Table of Contents
In retrospect, the era of the 1970s and 1980s is considered by many former activists of Islamic groups as a most difficult and challenging time. Within the university campuses, signs of distrust and grievance towards Soeharto’s New Order regime were very common. The regime’s restrictions on the students’ involvement in political activities and on the use of the campus as a free space to criticise the government caused considerable disillusionment among them. In their eyes, the regime was a tyrant similar to the Pharaoh of Egypt.[1]
In similar way radical activities carried out by some sections of Indonesian Muslim groups outside campus were met with uncompromising measures on the part of the government. Such heavy-handed responses resulted in spontaneous reactions of violence and destruction by some radical groups. Many other oppositional groups were suppressed and their activists jailed. The regime did not hesitate to use armed force in handling civil dissent at the grassroots level.[2] President Soeharto firmly stated that “groups that were greatly influenced by their respective ideologies [tried] to impose their will on other groups, and if necessary, we must take up arms.”[3] Confrontation between particular Muslim groups and the regime apparatus was unavoidable.
In fact, since the late 1970s many Islamic activities organised by various groups mushroomed in the secular campuses. They were mainly identified with exclusiveness and developed small religious circles, attracting many students. They focussed their religious activities on cultivating personal piety and devotion. These Islamic circles usually provided students with a strict set of behavioural rules, observing the halal and haram regulation and promoting a familiar and reassuring Islamic identity.[4] They perceived themselves to be the carriers of “true” Islam whilst viewing other students as not committed Muslims. They practised Islamic teachings strictly and sought to avoid acts prohibited by Islam. They were eager to draw a sharp line between themselves and other Muslim students; to a great extent they were too quick to cast blame on anything that they considered was “un-Islamic” in nature.
Jemaah Tarbiyah grew out of this situation. Instead of directly opposing the regime through physical confrontation or by raising harsh criticism in public, Jemaah Tarbiyah developed its activities by strengthening religious belief and encouraging the basic religious obligations. How could this movement survive during oppression in the 1980s and regroup to establish a political party during the era of political participation in 1998? Why did it not actively respond to the regime’s oppression with violence?
In fact, the success of Jemaah Tarbiyah in transforming itself into a reputable political party has been interpreted in various ways. Not a few activists from other movements during the time of oppression accused Jemaah Tarbiyah of being infiltrated and orchestrated by government intelligence officers.[5] Was it for ideological reasons or due to co-optation by the regime that induced members of Jemaah Tarbiyah to keep silent when some radical Islamic movements, such as Negara Islam Indonesia-associated groups, increasingly mounted direct confrontation?
This chapter analyses the factors behind the success of Jemaah Tarbiyah in consolidating its cadres during the period of the regime’s oppression. There are three reasons contributing to its success. First, Jemaah Tarbiyah had learned from the bitter experiences of Islamic oppositional movements, in which direct confrontation resulted in oppression or even liquidation. There are three categories or groups that suffered this suppression: the Islamic state-aimed movements, the ranks of resentful modernist groups and the anti-Asas Tunggal [6] movements. Second, the commitment of Jemaah Tarbiyah to keep its approach of Islamic reform, instead of revolution and violence, led it to firmly uphold its commitment to a gradual and longer agenda. The fruit of this approach is that many of the younger generation of Muslims coming from oppositional groups finally joined Jemaah Tarbiyah. Third, political openings in the early 1990s and the collapse of Soeharto in 1998 opened more space for Jemaah Tarbiyah to express its ideas and establish its political party.
In general, Muslim resistance toward successive regimes in Indonesia had been driven by various motives and factors, such as the notion of the establishment of an Islamic state, political exclusion, or the rejection of certain of the government policies. Thus, the factors responsible for triggering Muslim opposition were not always ideological but economic and political as well. Major resistance in Indonesia has been represented by a particular group, chiefly the modernists, who act from disenchantment with the regime.
In fact, Islam had occasionally served as an ideological opposition to the established Pancasila state ideology and endangered the stability of the government. The seeds of conflict were between the most powerful forces in Indonesia, the army and Islam, in which suspicion and distrust widely existed.[7] The army was most concerned about the latent threat of political Islam. Despite the cultural roots of hostility, in which Javanese (abangan) figures dominated the army, the main reason for the army’s hostility to Islamic forces was the ability of Muslim activists to win loyal support among those who strictly observed the teachings of Islam. With their strong social basis, the army worried that Muslim activists harboured a secret agenda to establish an Islamic state.[8]
Many policies issued by the army-backed government were widely received by Muslims as designed to restrain the role of Islam in society and politics. The proposed marriage legislation in 1973, giving authority to Kantor Catatan Sipil (the Civil Registration Office) to register marriages and the draft of Aliran Kepercayaan legislation in 1978 regarding mystical belief, which put Javanese mysticism on the same level as the five officially recognised religions, were perceived by some Muslims as evidence of the increasingly secular orientation of the regime. This was further considered to de-legitimise the role of Islam in society and politics.[9] However, Muslim activists never lost the resolve to challenge government policies which seemed inimical to Islam teachings. Any policies perceived to undermine the role of Islam in society and the state have always faced great pressures. Extra-parliamentary force, such as demonstrations, became an alternative to force the regime to postpone such proposals, since the United Development Party, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) at that time was considered incapable of voicing the interests of the Muslim community.
