Program evaluation

One weakness of NATSSIS-type of data collected by the ABS is that it is not well suited for program evaluation. To do program evaluation well requires combined administrative and survey data, and the responsibility for putting this type of data together must rest with the relevant program departments. Let me give you some indication of the type of data needed.

The Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (DEWR) has recently provided important administrative evaluation data as part of the Indigenous Employment Policy Evaluation Stage 2. Administrative data like this provides us with a number of important lessons that we cannot learn from ABS data alone. Although the DEWR administrative data in the public arena is only a small fraction of that which is needed, DEWR is, nevertheless, to be congratulated on making some data available.

The first lesson we learn from a consideration of the DEWR data is that administrative data re-emphasises how difficult it will be to develop effective employment programs. The data makes clear that Indigenous job-seekers are extremely poorly qualified. They have very low education levels and very low levels of English competence (see Table 11.2).

Table 11.2. Selected characteristics of the Job Network eligible population, 2002–03

 

Indigenous

Non-Indigenous

 

Per cent of participant in categories

Male

63.3

62.6

Less than Year 10 education

47.7

22.3

English speaking ability less than good

10.6

6.2

English writing ability less than good

28.3

12.7

From a remote or very remote location

33.7

1.7

Source:DEWR (2003: 28)

The second lesson we learn from administrative data is that the juxtaposition of administrative data with the NATSISS and ABS type data helps prevent over-optimistic interpretations of program evaluation results. Consider the following. Over the last five years, the annual growth of mainstream non-CDEP Indigenous employment revealed by ABS census data is of the order of 1000 people per year (row 4, Table 11.3 and Gregory 2005). DEWR, however, states that during a typical year, 38 000 Aborigines are referred to Intensive Assistance (see Table 11.4). This referral rate, as a ratio of the increase in mainstream employment, is of the order of 38 to one, which suggests that any job finding that can be linked to participation in the job network must be largely the replacement of one employed Indigenous person for another. Intensive Assistance seems to add very little to the stock of Indigenous employment.

Table 11.3. Employment and population changes for Indigenous Australians (in 000’s)

 

1991–1996

1996–2001

2001–2006

2006–2011

Population increase

23.5

33.6

40.6

43.0

Employed

11.9

16.9

9.2

8.6

CDEP

7.5

11.8

3.8

2.7

Mainstream non-CDEP

4.4

5.0

5.5

5.8

Mainstream non-CDEP, non-elite

1.0

1.4

N/A

N/A

Sources:1991–1996:Taylor & Hunter (1998), Gregory (own calculation),1996–2011:Hunter, Kinfu & Taylor (2003), Gregory (own calculation)

Table 11.4. Hypothetical estimates of labour market circumstances 16 months after being referred to Intensive Assistance

       

 Commenced

   

20 900

  Employed due to participation

1360

   

  Employed anyway

3200

   

  Total employed

4560

   

  Unemployed

 

16 340

 

 Did not commence

   

17 100

  Employed due to compliance

1910

   

  Employed anyway

2460

   

  Total employed

4370

   

  Unemployed

 

12 730

 

 Totals

     

  Employed

8930

   

  Unemployed

 

29 070

 

Total Referred to Intensive Assistance

   

38 000

       

Source: DEWR (2003: 76)

The third lesson we learn from administrative data is that when individuals are directed towards Intensive Assistance, which is very expensive and designed to help them find employment, many individuals choose not to enter the scheme. For example, of the 38 000 Indigenous people referred to Intensive Assistance each year, just over 50 per cent (20 900) commence the program of Intensive Assistance. Around 17 100 say no thanks and refuse to enter the scheme. Does this mean that Indigenous people are judging that Intensive Assistance is not useful or does it mean that they do not want jobs?

The fourth lesson we learn is that of those who were referred to the scheme, 4560 became employed. Of those who were referred but did not commence the scheme, the increase in employment was approximately the same, 4370. This suggests the Intensive Assistance scheme has a very small impact, and perhaps no impact at all. DEWR, however, went further and suggested that among those who entered the scheme, only 1360 were employed as a result of participation. The other participants who became employed would have found employment without participating in the scheme. This estimate implies that 4 per cent of these who enter Intensive Assistance receive a job because of the scheme. This is a very low rate of success.

Finally, Table 11.4 indicates a nice point to think about. DEWR suggests that the threat of entering Intensive Assistance leads to individuals accepting jobs that they would not otherwise have done. The employment response to this threat suggests an interesting result; namely, that the success rate from the threat of having to participate in Intensive Assistance is greater than the success rate from participating in the scheme. This prompts the thought that from a financial point of view, more emphasis should be placed on threats which are inevitably cheaper than providing training.

To sum up, the administrative data indicate that employment training schemes are relatively ineffective. This pessimistic result is not unique to programs directed toward Indigenous people. If non-Indigenous program evaluations are conducted, they produce similar results. It appears, therefore, that the lack of employment growth among Indigenous people is not easily fixed by policy initiatives that focus on skill development and job-finding skills for adults. Intensive Assistance is the Rolls Royce of job training policy. Government puts a lot of money into the program and yet it seems to pay very low returns. If, as a community, we are to do more in this policy area of developing skills and job-finding ability among the unemployed, we will need to substantially improve these schemes—a task that is, perhaps, too difficult.