The Pepela traders are only interested in the fishermen as suppliers of marine commodities in exchange for credit to fund the search for them. The relationships between fishermen and traders are of a type that Acciaioli (1987: 10) describes as ‘transitional ties of dependence’ rather than ‘traditional ties of patronage’. This type of indebtedness has replaced traditional patron–client relations throughout the maritime societies of eastern Indonesia (Pelras 1996: 332).

In Pepela in 1994 there were four main traders, each with his own network. These men are often called buyers (pembeli) by the fishermen, but the most common term is bos (after the English word ‘boss’). Some of these traders operated in conjunction with other members of the local community (also called bos) who supplied the fishermen with boats, capital and provisions.

The largest and wealthiest trader (Bos A) ^[12] was born in Pepela and was of part-Saudi descent. He worked for a husband-and-wife team based in Hong Kong who provided him with capital to purchase sun-dried fin for export to that destination. Bos A provided interest-free financial capital to fishermen or bought fin from fishermen who were financially independent. He also worked in conjunction with his uncle (Bos B), who operated from his own premises and offered capital and provisions to fishermen on credit with the condition that their product be sold to Bos A. Bos A owned 18 perahu and would lend these to Bajo and Pepela fishermen. It is difficult to know for certain but Bos A probably controlled 40–50 per cent of the shark fin trade in Pepela.

Bos C was of Chinese descent and lived in Ba'a on Roti. Of all the traders, he had the longest established relationship with fishermen in Pepela, being the first local trader to buy marine products from them although he had never lived in the village or directly supplied goods on credit to its residents. Bos A worked for Bos C for a time before he started working with his current Hong Kong partners. Bos C co-operated with another trader (Bos D), who was himself a relative of Bos A and Bos B. Bos D owned six perahu lambo which he would lend to Bajo fishermen, and would also provide supplies and money if needed. But Bos D did not buy shark fin himself; the fishermen indebted to him would sell their fin to Bos C who would forward it to his partner in Ujung Pandang (Makassar).

A Kupang-based Bugis trader (Bos E) started operating in Pepela in 1992, with finance supplied by another trader from Surabaya. His three Bugis collectors would buy provisions in Kupang, transport them to Pepela, supply the fishermen on credit, and purchase catch in return. Another Kupang-based trader provided capital for at least one Mola perahu in 1994 and would buy fin directly from some of the Bajo fishermen who were financially independent of the Pepela traders.

As a result of the good profits from shark fishing in the early 1990s, some of the wealthier residents and boat owners in Pepela purchased more perahu lambo and eventually branched out to become entrepreneurs in their own right. One of these newer entrepreneurs (Bos F) was selling fin to Bos E in Kupang, or sometimes to other traders. He also owned a fleet of 11 perahu lambo which he would lend out, and in 1994 he provisioned a total of 40 Bajo and Pepelan perahu operating out of Pepela. ^[13] Other wealthy Pepela residents were also buying fin from the crew of vessels that they owned and selling it to traders in Pepela or Kupang. Local shop owners were making a profit on the higher price charged to fishermen for goods obtained on credit, and they too would sometimes buy fin and sell it to local or Kupang-based traders.

The prices commanded by fins from different shark species vary in accordance with the quality and quantity of the fin needles used to make shark fin soup. The highest commercial value is attached to white-finned sharks and shark-like rays such as the white-spotted guitarfish (Rhynchobatus djiddensis), both of which are known to the Bajo as kareo nunang or lontar(white shark). Then come the five types of black-finned shark (Carcharhinus spp) know to the Bajo as kareo simburoh, kareo tarang tikkolo, kareo lapis gigi, kareo pote', and kareo angtugan. Least valuable are the tiger sharks (Galeocerdo cuvier) known as kareo mangali) and the hammerhead sharks (Eusphyra blochii and Sphyrna spp) known as kareo bingkoh.

In the traditional grading system, fins are classified either according to the species or the colour of the skin, and then distinguished by their size, dryness, and the type of cut. The best quality fins from one shark are normally sold as a set comprising two pectoral fins, the first dorsal fin and one caudal fin (see Figure 7-2). The second dorsal, ventral and anal fins and the fins from small sharks are not sold as a set but as mixed dried fins (Lai Ka-Keong 1983: 38). The upper lobe of the tail has little or no commercial value. ^[14]

Shark fins are now simply graded by size, colour and type of cut because each exporting country had its own grading practices and species are often hard to identify (Lai Ka-Keong 1983: 38). Most of the black fin sold in Pepela in 1994 had a half moon cut (potong semi), with only a few fishermen attempting the full moon cut (potong full), and only In some instances, the fins from the larger black species were sometimes sold in sets of four (see Plate 7-8). The fins from white species were sold in sets of three and were always crude cut (potong biasa) (see Plate 7-9).

