The scholarly exploration of the European Union’s evolving citizenship regime takes place within an intellectual territory that is framed largely by debates surrounding globalisation and contemporary cosmopolitan ideology. By the 1990s, globalisation studies developed a set of new conditions for the postmodern re-conceptualisation of citizenship. [2] Cosmopolitanism emerged as a suitable ideological framework to accommodate these new conditions. [3] Academics and European policymakers thus often present the European integration project as a viable forum for the cosmopolitan conceptualisation of postmodern citizenship and further propose that the cosmopolitan framing of European citizenship has the potential to enhance the European Union’s viability, legitimacy and integrative capacity. [4]
The end of modernity: postmodern conditions of citizenship
Scholars concerned with the impact of globalisation have come to a common understanding that the modernist premises of the national state have been eroded. [5] The Westphalian state is no longer the singular unit of political power with absolute sovereignty. There exist quasi-autonomous political entities that nurture embryonic rights regimes and democratic institutions beyond the State. The nation is neither culturally homogenous nor the primary expression of collective identity. National communities are diverse; the individual’s identity is multiple. Therefore, the modernist paradigm of citizenship that has had long symbiotic existence with the national state needs rethinking. The new postmodern conceptualisation needs to express the multiplicity of citizenship as a politico-legal status (post-nationalism), accommodate diverse and multiple identities (multiculturalism) and facilitate the citizens’ political activism on all levels of sovereignty (transnationalism).
In parallel, the heightened post-world-war awareness of the need for ‘global planning, global knowledge and the recognition of a shared future’ [6] restored interest in universal conceptualisations of belonging and institutional expressions of global norms. In the immediate absence of available conceptual frameworks to understand and respond to these challenges, the Kantian ideology of cosmopolitanism was resurrected. The contemporary expressions of cosmopolitanism are noted to represent a logical accommodation of the postmodern challenges to citizenship. Cosmopolitanism is depicted as the expression of a post-national multiculturalist model of political community, which preserves national and also facilitates global, regional and municipal loci of legal status and political membership. [7] It is also transnationalist, in that it promotes an active citizenry that is empowered within a global civil society and enabled to shape the political future and the socio-cultural facet of their communities. [8] The next section provides an abbreviated overview of cosmopolitan philosophy, highlighting critical junctures in its evolution and examining its relevance for the development of postmodern concepts of citizenship.
The Kantian theorem of cosmopolitanism
A common reference point for contemporary cosmopolitanists is the Enlightenment philosophical works of Immanuel Kant. [9] Immanuel Kant’s cosmopolitanist theorem[10] was built around the vision of world peace. Kant proposed that the forming of a global ethical regime would eliminate the possibility of war, without the need to form a world state. The cornerstones of his normative order were the establishment of cosmopolitan law and the republican grooming of states.
Kant outlined a tripartite system of jurisprudence that contained a new type of jurisdiction—cosmopolitan law—in addition to domestic and international law. For Kant, cosmopolitan law was of a fundamentally different type of jurisdiction. The domestic law of a particular state contained rights and duties that regulated the individual citizens’ relationships with fellow citizens as well as the State. International law was to police states only, and thus governed state-to-state relations. Cosmopolitan law was to consist of rights and duties that regulated ‘the relation of individual persons of one state toward the individuals of another, as well as toward another state as a whole’, [11] regardless of national origin or state citizenship.
Individual rights under the umbrella of Kant’s cosmopolitan law also differed from citizenship rights in domestic law. First, the individual’s access to cosmopolitan rights rested on the individual’s natural belonging to humanity, a much wider justification than the individual’s alliance with a particular state. Second, the notion of cosmopolitan rights was also unique in that it attempted to articulate a normative ideal in response to ethical problems that were raised by the organic transformation of the world order and the resulting heightened sense of global interconnectedness. [12] These new conditions called for new legal and institutional frameworks and ultimately made cosmopolitan law ethically desirable and empirically necessary. With the idea of cosmopolitan rights, Kant sought to regulate this new type of relationship between the State and foreigners. Kant’s primary aim was to guarantee the ‘conditions of universal hospitality’ defined as ‘the right of a stranger not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on someone else’s territory’. [13] Thus, for Kant, hospitality was not based on philanthropy but a legal and universal right. [14]
As for the institutionalisation of cosmopolitan law and rights, Kant rejected the idea of a world state. [15] Instead, Kant embraced the modern era’s principle of non-intervention and reinforced the ideal of ‘self-policing individual states’. [16] He proposed the establishment of a cosmopolitan world order centred on the congress of free states, whereby state cooperation was a regulative but not a constitutive principle. Externally, this meant the voluntary federative cooperation of independent states: ‘a united power and law-governed decisions of a united will’. [17] Internally, this referred to the consolidation of the republican and representative democratic traditions of government. [18] Kant reasoned that democratic states did not go to war and therefore the establishment of ‘domestic justice’ [19] was a sufficient precondition for the federal cooperation of states. Once the federative cooperation of the states is facilitated, a cosmopolitan ethical order to guarantee the ‘cosmopolitan condition of general political security’[20] is likely to emerge.
