One purpose of the case studies is to determine more precisely the role and functions of implementation units that have emerged in recent years, realising that the label could encompass a variety of activities. Accordingly, this section returns to the hypotheses set out earlier in the chapter to determine whether implementation units emphasise one stream of potential activities over others, and whether this differs significantly across the cases. This section also ventures ideas about why implementation units have emerged in the way they have, and at this particular juncture.
Table 2 demonstrates that, based on the evidence provided in the case study papers, the implementation units do not seem to focus on only one or two aspects of implementation, such as only monitoring government policy commitments or fixing delivery problems as they emerge. Rather, they seem multi-functional, designed to accomplish multiple goals. To be sure, the accounts suggest that each unit has different emphases: arguably the UK PMDU is more squarely focused on challenging agencies to develop robust timetables and to address problems, and has the capacity to do so; Australia’s CUI devotes more time in the upstream reviewing cabinet policy proposals for the quality of implementation analysis; and Queensland’s IU seems more focused on ensuring more complete cabinet proposals (as opposed to closely vetting proposals) and reporting. These emphases get revealed not only in the balance of activities, but also the number and staff capabilities associated with each implementation unit.
|
Hypotheses |
UK – PMDU |
Australia – CUI |
Queensland – IU |
|
1. Meeting government commitments |
Yes – a monitoring system for tracking progress on top policy commitments |
Yes – a monitoring system for tracking progress on top policy commitments. |
Yes – a monitoring system for tracking progress on top policy commitments. |
|
2. Asserting political control over bureaucracy |
Yes, asserting control was an important motivation behind its creation, work, & staffing arrangements. |
Somewhat: its focus is on reviewing and monitoring – it does not problem-solve like UK’s PMDU. |
Not really: designed not to over-complicate the work of departments, yet send a message about priorities. |
|
3. Anticipating policy design challenges |
PMDU focus more on identifying targets and realistic timetables than implementation analysis. |
Implementation analysis in upstream an important role for CUI – reviews all Cabinet policy proposals. |
Hired staff with policy and reporting background; not hired for implementation analysis; focus on better cabinet documents. |
|
4. Navigating implementation challenges |
PMDU involved not only in monitoring but also in negotiating and making adjustments through JAP. |
Mainly provides an early warning system for PM; issues likely addressed by the portfolio secretaries. |
Provides an early warning system; presumably the DPC-PCOs and ministers deal with delivery issues. |
|
5. Addressing political optics |
Not simply optics, but does seem a factor – PM invests considerable time negotiating milestones for priority initiatives. |
No, other ways to secure optics…about injecting better analysis, avoiding surprises, and less about solving delivery problems. |
Does seem more symbolic and IU diverted to fight political fires. However, there is an educative and monitoring roles at play. |
It bears repeating that the goals encapsulated by these hypotheses can be achieved by governments using other capabilities and processes; in other words, there could be central units and processes that are very much concerned about implementation but undertake the work without the ‘implementation’ label. Identifying such functional equivalence does not fall within the scope of this exploratory study.
Having explored the patterns in genesis and modus operandi of implementation units, we can now step back and consider broader questions like: Why entities with these labels and responsibilities emerged at this point in time? What accounts for the different emphases of the units in each jurisdiction? Why have some central agencies not seemed threatened or taken on the responsibility for implementation advising and oversight? Here I venture several different broad speculations in response to these questions. [3]
Governance challenges, results, and responsible government. At the outset of this chapter it was observed that the emergence of this handful of implementation units across jurisdictions was not stimulated by any recent manifesto from the scholarly literature (if anything, it appears to be a triumph of circumstance with a tapping into a general concept, well-established for several decades). And, it seems that relatively little attention has been paid to the literature in designing and carrying out the mandate of the units. A better explanation may emerge from the complexity of governance challenges and the expectation that governments need to identify commitments and demonstrate results. In parliamentary systems first ministers are answerable for the progress of the government in implementing its agenda, even if the responsibility for implementation for specific initiatives rests with ministers, departments, and the associated service delivery agencies. In the face of such complexity, first ministers must demonstrate that their governments are making progress on commitments, and react as required if things go wrong. This pressure only increases with demonstrable failures or implementation gaps, particularly so when first ministers were caught unawares. Implementation units can be seen as entirely pragmatic response to contemporary governance pressures.
The demonstration effect. It may be true that the staff of implementation units have not tapped into the implementation literature (and this may be because the literature does not attempt to speak to central institutional designers and agents), there can be no doubt that they have emulated other governments. In designing the PMDU, Prime Minister Blair emulated the approach taken in previous central initiatives associated with public sector reform in the UK, and, subsequently, both Australia and Queensland quickly adopted variants on the theme, even if not as potent and directive as the British model. The point is that all governments in the OECD countries are under similar governance pressures from Opposition parties and citizens; the emergence of an approach that promises to symbolically and substantively deal with some of those pressures will get examined more closely, and particularly so given the close ties between Australian and British officials.
Governance traditions matter. The PMDU seems more robust and aggressive than the CUI and IU in Australia. One explanation seems interesting, and this involves the ‘style’ of handling public service reform. Modern British prime ministers have developed a tradition of creating strong central units that tap into a mix of internal and external expertise to design and implement major corporate initiatives (consider the Rayner scrutinies, the Financial Management Initiative, and Next Steps). The PMDU reflects this tradition. Creating such a significant central capability would be far less likely in Australia or Canada, for that matter.
Implementation and budget offices. Earlier we noted that results discourse would explain why first ministers might be anxious to demonstrate symbolically and in real terms how their governments have progressed on key commitments. First ministers and their central governments have strong incentives to get out in front of external auditors and the public before problems with implementation and delivery arise. However, this does not explain the disinterest of budget offices and treasury board agencies, which creates the need and room for implementation units. One answer is that these offices are far more focused on meeting financial targets and working with the principles of accrual accounting, to the exclusion of program management – in other words, programs that ‘under-perform’ by not getting enough services out the door to target audiences mean that the programs are within tolerances and do not pressure budgets. An implementation frame leads to different, more managerial questions; concern emerges if deliverables or milestones are not met.
Fragmented service delivery and fighting guerrillas/knaves. Another perspective casts the emergence of implementation units as a response to a failure to effect change in the culture and performance of the organisations actually delivering public services, particularly in the context of significantly fragmented service delivery systems. This perspective is consistent with the second hypothesis, that there are recalcitrant or hard-to-change service delivery bureaucracies, but is more elaborate because it points the finger towards ministers and core departments (see David Richards and Martin Smith, 2005). One way to see this argument is that implementation units are devices employed by first ministers to bolster or force ministers and departments more closely monitor and manage the performance of delivery agents, whether departments, agencies, or third-party providers at other levels of government or in the non-profit or for profit sectors – or to use a phrase from Canada, to ‘make the managers manage’. Aidan Vining suggested that we depict the predictable resistance of service providers as ‘guerrilla warfare’ which requires a coordinated, strategic response and the cache of first ministers to make a dent in the problem. In this view, first ministers establish implementation units as ways to stiffen the resolve and create incentives for ministers and top officials to more closely manage service delivery capabilities. In the case of the UK, the Prime Minister is clearly attempting to circumvent ministers and department on priority issues.
The explanatory power and worth of these suggestions is clearly conditioned by the very small number of cases at hand, but they are intriguing nonetheless. At the very least, the three exploratory cases put some interesting questions on the table, and constitute prisms through which we can view larger forces at play.