Tables 7-5 and 7-6 show examples of the grading and pricing systems used by traders in Pepela in 1994. The range of prices depended in part on the quality of the fin. There were small variations between traders but competition between them meant that the average price of a given colour, size and cut of fin was relatively stable. However, fishermen might be offered lower prices or might lose a percentage of the total price if their fins were not completely dry.

Table 7-5: An example of grading and prices of black shark fin at Pepela, September 1994 (prices shown are in rupiah per kilogram).

* The term kepel refers to ventral fins, anal fins,and second dorsal fin.

Table 7-6: An example of grading and pricing for white shark fin from two traders in Pepela, 1994 (prices shown are in rupiah per kilogram).

Traders made a profit on the resale value of the fin at each level. For example, the largest black fins (hitam besar) with the most common half moon cut would be purchased from fishermen at Rp 105 000/kg and then sold to another trader — say in Surabaya — for Rp 110 000/kg if the cut remained the same. However, if the first trader re-cut the fin to a full moon, he would sell it to the next trader for a higher price and make a bigger profit. The profit margin must be high enough for traders to cover local tax and transportation costs. A local fisheries officer from the camat’s office in Eahun would visit Pepela daily to collect tax at the rate of Rp 500/kg of shark fin from each trader, but traders would often make false declarations to avoid this tax. From Pepela the shark fin was transported to Kupang and thence by air to Surabaya in Java or Ujung Pandang in Sulawesi at a freight cost of Rp 2500/kg. From there it was either sold to the local domestic Chinese market or exported to Hong Kong, mainland China, Singapore, Taiwan or Korea. It is impossible to know precisely how much shark fin actually passed through Pepela in 1994, but the local fisheries officer reckoned that 29 tonnes had been exported from Pepela in 1993.

To give some idea of the cost of shark fin soup in Indonesia, in April 1995 the manager of the Surya Super Crab restaurant in Ujung Pandang said that he purchased 5 kg of partly processed shark fin from a local trader for Rp 210 000/kg. From that amount he could make approximately 50 bowls of shark fin soup, each of which would sell for Rp 35 000 in his restaurant, which meant a final mark-up of more than 300 per cent over the purchase price. One of the reasons why shark fin soup is so expensive is because of the complex processing required to extract the fin needles. This involves the removal of the skin and any meat attached to the fin and base of the cartilaginous platelets, followed by a process of soaking, washing and bleaching to remove any blood in the cartilaginous base. Before the fins can be cooked they are soaked to make them soft, then bleached and boiled before the base is kneaded by hand to separate the fin needles from the membrane. The needles from one fin may be cooked in their original shape or converted into a fin net before cooking (Lai Ka-Keong 1983: 35–7). The fins and fin needles may be sold in either wet or dry state at different stages in the process.

Hong Kong has long been the main hub of the global trade in shark fin (Rose 1996: 57). In the mid-1990s, retail prices for shark fin in Hong Kong ranged from US$ 40/kg to US$ 564/kg, while a bowl of shark fin soup ranged in price from US$ 4.50 to US$ 90.00 (ibid.: 50). As well as local consumption, a percentage is exported to other overseas Chinese markets from Hong Kong. At that time, more than 80 per cent of shark fins sold in Hong Kong were consumed in local restaurants, and strong ties were established between processors and restaurants to ensure a steady supply of prepared fin. ^[15] The remaining product was re-exported to other Chinese markets or sold through retail outlets in packages or cans.

Bajo departing from either Mola or Pepela usually finance their shark fishing voyages through credit arrangements. Dependence on credit is commonplace in the artisanal fishing communities of Southeast Asia and is ‘closely bound up with the nature of fishing’ (Sather 1997: 132), where ‘the peaks are sharper and the valleys deeper’ (Alexander 1982: 58). The highly variable and fluctuating returns from fishing mean that at certain times of the year income is not sufficient to cover daily household expenses or the costs of education, life cycle rituals, religious feasts, fishing equipment or boat maintenance. Most households dependent on this economic activity do not have any significant cash savings nor do they own the assets required to guarantee a conventional bank loan.