Kant’s cosmopolitan law and world order fundamentally shaped Kant’s notions of cosmopolitan citizenship. First, Kant’s interpretation of the right to universal hospitality was grounded in the natural right to exercise trading activity—that is, in the temporary, sporadic and trade-focused interactions among the foreigners, and the State and its citizens. Only those foreigners who passed through or resided in another state for the specific purpose of trading were entitled to cosmopolitan rights. [21] Second, Kant’s rejection of the need to institutionalise cosmopolitan law beyond the State meant that guarantees for generating, implementing, enforcing and upholding cosmopolitan rights relied primarily on the State’s ethical commitment to cosmopolitan ideals, rather than on the sovereignty of supra and supernational institutions. According to these two conditions, the State’s responsibility towards non-citizens was simply to provide the conditions of hospitality—that is, a limited form of civil protection to enable their economic activity. This further meant that the rights of citizens and of foreigners were to be kept separate. Despite the expression of its global and universal scope, cosmopolitan law was not considered to have the competence to override domestic law and grant foreigners access to civic and political rights associated with state citizenship. In short, Kant’s cosmopolitan citizenship was more an expression of global collective identity than a constitutionalised politico-legal status of universal belonging. [22]
It is evident that Kant’s theorem was grounded in the modernist rather than the postmodernist understanding of citizenship. In the absence of inter and supranational legal and institutional frameworks for citizenship, it falls short of post-nationalism. As the cosmopolitan ethical order is conditioned on the states’ cooperative activity and democratic ability, it is also deficient in terms of transnational citizenry activism. As it is focused on the universal sameness of all, it does not engage with the notion of cultural diversity. Further to this, Kant’s cosmopolitan citizen is also an inconsistent notion. The cosmopolitan ideology and the modern paradigm of citizenship are founded in the liberal principles of individualism, egalitarianism and universalism. As Kant’s cosmopolitan rights are limited in content and in terms of access, it serves only as a fragmented category that fails to fulfil universal and individual equality.
Liberal national and universal cosmopolitanism
In the recent globalised context, cosmopolitan thought has flowed into several core streams, two of which—universalism and liberal nationalism—have preserved a common root in the Kantian traditions. [23] Despite their shared legacy, liberal nationalism and universal cosmopolitanism differ fundamentally. Liberal cosmopolitanism embraces the Kantian limitations on political cosmopolitanism and proposes that normative cosmopolitanism is best expressed and maintained within the national context. As such, liberal nationalism is often mistaken as being anti-cosmopolitanism. However, what liberalists in fact foster is the cosmopolitanist remodelling of the national state so that basic principles of liberalism can be reconciled with multicultural diversity. [24]
The universalist position promotes the expression of global morality in the form of supranational legal systems and political institutions. It is founded on the belief that the ideology of cosmopolitanism and the modern national state-based theory of citizenship differ fundamentally. Universalists also claim that cosmopolitanism is superior, or at least more valid, in the context of the postmodern conditions. As they promote the politico-institutional establishment of the cosmopolitan ideal, the universalist stream is rightly labelled as the ‘radical extension of Kant’s theory of world citizenship’. [25]
The article proceeds with a focus on the universalist stream of cosmopolitan thought, as it is the universalists who are engaged with the European traditions of the cosmopolitan theory of citizenship and the development of the institutional and the ethical frameworks of cosmopolitan citizenship—both of which are already established to some degree in the European Union. Universalists trace a developmental arc of contemporary cosmopolitan thought from a singular to a hybrid and multi-layered expression of sovereignty and identity, and from international rights to European citizenship as the manifestation of the cosmopolitan idea.
