All these issues highlights the need for some fresh thinking about the way new major project proposals are assessed so that they do not turn into ‘white elephants’. Flyvbjerg et al (2003: 7) concluded in their international survey of poor megaproject management that:
… good decisions making is a question not only of better and more rational information and communication, but also of institutional arrangements that promote accountability … We see accountability as being a question not just about periodic elections, but also about a continuing dialogue between civil society and policy makers and about institutions holding each other accountable through appropriate checks and balances.
It seems that existing processes and institutions and now accepted norms in public sector management are no longer adequate in ensuring effective project management of major public infrastructure. Auditor general reports, as highlighted in this chapter, do provide useful insights into what went wrong. However, these evaluations are necessarily after the event. Nor can exhorting elected officials to act in the public interest be effective. Such exhortations are like asking children put in charge of a sweet shop not to eat the merchandise! Treasuries certainly have the capacity to do the analysis, but treasuries are part of the bureaucracy and face all the limitations that this imposes as has been discussed above. As Ian Lowe (1992:142) suggested:
The crucial lesson to be learned (from white elephant projects) … is that we ought to be able to do a better job of foreseeing problems. The need is for improved foresight: an enhanced ability to analyse the future impacts of our decisions and actions.
Others too, have stressed the need for improved long term policy development processes in Australia, but these suggestions have focussed on the broader policy framework (Marsh and Yencken 2004). The need, it seems, is to provide some brake of the ‘Let’s do it’ approach in project initiation which while possibly acceptable for entrepreneurs like Richard Branson of Virgin Airlines fame, are so patently unsuitable for major long term public sector projects, and one suspects most private sector ones.
While Lowe stresses the need to challenge some of the underlying rationale of many projects such as the obsession with growth and faith in technology, what is also needed is some institutional renovation to better manage infrastructure issues in general. This is especially needed at the state level where many infrastructure decisions are made. Also, at the state level there are fewer and less transparent processes of decision making, accountability and advice giving than nationally.
Indeed, in many ways the problems in effective project management now so evident in the public sector are similar to those that surrounded industry assistance at the beginning of the 1970s. In those times there was a lack of any real independent and public evaluation process of what industry assistance was really costing the Australian public both directly in the form of subsidies and indirectly in terms of extra costs to consume certain products. The solution was the establishment in 1973 by the Whitlam Labor Government of the expert based, independent Industries Assistance Commission (IAC), which has now become the Productivity Commission Notwithstanding the potential narrowness of IAC’s economic analysis, it gave the Australian public some insight into the real costs of assistance across both the manufacturing and agricultural sectors through a very public and consultative process (Rattigan 1986; Warhurst 1982). John Howard (1976:12), when Minister for Business and Consumer Affairs in the Fraser Government summed up the rationale for the IAC:
Most economic issues involve some kind of dilemma, some kind of striking a balance and that is one of the reasons why it is important as part of the process of arriving at decisions on industries, that you have an independent advisory body such as the IAC to give government advice.
While different state business groups have proposed an infrastructure council composed of representatives of government and business, this smacks of decisions behind closed doors between consenting interest groups. Such an infrastructure council would lack any sense of independence or have any real research and analytical capacities.
Another suggestion to tackle both the infrastructure selection issue, to improve choice, ensure public involvement, enhance accountability and potentially improve subsequent project management is for an expert, statutory base state priorities commission.
Such a body would audit a state’s present infrastructure needs, identify gaps, and make public recommendations for improvement. Done annually, this would provide a report card on a state’s infrastructure needs and their overall performance. In addition, such a commission could evaluate openly any new proposals for new infrastructure or events and to provide a means for effective consultation with both the business and wider community. It could provide government with a convenient post box to which complex proposals could be despatched and so give everyone time to think, before acting. The government could lay down priority areas and criteria that the commission would use to determine priorities and make assessments.
Of course, a priorities commission could only provide advice to governments – elected officials would have to make the final decisions. Nevertheless, such a process would give governments a better means of making choices from a range of projects that maximise benefits. It would also provide greater public participation in decision-making, improve accountability and assist in more efficient allocation of taxpayers’ funds on big projects.