The two-pronged policy of the New Order towards Islam in Indonesia was responsible for the decline of the forces of political Islam. The regime repressed “organised Islam” and maintained cooperation with and co-option of Islamic representation that was non-political in nature. It was eager to exclude politicised Muslims because of the threat to the stability of the regime, should they increase their influence in society and in government affairs.^[7] Since Muslim politicians enjoyed “genuine popular support”, they indeed posed potent threats. On the other hand, nominal Muslims accused them of having an agenda to establish an Islamic state and to impose the shariah on those who did not wish to comply with the tenets of Islam.^[8] The heavy-handed policies of the New Order towards political Islam led some Muslims to adopt a more pragmatic approach, avoiding formal political struggle and turning instead to cultural and social activities. Some of them even preferred to join government-sponsored associations and to become outright supporters of the regime.

To cast our eyes further back in time, the fall of Soekarno and the establishment of the New Order in 1966 were welcomed optimistically by former members of Masyumi, which had been banned by Soekarno. In their view, the New Order promised to accommodate the forces of Islam, since they had contributed to the campaign to destroy the Communist Party of Indonesia. Islamic groups, particularly the modernists, hoped that the new regime would open up political opportunities to them. In August 1966, thousands of Muslims attended a public gathering held in Jakarta’s al-Azhar mosque, welcoming the release of political prisoners such as Hamka, Isa Anshary and Burhanuddin Harahap.^[9] Other important figures, such as Syafruddin Prawiranegara, Prawoto Mangkusasmito, Mohamad Roem, Kasman Singodimejo and M. Natsir appeared and gave orations appealing to the government to immediately rehabilitate Masyumi.

The demands of the modernist activists did not gain much attention from the government, however. The military-backed regime affirmed its stance that its ally, the army, would not allow any political groups which had carried out “illegal actions and rebellion” against Pancasila and the Constitution of 1945. The Communists, Darul Islam, Masyumi and the Indonesian Socialist Party (Partai Sosialis Indonesia – PSI) were counted among such dissenting groups.^[10]

In preparing a new Islamic party, some former activists of Masyumi established a Co-ordinating Forum for Muslim Action (Badan Koordinasi Amal Muslimin, BKAM) and, with the support of sixteen other Islamic organizations, proposed a new political party, Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Parmusi). In February 1967 the ruling elite permitted the establishment of Parmusi but rejected the involvement of former Masyumi figures. The establishment of Parmusi was “recompensed” by the appointment of a Parmusi chairman who was chosen by the regime itself. The 1971 general elections then showed an ineffective performance by the party, when it gained only about 5 % of total votes, far below the achievement of the traditionalist party of Nahdlatul Ulama (19%).

The success of the new regime in controlling modernist Muslim activists was followed by repression towards traditionalist groups as well. The NU, which had maintained a good rapprochement with the Old Order regime, had immediately joined forces with the army against the PKI during the tragic bloodshed of 1965. Even though NU was able to cooperate with other parties, including the PKI, under the Guided Democracy of Soekarno, in fact at the grassroots, members of NU were in deep conflict with the Communists. When armed clashes took place, NU was among those who harshly attacked Communist sympathisers. However, events around the 1971 general elections showed political competition between NU and the regime’s party, Golkar, which involved a terrorising of NU, when many NU campaigners were kidnapped and tortured by the supporters of the regime.^[11] NU then shifted its attitude from collaboration to confrontation, a turnabout that caused the government to respond by hardening its stance towards NU and the Muslim community in toto.^[12]

Nonetheless, the political struggle of the old santri had by no means ended. Both old traditionalist and modernist santri still channelled their aspirations through political means, as was indicated by the survival of some Islamic parties, such as NU, Parmusi, PSII and Perti which merged into the United Development party, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) in 1973. Subsequently, in 1984, PPP was compelled to adopt Pancasila as the only basis of political ideology, diminishing its Islamic stance. This was the moment when the regime succeeded in breaking the links between the Muslim parties and their genuine constituents, whilst proponents of formal Islam suffered an inevitable failure under the regime’s suppression.^[13] The success of the New Order regime was proved by its economic and development performance, by which it appeared able to increase national economic growth, regardless of chronic corruption and the abuse of power, and to serve as a strong symbol of political stability and the protection of the people.^[14]

Under these conditions, the shift of the Islamic struggle from political into cultural orientations, focussing on intellectual life or on predication, enabled the two opposed traditionalist and modernist groups to encounter each other and to develop social networks. While the intellectually-oriented group tended to denounce Islamic parties, the predication-oriented group, with its non-partisan strategy, further chose not to vote during the general elections as golput (golongan putih, non voters). Thus it was that the two generations of traditionalists and modernists found themselves inclined to merge. They were able to dissolve the schism between traditionalist and modernist santri through intra-organisational interaction, developing a growing acceptance of the idea that the truth might lie in synthesis rather than in antithesis.^[15]

