Boundaries separating nation-states perform various functions: for example, restricting and excluding labourers and diseases, preventing smuggling, collecting taxes and duties and defining citizenship and legal jurisdiction. The modern concept of nation-state boundaries spread virtually worldwide through European colonialism (Boggs 1940: 23–4; Asiwaju 1983: 2–3). Under this notion, borders should be precisely defined, clearly demarcated, jealously guarded, and exclusive. As a result, states see borders as lines separating distinct social systems.

Yet borders worldwide resemble one another as arbitrarily imposed lines of demarcation, often dividing similar areas and people, sometimes into mutually hostile states (Asiwaju 1983: 9–10). The regions along such boundaries are often unique social systems in themselves, defined by the movement of people, goods and ideas across the border and by the forces behind that movement (Martinez 1994; Alvarez 1995). The unity of a people within a boundary zone is thus often greater than that of the borderlanders with the heartland (Boggs 1940: 6). Indeed, ‘cross-border informal linkages … generally operate often to the embarrassment of all modern states everywhere in their inherent concern to keep their borders as clear and visible as possible’ (Asiwaju 1983: 18).

Colonial and state boundaries have imposed different symbols of formal status upon the same ethnic groups, mainly in the form of citizenship. Boundaries were drawn across well-established lines of communication, including: a sense of community based on common traditions; usually very strong kinship ties; shared socio-political institutions; shared resources; and sometimes common political control. Colonisation brought different education systems and different official languages that have often persisted after independence. In many cases, ethnic groups divided by borders were given different names on either side. Yet despite the imposed boundaries and accompanying divisions, partitioned peoples in many Third World situations largely ignore the border in their daily lives (Asiwaju 1985).

Border areas are characterised by a high degree of peripherality, wherein often minority ethnic groups face disadvantage vis-à-vis the élites who control the state and see the borderland from a standpoint of strategic territorial advantage against potentially rival states. Borderlanders are more culturally and economically independent and less willing to adopt the national culture (Rumley and Minghi 1991), leading in some cases to attempts at secession from the state (Martinez 1994). In other cases, cross-border migrations occur, spurred by the desire for sanctuary against taxes, to escape political and economic oppression, or to take advantage of economic opportunities (Asiwaju 1976, 1983, 1985).

Borders ‘invariably separate inequalities’ (Asiwaju 1983: 19), so borderlanders have a casual and enterprising attitude given their need to be resourceful in exploiting changing border conditions. As mentioned above, borderlanders are often politically ambivalent (Asiwaju 1985). They try to manipulate their national identities, with many people acquiring and claiming citizenship in different countries and taking advantage of the rights and privileges of citizenship, but rarely exercising the corresponding duties (Martinez 1994: 20, 313).

Borderlanders also develop interests that may conflict with the state or national interest, fostering a high degree of alienation from the core. Borderlanders may thus find it acceptable to breach laws that they perceive as being at odds with cross-border interaction and thus their own interests, such as in smuggling. Smuggling is often fuelled by cross-border ethnic ties. The borders in many Third World countries are often not patrolled, may be impossible to patrol, are occasionally unmarked, and thus are not a barrier to trade but rather a conduit of people and goods. Indeed, what states regard as smuggling is often everyday economic activity within a group of closely related people (Asiwaju 1976).