Chapter 15. Managing trans-boundary crises: leadership challenges for the EU Presidency

Bengt Sundelius

Table of Contents

1. Crises without borders
2. Making sense of uncertainty and complexity
3. Accepting the heat at the top
4. Practice makes perfect
5. Beyond the thrill ride

1. Crises without borders

In the bulk of this book, research findings have been presented on how national leaders have handled the many aspects of the recent international financial collapse and its multiple effects on their societies. Theoretically informed empirical examinations of several political systems have shown the perils of leadership under severe financial conditions. We expect much from our public leaders in the national hot seats.

In this chapter, I heighten the stakes of top-level crisis management even further. Trans-boundary crises such as the financial meltdown in 2008–09 or the likely pandemics of the 2009 influenza season are even more complex than more common disasters that are by and large bounded by space and time. The global financial crisis of 2008–09 as examined in this volume is an early example of a type of fast-paced and vastly diffused development that leaders are likely to experience more frequently in future years.

Trans-boundary phenomena require that multiple actors in distinct jurisdictions, in coherent ways, jointly handle the shared crisis and its often-unexpected aftershocks. The leaders of the G8 and G20 member states were activated in the global financial crisis for this reason. In the European Union, the European Commission and the European Central Bank were very active (see Fletcher, this volume). The French Presidency during the second half of 2008 headed the common crisis-management efforts that involved a number of initiatives, top-level meetings and financial support packages (see Windle, this volume).

In Europe, a multilevel form of crisis management is emerging. Effective crisis coordination must here be fostered across levels, sectors, institutions and sovereign jurisdictions. It would be prudent to strengthen European networks of crisis coordination before events overtake the capacity for effective joint management. This type of preparatory work is well under way and it seems to have been given some priority by current and recent presidencies. The legitimacy of the European Union can be strengthened and the social distance to its citizens can be shortened when the common union capacity to manage crises is put to the test by unexpected trans-boundary phenomena.

The Presidency of the European Union is responsible for multinational, multilevel, multi-sector and multi-institutional leadership in situations of severe stress for the union, its 27 member states and almost 500 million people. During the second half of 2009, Sweden serves in this capacity. In his program statement of 1 July, the Swedish Prime Minister and EU President, Fredrik Reinfeldt, listed the top-priority issues facing his six-month tenure: finding a durable solution to climate change and overcoming the financial collapse. Reinfeldt concluded the manifesto boldly: ‘We must also be prepared to manage the unexpected. Sweden is ready to meet this challenge.’ Many observers claim that the test of the performance of an EU President rests on the ability to excel in public leadership in the high-stakes and very visible media setting of dealing with gravely consequential problems that are not yet known. Some presidencies do very well—such as the French term during 2008—while others fare less well.

This memo is directed to the holders of the EU Presidency. I am convinced that research into crisis management has practical value. Recognising all the limitations of trying to turn research findings into ‘how-to’ (or more often ‘how-not-to’) recommendations, this essay draws on the scholarly evidence for reflections and advice to the incumbent EU Presidency. Leaders have to face the challenges, make choices and live with the consequences of their action or inaction. After many years of observation of crisis leadership, I have considerable respect for the difficulties and burdens of exercising authority and upholding credibility in crisis—in particular, when facing trans-boundary phenomena. My normative stand is that I applaud crisis leadership practices that help minimise human and material losses and other societal costs, while also upholding fundamental values of democratic governance, the rule of law and citizen rights. When our academic understanding can in modest ways enhance crisis leadership, along the above criteria, so much the better.