The structural approach of Islamisation tends to use a collective pattern, in which Islamic predication is mediated by the state. The structural change of the state, including its elites and apparatuses, enables its proponents to insist upon the implementation of Islamic teachings in society. Demands for structural change, however, make the government feel threatened, whether change is carried out in a gradual or a revolutionary way. Since the proponents of the structural approach believe that Islam must play a role within the state, they differ in regard to how best to pursue their goals. Does Islam need to be implemented through formal legislation, or it is enough to present it as a moral and inspirational source of the state’s rules and legislation? In other words, as formulated by Dawam Raharjo, “how (are we) to promote Islamic ideas in a religiously democratic system that acknowledges the influence of religion in the state’s affairs?”[81] Within these parameters, most Indonesian Muslim scholars have differed in defining the concept of structural Islamisation and its scope within a context of pluralism.
Historically, Islam has been understood and applied by Indonesians in both its political and cultural aspects in various stages. To struggle for Islam in society and the state, Muslim activists have used both cultural and political expressions, depending on social and political contexts. “Cultural Islam”, as it was initiated by the generation of the 1960s and 1970s, by no means neglected the political consciousness of Muslims. The political aspirations of Indonesian Muslims, however, had to be expressed in terms of temporary and short-term goals by the means of a political party.[82] Against this it must be understood that Indonesian Muslims subscribe to the idea that there can be no ultimate separation between religion and society, though there may be many ways to implement this principle.[83]
Generally speaking, the political experiences of Muslims in the Middle East have taken three types of expression, secular, fundamentalist, and moderate. A secular orientation emphasises the need to completely differentiate the state and religious affairs; in contrast, the fundamentalist approach considers that Islam and the state are inseparable. This position requires its followers to establish an Islamic state. The moderate stance seeks to compromise between secular and fundamentalist goals. In the case of Indonesia, a secular orientation, which promotes the total separation of religion and the state, has been not prominent. Similarly, a fundamentalist orientation, even though gaining momentum, has received little support. In general, Indonesian Muslims hold moderate attitudes towards the status of religion in the state. The main debate has been around the question of whether Indonesia should be ruled according to Islamic law or Islam is to be considered one source of laws and allow other sources of legislation than Islam. The debate has taken place between the group who understands Islam as a political ideology (the legal-formalist position) and those who consider it as merely a moral force in politics (the substantialist). Even though in the 1950s, all Islamic parties demanded the implementation of some aspects of shariah, their aspirations were channelled through democratic ways.
Therefore, the struggle to create an Indonesian Islamic state by particular groups promoting radical action has failed, while any efforts by Muslim activists to control political directions has been crushed by the regime of Soeharto’s New Order. The political expression of Muslims is no longer directed to a struggle for the establishment of an Islamic state, but rather it has given priority, explicitly or implicitly, to “colouring” the existing government with Islam. For the proponents of political Islam, their struggle mainly aims to promote some aspects of Islamic law to be accommodated within the national laws.[84]
Yet, in order to neutralise the influence of the forces of political Islam among Indonesians since the late 1980s, the New Order has also actively supported Islamisation at the structural and societal level. The establishment of the Association of Muslim Intellectuals in Indonesia, Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI) in 1990, led by B.J. Habibie, a close associate and minister of Soeharto, succeeded in placing its cadres in strategic positions, including some ministerial posts, which under the Soeharto regime had been seen as the fruits of new Muslim Middle class groups in the process of social mobilization.[85] However, the phenomenon of ICMI also represents the success of the regime in monopolising power and co-opting Islamic forces in Indonesia. It was an “instrument designed and used by President Soeharto for his own purposes.”[86] At the very least, the role of Muslims within the system during that regime had the effect of increasing the development of Islam at the grassroots level and in some areas of state structure.[87]
Corresponding with the two streams of cultural and political orientation in Indonesian Islam, there are two typologies for explaining Muslim views. The political Islam group calls for a legal and formal approach and the cultural group promotes a substantialist approach. Apart from these two, there is an emerging tendency in political Islam to play a mediating role between formal-legalistic and substantialist strategies, regarded as pragmatic. Here the role of Jemaah Tarbiyah in shaping the political praxis of PKS is the phenomenon to be addressed.