The cosmopolitan democracy thesis
A major contribution to the universalist stream is the theory of cosmopolitan democracy, centred on David Held’s idea of global governance. Held argues that the realisation of the cosmopolitan vision, that of lasting world peace and universal equality of individuals, cannot rely on the states’ democratic capacity only. As a result of globalisation, the locus of political power can no longer be assumed to be with the State. Therefore, the State on its own cannot generate the conditions of democracy within its boundaries and then transfer the democratic principle into the international domain. Thus Held argues that, for ‘democratic law to be effective it must be internationalised’. [26]
A regular collaborator with Held, Daniele Archibugi, elaborates on Held’s new democratic condition. Archibugi argues that an international system that is based on democratic principles does not necessarily generate democracy within the constituting states. Therefore, democracy has to function simultaneously on all levels of political authority—domestic, international and global—in order to generate a lasting normative framework in each domain. In short, Archibugi’s vision of the cosmopolitan world order is one of a multi-level system of democratic governance. [27]
Therefore, Held’s and Archibugi’s recreation of Kant’s tripartite jurisprudence exceeds the Kantian global order in many respects. The democratic requirements of domestic law subscribe to the Kantian idea of republican democracy in the State. The international requirement of democracy is no longer purely reliant on the respect for reciprocal sovereignty between states; it rests on two additional criteria: the agreement on commonly shared norms to which states subscribe and the institutionalisation of these principles through the establishment of intergovernmental organisations. [28] Further to this, the global (or cosmopolitan) domain is not restricted to the universal right of ‘hospitality for strangers’ but a more comprehensive, and state-like, package of rights.
Based on this new conditionality for democracy, it is thus clear that the cosmopolitan democracy theory moves away from Kant’s purely ethical to a more constituting and institutionalised world order. For Held and Archibugi, the entrenchment of democratic institutions outside of the boundaries of the State is indeed necessary in order to complement the inadequate democratic capacities of the postmodern state [29] and to monitor the domestic affairs of states. [30] Universalist scholars emphasise that the cosmopolitan argument for the federative development of the global domain is not a call for the establishment of a global federation in the traditional sense. As Held notes, ‘any global legislative institution should be conceived above all as a “framework-setting” institution’, and not a nascent global government of an emergent world state. [31]
Further to this, cosmopolitan democracy also means the active membership of individuals in the global community. [32] Global issues, such as human rights, the environment and poverty, have a universal impact on all individuals, and as such, transcend national and international frameworks of cooperation. If global challenges are to be addressed in line with basic democratic principles, citizens shall have political representation in global affairs. This representation shall be independent and autonomous of the citizens’ politico-legal status in domestic affairs. The citizen of the postmodern and globalised epoch has ‘a twofold role—that of citizens of the state, and that of citizens of the world’. [33] Held and Archibugi argue that this requires the establishment of global bodies that are designed to facilitate the deliberation of individual interests in specific global issues. It further involves the institutionalisation of a universal and global citizenship status, which contains ‘a mandatory core of rights’, such as political rights of representation and participation, civic rights of protection, ‘duties vis-à-vis global institutions’, as well as instruments of accountability and transparency. [34] In short, global citizenship means the transfer of specific elements of national citizenship into the global domain so that specific global issues can be tackled.
On the basis of the previous synopsis, it is important to note that the cosmopolitan democracy thesis expresses itself as a postmodern reinterpretation of Kant’s cosmopolitan philosophy. The focus on the institutional establishment of the cosmopolitan ideal and the emphasis on the multi-level nature of the emerging system of governance indicate that the thesis subscribes to the condition of multiple post-nationalism. The introduction of a (global) cosmopolitan citizenship status to complement national citizenship indicates that the project of cosmopolitan democracy aspires to comply with the de-national and the de-territorial, and consequently with the multiple conditions of citizenship. References to the continuing relevance of national as well as regional and local loci of citizenship in terms of social membership and collective identity in the globalised world mean that the thesis also claims to suit the requirements of multiculturalism. Finally, the expression of cosmopolitan citizenship as the empowerment of a nascent global civil society denotes the transnational ambition of the cosmopolitan democracy project.
Cosmopolitanism and constitutional patriotism
A comprehensive critique of the cosmopolitan democracy thesis is provided by Jürgen Habermas, whose own theorem shares a common foundation in universal ethics and rights. Like Held and Archibugi, Habermas endorses the requirement of supranational democratic institutions and transnational civic activity, and denies the viability of Kant’s self-imposed limitations on political cosmopolitanism. Yet Habermas takes issue with the postmodern deficiencies and the traditional modernist premises of the Heldian model.