Despite its policies adverse to politically organised Islam, the New Order regime served to expand the social role of Islam in other ways. The Soeharto government offered considerable support to missionary activities and religious education. Robert W. Hefner has presented a remarkable counter example of the process of Islamisation in his research on the region of Tengger in East Java.^[16] Bambang Pranowo has also illustrated a similar trend in a rising Islamisation in Central Java during the era of political restriction on the santri in general.^[17]

The double-edged policy of the New Order government towards Islam has created many speculations of its motives. Yet it was not a new policy. During the first half of the 20^th century the Dutch colonial government of the East Indies practised precisely the same policy when it made the distinction between Islam as a religion and Islam as politics. The difference is that the Dutch government did not support the growth of Islam among the Indonesian people, while the Soeharto government did indeed cultivate a process of Islamisation.^[18]

The establishment of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, Departemen Agama (Depag) was part of the role of the government to promote Islam.^[19] The function of this ministry was to ensure and preserve practice and belief within the five formal religions recognised in Indonesia. The first pillar of Pancasila, “the Oneness of God”, reflects the implicit responsibility of the state in maintaining the existence of these religions. Even though the Ministry of Religious Affairs was charged to serve the interest of all religions, since Islam is embraced by the majority, it is obvious that the ministry became an affective agency in carrying out the agenda of Islamisation. During the 1950s and the 1960s much attention was given to the organization, education and internal reinforcement of the Muslim community, as well as to the spread of Islam to the non-literate parts of the country. The Christians initially did not like the Ministry and opposed the intervention of the government in their affairs. Hinduism and Buddhism obtained a directorate within the Ministry not long after the late 1950s.^[20]

Few can deny that this ministry has served the interests of the santri at the levels of both government and grassroots.^[21] Nevertheless, B.J. Boland has disagreed about any dominant role of Islam within the Ministry of Religious Affairs and has argued that the department has served as an important medium in resolving problems between Islamic and secular oriented groups in the heated debate over the foundations of the Indonesian state.^[22] The involvement of the government in the area of religious practice among its citizens has contributed to eliminating barriers among the adherents of five legal religions in Indonesia.^[23]

One of the main implementations of state support is to ensure that students in public schools and universities receive religious education from teachers of their own religion. However, the commitment of the government to promote religion in educational institutions was a longstanding one, dating from the 1950s. It was Soekarno who issued the governmental decision Peraturan Pemerintah (Perpu) No. 4/1950, regulating universal instruction in religion through the collaboration of both the Department of National Education and the Department of Religious Affairs.^[24]

President Soeharto confirmed this regulation at a meeting of People’s Consultative Assembly, Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) in 1966. It is stated that religious education is a core subject for all students from primary school to university.^[25] Recently, on 11 June 2003 through debate and rejection from non-Muslim schools, this regulation has been validated by the government as the System of National Education Law (Undang-Undang Sistem Pendidikan National, UU Sisdiknas).^[26] This policy has brought about change in religious trends within schools and universities, so that many students have been able to learn and practise their religion. Along with the facilitation of religious instruction in public schools, religious activities involving both students and teachers have become more apparent. For instance, students may celebrate the high religious days (Hari-Hari Besar Keagamaan) and observe their religious obligations during the course of their studies.

The vital role of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in providing and supervising religious courses has made this ministry an arena of conflict between traditionalist and modernist Muslim groups. Motivated by the need to preserve their specific religious practices, which are based on the jurisprudential schools (al-madhhab), both traditionalists and modernists are in competition to secure the position of Minister of Religious Affairs for one of their own. Holding the position of Minister means securing more influence over thousands of teachers who are responsible for delivering the religious message to students. When, in 1971, NU lost the top leadership of the Ministry of Religion, its influence over religious training in the primary schools gradually diminished. Religious courses of instruction and textbooks published by the Ministry of Religion were perceived by the traditionalist group as substantially promoting non-traditionalist views.^[27]

However, teachers of religion in primary schools have the right to teach Islam in a way that is suited to their students. The teaching of religion in the universities is more open and might well accommodate both traditionalist and modernist views of Islam. Lecturers are not able to impose their own understanding of religious matters, rather it is expected that they maintain a balance and discuss fairly the various understandings of Islam.

Through their religion classes, university students are no longer concerned with sectarian differences and tend to share traditionalist and modernist practices equally. Thus government policy has been responsible for the dilution of traditionalist-modernist antipathies. Students tend to practise Islam in simple ways that are suited to their needs. Since the campuses also provide many extra-curricular Islamic training courses and activities, students are at an increased risk of being diverted from mainstream Islam. They feel no need to visit mosques outside their campus to interact with traditionalist or modernist organizations.^[28]However, since they are not sufficiently trained in traditional and classical Islam, in deriving the laws of Islamic jurisprudence, they tend to be more literal in their understanding of Islam.^[29]

In the 1980s, Islamic student organizations were barred from the campuses. The Islamic Students Association, Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI) which had been very prominent during the 1960s and 1970s, was no longer able to recruit the best students from the prestigious secular campuses.^[30] Leading student association figures became more interested in organisational issues and campus politics in order to control student executives, abandoning their duties of religious training and predication.^[31]

