The relationships between the key players—ministers, the board and Centrelink—have evolved with time. Various modes of operation were reached regarding the nexus of relationships and how to handle political dimensions.

There was much that was commendable in how these arrangements were worked through. If there were unconventional governance elements they were made to work in practice by the key participants. The practical realities of the conduct of governance, however, mattered less for steering the system. The government’s Review of Corporate Governance (Uhrig 2003:45) was insensitive to the subtleties of corporate governance practice in this case. It observed that under the FMA and Public Service Acts, the chairman of the board and the CEO had responsibilities and this created the anomaly of two chief executives for accountability and governance. The review ‘identified the need for a consistent approach to structuring agencies and establishing effective governance frameworks, including where to use boards and the application of the FMA and CAC Acts’ (Uhrig 2003:46).

Several tensions and issues in governance were apparent, including the internal contradictions in the model. These questions touched on the impact on departmental secretaries and were related to the move towards a more mature partnership with client departments. In the end, Centrelink emerged during its formative years much like a department of state, in part because of pressures to fit the core public service culture. This was simply confirmed when new corporate governance arrangements were introduced.