12. Inside or outside the tent: the role of the Public Service Commissioner

Table of Contents

Promoting the APS Values and contributing to APS capability
Guidelines
Leadership development
The Management Advisory Committee
State of the Service Reports
Succession management
Working with ministers
Whole-of-government work
Working with the Parliament
Public Service Commissioner and the Parliament
Parliamentary Service Commissioner’s role
Management of the commission
External relations
Working with the media
Issues raised: inside or outside the tent?
Lessons learned as commissioner

I was Public Service Commissioner for three years from the beginning of 2002 until the end of 2004. The position is a statutory office under the Public Service Act 1999 and, once appointed, a commissioner cannot be removed other than by the Parliament. The commissioner nonetheless has a minister (in fact, two: the Prime Minister and the Minister Assisting the Prime Minister on the Public Service).

The following summarises the role from my experience, using similar headings to those of the earlier chapters concerning departmental secretaries, which can be used to summarise the responsibilities of almost all heads of government agencies. The differences in the commissioner’s role are reflected in the very different amounts of time spent on the various responsibilities of an agency head.

Table 12.1 Time allocation by secretary and commissioner

Area of activity

Departmental secretary (%)

Public Service Commissioner (%)

(a) Supporting the minister

35–50

<10

(b) Supporting the government as a whole

<5

<5

(c) Working with the Parliament

up to 5+

5–10

(d) Management of the department/agency

15–30

15–20

(e) Management of the portfolio

up to 5

nil

(f) External relationships

—with other Commonwealth agencies

—with other governments

—with non-governmental bodies

 

5

 

10

5–10

 

15

 

<5

<5

(g) Contributing to APS capability

up to 5

50

Again, a number of activities could be allocated to several headings. Time spent on APS Commission and MAC reports and on commission events and programs as commissioner has been allocated here to ‘contributing to APS capability’, while ‘supporting the government as a whole’ relates mostly to involvement in portfolio secretaries’ meetings and related activities not initiated by the commission.

The extra time involved in working with the Parliament was because I was also the Parliamentary Service Commissioner. Since the latter position was created in 1999, the presiding officers have asked the Public Service Commissioner to take the role.

Promoting the APS Values and contributing to APS capability

As these are at the centre of the commissioner’s statutory responsibilities, I will describe them first rather than last.

The main elements of this work as commissioner are:

  • issuing directions and developing and disseminating guidelines on the APS Values and Code of Conduct

  • developing and supporting the leadership cadre of the APS (SES and agency heads)

  • working through the MAC to identify good management practice in areas of shared interest across the APS

  • evaluating and reporting on how agencies are upholding the APS Values

  • succession management and agency head performance assessment.

Guidelines

When I was appointed commissioner, my predecessor, Helen Williams, had issued the directions required under the new legislation on the APS Values and Code of Conduct. These, appropriately in my view, clarified the responsibilities of agency heads while leaving them some room to manage how they would promote the values and ensure the code was upheld. My focus was on developing guidelines to help agency heads and their employees to apply the values and Code of Conduct in their practical work situations.

My earlier, practical experience as a departmental secretary made me somewhat sceptical of some of the rhetoric of the management literature and the fads and fashions involved in management theory. I therefore put considerable emphasis on what I called ‘hardwiring’, whether of the APS Values or of the concept of leadership, both of which were emphasised in the Public Service Act 1999.

So, for example, I grouped the 15 values in the act under four headings, which identified public servants’ key relationships and behaviours, and clarified how the values reflected the unique role of the Public Service under the Westminster system (for example, responsive to the elected government, non-partisan, impartial, merit based). This grouping of the values guided the structure of the State of the Service Reports from 2002 and the rewriting of the Guidelines on Official Conduct in 2003. Using OECD experience, we also identified how agency heads could go about ‘embedding’ the values in their organisations in practical ways through ‘commitment’, ‘management’ and ‘assurance’ activities. This led to the following diagram (Figure 12.1) to illustrate the practical approach we were advocating and the guidelines we prepared for agency heads on embedding the values in their organisations.