In Mola, credit is generally secured from relatives, from wealthy local residents, or from specialised money lenders based in Wanci. Money lenders either charge interest of 10–15 per cent per month or else charge a higher rate (normally 50 per cent) for a loan without a fixed repayment date. In both cases, the standard form of security is gold jewellery. Another type of credit is the profit-sharing arrangement known as saduh, or sometimes as bagi dua (two parts). In this case, the interest on a loan consists of a share in the proceeds from the sale of the catch that is equivalent to the share normally allotted to each crew member. The agreement normally covers two fishing trips within a single season. There is no security for the money lender, but if the trips are successful, the profit may be substantial.

Many Mola and Mantigola Bajo were attracted to Pepela in the 1990s because of the opportunity to obtain credit from local bosses on better terms than those available in their own villages. In 1994, most of the Mola fishermen would still raised the operating capital needed to cover the cost of food, equipment and supplies for the voyage to Pepela and the first fishing trip before setting out from their home villages. Crew members would also borrow enough money (Rp 50–250 000 each) to cover the household expenditures of their families during their absence. On arrival in Pepela, these fishermen would then obtain extra supplies or equipment, and sometimes cash, from a bos on credit. Some Mola-based crews would initially buy just enough provisions to sail to Pepela, and then obtain the rest of their supplies on credit from a bos, along with cash to send back to their families in Mola. The disadvantage of this strategy was that the traders charged a higher price for goods supplied on credit than the normal shop or market prices, ^[16] but since there was no interest charged on this type of credit, there was a lower risk of higher debts in the long term if the fishing trip were to be unsuccessful, especially when cash loans would cost 10 per cent interest per month. In 1994 a few Bajo managed to finance their own fishing voyages, and since they were independent of the bosses in Pepela, they were able to sell their shark fin to any trader offering the highest price in either Pepela or in Kupang.

The distribution of the earnings or profits from shark fishing is based on the allocation of shares to the providers of capital, the boat owners, and the crew. The share system ‘effectively increases the motivation of the crew by making them partners in the enterprise, and reduces the risk for boat owners by ensuring that they will not have to pay fixed wages if catches are poor’ (Acheson 1981: 278). The Bajo have two systems for dividing the profits from a fishing voyage, which they call the Mola system (bagi Mola) and the Pepela system (bagi Pepela). Both are contemporary versions of systems that have been in use for a long time in the maritime societies of Indonesia. ^[17] The choice of system depends on the way the capital was obtained.

The following examples illustrate the differences between the two systems following the sale of shark fin to a trader in Pepela. The first case study examines the arrangements for the financing of a Mola perahu under the saduh system, while the second details arrangements for a Pepela-based Bajo perahu financed by a local trader. In both cases, the longlines were not new but had been repaired, and the cost of repairs was included in the total expenses. ^[18] The Mola-based perahu had a crew of nine, while the Pepela-based perahu had a crew of seven.^[19]

The nine crew and owner of one Mola-based perahu obtained a total capital of Rp 3 600 000 in Mola under the saduh system. This was calculated as follows: at a rate of Rp 300 000 for one share, the crew of nine (including the captain) held one share each, while the perahu (or its owner) held three shares, thus making a total of 12 shares in all. The capital covered the cost of the voyage from Mola to Pepela and the first shark fishing trip, including the purchase of fishing gear and food supplies, and also the allocation of Rp 150 000 in cash for each of the families of the owner and each crew member. On arrival in Pepela the crew obtained Rp 100 000 worth of extra supplies on credit from a local trader. The fishing trip lasted four weeks and Rp 6 000 000 was made from the sale of shark fin back in Pepela.

The net profit on the sale (Rp 2 300 000) was then divided into shares as follows. The owner of the perahu got three shares, while the captain and crew got one share each. One share was allocated to the owner of the longline gear, which in this case was the crew as a whole. The owner of the two canoes, in this case the captain, was allocated a quarter share for each canoe. And finally, for each of the 12 shares in the original capital, the borrower had to repay the lender one share in the net proceeds. The proceeds were thus divided into 25.5 shares with a value of Rp 90 200 each, and each crew member received a total of Rp 100 200 (then worth about 62 Australian dollars) for six weeks of sailing and fishing.