First, Habermas rejects the prospect of a world state that he claims underwrites the cosmopolitan democracy thesis. Habermas argues that Held’s and Archibugi’s cosmopolitan vision relies on the reproduction of state-like institutions on a global scale. Therefore its global community-building trajectory has a tendency to shift away from a multi-layered post-national system of governance to a universal state. In particular, Habermas notes that the cosmopolitan democracy thesis explicitly advocates traditional institutions and guarantees of membership. Habermas instead envisions a new cosmopolitan order that is ‘a dynamic picture of interferences and interactions between political processes that persist at national, international, and global levels’. [35] Further, Habermas proposes to introduce a procedural notion of governance, whereby only the conditions of rational and democratic decision making are guaranteed but not a fixed institutional and legislative outcome.
Second, Habermas also maintains that the thesis of cosmopolitan democracy does not employ multiculturalist attributes. It prioritises universalism that is focused on an all-inclusive and a priori sameness at the cost of multicultural particularism. It fails to engage with the notion of the ‘other’ in general and the idea of national political culture in particular. In simple terms, it cannot reconcile universalism and particularism and therefore re-establishes the competitive relationship between the national and cosmopolitan domains of collective belonging.
On this point Habermas stresses the importance of implementing a new community-building logic in the national and the global domains. He argues that the cohesiveness of a national community cannot be guaranteed by fostering an exclusionary ethno-cultural identity. Instead, Habermas pleads for the advancement of a civic form of national identity: ‘constitutional patriotism’. He reasons that rationally chosen commitments to a common set of constitutional principles, fundamental rights and democratic institutions can provide a common normative framework that is culturally neutral and therefore sufficiently inclusive for binding a multicultural society together. [36]
Habermas claims that although constitutional patriotism is posited on neutral and universally shared norms, it does not involve the rejection of particularism per se. Like any other civic form of collective identity, constitutional patriotism is also culturally patterned—it is an expression of ‘universalism sensitive to difference’.[37] Universalism refers to the individuals’ commitment to abstract principles and rights. Particularism is attributed to ‘the context of a historically specific political culture’, [38] which for Habermas is indeed crucial in translating abstract norms into meaningful political actions and institutions for the individual.
Habermas’s third critique regards the democratic credentials of the cosmopolitan democracy thesis. He notes that Held et al. draw on the traditional Kantian belief in a pre-existing global morality that holds all humans together in a global community. This grounding implies that cosmopolitan rights are also understood as predefined and universal, distilled from the notion of global morality. [39] For Habermas, this logic is antithetical to the principles of democracy. Democracy, as Habermas understands it, is the self-defined and self-legislated power of the public. That is, identity, rights and their institutional manifestations are organic and negotiated categories, and not elemental and constructed notions. The cosmopolitan democracy project does not meet this transnational requirement. Rather, it employs conservative notions of republican democracy and democratic legitimacy, relying on the logic of functional (or system) integration from above and avoids the notion of social, informal integration from below. In this sense, Habermas claims, the theory of cosmopolitan democracy subscribes to the traditional logic of community building that underlines the modern national paradigm of citizenship: citizenship rights constitute the single source of collective identity and collective identity is a sufficient source of legitimacy.
In order to overcome the democratic deficiency of the cosmopolitan democracy thesis, Habermas advocates the move away from representative towards a deliberative notion of democracy domestically and globally. The latter entails a more extensive involvement of the people in the political decision-making processes. [40] It involves a ‘self-referential model of citizenship’ [41] under an umbrella of a political order that is ‘created by the people themselves and legitimated by their opinion and will formation’. [42] In particular, deliberative democracy promotes channels of interactive and discourse-based civic activity in addition to the formalised institutional representation and participation of the citizen. [43] It further facilitates a comprehensive notion of public sphere: a dimension of civil society whereby individuals can engage in rational critical discourse about affairs of common political interests. Following from here, Habermas argues that deliberative democracy creates socially constructed collective identity that is constantly reproduced, and generates legitimacy from below. He notes that deliberative practices facilitate epistemic as well as integrative functions. They accumulate knowledge and thus enable reason-based decision making. They internalise decisions and create ownership of agreements. [44]
Habermas’s final criticism of the cosmopolitan democracy thesis refers to its empirical foundations. It is mistaken to base a cosmopolitanist thesis on the developments of the international domain: the evolution of an international human rights regime and the UN system. He insists that ‘any plans for a “cosmopolitan democracy” will have to proceed according to another model’ [45] and posits the European Union as a viable ‘example for a form of democracy beyond the nation-state’. [46] Habermas points out that since Maastricht, the European Union has created and consolidated the status of union citizenship, gradually upgraded the European Parliament’s decision-making power, introduced the deliberative-style convention method in the European Union’s decision-making procedures and launched the constitutionalisation process. These developments, he argues, demonstrate the willingness of the political elites to empower the citizens of Europe in shaping the future direction of the integration project.
Despite this positive outlook, Habermas admits that the European Union is not yet adequately equipped to deliver on this promise. He insists that the integration venture must incorporate the vehicles of constitutional patriotism and deliberative democracy so that the deficiencies of the European Union’s democratic capacity can be mended while the multi-layered nature of the European polity can be maintained. In particular, a common European political culture—shared political values, moral norms and legal rights—is yet to be distilled. The exercise of producing such a common ethical framework can only transcend but not erode national and cultural particularism if it wants to provide a viable and meaningful basis of solidarity for the public. [47] For this, the European Union needs to advance the deliberative capacity of the supranational institutions of democracy, simplify multi-level decision making by deepening the federative aspects of the European Union [48] and establish a common European constitution. [49]
[2] The literature identifies three stages in globalisation studies. First-wave scholars investigated the impact of globalisation on national economies and concluded that a neo-liberal world economy government and homogenous world society were on the rise and the national state was in demise (globality and universalism). The second-wave engaged in the cultural aspects of globalisation and argued against the convergence thesis of the first wave. It advocated a fragmented and multidimensional world view, whereby national communities would be only one of the multiple loci of human organisation (globalism and particularism). The third-wave brings together a multidisciplinary and multidimensional exploration of globalisation, with particular focus on the political manifestation of globalisation. It concludes that globality and globalism represent the dual character of globalisation, in that they simultaneously generate the conditions of universalism and particularism. Beck, Ulrich 2000, What is globalization?, Polity Press, Malden, Mass.; Brodie, Janine 2004, ‘Introduction: globalization and citizenship beyond the national state’, Citizenship Studies, vol. 8, no. 4; Falk, Richard 2000, ‘The decline of citizenship in an era of globalization’, Citizenship Studies, vol. 4, no. 1.
[3] Habermas, Jürgen 1996, ‘The European nation-state—its achievements and its limits. On the past and future of sovereignty and citizenship’, in Gopal Balakrishnan (ed.), Mapping the Nation, Verso, London; Habermas, Jürgen 2003, ‘Making sense of the EU: toward a cosmopolitan Europe’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 14, no. 4; Archibugi, Daniele, Held, David and Kohler, Martin (eds) 1998, Re-Imagining Political Community—Studies in cosmopolitan democracy, Stanford University Press, Stanford; Linklater, Andrew 2002, ‘Cosmopolitan citizenship’, in Engin F. Isin and Brian F. Turner (eds), Handbook of Citizenship Studies, Sage, London; Preuss, Ulrich 1998, ‘Citizenship in the European Union: a paradigm for transnational democracy’, in Archibugi et al., Re-Imagining Political Community; Rumford, Chris 2003, Rethinking the state and polity-building in the European Union: the sociology of globalization and the rise of reflexive government, European Political Communication Working Paper Series, Issue 4/03; Rumford, Chris 2003, ‘European civil society or transnational social space?’, European Journal of Social Theory, vol. 6, no. 1; Weiler, Joseph 1996, ‘European neo-constitutionalism—in search of foundations for the European constitutional order’, in Richard Bellamy and Dario Castiglione (eds), Constitutionalism in Transformation, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford.
[4] Bowden, Brett 2003, ‘The perils of global citizenship’, Citizenship Studies, vol. 7, no. 3.
[5] Chris Rumford expressly concludes: ‘Modernity has come to an end, replaced by the Global Age, a transformation which requires a new conceptual framework.’ See Rumford, Chris 2002, The European Union: A political sociology, Blackwell, Oxford, p. 24. See also Albrow, Martin 1996, The Global Age: State and society beyond modernity, Polity Press, Cambridge; Biswas, Shampa 2002, ‘W(h)ither the nation-state? National and state identity in the face of fragmentation and globalisation’, Global Society, vol. 16, no. 2; Brodie, Janine 2004, ‘Introduction: globalization and citizenship beyond the national state’, Citizenship Studies, vol. 8, no. 4.
