Both in Australia and internationally, there is concern that governments have lost policy capacity (Parsons 2004; Peters 1996; Savoie 2003). The concept of policy capacity is complex and ambiguous, but is typically concerned with policy advising – specifically the availability of high quality information, analysis and advice to support decision-making.
Perceptions that policy capacity has declined are widespread, including in Australia (Edwards, Ayers and Howard 2003). Under a variety of labels including ‘capacity’, ‘competency’ and ‘capability’, concerns have been expressed about the ability of governments to make intelligent choices (Painter and Pierre 2005), to scan the environment and set strategic directions (Howlett and Lindquist 2004; Savoie 2003), to weigh and assess the implications of policy alternatives (Bakvis 2000), and to make appropriate use of knowledge in policy-making (Parsons 2004; Peters 1996). Others question the ability of existing processes and structures to ensure an appropriate flow of information, analysis and advice to decision-makers (Painter and Pierre 2005; Walter 2006), particularly around issues of policy implementation and delivery, and whether after two decades of almost continuous public sector reform, the public service has the requisite expertise, knowledge, skills and resources to support decision-making through its policy advising functions (Bakvis and Aucoin 2005).
Concerns about declining policy capacity have been expressed by ministers, senior public servants and scholars. Prime ministers from Australia’s John Howard, to New Zealand’s Helen Clark to Britain’s Tony Blair have stated publicly that they have been underwhelmed, and at times let down, by advice from their bureaucratic advisers. The Australian Wheat Board (AWB), Iraq weapons intelligence and ‘children overboard’ controversies are recent cases in point. In Queensland, Premier Peter Beattie, has complained bitterly about the quality of advice provided to him by public service departments and agencies. Public service leaders have also expressed concern about declining policy advising skills and competencies (Briggs 2005; Podger 2002; Wintringham 2003), particularly in moments of crisis (Shergold 2004b).
Though expressed in similar terms, the discourse of declining policy capacity means different things to different people. It has become an umbrella term encompassing a variety of concerns about:
the research, analytical and advisory skills and abilities of the public service;
the ability of the public service to recruit and retain people with requisite knowledge, skills and experience;
the nature of relationships between officials and political executives; and
the policy advising role of the public service in an increasingly dynamic, pluralised and contestable environment.
Within the discourse of declining policy capacity, concerns have also been expressed about implementation and delivery, specifically:
the ability and willingness of the public service to promptly deliver government commitments and priorities;
the potential for policy intent to become distorted or diffused during implementation. That is, for the ‘line of sight’ between policy formulation and implementation to be obscured;
the public service’s ability to mobilise and coordinate around whole-of-government issues and priorities; and
the potential for unanticipated or unintended consequences to flow from government policy interventions.
Such concerns have sparked a more general renewal of interest in policy implementation – a much neglected topic in policy studies (Barrett 2004). The Blair government in Britain is frequently credited with spearheading this agenda, mostly tangibly through its creation of the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit (PMDU) in 2001. The PMDU is dedicated to ensuring that the government delivers on its priorities in key areas of public service provision (Smith and Richards 2006). A major reform effort is currently focused on enhancing the British government’s capacity for policy delivery, including the requirement for regular departmental ‘capability reviews’ to be conducted by the PMDU. [1] Implementation Units have emerged within the core executives of other jurisdictions including the Australian Commonwealth (Wanna 2006) and Queensland (Tiernan 2006). The Victorian and South Australian governments have also established implementation units recently. This suggests that there is broad interest in strengthening capacity for implementation and that significant policy transfer and learning is occurring between jurisdictions – a finding endorsed by comparative research. Lindquist (2006) notes that first ministers in each of these locations have instigated the development of new central capacities to ‘advise, monitor and ensure better implementation of policy initiatives’.
The renewed focus on policy implementation has been primarily driven from the political centre. In the Commonwealth and elsewhere, implementation units are co-located with Cabinet support functions in Prime Minister’s and Premiers’ departments. As with much of the infrastructure supporting first ministers, they are instruments of central control, principally concerned with advancing the political interests of the incumbent leader (Peters, Rhodes and Wright 2000, p. 266).
Since their establishment in late 2003 and early 2004 respectively, the Commonwealth and Queensland implementation units have established strong central monitoring and reporting of commitments and priorities. Procedural changes to focus agency attention on implementation planning during policy development have been introduced and the units are engaged in a variety of awareness and consciousness raising initiatives – the Commonwealth much more so than its Queensland counterpart. [2] Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Dr Peter Shergold, has been an energetic champion of the Cabinet Implementation Unit, and of the utility of project management techniques in implementation planning and monitoring (see, for example, Shergold 2004; 2006b).