The legal formalist group views Islam not merely as a religion that consists of ritual and worship and a source of ideology; it is the main ideology. For this group, the establishment of a political party based on Islamic ideology is important. The group struggles for the recognition of Islamic law and tries to safeguard the implementation of shariah as the all-embracing way of life through the organs of the state.
Two common ways to promote the legal formalist strategy are channelled either through the establishment of an Islamic state or through struggle within the political system. The former demands revolutionary change and may result in radical changes in the existing regime that are not based on the Islamic principles. However Islamic groups are supposed by radical groups to comply with the people’s expectations and lead to revolution or contra- state movements.[88] This approach requires that Islam must be politicised.[89] In the case of Indonesia, the regime has been quick to handle such Islamic state-aimed movements harshly. As well, the obstacles in creating an Islamic state through revolution and confrontation have come not only from the ruling system but predominantly from Indonesian Muslims themselves.
A political approach that focuses on struggle through the establishment of a legal political party, even though it is not free from government intrusion, at least provides the possibility of achieving its goals. The hostility of the regime towards organised Islam during the New Order period contributed to reducing the survival of Islamic parties in the long term. The only Islamic party that might have survived at that time was forced to follow the regime’s interests. The supporters of Islamic political Islam found themselves not only increasingly oppressed by the regime but they also increasingly isolated from the Indonesian people. However, the situation changed after the fall of the New Order in 1998, resulting in the emergence of a remarkable number of new Islamic parties. This political party approach believes that Islam is a practical religion, offering guidance in political, social, economic and international affairs.[90] In order to promote the ideas of Islam, politics indeed needs to be “spiritualised.”[91]
It seems that current Islamic parties in Indonesia are quite aware of the social, political, and cultural dynamics of their country. Parties promote most Islamic aspirations in modest and moderate ways in order to gain public support. They understand well that political change in Indonesia happens only through the accommodation of political groups and the majority support of the Indonesian people. Any effort to impose an Islamic orientation without considering social and political contexts not only will fail but also will surely meet with great resistance from the people. This has been proved by the fact that Islamic parties that devoted to the formalisation of shariah in Indonesia performed poorly during the 1999 and 2004 general elections.
The substantialist group, on the other hand, supports secularism, believing that Islam is not an ideology. Any effort to make Islam a political ideology will result in the relegation of Islam to the sidelines and neutralise specific values of the religion itself. An ideology that results from human thought and truth is subject to the contexts of time and space, whilst Islam as a divinely revealed religion is far from human limitation.[92] For this group, the establishment of an Islamic party is not necessary, because in political matters, they believe Muslims may derive various ideologies from many sources, including Islam.
Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurahman Wahid, and many proponents of cultural Islam are the champions of the substantialist movement. Rather than trying to implement Islamic laws that are derived from certain religious traditions, they prefer to formulate the substance of Islamic teachings and laws into general principles. For instance, Madjid asserted that Islamic ideals are indeed in line with humanity in general. Islam provides the values of inclusiveness, pluralism, and tolerance.[93] Religion, in its original message, refrains from seeking to force or impose an exclusive political and social system on its adherents, which opens up for discrimination against others. Another prominent figure from this group is Dawam Rahardjo. According to Rahardjo, instead of promoting a legal formal approach, Muslims should uphold the values and the essence of Islamic teachings on liberation and justice. These two principles are the key to a true understanding of the message of Islam, and the Indonesian political system and law should reflect these principles.[94]
Abdurahman Wahid advocates the idea of substance and essence rather than symbols and formalisation by instituting the “de-confessionalisation” of Islam from Indonesian political discourse. According to him, Muslims should not demand an Islamic state because it would be impossible for one to exist. It opens up the possibility of further violation of non-Muslims’ human rights because it would affect the status of non-Muslims and regard them as second-class citizens.[95] The discourse of “de-confession” promoted by Wahid does not aim to support the establishment of a totally secular state in Indonesia, but rather it is his strategy to accommodate Indonesian Islam within the context of pluralism, even though Islam is the majority religion of Indonesian citizens.