However, it was not only Muslim groups that saw the Minister of Religious Affairs as a crucial post, the regime also found that the ministry was a significant tool of intervention in the daily affairs of Indonesian Muslims. Since the Soeharto regime was able to control the department, its minister could be kept in line with the government’s national policies. Soeharto discarded the influence of Islamic forces, traditionalist or modernist, by appointing the minister from elsewhere - the professional class, or even from the ranks of the armed forces.^[32]

The encounter of Indonesians with global issues and ideas occurred not only in the 1980s, particularly after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, but it had developed centuries ago. Historically, since the late 15th century it was the haramayn, the two holy Arabian cities of Mecca and Medina that were considered to be the hub of the global network of Islam.^[33] Scholars in both cities developed their authority throughout the Muslim world. They not only judged to issues within their region but also gave responses to many questions sent by Muslims from around the world. Contact between Muslims of the Indonesian archipelago and the Middle East had become significant since the late 16^th century and developed intensively in the late 19^th century.^[34] Certain Meccan scholars, for instance, were involved in religious issues arising in Indonesia, including the sending of a decree to topple a woman, Sultanah Kamalat Syah of Aceh of the late of 17^th century, from rule in accordance with the prohibition against a woman leading a kingdom.^[35] The capacity of Indonesian Muslims to accommodate foreign and local elements together resulted in the internalising of the global element into local beliefs. Indonesian Islam was thus distinct in nature in from its Middle Eastern counterpart.^[36]

Since the 1980s, the global influences of Islam on Indonesian Muslims have become more apparent. This “globalised” phenomenon of Indonesian Islam is the result more of a direct imitation of international orientations than a reliance on local traditions. Socio-political events in the Middle East, including religious conflicts and scholarly schisms, have had a large impact upon Indonesian Muslims.

Since the adoption of international ideas is not monopolised by any single figure or source of religious authority, their manifestations in Indonesia have been varied. Middle-East-replicated movements have mushroomed in Indonesia, each developing its own channels of contact and networks with Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, India and Pakistan. The emergence of movements such as the Muslim Brothers (Egypt), the Salafi groups (Saudi Arabia), Hizbut Tahrir (Jordan) and Jemaah Tabligh (Indo- Pakistan) are significant evidence that trans-national movements have seeded their influences in Indonesia.

Thus one of the most salient characteristics of Indonesian Muslims since the 1980s has been their tendency to connect themselves with global issues and movements. This has undermined the authority of local scholars in dealing with religious issues. They were considered to have been co-opted by the governing regime and so not to speak for the interest of the ummah. The younger generation of Indonesian Muslims has been attracted to foreign movements because of their “original” and “authentic” cachet and their image of not having been manipulated by the state.^[37] Jemaah Tarbiyah has adopted new models in carrying out its dakwah activities derived from the Muslim Brothers of Egypt, while other segments of Indonesian Muslims have blatantly imported the modus operandi of Middle Eastern movements into Indonesia, and the Salafi, Hizbut Tahrir and Jemaah Tabligh are examples of trans-national movements at work in Indonesia.

Historically, the more apparent influence of the Middle East-based movements in Indonesia was due to the outreach of Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII) under the leadership of M. Natsir, who personally established good relations with Middle Eastern leaders. Concerned about the expansion of the renewal movement and its secular orientation, DDII sent many students to study in Middle Eastern universities, in order to balance the Ministry of Religious Affairs’ program led by Munawir Syadzali (1983-1993) who preferred to send young scholars to educational institutions in the United States and to Western Europe.^[38] Barred from domestic political participation, Natsir earned a high reputation in Middle-East Muslim countries. He has won credentials recognised by most international Muslim leaders and DDII has benefited from connections with donors in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Pakistan to finance its domestic programs. To some extent, the sponsorship of DDII has meant that hundreds of Indonesian students have obtained international degrees, in turn helping to maintain cadres who are committed to global awareness and to anti-liberal Islam.^[39] Since the 1970s and 1980s, the oil boom has permitted more funds for religious scholarship programs and the number of Indonesian students in Middle-Eastern countries has multiplied.

The era since the 1970s has also witnessed the translation of hundreds of books from Arabic into Indonesian. In Nasir Tamara’s observations of the 1980s Islamic revival, he was amazed at the numbers of Islamic publications and the extent of publishing activity. Most books were not just about ritual obligations but carried a concern for social and political problems as well. For instance, translations of the writings of Sayyid Qutb were very popular.^[40] Subsequently, during the mid-1980s, the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideas was not confined to the medium of translated of books, but direct personal contact between Indonesian students and Middle Eastern mentors was also very likely to occur.^[41]

The homecoming of Middle Eastern graduates and their interactions with the younger Muslim generation in the secular campuses of Indonesia introduced more comprehensive and systematic models of Islamic movements and thought. The Middle Eastern graduates became actively involved in predication, preferring neither to become government employees nor to return to their old Islamic institutions (pesantren) to teach. They remained independent and set up their own Islamic institutions, called ma’had, in urban centres where they became involved in providing informal religious instruction to students in their surrounds. Rahmat Abdullah, a Jemaah Tarbiyah activist, acknowledged the role of one Middle Eastern graduate: