Apart from the various ways in which domestic production and consumption is organised as described above, the Palokhi Karen recognise a number of arrangements which form a part of the organisation of agricultural production. In general, these arrangements may be distinguished according to whether they are contractual or non-contractual, loosely defined—that is, binding agreements which recognise certain terms or conditions as against informal non-binding agreements, between two or more people. There are, essentially, four kinds of arrangements which may be regarded as contractual: they are “partnerships” and various forms of share-cropping or rent contracts. The only important non-contractual arrangement is co-operative labour exchange.
Partnerships, the most general type of contractual agreement between two or more people, are termed ma ‘au’ soekau’. It literally means “to work-eat in association”. Ma means “to work” and ‘au’ “to eat”. Soekau’ can refer to a companion, an associate or a partner, that is, someone who is rather less than a friend (ghomau’). Friends and kin, however, can of course be soekau’. In essence, the term ma ‘au’ soekau’ describes any binding agreement between two or more people to work together and to share the proceeds of their effort, on the basis of some criterion or principle of equity. More often than not, it relates to agricultural work though it can also be used with respect to non-agricultural income earning activity in which case the term is used rather more loosely.
In 1980–81, there was only one instance of a ma ‘au’ soekau’ arrangement in Palokhi. This was the arrangement between Su Ghau (H4) and Chi Choe (H5) described earlier.
There are three kinds of share-cropping arrangements which the Palokhi Karen distinguish and they are similar to Northern Thai share-cropping arrangements. Indeed, given that these arrangements pertain to the cultivation of wetrice and not swidden farming, it is altogether likely that the arrangements recognised by the Palokhi Karen are derived from Northern Thai practices.
The first kind of share-cropping arrangement is called ma ‘au’ pha’ phau which means “to work-eat divided in half”. It is similar to the Northern Thai baeng koeng or baeng koeng kan which means “dividing in half”. The contracting parties in such an arrangement would be a cultivator and an owner of a field. As the term implies, payment is made in the form of an equal share in the rice crop. In some cases, there may be additional payments if, for example, the use of a buffalo for ploughing is also made available by the owner of the field. Alternatively, the cultivator may rent the use of a buffalo from someone else, in which case the payment (in rice or cash) would then constitute a separate contractual agreement. In 1980, there was only one case of such a ma ‘au’ pha’ phau agreement; it was entered into between Duang (H3) and Chwi’ (one of the co-founders of Palokhi along with Tamu’) who owned a field in Palokhi and left to settle in Huai Dua in 1974, as discussed in Chapter II. In 1981, Nae’ Kha took over the cultivation of the field under a similar arrangement with Chwi’. This particular contract and the consequences of Chwi”s death are discussed in more detail, in the next chapter, in the context of the ownership of land in Palokhi.
The second type of share-cropping arrangement is called ‘au’ kho pghe which means “eating the price of the head”. It is similar to, and indeed is the literal equivalent of, the Northern Thai kin kha hua (“eating the cost of the head”). As with ma ‘au’ pha’ phau, rent payments are made in the form of rice. However, the payments are much less with the cultivator retaining more than half of the crop. In 1980 and 1981, there were no ‘au’ kho pghe contracts in Palokhi.
The third contractual arrangement is termed ‘au’ chi’ ‘a’ khloe xi. The term means “to eat the back of the wetrice field”. It is a wholly Karen term but it refers to a practice which is also found among the Northern Thai who call it syy or “buying” (Wijeyewardene [1966:48]). The arrangement consists essentially of the sale of use rights to a field for a particular period of time. As the Palokhi Karen conceive it, it is the owner of the field who “eats the back of the field”. In Palokhi, there was one ‘au’ chi’ ‘a’ khloe xi contract which lasted from 1979 to 1981. In this case, the use rights to a plot of wet-rice terraces (of 0.51 ha) were sold by H5 to a Northern Thai in Ban Mae Lao for a fee of Bht 1,200. Further details of the circumstances surrounding this agreement are discussed in the following chapter in relation to land use, ownership and inheritance in Palokhi.
The various contractual arrangements described above are not commonly practised by the Palokhi Karen. The norm in swidden and wet-rice cultivation is owner-cultivation of fields. One reason for this is that there is no excess capacity in the form of wet-rice land which may, therefore, be rented out to individuals or households which require land. A more important reason, however, is that in general there are sufficient tracts of land in the Huai Thung Choa valley which can be brought under both swidden and wet-rice cultivation thus eliminating the need to rent land. The existence of these contractual arrangements is nevertheless important. It shows that they constitute mechanisms which may be resorted to in the short term, according to the exigencies of the circumstances of households, as a means of meeting their subsistence requirements until a more permanent solution—in the form of ownership of wet-rice land—is found.
It will be noticed that the contracts entered into by the Palokhi Karen happen to involve non-kin. It is worth noting, however, that the Palokhi Karen say that these kinds of contractual arrangements may be entered into by kin and non-kin. In other words, such contractual agreements do not necessarily apply to non-kin only. One area where such contractual agreements between kin are potentially important in Palokhi is the inheritance of wet-rice fields. As I discuss the inheritance of land in the next chapter, it will be sufficient to point out here that the Palokhi Karen say that some of these agreements may be entered into by siblings who inherit wet-rice fields. The reason why inheritance and such agreements are not yet an an issue of major importance in Palokhi lies in the fact that only two of the male heads of households who opened up wet-rice fields have died.
As with most if not all agrarian societies, there is in Palokhi an informal, non-contractual system for organising agricultural work on the basis of co-operative labour exchange. The underlying principle in this system is reciprocity in the provision of labour. In Palokhi, such work arrangements are called ma dau’ lau (poe’) sa’ which may be taken to mean “working together” or “working mutually”. The literal translation of this expression is “to work with (our) hearts falling together” where the essential sense of the term is conveyed by lau sa’, a phrase that functions as a simulfactive denoting mutual, reciprocal action or common activity.
Co-operative labour exchanges are most commonly found in clearing, planting, weeding, and harvesting in swidden cultivation. In wet-rice farming, it is found in the preparation of fields (ploughing, harrowing and levelling), planting, and harvesting. The main reason why labour exchange usually takes place in these tasks is that they either require large inputs of labour over a short period of time, or because they are tedious, time consuming tasks in which the presence of others helps to reduce the drudgery of the work as in weeding.
An examination of labour expended by Palokhi households on agricultural work and co-operative labour exchange (see Appendix B) reveals some interesting patterns which bear out some of the conclusions from the case studies.
First, the data show very clearly that despite the general principle of reciprocity which guides the exchange of labour there is, nevertheless, an imbalance in the labour supplied and received by all households in both swidden and wet-rice cultivation (see especially Tables B.2 and B.3). Much of the variation in the lack of full reciprocity in labour exchanges may be explained by the operation of contingent factors. These include differentials in the size of swiddens or wet-rice fields which affect the amount of labour required for the performance of related tasks, the size of domestic supplies of labour and domestic dependency ratios, competing demands on labour faced by households in non-agricultural activities, and so on. Other very human considerations also affect the amount of labour which may be contributed by households in co-operative labour exchanges. These include the degree of amity between members of different households, the expectation that good food will be provided for the labour gangs, the presence of marriageable young women who invariably attract a larger number of young men, and so forth.
Second, following some of the patterns discernible in the case studies, households related by collateral kin links by no means consistently work together. Indeed, in some cases, the level of exchange labour is greater between non-related households than that between related households.