The picture that emerges is one of continued complexity and policy contestation in Indigenous governance. The period during which the case study research was undertaken is one more iteration of the continuing tensions that arise from the false dichotomy of treating Indigenous people as equal citizens or treating them as holders of special Indigenous rights. The pendulum has swung heavily towards treating them as individual citizens to be ‘brought into the mainstream’ and ‘normalised’ to the dominant way of life. In doing so, it is jeopardising deeply-valued Indigenous rights, especially the right of self-determination. As Kerry Arabena recognised:

The Indigenous Community Governance Project’s research has confirmed that on the ground it is self-determination that Indigenous people are still seeking. They may call it ‘self-control’ or ‘independence from government’, but fundamentally they are striving to gain greater control over their lives and to promote the kind of development that they value (Hunt and Smith 2007). In 2003, Dodson and Smith argued that Indigenous people should focus on areas of development over which they had control, and they particularly highlighted governing structures, processes, and institutions and local development strategies (Dodson and Smith 2003). Since that was written, some of those governance structures have been dismantled, have collapsed or are struggling in the face of the dramatic changes of the past four years. This has left a significant vacuum of national Indigenous networking and organisational infrastructure to assert Indigenous rights (ATSISJC 2007a).

In the meantime, local and regional organisations within the Indigenous sector have been experiencing considerable tensions as they try to reflect Indigenous aspirations and expectations to be self-determining, while being dependent for funding on mainstream government departments that are applying increasingly incompatible mainstream principles to their Indigenous ‘clients’. Indigenous community organisations have become the front line in these inevitable tensions, and this generates conflict and pressures on them, which only the most resilient can manage successfully. RCIADIC warned as early as 1991 that when the government funded services through Indigenous organisations they were subjected to ‘minute and suspicious scrutiny’ and that the ‘whole process of delivery of such services was one of further control of their lives, and not one which offers autonomy’ (RCIADIC Vol 4: 20.4.7). If that was true in the previous era, it was more so now. In fact, mainstreaming, as Finlayson (2005) observed, has been accelerating the effects of corporate management policies and competition policy across the board in Indigenous affairs, and this has been most evident in employment programs. Yet Indigenous success stories reflect a different approach, one that has involved government support for Indigenous-driven programs, based on Indigenous values, towards Indigenous-driven goals (Finlayson 2004; Gilligan 2006; Reconciliation Australia 2006).

Furthermore, the experience of the COAG trials demonstrates that for ‘mainstreaming’ and whole-of-government approaches to work, it has to be in partnership with Indigenous communities and their organisations. It requires effective and legitimate governance in Indigenous communities as well as improved governance by governments themselves. If weak or ‘dysfunctional’ Indigenous governance undermined outcomes in the self-determination era, the same problems are likely to frustrate success in whole-of-government mainstreaming as well, particularly as governments are struggling within themselves to make these new approaches work.

The difficulties facing Indigenous community government are further compounded by tensions between the three levels of government, and particularly State and Federal levels, about their respective responsibilities for service provision in remote areas. An African proverb—‘When the elephants fight the grass gets trampled’—sums up the problem. While governments resist each others’ attempts to cost-shift, the gaps have to be picked up by seriously under-resourced Indigenous community bodies. The need for a properly planned and negotiated process to address the historical anomalies and shortfalls is urgent. It is something the COAG, with all the governments at the table, could usefully lead as part of its Overcoming Disadvantage strategy. It is to be hoped that the new Australian Government’s emphasis on COAG addressing duplication and overlap in jurisdictional responsibilities in Indigenous affairs, and working cooperatively to resolve these, may over time improve the situation (COAG 2007).

Across much of remote Australia, the policy of self-determination faltered when State Governments walked away from their responsibilities, local governments were not engaged, and Indigenous policy was left to the Australian Government, which exercised its role largely through the limited powers and resources of ATSIC. Gradually, as public services and the private sector withdrew from remote regions and ATSIC was axed, a vacuum of governance was left. The long-term strategic development of regional Australia is being ignored (Sanderson 2007). Many levels of government failure have been identified, among them, Commonwealth Grants Commission formulae, which fail to address infrastructure backlogs, the fact that funds allocated to States and Territories on the basis of Indigenous disadvantage are not tied to such expenditure, and the dysfunctional funding arrangements for Indigenous communities (Dillon and Westbury 2007; Morgan, Disney and Associates 2006a; Smith 2007a). Some have argued that the situation has reached crisis proportions and that remote Australia is a ‘failed state’ (Westbury and Dillon 2006). But this is not a classic failed state in the sense used in international development. The state certainly has failed to provide services, but it creates enormous complexity at the same time, due to the difficult legal, regulatory and policy environment that it has constructed. The state is both absent and ever-present; and the context it creates is not conducive to Indigenous capacity to resolve the challenges Indigenous communities face. Meanwhile, in the urban areas it is clear that mainstream services remain insufficiently responsive to Indigenous needs, while Indigenous-specific services are being dismantled in some sectors or continue to struggle with inadequate, short-term and unreliable funding in others.

Finally, it seems that ‘welfare’ has to a large degree substituted for development in Indigenous Australia and this has had very negative effects on people’s capacities to be self-determining. Australian governments have used ‘welfare’ while ignoring the need for remote communities to engage in community and economic development, to create the economic base so essential to genuine self-determination. The drip-feed of welfare has maintained them, but not enabled them to develop in ways they may have wished. Indigenous peoples’ idea of CDEP was to try to move in that direction (Whitby 2001), but it was inadequately resourced for the kind of community or economic development necessary. However, Indigenous organisations in the NT pushed again in late 2007 for a greater CDEP focus on community and business development (CDEP Reform 2007). With a welfare economy entrenched, and with very limited support by governments to help communities develop their livelihoods and economic base to date, it is now much harder than it might have been 30 years ago. Nevertheless, it is clear that Indigenous communities are turning their attention to economic development, but using a variety of models and strategies that embrace capitalist entrepreneurialism (Elu 2007; Smith 2006) and hybrid approaches (Altman 2001, 2007b). Those able to operate from self-generated resources, without government funding, are in a stronger position to demonstrate what their ideas of self-determination look like, even in an era of ‘mainstreaming’ (Smith 2006).