The mainstream discourse on Islam and state relations in Indonesia has never gone beyond the boundaries of a moderate stance. The proponents of liberal Islam, according to some Muslims in Indonesia, have gone far beyond Islam in promoting their substantialist ideas. The leading Liberal Islamic Network, Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL) does not really represent the face of secularism. This is because the major role of Islam in politics and governmental affairs can still be accommodated, without following a formal legalist direction. Ulil Abshar Abdalla is the chair of JIL. He is known to be a supporter of secular and liberal ideas. He recognises the historical fact that Islam as lived out by the Prophet Muhammad contained a large measure of political experience and practice. However, Abdallah does not agree that Indonesian Muslims should follow totally the political practices of the Prophet and his companions. What is needed is a new understanding of the political example of the Prophet so that this can then be applied to Indonesian realities and circumstances.[96]
In short, while JIL members strongly opposes the idea of imposing an organic relationship on Islam and the state, they still tolerate a degree of religious influence within the state. They insist, too, that all religions, not just Islam, should be treated equally before the law.[97] Based on the experiences described above, Jemaah Tarbiyah realised that to participate in Indonesian politics it needed to develop a pragmatic approach.
It appears that the phenomenon of Jemaah Tarbiyah and its political party, PKS, represents a kind of synthesis between legal formalist and substantialist inclinations. The political expression of PKS has shown a more pragmatic approach in which it has tried to steer a course between the demand for the formal acknowledgment of Islam and the substantialist issue. In fact, Jemaah Tarbiyah, with its revivalist experience in its role as a religious movement has transformed itself into a political party which is very much aware of the need to use political vehicles in a way which is likely to allow compromise with the existing system.
In general, the establishment of a political party became an urgent decision for Jemaah Tarbiyah in order to Islamise the national structure. However, by forming a political party, Jemaah Tarbiyah, which had previously organised its activities in covert ways to avoid the regime’s oppression, was transformed into a legal institution. In 1998, during the early days of its establishment, the Justice Party (PK) functioned to carry out its mission as a “vehicle” to interact with society and the state in legal ways.[98] The first priority for Jemaah Tarbiyah activists after establishing the party was to formulate the relationship between the movement and party.
Even though in the early stages of its establishment, not all members of Jemaah Tarbiyah had chosen to channel their activities into a political party, some of them preferring to establish non-political organizations instead, all members finally accepted the decision after the majority of activists decided to form a political party through an internal referendum in 1998. Like it or not, they have had to follow the result of consultation and referendum among the core cadres of Jemaah Tarbiyah. Furthermore, the obligation for members to support the establishment of a political party has strengthened the principal tenet of the movement that says “al-jama’ah hiya al-hizb wa al-hizb huwa al-jama’ah”, which means “the movement is the party and the party is the movement.” This tenet emphasizes the unity of religious and political association in which there is no distinction between the party and movement.[99] The term jemaah (Ar. al-jama’ah, movement) is used when a religious movement is unlikely to carry out its mission in legal ways because of the political repression of the regime. In addition, the term hizb (Ar. al-hizb, political party) is used when the regime has lifted all political restrictions to allow all segments of society, including religious movements, to promote their ideas in legal and structural ways.[100]
At this stage, Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Justice Party are united as one institution, each synonymous of the other. Before the setting up of the party, individuals who interacted within the networks of Jemaah Tarbiyah were responsible for all recruitment and training activities. Thus, after the establishment of PK, all members of Jemaah Tarbiyah automatically became members of PK and all religious training and activities were taken over by PK, now PKS.[101] The leaders of Jemaah Tarbiyah were accommodated in an institution of the party called Majelis Syura (the Consultative Board) and all members of Jemaah Tarbiyah must vote for PK.[102]
The concept of sirriyyah al-tanzim wa alamiyyah al-da’wah, meaning “the structural of organization is secret and the predication is open” was only valid before the establishment of a formal political party.[103] Most members of Jemaah Tarbiyah believed that during the repressive era of the regime, keeping the structural organization of the movement and its coordinators were unavoidable, but when the regime promoted openness and freedom of expression, the secret nature of the movement was no longer necessary. The formal organization of PKS has been considered the formal form of Jemaah Tarbiyah movement itself.[104] However, nowadays the term “Jemaah Tarbiyah” is still used by Indonesian Muslims to refer activists of PKS.
