This general outline of borderlands describes quite well the historical and contemporary situation along the border separating West Kalimantan and Sarawak. Here, I focus on that part of the border inhabited by the Iban and in the vicinity of the national park (Figure 6.1).

The border between Dutch-held West Borneo and British-controlled Sarawak developed from the 1840s following the establishment of James Brooke’s kingdom in Sarawak. Brooke sought to extend British influence in the western archipelago, and his presence in Sarawak led the Dutch into numerous attempts to establish

and clarify an inter-colonial border (Wadley 2001). An understanding developed between the Dutch and Sarawak governments, that the generally low-lying watershed between the north-flowing and west-flowing rivers formed the inter-colonial boundary. This demarcation, which held for several decades, effectively partitioned a number of ethnic groups inhabiting the area but was not formally set down in a treaty until 1891.

Early on, the Dutch were very concerned about the contacts James Brooke had made with the various rulers along the Kapuas. They knew Brooke was interested in stimulating trade across the frontier but also worried that he might destabilise Dutch control of the area through much lower rates of exchange for essential goods such as salt, and a lucrative trade in firearms and ammunition.^[2] The Dutch observed that the Sarawak ruler was in communication with the various Kapuas rulers regarding matters of trade and disputes with Dayaks, and they worried that the border Dayaks would fall under his influence through the salt trade.^[3]

The frontier between the Batang Lupar River in Sarawak and the extensive Kapuas Lakes area provided fairly easy access from the upper Kapuas to the north coast. In fact, the point where the old trail crosses the watershed (and border) is only 72 m above sea level and, in the early 1850s, the ‘path lay constantly through narrow valleys, in which the ascent was very trifling’ (Pfeiffer 1856: 73). In peacetime, Malay traders settled along this route by which ‘some trade is carried on from Sintang and other places in the interior with Singapore… [In 1839 and prior to Brooke’s arrival] a quantity of fire arms was brought that way from Singapore [to Sintang]’ (Anonymous 1856: 121).

This was one area through which the Dutch suspected Brooke of seeking trade links into the Kapuas.^[4] They regarded the native trade between the Kapuas and the north coast, which had probably existed for centuries, as smuggling. Dutch concern grew when Brooke established an outpost at Nanga Skrang (later Simanggang) on the Batang Lupar River where Dutch ‘subjects’ could buy salt and other goods at far lower prices than through sanctioned Dutch channels (Kielstra 1890: 1483–5).^[5]

These trade concerns were complicated by the existence of the very large, assertive Iban population along the watershed. In 1855, Iban leaders (on the Kapuas side of the frontier) formally pledged their allegiance to the Netherlands Indies Government. They agreed to cease headhunting, to bring all disputes to the government, and stop trading in smuggled goods. The Dutch specifically forbade trade with Sarawak in salt, opium and tobacco. This ‘treaty’ with the Iban began a very troublesome relationship between the Dutch and the Iban, and between the Dutch and Sarawak, over frontier Iban affairs (see Kater 1883; Niclou 1887; Pringle 1970; Wadley 2000, 2001, 2003).

The decades of the 1860s–80s were the most troublesome for both the Sarawak and Dutch governments as they sought to control Iban raiding, migration and farming across the border. Foremost among these problems for the Dutch was what they saw as Sarawak’s failure to respect their territorial sovereignty and control its subjects’ cross-border activities. The Dutch were particularly concerned with defining Iban citizenship, and the Iban themselves continually confounded their efforts, behaving as classic borderlanders and using either side of the border to flee punishment for raiding and to escape increases in taxes (Kater 1883; Wadley 2001).

Even after Iban pacification and a lessening of Dutch–Sarawak rivalry in the early 20th century, the Iban maintained their position and identity as borderlanders. Post-independence conditions have only enhanced this (Kompas Cyber Media Online, 7 August 2000), especially with the consistently much stronger Malaysian economy offering opportunities to people who can easily pass as Malaysian citizens (Wadley 1997).

Indonesian involvement in this area came in 1963 when President Sukarno devised Konfrontasi (Confrontation) with the newly formed Federation of Malaysia, sending troops to the Sarawak–West Kalimantan border in an ostensible attempt to protect the borders from British neo-colonialism and to aid insurgents in Malaysia (Mackie 1974). When Suharto came to power in 1966 and orchestrated the massive purge against communists and suspected communists, Konfrontasi along the border phased into an even heavier military presence aimed at wiping out the communist insurgents who fled to the area to continue their struggle. This campaign lasted into the early 1970s and resulted in a great deal of disruption to the lives of the Iban borderlanders. Not only was there a cramp on cross-border activities such as trade and visiting kin (McKeown 1983), but for Indonesian Iban, political and economic loyalty was often in question (Soemadi 1974; Wadley 1998). This set the stage for subsequent outside resource exploitation under the New Order regime.

From the 1970s, under Suharto’s national development program, the government granted huge timber concessions throughout the archipelago. Following the Basic Forestry Law of 1967, these concessions were laid over and largely ignored local claims to land and forest, as they operated ‘in the national interest’ and therefore superseded local rights. In the West Kalimantan borderlands, these concessions invariably involved Indonesian military connections derived from the earlier anti-insurgency efforts. One concession, that of PT Yamaker, combined economic exploitation with national security concerns, stretching along the border from Tanjung Datu in the west to the upper Leboyan in the east. The company leadership was largely ex-military. In addition to Yamaker in the Iban borderland, there were three other companies, one of which was controlled by local border Iban élites who made powerful allies by helping the military during the insurgency.

During the heyday of concession logging in the 1980s and early 1990s, timber companies operated with broad and state-supported authority over the forests granted to them. In dealing with local communities there was often talk about gaining permission from the locals to log, and of promises of jobs and development, but even locals were generally aware that the companies did not need permission from them if they held permits from the government. ^[6] Company representatives and their contractors paid honoraria to local officials for their cooperation, ^[7] and they made occasional, but half-hearted, gestures to aid affected communities.^[8] In consultation with district adat leaders they also provided compensation to locals for damage to fruit and rubber trees or to forest cemeteries during road building and logging work. But the fines levied were generally 60 per cent less than those levied on locals. ^[9] In addition, locals tended to shun the jobs available because of the low wages offered. In the mid-1990s, the border area was facing the looming prospect of oil palm plantations and further loss of local access to old resources (Wadley et al. 2000). ^[10]

This situation continued until the fall of Suharto in 1998, the ensuing economic crisis (krismon), and the eventual election of a ‘reform’ government. The new government ended some concessions in the border area, including that of PT Yamaker (which was taken over by the government corporation PT Perum Perhutani III). An oil palm concern (laid over part of Yamaker’s concession) escaped the axe, as did the ‘Iban’ concession, which was even granted a 10-year extension because its leaders argued that it was a local concern dedicated to local development (Harwell 2000). Although the government was making moves toward more regional autonomy, even under Suharto, there was de facto autonomy already in the provinces given the shaky hold the new national leaders had on power.