[6] Nussbaum, Martha 1994, ‘Patriotism and cosmopolitanism’, Boston Review, vol. 19, no. 5, p. 5.
[7] Habermas, ‘The European nation state—its achievements and its limits’; Koopmans, Ruud and Statham, Paul 2000, ‘Challenging the liberal nation-state? Post-nationalism, multiculturalism, and the collective claims-making of migrants and ethnic minorities in Britain and Germany’, in Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham (eds), Challenging Immigration and Ethnic Relations Politics, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
[8] Conway, Janet 2004, ‘Citizenship in a time of empire: the world social forum as a new public space’, Citizenship Studies, vol. 8, no. 4. See also Dagnino, Evelina 1998, ‘Culture, citizenship and democracy: changing discourses and practices of the Latin American left’, in Sonia E. Alvarez, Evelina Dagnino and Arturo Escobar (eds), Cultures of Politics, Politics of Cultures: Re-visioning Latin American social movements, Westview Press, Boulder, Colo.; Falk, Richard 1994, ‘The making of global citizenship’, in Bart van Steenbergen (ed.), The Condition of Citizenship, Sage, London; Falk, ‘The decline of citizenship in an era of globalization’; Fraser, Nancy 1997, Justice Interruptus: Critical reflections on the ‘postsocialist’ condition, Routledge, New York.
[9] Delanty, Gerard 2006, ‘Nationalism and cosmopolitanism: the paradox of modernity’, in Gerard Delanty and Krishan Kumar (eds), The SAGE Handbook of Nations and Nationalism, Sage, London; Linklater, ‘Cosmopolitan citizenship’.
[10] The depiction of Kant’s cosmopolitan theory in this article relies primarily on Kant’s highly influential 1795 essay, ‘Perpetual peace’. His further works—such as ‘Idea for a universal history with cosmopolitan purpose’, ‘The metaphysics of morals’ and ‘The conflict of faculties’—will also be referenced. See Kant, Immanuel 1970 [1795], ‘Perpetual peace: a philosophical sketch’, in Murray Forsyth, Maurice Keens-Soper and Peter Savigear (eds), The Theory of International Relations: Selected texts from Gentili to Treitschke, Allen & Unwin, London; Kant, Immanuel 1970 [1784], ‘Idea for a universal history with cosmopolitan purpose’, in H Reiss (ed.), Kant’s Political Writings, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; Kant, Immanuel 1991, The Metaphysics of Morals, Translated by Mary J. Gregor, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; Kant, Immanuel 1992, The Conflict of Faculties, Translated by Mary J. Gregor, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln. Further, the article also presents a mainstream reading of Kant’s cosmopolitan vision, which accepts Kant’s self-imposed limitations on political/institutional cosmopolitanism and thus a world state. This orthodox reading is claimed to have grounded modern international relations theory and contemporary streams of cosmopolitan thought. Central to the mainstream reading of Kant’s theory is the original scholarship of Friedrich and Hisley (see Friedrich, Carl Joachim 1948, Inevitable Peace, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.; Hinsley, F. H. 1963, Power and Pursuit of Peace: Theory and practice in the history of relations between states, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge). On non-orthodox reading, see further under Note 17.
[11] Kant’s ‘Doctrine of rights’ (6:34), cited in Muthu, Sankar 2000, ‘Justice and foreigners: Kant’s cosmopolitan rights’, Constellations, vol. 7, no. 1, p. 32. See also Brown, Garrett Wallace 2005, ‘State sovereignty, federation and Kantian cosmopolitanism’, European Journal of International Relations, vol. 11, no. 4; Hutchings, Kimberly 1999, ‘Political theory and cosmopolitan citizenship’, in Kimberly Hutchings and Roland Dannreuther (eds), Cosmopolitan Citizenship, St Martin’s Press, New York.
[12] ‘Perpetual Peace’, p. 107. See also Muthu, ‘Justice and foreigners’.
[13] Ibid., p. 105, emphasis added.
[14] Brown, ‘State sovereignty, federation and Kantian cosmopolitanism’, p. 511. See also Pagden, Anthony 2000, ‘Stoicism, cosmopolitanism, and the legacy of European imperialism’, Constellations, vol. 7, no. 1.