There is also a group of Jemaah Tarbiyah that has not agreed about the total transformation of the movement into a political party. They have preferred to consider the party as no more than the political wing of Jemaah Tarbiyah.[105] However, the opinion of this group is peripheral since most members of Jemaah Tarbiyah have accepted the existence of the political party as a manifestation of the movement. For those who had not admitted the existence of political party, were excluded from Jemaah Tarbiyah memberships.
So the establishment of the political party in 1998 was a momentous event for Jemaah Tarbiyah. There was broader political change in that year, and Jemaah Tarbiyah was able to benefit from the new situation and to form itself into an open organization. For years involved in secret activities, it finally found the momentum to appear as a legal political party. The PK then transformed itself into PKS, and was immediately promoted to represent the mission of Jemaah Tarbiyah in developing a strong social capital and a basis for supporting the political ideas of the movement.[106]
However, besides its pragmatic attitude in politics in promoting the agenda of Islamisation, PKS still envisions promoting Islamic ideas in Indonesia. It has faced obstacles in its involvement in political activity. Yet the solid and loyal cadres, who are the result of an intensive individual process of Islamisation through regular tarbiyah training, have enabled the movement to develop the party. Conflict and friction within the party so far has been easily resolved, since it is strongly supported by core activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah who have no vested interests in conflict.
However, since PKS has become a political party of considerable size, accommodating some non-Jemaah Tarbiyah cadres as well, dispute is likely to occur. So, to what extent is the party able to maintain its religious aspirations and make compromises with political realities and challenges in Indonesia? Dilemma often occurs between accommodating the militant cadres’ demands and those of pragmatic political players. This conflict of interests among PKS members has manifested itself in decisions that to some extent have showed inconsistency. The following discussion will show how doctrines of Jemaah Tarbiyah have provided guidelines for its cadres involved on the political stage in Indonesia.
Many observers and scholars of Indonesian politics have wondered about the attitude of the new party towards the existing system. The question is often raised in academic debates about the phenomena of Islamic activism in politics, “are Islamists ideological or pragmatic?”[107] However, as is common in political games, the involvement of religious movements in political activities by integrating with the existing political system will usually entail a degree of political compromise.[108] The experience of PKS offers many examples of how the party has diluted its ideology to conform to political realities. However, while there are central principles that serve to guide activists, the conflict between idealism and pragmatism remains widely discussed in Indonesian politics.
The principle of “to interact but not to dilute” (yakhtalituna walakinna yatamayyazun) has encouraged activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah to socialise with others beyond the movement.[109] This principle has no clear-cut direction other than to advise the cadres to maintain their Islamic distinctions and not be contaminated by existing corrupt practices. The challenge to be involved in social and political affairs was prescribed by the Prophet Muhammad in his saying: “the one who interacts with others and is patient is better than the one who does not interact with people and shows his intolerance.”[110] The risks of being co-opted by the system are accepted by Islamists, and they still believe that neglecting political activities is much worse.[111]
The flexibility of PKS in conforming to the ideology of the social and political realities of Indonesia is based on the consideration that involvement within politics should not trespass the limits of Islamic teachings or shariah but it also should not strictly restrain the political creativities of activists.[112] In elaborating this concept, a member of the legislation of PKS, Zulkieflimansyah, told a story that gives a lesson in keeping the balance between holding the ideology and compromising with political realities.
