The internal witness survey collected more detailed evidence about the nature of bad treatment and harm experienced by whistleblowers. In particular, in addition to asking about the overall good or bad treatment outlined in the previous section, the survey asked about deliberate bad treatment or harm in the workplace as a result of the respondent having reported or provided information about wrongdoing. Sixty-six per cent of respondents said that they did experience deliberate bad treatment or harm, a proportion that matches the proportion who had earlier responded that they had been treated badly by managers, co-workers or both (Table 5.11). Using the corresponding proportion of those treated badly by managers or co-workers in the employee survey, we can estimate that the overall proportion of whistleblowers who perceive themselves as having experienced a deliberate reprisal is likely to be about 20–25 per cent.

Respondents to the internal witness survey were asked to say what forms this deliberate harm or bad treatment took. The results are presented in Table 5.13. As even a cursory inspection shows, those whistleblowers who do endure reprisals are likely to encounter more than one type of deliberate bad treatment or harm. The average number of different types of reprisals recorded, among those suffering any at all, was 6.7. When reprisals occur, they are likely to take a range of forms. Some reprisals are also more common than others.

Table 5.13 also presents, alongside the reprisal experiences of whistleblowers themselves, the perceptions of reprisals among case-handlers and managers in the same agencies who indicated they had direct experience of cases involving action against whistleblowers. The two groups were asked different questions about reprisals. Whistleblowers were asked which reprisals they had experienced in their own particular cases of reporting wrongdoing, while case-handlers and managers were asked to reflect on all the cases of reprisals of which they had direct experience. Despite these different questions, with very few exceptions (unsafe and humiliating work, financial loss and essential resources withdrawn), the patterns of the most and the least common types of reported reprisals are remarkably consistent across both groups. This is believed to be the first time that data on this subject have been collected from case-handlers and managers, in addition to whistleblowers.

Key differences separate the most and least common types of reprisal. The most common types—threats, intimidation, harassment or torment, undermining of authority, heavier scrutiny of work, ostracism, questioning of motives, unsafe or humiliating work and being made to work with wrongdoers—centre on those that result in the whistleblower’s position at work becoming more psychologically uncomfortable over time. If undertaken deliberately, these types of reprisals can all be achieved more or less surreptitiously and without formal change to the status of the whistleblower. Some of them are also highly subjective, in that while they could be very real in the mind of the whistleblower, the action could be relatively unconscious or unintended to cause harm on the part of co-workers or management. These contrast with the least common reprisals—loss of entitlements, sacking, suspension, demotion, forced probation and assault—which involve more drastic and tangible action against the whistleblower. Precisely because of this tangibility, they are riskier than the most common reprisals. For example, assault leaves physical evidence, while the other five all involve formal changes to the whistleblower’s status that are more difficult to achieve and which leave a paper trail.

^a Percentages in each column total more than 100 because respondents could indicate as many categories of harm as applied to them. The response ‘[S]uffered a new or increased illness’, recorded by 30.6 per cent of all whistleblowers and 48 per cent of case-handlers and managers who had direct experience of reprisals against whistleblowers, has been omitted from the table, since it does not refer directly to a type of action taken against whistleblowers.

^b Column percentages are proportions of the total number of case-handlers and managers who reported direct experiences of whistleblowers alleging or experiencing reprisals. Each percentage refers to the proportion of such case-handlers and managers who believed that the relevant type of reprisal had occurred at least once in the cases with which they had direct experience.

Sources: Internal witness survey: Q53 (n = 141); case-handler and manager surveys: Q38 (n = 225).

These results show that when bad treatment does occur, or is perceived to occur, it is unlikely to involve a single decisive blow such as a sacking or demotion and is more likely to involve a series of smaller blows over time. Further, even though bad treatment is clearly real and all too common for the 20–25 per cent of whistleblowers who experience it, only in very rare cases is the nature of the reprisal such that it could meet the legal thresholds required to prove criminal liability on the part of any individual. Consequently, these data reveal even further questions about whether reliance on criminalisation, prosecution and the like is a well-founded strategy for addressing the bulk of reprisal risks or for trying to deal with most of the reprisals that do occur.

^a Percentages sum to more than 100 because respondents could indicate as many categories as applied to them.

Source: Internal witness survey: Q54 (public interest non-role reporters who experienced deliberate bad treatment or harm, n = 93).

Who takes reprisals against whistleblowers? Table 5.14 sets out the views of the respondents to the internal witness survey. Its basic theme is that reprisals almost always come from the workplace. Managers and co-workers occupy the first five places in Table 5.14 and, in one way or another, they are involved in all but 3 per cent of cases of reprisals. Again, contrary to popular belief, it is managers and not co-workers who are more likely to be responsible for reprisals. According to whistleblowers, two-thirds of cases (65 per cent) involved deliberate harm by one or more levels of management (immediate supervisors, other more senior managers and/or CEOs), with no involvement by co-workers (workers at or below the respondent’s level). One-quarter of cases (25 per cent) involved managers and co-workers, while just one in 14 (7 per cent) involved co-workers and not managers. In about three-quarters of the cases of co-worker reprisals, managers were also involved. One interpretation of this finding is that co-workers need the covert or overt permission of managers before they will themselves engage in reprisals (see Strandmark and Hallberg 2007).

It is worth stressing again that the employee survey suggests that in the clear majority of cases, managers do not harm whistleblowers. At the same time, according to the internal witness survey, in the minority of cases in which whistleblowers do suffer reprisals, managers are very likely to be involved. As elsewhere in this book, our attention is drawn to the crucial role that managers play in the successful or unsuccessful handling of cases of whistleblowing.

This point is underscored in Table 5.15, which shows the relationship between the treatment of whistleblowers by managers and those whistleblowers’ perceptions of the general change in organisations after their reports. The table shows that things are 10 to 17 times more likely to get worse in organisations when managers treat whistleblowers badly than when they treat them well or the same. Things can get better in an organisation when managers treat whistleblowers badly; however, things almost always will get better in an organisation when managers treat whistleblowers well. Once again, the actions and attitudes adopted by managers appear to play a pivotal role in the success or failure of whistleblowing.

Source: Employee survey: Q30, Q33 (n = 557).