As early as the 1950s, philosophers forcefully criticised positivism but political scientists often fail to take seriously the effects of rejecting a positivist notion of pure experience. Some cling tenaciously to the positivist idea that we can explain human behaviour by objective social facts about people and avoid interpreting beliefs. They try to avoid such interpretation by reducing beliefs to abstract and deductive models or to intervening variables between social facts and actions. However, once we reject the idea of pure experience, we cannot ‘read-off’ beliefs and desires from objective social facts (Bevir 1999a, 127-173). Instead, we must give prominence to the task of exploring the beliefs and meanings through which people construct their world. Because people do not have pure experiences, their beliefs and desires are inextricably enmeshed with theories. Thus, political scientists have to interpret beliefs as part of webs of beliefs, and locate these webs against the background of traditions and dilemmas.