A knowledge seeker came to a grand teacher asking him to teach him wisdom. The teacher taught him nothing but asked him to look around his temple while he held a lamp. The only thing that he remembered from his teacher was not to let the lamp go out. With care he kept it on and went around the temple. He then went to his teacher saying that he had finished his job and gave the lighted lamp back to him. Immediately his teacher asked his opinion about the library in the temple. The wisdom seeker was surprised because he had not even looked at the library, so busy was he with keeping the lamp alive. Finally, he repeated his job and focussed on observing the details of the library and all the other places within the temple. He proudly went back to his teacher informing him of his observations. The grand teacher asked, “Where is my lamp?” The poor student was shocked because he had left it somewhere while he was busy observing the building.[113]
The pragmatic inclination of the party is also supported by the application of principles of Islamic jurisprudence and a strong encouragement to practice ijtihad in responding to issues that are not clearly prescribed by the Qur’an and the Hadith. Among these famous principles are the concepts of maslahat (Ar. al-maslahah, the common good), akhaffud durarain (Ar. akhaf al-durrarayn, choosing the lesser of two evils) and ma la yudraku kulluh laa yutraku kulluh (something that cannot be wholly attain does not mean it can be left out totally). These principles have made a great contribution towards the exercise of political pragmatism, as in the case of NU, which has used just such jurisprudential principles to justify its political decisions.[114] The following are some precepts adopted by PKS in justifying its political decisions:[115]
First, in order to decide among favourable options, Jemaah Tabiyah activists must consider these formulas (1) giving priority to something definite rather than something uncertain, (2) giving priority to something that has great benefit rather than small, (3) giving priority to communal interests rather than to the individual, (4) giving priority to permanent benefit rather than temporary, (5) giving priority to essential and fundamental issues rather than the superficial and symbolic and (6) giving priority to something that affects the future rather than the present.
Second, in order to choose among harmful consequences, the precepts are (1) avoiding further harm, (2) eradicating all harmful actions (3) not using destructive means to avoid harmful things, (4) choosing something that is less harmful and (5) choosing something harmful that affects particular interests rather than the general good.
Lastly, in order to choose among mixed favourable and harmful conditions, the precepts are as follows (1) giving priority to prevent destruction rather than taking benefit, (2) small destruction is tolerable in order to gain a large benefit, (3) temporary destruction is acceptable in order to gain continuous benefit and (4) giving priority to assured benefit, regardless of uncertain negative impacts.
These jurisprudential precepts are often applied by the party to justify its political decisions that to some extent have no consistency with its main doctrinal ideas. For instance, the case of appointing a woman as a president is a problematic issue for many Muslims. During the Indonesian presidential elections of 1999, the Justice Party had no alternative but to support Abdurahman Wahid for president. Even though most figures of the Justice Party disagreed with Wahid’s religious ideas, the party supported Wahid instead of Megawati in order to minimise further harmful conditions for Muslims. Wahid was the candidate of the Central Axis (Poros Tengah) supported by Muslim groups. In addition, doctrinal issues related to the prohibition on a woman becoming a president became a decisive consideration. The Justice Party itself still held the opinion that a president must be man.[116]
However, after one and a half years of enjoying the position of president, Abdurahman Wahid was forced to leave, due to an impeachment process by the Peoples Consultative Assembly (MPR). The Justice Party and its cadres were among the protesters who urged Wahid to step down. Nonetheless, after Megawati replaced Wahid, the Justice Party gave support to her and downplayed its opposition towards a woman president.[117] Jurisprudential precepts and political considerations were used to justify this pragmatic decision. Supporting Megawati was less harmful than maintaining Wahid in power, which might cause further damage for Muslims. Indeed, not all constituents have agreed on this issue, asking responsibility for those who elected her. As was stated in Syariahonline.com, a website run by activists of PKS:
Any decision to propose a woman as a president must have risks and consequences. The appointment of Megawati as the Indonesian president, intentionally or accidentally, would carry consequences for those who elected her.[118]
In short, the nature of Indonesian politics has necessitated that PKS follows a realistic, pragmatic approach to deal with all issues. This is because both radical and secular inclinations in promoting Islam in Indonesia would not find favour with the Indonesian people. Down-to-earth approaches become an unavoidable option in order for political parties to survive. In its religious activities Jemaah Tarbiyah has shown its accommodative ways in promoting its ideas. In addition, the history of Jemaah Tarbiyah in responding the New Order regime’s oppression also has indicated its well-prepared strategy of avoiding conflict and confrontation with the regime, while keeping the spirit of reform, instead of revolution and confrontation. The following chapter will give a detailed analysis of how Jemaah Tarbiyah was able to flourish within a hostile environment of the New Order period.