Opposition and resistance against the state had taken various forms of expression, such as violence, harsh criticism and civil disobedience. These were mainly driven by the ideal of an Islamic state, demanding a radical shift in the state from a secular to a purely Islamic one. Other groups demanded that the regime accommodate former activists from Masyumi into political activities. Still others merely wanted the state to acknowledge their specific character and identity, manifested in their organizational ideologies and that this need not be challenge or de-legitimise the national ideology of Pancasila.
In addition, the timing and targeting of repression have also been important factors in encouraging either confrontation or conformity. In studying types of contention in Egypt, Mohammad M. Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz classify the timing when repression is applied as either pre-emptive or reactive.[10] Repression is pre-emptive when it is applied before the opposition movement has had a chance to arrange and assemble disparate supporters and sympathizers around a common goal. Repression is reactive when it is applied in the rising phase of the protest cycle - that is, after activists have gained organisational momentum. Hafez and Wiktorowicz also classify the targeting of repression into two patterns, selective when repression simply targets the leaders and core activists of the movement and indiscriminate when it expands to include supporters, sympathisers and even ordinary citizens suspected of involvement in the movement. Pre-emptive and selective repression will discourage violent conflict on collective actions, while reactive and indiscriminate repression is likely to encourage reactive response and confrontation.[11]
Modern Islamic state-motivated rebellions have fought long periods of resistance against the secular Indonesian state, dating from the declaration of the Islamic State of Indonesia, Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) in 1949 up to the present. The rebellions have been represented by various groups and factions, but originated with the movement called Darul Islam (DI) led by Kartosuwiryo in West Java. In the contemporary Indonesian Islam discourse DI and NII are distinguished by the fact that the former represent the old Islamic state-aimed movement led by Kartosuwiryo in the 1950s, while the latter refers to the continuation of DI that has been supported by a younger generation, who had not experienced rebellion. However, the government, particularly the military, has used the name NII to label any groups who struggle for an Islamic state in Indonesia, without considering the diversity of movements.
A subsequent formation, Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) that was proclaimed on 9 August 1949 in Malangbong, Garut, West Java, gained wide support in West Java and beyond. Two strong Islamic rebellions in South Sulawesi (1952-1965) and Aceh, led by Kahar Muzakkar and Daud Beureuh (1953-1962) respectively, supported the struggle towards the establishment of an Islamic state under the leadership of Kartosuwiryo in Java.
Even though the Indonesian central government successfully curbed the initial rebellions and captured most of the leaders and forced them to sign a declaration of allegiance to the state on 1 August 1962, some splinter groups of DI have continued to develop in the regions. Many DI members considered that those who signed the declaration of allegiance had betrayed their leaders. They regrouped and continued their struggle in clandestine ways. Some of them still genuinely believe in Darul Islam doctrines, whilst others are merely orchestrated by Indonesian intelligence.
By the 1970s, some former members of DI had regrouped themselves. They were then supported by Indonesian intelligence under a mission of Special Operation, Operasi Khusus (OPSUS). The head of Opsus, Ali Murtopo, was in charge of reactivating the old DI to help the government defend the country from the threat of resurgent communist groups.[12] The intelligence involvement in reactivating DI and its interest in discrediting the image of the Islamic parties contributed to accelerating the violence perpetrated by a group called Komando Jihad.[13] In 1981, Imran bin Muhammad Zein hijacked a Garuda Airlines aircraft, killing all passengers. Following the Tanjung Priok riots in 1984 in North Jakarta in which several hundred Muslims were shot dead by the military, on 21 January 1985, an explosion damaged stupas of the newly restored Buddhist temple of Borobudur in Central Java, while yet other groups associated with Komando Jihad were involved in the bombing of Bank Central Asia in Jakarta and several Christian institutions in East Java.[14] The connections between state intelligence and Komando Jihad have never been denied. Two former advisers of Ali Moertopo, Harry Tjan Silalahi and Jusuf Wanandi, admitted this but claimed that most recruits had misused their mandate.[15] However, general opinion among Indonesians, including military figures, reportedly acknowledged the link.[16]
In general, NII associated groups do not recognise the existence of the Republic of Indonesia because it is not ruled by Islamic law. In their eyes, since Indonesia is not an Islamic state, it has inevitably drifted into moral, economic and political deterioration. These groups argue that the Republic of Indonesia needs to adopt an Islamic system.[17] Muslims who currently live in an un-Islamic state, according to them, do not need to obey state laws that are not derived from the Qur’an and Hadith. In fact, many NII members have been involved in criminal activities, such as robbery and assassination.