Figure 12.1 The APS Values framework

Figure 12.1 The APS Values framework

This work recognised the different business responsibilities of agencies and how these might reflect differences in priorities among the APS Values (for example, Centrelink might give more weight to values concerning the relationship its staff have with the public while the Department of PM&C might give more weight to values concerning the relationship its staff has with the government and the Parliament), but confirmed the unifying role and relevance of the full set of APS Values.

Leadership development

Similarly, I was becoming uneasy about the language of ‘leadership’. The SES Leadership Capability Framework had proven to be very robust, with richness in its detail and language, but there was a push to apply the framework to everyone at every level. I felt this ran the danger of making it meaningless. We therefore did some extensive research into the skills and attributes that were really required at different levels, recognising that there could be wide disparities for different jobs in different businesses. I was also concerned not to understate the importance of technical expertise or the specific skills required of managers at different levels. The ensuing Integrated Leadership System (ILS), released in 2004, gained considerable credibility throughout the Public Service precisely because of this practical balance, as illustrated by Figure 12.2, which appeared near the beginning of the ILS documentation.

Figure 12.2 The changing mix of skills and capabilities

Figure 12.2 The changing mix of skills and capabilities

The ILS led to a substantial refreshment of our suite of APS Commission development programs, though these continued to focus mostly on the SES and the feeder groups into the SES.

My personal involvement in these was extensive, both in the design and in their delivery. I attended all the courses for new SES officers, which were held three or four times a year, to discuss the statutory obligations of SES officers in promoting and upholding the APS Values and in working throughout the APS—not just within their own agencies. Often I would raise common ethical dilemmas and encourage discussion of how they might be handled. I also attended many of the other leadership programs managed by the commission or run by agencies for their own staff.

A particularly useful program was the Career Assessment Centre for staff at EL2 level considered likely to be promoted to the SES in the future. The value of this program for those participating and their agencies was in its direct assessment, without pulling punches. An added value for the commission was the capacity to collate the assessments and to build a picture of common strengths and weaknesses and trends over time, to help in the design of future development activities. This analysis showed that most of these high-flying staffers were skilled in communication and demonstrated personal commitment and integrity, but many were weak in shaping strategic thinking and maintaining productive working relations.

The Management Advisory Committee

Our APS Commission guidelines were prepared through an extensive process of consultation with agencies, mostly using a reference group of secretaries and drawing on APS-wide case studies. MAC reports similarly used reference groups and case studies, but also employed a team of deputy secretaries to pull the material together. This had the added virtue of allowing secretaries to see close at hand deputy secretaries from other agencies who might be candidates for advancement in the future, thus contributing to succession management.

I was always closely involved in the MAC projects as the commissioner was the ‘executive officer’ of the MAC under the Public Service Act. I initiated some projects, prepared papers for the MAC on the scope of each one and was on every reference group of secretaries.

Those that I contributed most to were the 2002 report Organisational Renewal, on the likely demographic impact on the APS and the need for improved workforce planning, and the 2004 report Connected Government, on the management of whole-of-government policies and projects. I had previously contributed substantially to the 2001 report Performance Management in the APS: A strategic framework.

Table 12.2 Connected Government: improving whole-of-government capacity

Peter Shergold, Secretary of the Department of PM&C, initiated the 2004 MAC review of whole-of-government management, with strong support from me as Public Service Commissioner.

Roger Beale (Environment department) chaired the reference group of secretaries and agency heads and Lisa Paul (later Secretary of Education) led the deputy secretary project team; Lynne Tacy (Deputy Public Service Commissioner) provided the most substantial contribution among the deputies’ group.

The project drew on a wide range of case studies of whole-of-government exercises, including the response to the Bali bombings, the management of the Sydney Olympics, the establishment and role of the Australian Greenhouse Office, the COAG Indigenous trials, the Goodna service integration project, the National Illicit Drugs Strategy and iconsult (a proposed electronic information exchange on community consultations).