Since the arrangement under the saduh system was for two fishing trips, the original capital would still attract an equal share of any profits from the second trip. However, provisioning expenses for the second voyage would not be as much as for the first — maybe Rp 4–700 000 altogether. Under this system, the owner and crew would not be free to split the whole profit between themselves unless or until they undertook a third trip.

If the original capital had been obtained from a money lender in Wanci at prevailing interest rates, then each crew member would have ended up with a smaller net income from the first fishing trip. However, the advantage of a cash loan over the saduh system is that the loan would then be paid off and the income obtained from a successful second trip would be much higher.

The crew of a perahu based in Pepela secured their original capital, including provisions and cash to be left for their families, on credit from a local bos. The total value of the debt was Rp 700 000. The longlines belonged to the boat owner and he was responsible for any expenses associated with them. The canoes were rented from the owner for a fixed price. As in the first case, the fishing trip lasted four weeks and the crew obtained Rp 6 000 000 from the sale of shark fin on their return.

Under the Pepela system, the proceeds were divided as follows. One third of the total was taken by the owner of the boat. From the balance of Rp 4 000 000, the bos then collected his Rp 700 000 while the owner collected another Rp 50 000 as rent for his two canoes. The remainder was then divided into eight shares, one for each crew member (including the captain), and one for the owner of the longlines (who was also the owner of the boat). ^[20] This meant that each crewmember received a net income of Rp 406 250 from four weeks at sea. The income was much higher than in the previous example because the amount of capital required at the outset was much lower, and so was the effective rate of interest.

The owner of the boat obtains a significantly greater share of the profits under the Pepela system than under the Mola system (Rp 2 000 000 as against Rp 270 600 or Rp 111 120) because his share is taken out of the gross amount of the sale price while the cost of the voyage is deducted from the shares allocated to the crew. This means that the boat owner always receives a share, even if the voyage makes a net loss. Under the Mola system, the cost and risk of the voyage is shared more equally between the owner and the crew. Under the saduh system, the return to the boat owner on the capital invested in his boat is relatively low compared with the return on other forms of capital. ^[21] The owner receives the same number of shares irrespective of the boat’s seaworthiness or value. A lambo worth Rp 4 000 000 receives the same number of shares as a lambo worth Rp 9 000 000. Likewise, the share allocated to the owner of a longline worth Rp 750 000 is the same as for one valued at Rp 1 500 000. According to Acheson (1981: 278), the effect of this kind of share system, which seems to be a widespread feature of indigenous fishing societies, is that:

Even though the perahu represents a significant financial investment for the Bajo under the Mola share system, its value as a capital asset cannot be depreciated over time due to usage or damage, nor can it be used as collateral for raising investment finance. The perahu participates in the voyage as three persons rather than as capital (Southon 1995: 120). The practical advantages of boat ownership therefore depend on the success of the voyage, and a Mola or Mantigola boat owner has an incentive to increase his returns by participating as a crew member. In 1994 approximately half of the Mola perahu owners participated in the voyage as captains or crew members.

Since no security was required to obtain credit in Pepela, it is unclear why more men and their families had not migrated from Mola to Pepela to take advantage of the credit arrangements there. Some Bajo told me that they preferred their families to remain in Mola so that their children’s schooling was not interrupted. However, it was also apparent that there were fewer opportunities in Pepela for women and children to obtain food for subsistence through fishing and collecting, and there were also difficulties associated with housing and living conditions.

The earnings from shark fishing are variable since there is a ‘large element of unpredictability’ (Sather 1997: 131). One trip may provide good returns while the next may see the crew suffer a loss. Similarly, one boat crew may be successful throughout the entire season while another may not have been able to clear their debts. The success of a shark fishing expedition and the crew’s earnings over a season depend on a number of variables. A boat may be forced to return to Pepela after a few days because of adverse weather conditions or because a crew member has fallen ill. Fishing gear may be lost or fouled on the seabed at some point during the voyage, and the crew must then return to Pepela and make a further investment to repair or replace their equipment. Sails may be torn in bad weather, or the boat may otherwise become unseaworthy. Such occurrences were relatively common during the 1994 season among, even the most skilled of the Bajo fishermen.