[81] See Dawam Raharjo, Islam dan Transformasi Budaya (Yogyakarta: PT Dana Bhakti Prima Yasa, 2002), 200
[82] Syafi’i Anwar, Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam Indonesia: Sebuah Kajian Politik Tentang Cendekiawan Muslim Order Baru (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1995), 136.
[83] Ibid.
[84] B.J. Boland, The Struggle for Islam in Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), 116-118.
[85] Taufiq Abdullah, “The Formation of a New Paradigm: A Sketch on Contemporary Islamic Discourse” in Toward New Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesia Islamic Thought (Tempe: Arizona State Univesity, 1996), 56.
[86] William Liddle, “The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation,” The Journal of Asian Studies 55 no. 3 (August 1996), 615.
[87] Robert W. Hefner, “Islamizing Java? Religion and Politics in Rural East Java,” Journal of Asian Studies 46 no. 3 (August 1987), 533-554.
[88] James P. Castori, ed., Introduction to Islam in the Political Process (London: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 5.
[89] Ibid.
[90] Ibid., 3-4
[91] Ibid.
[92] Nurcholish Madjid, “Cita-Cita Politik Kita”, in Aspirasi Umat Islam di Indonesia (Jakarta:Leppenas, 1983), 4.
[93] Ibid.
[94] Dawam Rahardjo, “Umat Islam dan Pembaharuan Teologi” in Aspirasi Umat Islam, 118.
[95] Mark R. Woodward, “Conversation with Abdurahman Wahid,” in Toward New Paradigm, 147.
[96] Ulil Abshar Abdallah, “Muhammad Nabi dan Politikus”, Media Indonesia, 04 May 2004.
[97] Ibid.
[98] See Mahfudz Sidiq, Dakwah & Tarbiyah di Era Jahriyah Jamahiriyah (Jakarta: Pustaka Tarbiatuna, 2002), 15.
[99] See Syamsul Balda, Abu Ridha, and Untung Wahono, Politik Da’wah Partai Keadilan, (Jakarta:DPP Partai Keadilan, 2000), 57.
[100] Ibid.
[101] Interview with Ahmad Shidik, Padang, 19 June 2003.
[102] Ibid.
[103] Mahfudz Sidiq, KAMMI dan Pergulatan Reformasi: Kiprah Politik Aktifis Dakwah Kampus dalam Perjuangan Demokratisasi di Tengah Gelombang Krisis Nasional Multidimensi (Solo:Intermedia, 2003), 84.
[104] Interview with Rafqinal, Padang, 24 June 2003.
[105] See an article entitled “Jamaah Partai, Partai Jamaah,” pkswatch.blogspot.com, 26 October 2005.
[106] Ibid.
[107] See Martin Kramer, ed., The Islamism Debate (Ramat Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1997), 51-85.
[108] A study of the failure of political Islam by Olivier Roy is a good account of how political parties have mainly been co-opted by the system and diluted of Islamic aspirations. See Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, trans. Carol Volk (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1994).
[109] Tandjung, Tarbiyah Perjalanan dan Harapan, 18.
[110] Ibid.
[111] Interview with Rofi’ Munawar, Surabaya, 7 March 2003.
[112] Cahyadi Takariawan, Rekayasa Masa Depan Menuju Kemenangan Dakwah Islam (Jakarta:Pustaka Tarbiatuna, 2003), 65
[113] Interview with Zulkieflimansyah, Canberra, 30 August 2004.
[114] For further details about the application of these concepts see Greg Fealy and Greg Barton, ed., Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia (Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, 1996), 35.
[115] See Takariawan, Rekayasa Masa Depan Menuju Kemenangan Dakwah Islam, 66-68.
[116] Discussions of this issue are elaborated in detail in Syariahonline.com which strictly opposes a female president. The religious consultation on the web is organized mainly by members of the Central Board of Justice Party.
[117] See Ali Said Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia (Bandung: Teraju, 2002), 296-304.
[118] Syariahonline.com, 01 January 2003.