.

In the rest of this chapter, I set out the general geographical and economic context of Palokhi and show briefly why the Palokhi Karen may be regarded as having, quite unambiguously, a Karen ethnic identity. I also set out an interpretative framework and argument which underlies my analysis of religion and the maintenance of cultural identity in Palokhi which forms the principal concern of the rest of this study.