The final report canvassed:

  • the most appropriate structures and processes for managing whole-of-government matters (Beale contributed most to this chapter)

  • cultural aspects that might facilitate cooperation and collaboration (Tacy and the APS Commission contributed most to this)

  • information management and infrastructure (with particular help from Helen Williams from the Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts)

  • budget and accountability framework (assisted by the Finance department, with considerable cajoling from line department secretaries and me)

  • engagement beyond the APS (I contributed substantially to this chapter, along with the heads of several service delivery agencies)

  • crisis management (DFAT contributed substantially to this chapter, along with Paul, who had played a key role in the Bali bombings response).

I believe the report has had a significant impact on APS practice, improving capability through shared learning. For example, crisis management is now a well-drilled process throughout the Commonwealth and there is more careful consideration of the structures and processes appropriate for different types of problems than in the past. This body of work also influenced the subsequent development of the Cabinet Implementation Unit.

State of the Service Reports

The main avenue for evaluating and reporting on how agencies are upholding the values is the commissioner’s yearly State of the Service Report. Helen Williams prepared the first two reports required under the legislation, developing an initial framework and infrastructure including a detailed survey of agencies. I built on this using the grouping of the APS Values I had proposed to clarify the main areas of performance I wished to focus on (relations with ministers and the government, relations with the public, workplace relations and personal behaviour) and adding a weighted random sample survey of APS employees to complement (and test) the survey of agencies.

Together with the commission’s own database, which tracked all APS employees, this provided an increasingly comprehensive evidence base to support judgments on performance against the APS Values and on APS capability. In my last report in 2004, I also introduced some information on the views of the public collected by some agencies through their own feedback mechanisms.

The surveys covered sensitive issues such as relations between public servants and ministers and their advisers, and public servants’ confidence in upholding the APS Values in this area. The data were fascinating, but caused considerable angst among my colleagues.

Table 12.3 Washing hands: handling sensitive data

The initial APS employee survey included questions on relations with ministers and their officers, whether the employees had had direct contact in the previous 12 months, whether they had faced challenges in upholding the APS Values in these contacts and their confidence in handling challenges.

Peter Shergold, Secretary of the Department of PM&C, asked me to brief portfolio secretaries in advance on the data collected for the State of the Service Report. I put together some raw tables that I had not yet fully analysed and about which I had yet to draft any commentary.

I distributed the tables at a meeting of portfolio secretaries highlighting what I felt were the most significant results, including that an amazingly high 26 per cent of all employees (including staff at all levels in all APS agencies including the Tax Office, Centrelink, Customs, the Bureau of Statistics, as well as ministerial departments) said they had had direct contact with the minister or minister’s office and that many had faced challenges in upholding the values, though most were confident they could manage them.

There was at first disbelief and then, when I stood by the validity of the data, unease about what it meant and what should be done with it. The data confirmed the growing importance of ministerial staff and the extent of their reach into the Public Service—a matter of some political sensitivity at the time. One secretary said, ‘If we are not sure what it means, why are we publishing it?’, to which I responded that ‘“we” are not publishing it, I am’.

Shergold’s nervousness, and that of most present, led him to propose that all copies of the data be returned to me there and then so that it was clearly the commissioner’s responsibility to analyse and report on it; secretaries then would not feel under any obligation to advise their ministers of the sensitive information until I reported. I was therefore given back all the tables and, somewhat bemused, returned to the commission to continue my analysis and start drafting the report.

While the quality of the reports, and of their underpinning data and analysis, was improving, I was nonetheless cautious about identifying the agencies whose performance was weak. I felt I needed to build our reputation for credible analysis before taking the step of ‘naming and shaming’. Instead, I named examples of good practice and provided agency heads with data on their agencies compared with the overall data so they could see where they were or were not performing well and consider whether action was needed to address weaknesses.