[15] ‘Perpetual Peace’; Brown, ‘State sovereignty, federation and Kantian cosmopolitanism’; Covell, Charles 1998, Kant and the Law of Peace. A study in the philosophy of international law and international relations, Macmillan, London; Donaldson, Thomas 1992, ‘Kant’s global rationalism’, in Terry Nardin and David Mapel (eds), Traditions of International Ethics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; Franck, Thomas M. 1990, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, Oxford University Press, Oxford; Linklater, ‘Cosmopolitan citizenship’; Pagden, ‘Stoicism, cosmopolitanism, and the legacy of European imperialism’.
[16] A term borrowed from Linklater, ‘Cosmopolitan citizenship’, p. 321.
[17] Kant explicitly remarked that ‘this federation does not aim to acquire any power like that of the state, but merely to preserve and secure the freedom of each state itself (‘Idea for a universal history with cosmopolitan purpose’, p. 104; ‘Perpetual peace’, p. 47). According to the mainstream interpretation of Kant’s limited political cosmopolitanism, as presented in this article so far, Kant consolidated the centrality of the national state as the locus of political power and the referent to the political organisation of humanity. Nonetheless, there exists another, non-orthodox reading of Kant’s scholarship. There are a number of scholars who argue that Kant’s cosmopolitan vision is a teleological theorem and ultimately antagonistic to the modern state. The textual inconsistencies and ambiguities indicate that Kant proposed that the federative association of states was indeed a transitional stage towards a world republic. See Bull, Hedley 1977, The Anarchical Society: A study of order in world politics, Columbia University Press, New York; Cavallar, Georg 1999, Kant and the Theory and Practice of International Right, University of Wales Press, Cardiff; Bohman, James and Lutz-Bachmann, Matthias (eds), Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’s cosmopolitan ideal, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.; Wight, Martin 1987, ‘An anatomy of international thought’, Review of International Studies, vol. 13, no. 3.
[18] For Kant, the internal conditions of democracy meant the implementation of four principles: separation of powers; freedom for all members of society; legal equality of citizens; dependence of everyone upon a single common legislation. That is, liberal democracy and representative government are the essential and sufficient mechanisms to generate the internal guarantees of Kant’s cosmopolitan ideal. Further, inherent to Kant’s depiction of republican democracy was the establishment of a social contract (anima pacti orignarii) between the citizen and the State. With this, Kant expected to delegate sovereign power to the people and thus to replace the liberal idea of absolute sovereignty with the republican idea of popular sovereignty. For Kant, the long-term guarantee for the democratic credentials of the State rested on popular sovereignty (see ‘Perpetual peace’). See also Franceschet, Antonio 2002, ‘Popular sovereignty or cosmopolitan democracy? Liberalism, Kant and international reform’, European Journal of International Relations, vol. 6, no. 2.
[19] Brown, ‘State sovereignty, federation and Kantian cosmopolitanism’, p. 503.
[20] ‘Perpetual peace’, p. 210; ‘Idea for a universal history’, p. 49.
[21] Kant wrote that the right to hospitality derived from the ancient and natural right to ‘free access to all for the purpose’ to ‘establish community with all’ (‘Perpetual peace’, pp. 107–8, 106–7).
[22] Kant, Immanuel 2002, Critique of Practical Reason, Translated by Werner S. Pluhar, Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, Ind., p. 321.
[23] Delanty, ‘Nationalism and cosmopolitanism’. Further to universalism and liberal nationalism, Delanty identifies a third stream of the contemporary cosmopolitan scholarship: post-colonialism. The post-colonial stream differs from universalism and liberal nationalism, in that it rejects the modernist legacy of political thought in general and opposes the Euro-centrism and liberal individualistic ideology entailed in the other streams of cosmopolitanism. Post-colonialists argue that the nation and national identity are essentially hybrid categories, in which the national, transnational and global domains are simultaneously implicated. That is, nationalism and cosmopolitanism are neither competing nor separable frameworks for the political and social organisation of humanity. For post-colonialism, see Bhabha, Homi K. (ed.) 2000, ‘Cosmopolitanisms’, Public Culture, vol. 12, no. 3; Bhabha, Homi K. 1990, Nation and Narration, Routledge, London; Appiah, Kwame Anthony 1998, ‘Cosmopolitan patriots’, in Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins (eds), Cosmopolitics: Thinking and feeling beyond the nation, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, Minn.
