Over time, the Howard government shaped a new policy framework — virtually by default. Changing governance requirements, a lack of success in promoting cultural industries and the rising costs of maintaining and operating cultural facilities, the difficulty of reconciling commitments to social inclusion versus cultural diversity, all combined to prompt the government to take (belated) charge of cultural development.
The Howard government resorted to an aggressive gamble on elite cultural organisations and, concurrently, promoted a policy ‘attachment’ approach in which arts and cultural activities would form a part of policy delivery strategies targeting unemployment, health, environmental sustainability and training (Gray 2004, 2006). Effort was also invested in producing cultural statistics (e.g. the Australia Council’s Australians and the Arts, reports by the Cultural Ministers’ Council, and reports on cultural participation by the Australian Bureau of Statistics). Although the Howard government’s three-pronged approach to arts and culture amounted, to a large extent, to an ‘unofficial’ policy, it nevertheless carried significant implications for re-shaping the arts and cultural sector.
From 1998, the government initiated, in an ostensibly ad hoc way, what became the review cycle of major elite cultural forms (performing arts, visual arts and crafts, new media, orchestras, and so on) (Strickland 2004). This approach was engineered by then Minister for Communication, Information Economy and the Arts, Richard Alston, who realised that the major flagship cultural companies ‘were teetering on the verge of financial collapse’ and needed a ‘business’ analysis of their performance and potential. A formal inquiry into Australia’s major performing arts conducted by Helen Nugent and published in 1999 (Securing the Future, also referred to as the Nugent Report) provided a rigorous ‘warts and all’ critique yet, surprisingly, resulted in ‘a $70 million injection’ into the sector by federal and state governments. According to Strickland (2004: 9):
The Howard model for arts funding was set: if arts organisations wanted more money from government, they should forgo warm, fuzzy talk and instead build a business case based on thorough research.
Reviews were subsequently commissioned for the following sectors: visual arts and crafts, symphony orchestras, music education, opera, new media, the small-to-medium sector and dance (see Appendix G). Although the Howard government was perceived to be anti-arts, in fact:
Through its review-driven cultural agenda the Howard government has given the arts greater funding than most governments. Its record for injecting extra funds into the arts is impressive, up there with the Whitlam, Keating, Kennett [Victoria] and Dunstan [South Australia] administrations. (Strickland 2004: 9)
The perception lingered that the Howard government was not favourably disposed towards the arts (Caust 2006; Glow and Johanson 2006) and that, unless a particular sector had secured a review and subsequent special treatment, there was little hope of government largesse for other sub-sectors. Overall, there was no vision for arts and culture – ‘no inspiring blueprint for the role culture could play in fostering a dynamic society’ (Strickland 2004: 9). Instead, the government placed its bets on the ‘Big End’ of town – national cultural organisations that were visible, elite-oriented and represented by effective lobbyists.
Elite nurturing was the outcome of the review cycle with a new emphasis on specialist financial shepherding of selected organisations under the Major Organisational Bodies fund of the Australia Council. In 2000, Australian Business Arts Foundation (AbaF) replaced the Australia Foundation for Culture and Humanities in an attempt to encourage the private sector to support the arts and cultural sector by sponsorship and partnership arrangements. This was an attempt to develop alternate models to government support for the arts (facilitation and architect). While AbaF has received positive coverage, it is still dependent on government support as an agency. Indeed, its budget has grown annually in contrast to many other arts and cultural agencies. Most recipients of AbaF sponsorship awards have gone to the ‘Big End’ of the culture business and, arguably, exacerbated the plight of small and medium arts and cultural organisations. The new style of arts policy that has emerged from this period has been described as ‘a cosy arts-business love match’ (Perkin 2006: 19), a combination of elite nurturing, facilitation and architect, or what I have called elsewhere a ‘neo-patronage’ model of support (Craik 2006; cf. Perkin 2007a,c).
Cultural funding by government has increased throughout the century, especially since the Second World War. This has been the case even in the face of the managerialist and economic rationalist policy formulations of recent governments. However, because of the expanding definition of culture and the expanded role of culture, there is more competition for support and, thus, less is available for particular organisations. Moreover, funding has devolved from federal to state and local governments, especially in certain sub-sectors, such that patterns of support and funding are increasingly a reflection of regional and local priorities rather than national agendas (cf. Schuster 2002; National Centre for Culture and Recreation Statistics 2005; Arts Queensland 2006). The exception is the Major Performing Arts program where selected national cultural organisations are funded under special favourable conditions.