Only six Bajo perahu made catches worth more than Rp 10 000 000 on one trip during the 1994 season, and the highest return from one trip was reported to be Rp 20 000 000. For the boat owners these trips were very profitable, especially for those based in Pepela and for Mola perahu on their second trip. Some Mola perahu owners reinvested their profits in repairs to their vessels during the west monsoon. The owner of the Suka Bakti used his profits to finance the haj to Mecca in 1995, while another owner made a special trip to purchase a cow from Buton for an extravagant feast to celebrate a rite of passage for his infant daughter.

The size of the Bajo fleet meant that it was not possible to collect information about the earnings of all the boats over the entire season, but Table 7-7 shows the variation in earnings between a sample of the boats in the fleet. At the end of the season the net earnings for each crew member ranged between Rp 100 000 and Rp 500 000 after 4–5 months of fishing.

Table 7-7: Amount received from sale of shark fin for 11 Bajo perahu, August to December 1994 (prices shown are in rupiah).

* The Madelina II was owned by a Mola Bajo man living in Pepela, and the Suka Bakti II was owned by a Mantigola Bajo living in Pepela. The other two Pepela-based perahu were borrowed by Mola Bajo from their Pepelan owners.

In one case, the crew of the Sumber Jaya who financed their voyage under the saduh system, sold their catch for Rp 7 000 000 after the first trip and received a net income of Rp 100 000 each. After the second trip they sold their catch for Rp 6 083 000 and received a net income of Rp 185 000 each. On the third trip the perahu was forced back to Pepela because of strong winds and the crew decided to return to Mola rather than risk fishing in early December. However, since the perahu had been provided with goods on credit from a trader to the value of Rp 250 000, the crew still had this amount of debt. Since the overall returns for each crew member for the entire season were fairly modest, the captain was obliged to leave his longline gear with the trader as security until the amount could be paid off at a later date.

For some Pepela-based Bajo, moderate returns for the season still enabled them to invest in a new vessel. The captain of the Mekar Indah, who had lived in Pepela for a few years, was successful enough to return to Mola with his family at the end of the season and finance the construction of his own boat. The owner of the Bintang Nusantara purchased a second hand perahu at the end of the season, while the owner of the Usaha Marni purchased a newly built boat in late November. In contrast with these successful fishermen, none of the owners, captains or crew from Mola or Mantigola purchased new perahu or began construction of a new boat at the end of the season.

Some crews made poor catches throughout the season. An unsuccessful trip means that fishermen are placed further in debt and have to borrow more goods on credit for the next trip. They are then under further pressure to obtain a good catch on the following voyage in order to repay these debts. At the end of the season a few perahu had not been successful enough to break even and clear themselves completely of all debts. After three trips for the season the crew of the Purnama had gross earnings of less than Rp 3 000 000, which did not even cover the costs of their voyages. This meant that the owner and crew made a net loss on the season, because each had accumulated an additional debt of Rp 70 000. A crew that has been repeatedly unsuccessful is forced to resume a relationship with their creditors in the following season, and that is how the cycle of indebtedness begins.

If a boat’s owner and crew are in debt to a bos in Pepela and want to return to Mola, then the trader may demand that they leave some form of indemnity behind. This might be their longlines or, in the worst case, the perahu itself. To pay off debts the owner may even be forced to sell the perahu to the trader if credit is refused to cover the following season’s fishing. This is what became of the Mola perahu, the Penasehat Bar, and the Mantigola perahu, the Suka Bakti II. Such cases partly explain the increase in ownership of perahu among the traders in the mid-1990s. After an unsuccessful season, a perahu may also be sold at the end of a season to repay debts to a money lender in Wanci. This is what became of the Karya Satu.

Fishermen deciding to remain in Pepela during the west monsoon may survive for a few months on any profits they made during the season. When this source of income runs out they can obtain cash and basic supplies on credit from a bos. If the men have not made any additional income from fishing by the end of the west monsoon or during the earlier months of the east monsoon, they may owe a considerable debt by the time the main fishing season begins in addition to the costs required to equip a perahu for its next voyage.

The subsistence needs of most Bajo households are normally met by harvesting local marine resources or by other small-scale economic activities undertaken by the female members. The returns from shark fishing and other forms of long distance voyaging provide the means to pay for such things as housing and furniture, fishing equipment, canoes and small boats, religious feasts and ceremonies, or the children’s education. This type of income is also used to pay off prior debts, sustain the family during the west monsoon and periods of bad weather, and purchase the gold that embodies the household savings. However, even if the net earnings from sailing are negligible and therefore make little contribution to the household economy, the subsistence needs of the men who are absent from their villages for months at a time on fishing voyages have at least been covered in the process.