[24] Miller, David 1999, ‘Bounded citizenship’, in Hutchings and Dannreuther, Cosmopolitan Citizenship; Miller, David 2000, Citizenship and National Identity, Polity Press, Oxford; Walzer, Michael 1994, ‘Spheres of affection. In response to Martha Nussbaum’s patriotism and cosmopolitanism, 1994’, Boston Review, vol. 19, no. 5; Walzer, Michael 1997, On Toleration, Yale University Press, New Haven.
[25] Linklater, ‘Cosmopolitan citizenship’, p. 328.
[26] Held, David 1997, ‘Democracy and globalization’, Global Governance, vol. 3, no. 3, p. 225.
[27] Archibugi, Daniele 1998, ‘Principles of cosmopolitan democracy’, in Archibugi et al., Re-Imagining Political Community, pp. 207–9. See also Archibugi, Daniele 2004, ‘Cosmopolitan democracy and its critics: a review’, European Journal of International Relations, vol. 10, no. 3.
[28] Archibugi, ‘Principles of cosmopolitan democracy’, pp. 210–11.
[29] Held, ‘Democracy and globalization’, p. 263.
[30] Archibugi, Daniele and Held, David (eds), Cosmopolitan Democracy—An agenda for a new world order, Polity Press, Oxford, p. 14.
[31] Held, David 1995, Democracy and the Global Order—From the modern state to cosmopolitan governance, Polity Press, Oxford, p. 274 (emphasis added).
[32] Archibugi, ‘Cosmopolitan democracy and its critics’, p. 456. See also Carter, April 2001, The Political Theory of Global Citizenship, Routledge, London; Dower, Nigel and Williams, John (eds) 2002, Global Citizenship—A critical introduction, Routledge, New York; Heater, David 2002, World Citizenship: Cosmopolitan thinking and its opponents, Continuum, London.
[33] Archibugi, ‘Cosmopolitan democracy and its critics’, p. 456.
[34] Archibugi, ‘Principles of cosmopolitan democracy’, pp. 216–17. See also Dower, Nigel 2000, ‘The idea of global citizenship’, Global Society, vol. 14, no. 4; Held, ‘Democracy and the global order’; Linklater, ‘Cosmopolitan citizenship’.
[35] Habermas, Jürgen 2001, ‘The postnational constellation: political essays’, in Thomas McCarthy(ed.), Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought, Polity Press, Cambridge, p. 110.
[36] Habermas, Jürgen 1994, ‘Struggles for recognition in the democratic constitutional state’, in Amy Guttman (ed.), Multiculturalism: Examining the politics of recognition, Princeton University Press, Jürgen. See also MacCormick, Neil 1999, ‘Does a nation need a state? Reflections on liberal nationalism’, in Edward Moritimer (ed.), People, Nation and State: The meaning of ethnicity and nationalism, I. B. Tauris, London.
[37] Habermas, ‘The postnational constellation’, p. 84.
[38] Habermas, Jürgen 1998, ‘The European nation-state: on the past and future of sovereignty and citizenship’, Public Culture, vol. 10, no. 2, p. 226.
[39] Habermas, ‘The postnational constellation’. See also Fine, Robert and Smith, Will 2003, ‘Jürgen Habermas’ theory cosmopolitanism’, Constellations, vol. 10, no. 4.
[40] Habermas, ‘The postnational constellation’.
[41] Ibid, p. 76 (emphasis added).
[42] Ibid, p. 65. See also Habermas, Jürgen 1995, ‘Citizenship and national identity: some reflections on the future of Europe’, in Ronald Beiner (ed.), Theorizing Citizenship, University of New York Press, Albany.
[43] Habermas, ‘The European nation state—its achievements and its limits’. See also Cohen, Joshua 1989, ‘Deliberation and democratic legitimacy’, in Alan Hamlin and Phillip Pettit(eds), The Good Polity, Blackwell, Oxford; Dryzek, John S. 1990, Discursive Democracy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; Dryzek, John S. 2000, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
[44] Habermas, ‘The postnational constellation’, p. 76.
[45] Habermas, Jürgen 2001, ‘Why Europe needs a constitution’, New Left Review, vol. NLR II, no. 11, p. 109.
[46] Habermas, ‘Making sense of the EU’, p. 94.
[47] Habermas, ‘Citizenship and national identity’.
[48] Habermas, ‘Making sense of the EU’.
[49] Habermas, Jürgen 1999, ‘The European nation-state and the pressures of globalization’, New Left Review, vol. NLR I, no. 235.