Change began with the election in 1996 of the Howard Coalition Government (P. Dodson 1996; Dodson and Pritchard 1998). This occurred just over half-way through the 10-year national reconciliation process led by the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation (CAR), which was expected to lead to a negotiated agreement between Indigenous and other Australians. CAR was due to report to the national parliament in 2000. By then, for a variety of reasons, Australian Government relations with Indigenous Australia were deteriorating (Sanders 2006). From the outset, the Howard Government had been promoting what became known as ‘practical reconciliation’—essentially focusing on Indigenous socioeconomic disadvantage (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner (ATSISJC) 2000, 2001). The Government’s approach was to emphasise that, after many years of self-determination policies and focus on ‘rights’ (including land rights), Indigenous social and economic outcomes remained woefully below the levels of other Australians, and these earlier ideas were now off the agenda^[2]—despite evidence of at least some gains having been made (Altman 2004). The Government was tackling Indigenous disadvantage as its contribution to the reconciliation decade and would continue this focus in response (Commonwealth of Australia 2002). It was thus highly selective in its response to the Council’s recommendations on sustaining the reconciliation process, promoting recognition of Indigenous rights, overcoming disadvantage, and fostering economic independence (CAR 2000). Aboriginal critics directly and implicitly highlighted the false dichotomy implied in the distinction between ‘practical reconciliation’ and rights-based approaches (Behrendt 2001, 2002; P. Dodson 1996; Dodson and Strelein 2001), but their voices were ignored. Nor was the Government concerned about undermining the very foundation of the concept of reconciliation—the expression of collective responsibility for past wrongs (Gaita 2007).

Thus, in the year 2000 the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) initiated a process to collaborate in addressing Indigenous disadvantage. It established nationally agreed priority outcomes and pledged periodic assessment of progress through Overcoming Indigenous Disadvantage reports (Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision (SCRGSP) 2003, 2007). However, it offered no agreed national plan. Instead, COAG established eight ‘whole-of-government’ community trials to test new ways of working. Although progress in these was reportedly slow, in mid 2004 the Australian Government announced a set of ‘new arrangements’ in Indigenous affairs, which appeared to draw from this approach and were to apply nationally (Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination (OIPC) 2005).

The new arrangements involved the abolition of ATSIC, including its network of 35 elected regional councils (ATSISJC 2005b; OIPC 2005; Sanders 2004). Government would no longer work through these representative bodies, but instead would operate in direct partnership with Indigenous communities in a coordinated whole-of-government approach, emphasising Indigenous self-responsibility and mutual obligation (Shergold 2005). Proposed new regional Indigenous consultation arrangements (OIPC 2007) failed to materialise nationally, but the whole-of-government concept was implemented through various new processes or mechanisms, notably the leadership of the Secretaries Group on Indigenous Affairs (Gray and Sanders 2006), a single Indigenous budget, the establishment of Indigenous Coordination Centres (ICCs) in 30 locations around Australia, Shared Responsibility Agreements (SRAs) and Regional Partnership Agreements (RPAs). The idea was to ‘harness the mainstream’ to address Indigenous disadvantage, an idea reminiscent of one that had been tried—and failed—much earlier (Arabena 2005). Altman (2004) described this ‘new’ approach as simply moving Indigenous-specific programs to mainstream departments, which themselves had demonstrated little capacity to meet Indigenous needs.

The key new players established in terms of partnerships with Indigenous communities are the ICCs. Their role is to coordinate ‘Indigenous-specific programs’ and ‘negotiate regional and local agreements’ (OIPC 2005: 15). These centres are meant to be ‘one-stop-shops’ for Indigenous interaction with the Australian Government and, ideally, for other jurisdictions as well. But they have struggled to satisfy Indigenous communities in this regard, with some communities concerned about a lack of ICC activity or access, and others experiencing a proliferation of new departmental relationships, funding applications and reporting processes (ATSISJC 2007a; Gilligan 2006; Gray and Sanders 2006; Hunt and Smith 2006; Jeffries 2006; McCarthy 2006). Obviously, the ‘silo’ behaviour of different departments, which whole-of-government approaches were meant to overcome, was proving difficult to change.

Self-determination gave way to ‘sharing responsibility’. SRAs became the ‘front line’ of the partnership between government and Indigenous communities (Secretaries Group on Indigenous Affairs (SGIA) 2005). These local agreements sit within a broader context of ‘mutual obligation’ policy, as the key policy tools for a new direct conversation with Indigenous communities (Vanstone 2005). There have been many criticisms of SRAs, notably that government is by-passing competent Aboriginal organisations with existing capacity in order to negotiate directly with families and individual communities (ATSISJC 2005a, 2005b; McCausland 2005a, 2005b). With less than 250 negotiated in four years, and many of the easiest to finalise agreed first, SRAs appeared from the outset to be a very cost-inefficient and patchy means of delivering services to Indigenous Australians across the nation, even if some communities were relatively satisfied with them (ATSISJC 2007a).^[3] SRAs obviously contribute to the existing burden of ‘red tape’ (Morgan, Disney and Associates 2006a). More significantly, SRAs suggest that Aboriginal people can have a voice in a limited range of local matters, but remain voiceless and unrepresented on the far more significant backlogs of housing, health, education and other essential services due to them as citizens. The development of RPAs, which appeared by 2007 to be replacing the focus on SRAs, has been much slower, however, with less than a handful negotiated by early 2008 (Australian Government 2008); their responsiveness to Indigenous priorities is already being questioned (ATSISJC 2007b; Shire of Naaanyatjarruku and Ngaanyatjarra Council 2007).