Long-term indebtedness can also arise from the apprehension and forfeiture of a perahu, its catch and equipment. In the case of a Mola-financed perahu apprehended on its first voyage, where an indemnity is placed on the boat by the owner, the debt acquired by the crew could run into millions of rupiah. In 1994, Pepela-based perahu did not carry such indemnity, which was a further incentive for Bajo to borrow boats from Pepela owners.

Between August and December 1994, seven Bajo-crewed perahu were apprehended for suspected illegal fishing in Australian waters. Two of these (Nurjaya and Tunas Baru) were Mola-based perahu, three (Harapan Bersama, Teluk Pepela and Usaha Bersama) were owned by Bajo living in Pepela, and two (Putra Bahari II and Usaha Nelayan) were owned by Pepela traders. All the crews were convicted and only one boat, the Tunas Baru, escaped forfeiture. This case was unusual because the crew had sold the catch from their first voyage for Rp 11 865 000 and still had the cash on board, so they were able to pay a security bond of Rp 3 000 080 (the estimated value of the perahu) and return to Indonesia.

The seven crew of the Nurjaya were apprehended on their second trip after just clearing most of their debts in Mola with Rp 3 000 000 obtained from the sale of their first trip’s catch, but they still had debts amounting to Rp 450,000 from provisioning the vessel with credit from a Pepela boss. It was not clear whether the crew would be required to pay back the indemnity to the owner since the crew had no means to do so in the foreseeable future. In the case of the Putra Bahari II, there was no indemnity for the perahu and the crew had paid the costs of the their second voyage (Rp 800 000) out of the returns from their first one (Rp 3 000 000 in total).

Apprehension nearly always results in some level of additional debt for the crew. As well as the costs of the voyage which have to be repaid, they also have to replace or pay for the fishing equipment which has been confiscated. The biggest loss is faced by the owner of the perahu itself — a substantial capital investment which has provided a livelihood for several families. In addition, the fishermen suffer a loss of earnings while in detention in Australia, and this may be extended by the imposition of jail sentences for repeat offenders in breach of good behaviour bonds. While the men are absent, their families may have to borrow money or supply their basic needs on credit.

A perahu captain or owner may be fearful of being apprehended for a second time, only to be burdened with more debt and the likely prospect of a jail sentence, so may stay well clear of profitable fishing grounds outside the permitted MOU box area. In doing so, however, he has less chance of obtaining a good catch. One Mola perahu owner and captain apprehended in 1992 had a reputation for never being successful and was continually in debt because he was reportedly frightened of fishing too close to the AFZ and MOU borders and being apprehended for a second time. At the end of 1994 he was so deep in debt that he was forced to sell his boat to his boss. On the other hand, the captain of the Sinar Jaya II, who had been apprehended in 1991, said he was not scared to go fishing in the Timor Sea because he would otherwise not earn enough money to support his family.

For a small minority of Bajo captains, the deterrence strategy appears to be effective. A few are discouraged from entering the AFZ and from fishing illegally outside the MOU box. However, even for the minority who are deterred — people who are poor to begin with — they are faced with the prospect of bad fishing and poor returns. This is turn creates a situation where people are unable to extract themselves from the cycle of further debt and poverty. The majority of captains and crew are not deterred, however, and they continue to embark on voyages. The economic pressure is far too great for them to have any trepidation about return forays in the AFZ.

There is little ethnographic evidence that apprehension and forfeiture of vessels has, in fact, deterred continued illegal fishing activity over recent years. The situation is infinitely more complex. The philosophy that ‘removing the boat removes the threat’ does not actually work since there is no shortage of perahu lambo in Pepela or in eastern Indonesia. Most of the captains and crew from Mola and Mantigola apprehended in 1990, 1991 and 1992 were still embarking on shark fishing voyages during the 1994 season. This does not suggest a deterrent result. In fact, it appears that apprehension and forfeiture of vessels may have the opposite effect. Indebtedness as a result of apprehension compels the fishermen to go shark fishing again in an attempt to clear their debts. And since the best fishing grounds are located outside the permitted areas, illegal fishing may be well worth the risk. ^[22] For the bosses of Pepela who own large fleets of lambo, the apprehension of a few boats each year does not act as a deterrent since the possible gains from the remaining boats are more than enough to compensate for the loss.