Succession management

The commissioner has no statutory role in the appointment of secretaries and agency heads, other than in the case of the Secretary of the Department of PM&C. I did, however, contribute to succession management by the Secretary of PM&C by providing a database on potential candidates and on each agency head position (extending the process developed by Williams). The data were based largely on interviews I held each year with secretaries about their deputies and equivalent, and about other SES officers seen as ‘high fliers’, and data the secretaries subsequently provided on their experience and strengths and suggestions for future development. I also encouraged confidential discussion at the portfolio secretaries’ retreats of the capabilities of deputies and equivalent under protocols that required firsthand evidence to support any view expressed. These discussions were critical, as they facilitated moderation of the claims of each secretary about his or her own staff (and they did reveal some very different assessments of some staff). As commissioner, I generally added my own comments to the information base held in the commission, drawing in part on these conversations.

Secretaries quite often contacted me for suggestions about people they might encourage to apply for senior vacancies, accepting that my advice would reflect my interests in broader capability building throughout the Public Service and not only my views on likely strong candidates for the specific vacancies concerned.

Occasionally, the Secretary of the Department of PM&C and the commissioner took a highly proactive stance on succession management, setting up a committee of secretaries to advise on possible rotations of deputies to help their development. This did not happen while I was commissioner and earlier exercises had mixed success, with secretaries suspicious that individuals offered for transfer might not be high-performing ones and that those secretaries pursuing others’ deputies might be motivated by self-interest rather than the broader interests of the APS.

Performance assessment

Once a year, much of my time was taken up with managing the process of performance assessment of departmental secretaries and executive agency heads. This related to the Howard Government’s arrangements for performance pay, which I am pleased the Rudd Government has dispensed with. I have described the process in some detail elsewhere.[1] With some modification (including the removal of bonus payments), the process would still be worthwhile in my view.

In summary, secretaries would prepare self-assessments and discuss these with their ministers. They would then forward these to the Secretary of the Department of PM&C and to me. The two of us would subsequently meet the portfolio ministers and seek comments on the assessments and views on overall performance. I then drafted a short report on each secretary for the Prime Minister, which the PM&C Secretary would consider before a final agreed version went to the Prime Minister. I often checked some of the supporting material, for example, by examining Auditor-General reports during this process. The final reports summarised our views against the suggested criteria (support for the minister, supporting the government as a whole, management, leadership, upholding the APS Values and implementation of government decisions) and the ministers’ and our own recommended assessments. The two of us then met the Prime Minister to discuss the reports (after my meeting the Prime Minister on my own to discuss the performance of the Secretary of the Department of PM&C) and I would write to each secretary advising of the Prime Minister’s decision.

I also managed the process of assessing the CEOs of executive agencies who were covered by performance pay. In their case, I handled most of the process on my own, seeking the endorsement of the Secretary of the Department of PM&C only at a late stage; the Prime Minister usually wanted only my assurance that the assessments were consistently applied and that the ministers concerned were in broad agreement (he usually accepted my advice to moderate some excessively generous ministerial assessments). My process in these cases included discussion with the relevant portfolio secretary as well as the minister most involved (generally not the portfolio minister).

Despite my strong criticisms of the overall process, it had some strengths that should be preserved in future performance feedback processes for secretaries:

  • the suggested criteria were sensible, as long as they were all properly considered and balanced

  • a self-assessment based on some agreement with the minister at the beginning of the year and then discussed with the minister at the end provided some structure to the process

  • the Secretary of the Department of PM&C and the commissioner both checking with the ministers, and later both talking to the Prime Minister, ensured there was involvement of the operational and professional heads of the APS.

The changes I would like to see are:

  • a stronger peer review element, where at least one other secretary (or perhaps a former secretary) participates in the process, making a more careful judgment of the management, leadership and APS Values criteria as well as reviewing the ministers’ assessments

  • the Prime Minister being asked more to endorse (or not) rather than decide on the performance assessment

  • the performance assessment distinguishing only between strong performance, fully competent and not fully competent (the last giving notice that improvement is required).

Such an approach would line up more closely with the Canadian process; the New Zealand arrangement (where the State Services Commissioner is the employer of the secretaries) is even more independent of the political process.




[1] 'What Really Happens: Departmental Secretary Appointments, Contracts and Performance Pay in the Australian Public Service', Australian Journal of Public Administration, June 2007.