On the other hand, in responding to further development of NII groups, the New Order regime applied firm and uncompromising measures, marking indiscriminate targets. Like the communist groups in Indonesia, the Islamic state-motivated groups were considered a serious threat since they intended to replace the national ideology of Pancasila with Islam. They used its power to hit not only at the leaders and core activists but includes all supporters, sympathizers and ordinary people suspected of being involvement in radical movements.
Some state reactions seemed extreme. For instance, the regime suppressed an usrah group in Purwakarta in 1983. Most of its members were ordinary farmers and traders in the village and unlikely to pose any significant threat to the regime. The regime accused this group of secretly criticising their program to implement the national ideology of Pancasila and of having links with NII, so many the usrah members were raided and sentenced to jail. They were accused of carrying out subversive activity to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia.[18]
However, since NII still clung firmly to its utopian vision of establishing an Islamic state, it remained the target of regime oppression. The regime justified its suppression of all utopian groups and demolished them after an usrah group in Lampung, led by Warsidi, clashed with local army and government officers, causing many casualties on both sides in 1989. Warsidi’s followers were part of the Ngruki network of Surakarta, Central Java, under leadership of the charismatic cleric, Abdullah Sungkar. Sungkar had transferred his allegiance to NII in 1976, and subsequently the Pesantren Ngruki became a stronghold of NII.[19]
Even though the regime’s indiscriminate targeting of NII received criticism from many Muslim leaders and some members of the Indonesian parliament in 1981, the government continued to launch operations. The head of Supreme Military Operations Command for Security and Order, Panglima Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Pangkopkamtib), Admiral Soedomo, reminded the critics not to underestimate the government’s resolve to crush subversive groups, since their existence endangered the stability of Indonesia and, Soedomo claimed, they did not represent Islam.[20]
According to the activists, the regime deliberately pushed Muslims into a corner by raising the issue of Kommando Jihad mentioned above. Some Muslims in politics, such as the PPP, believed the motives behind exaggerating the issue of Komando Jihad was to tarnish the image of the Islamic parties and link them with terrorist action in the public mind.[21] By means of this tactic, PPP suffered and lost much of its popular sympathy during the general elections (1982 and 1987) since many cases of Islamic radicalisation always accelerated before elections.[22]
The most effective way used by the regime to destroy Islamic subversive groups was by intelligence operations that aimed to break the spirit of resistance among their members and to discredit them in the eyes of mainstream Islam. These allegedly radical groups were provoked into responding violently to the regime’s policies, when the military could easily crush them by arresting their core activists and supporters. These kinds of operations caused many death and casualties.
Reports of actions by Komando Jihad that periodically prevailed in parts of Sumatra in the 1970s and in Java in the 1980s were common and were generally believed be the work of Indonesian intelligence. Instead of providing the catalyst for a major Muslim uprising, they became a serious embarrassment to the rest of the Muslim community.[23] However, the fact remained that intelligence operations through DI revivals succeeded in trapping many sympathisers and imprisoning them.[24]
The Masyumi group represents another type of faction of Muslim resistance and opposition. Instead of being driven by the ideology of an Islamic state, Masyumi’s resistance was the result of political exclusion by the New Order regime, an exclusion which has made the heirs of Masyumi compelled to continue to oppose government policies. They sought to destabilise the Soeharto regime in order to force structural change to provide them with political accommodation. The regime restricted former Masyumi leaders from being involved in national politics and the officially sanctioned new political party, the Indonesian Muslim Party, Partai Muslimin Indonesia (PMI) established in 1968 made a poor performance in the 1971 general elections. Thus a strategy of opposition and confrontation became the alternative to regain political credibility and influence among Indonesian Muslims.
The main reason for the regime, and particularly for most army leaders, to restrain the re-entry of the Masyum elite into national politics was the involvement of some Masyumi leaders in the 1958-1961 regional rebellion in Sumatra in the name of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia, Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (PRRI). Even though Masyumi did not officially endorse the PRRI rebellion, its three top leaders, Mohammad Natsir, Syafruddin Prawiranegara and Burhanuddin Harahap did join the rebellion. In addition, the Javanese faction within the military’s high ranks who was suspicious of santri (mostly non-Javanese figures) remained strong and influential.[25]
Similarly, the good rapprochement between the New Order and the Chinese, as well as certain Christian figures, further broadened discontent among former activists of Masyumi who had organised themselves into the mass organisation called the Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication, Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII). They accused the regime of implementing a policy of politically excluding Muslims and favouring to non-Muslims. At the grass roots level, a process of conversion of some nominal Muslims to Christianity had strengthened the sense of insecurity among Muslims about the missionary activity of Christian.[26] Criticism was raised in almost all Friday mosque sermons and at public gatherings (pengajian) organised by DDII preachers, asking the government to stop Christian missionary activities. In order to avert further conflict between the Christian and Muslim communities, the government barred DDII from newly converted communities in South Central Java.[27] In fact, the government responded to Muslim pressure for an end to Christian missionary activities by issuing a decree restricting foreign aid for religious purposes and prohibiting attempts to convert anyone from other religious faiths.[28]
The spirit of resistance expressed by Masyumi group however was not limited to religious slogans, but was extended in scope by involving support from non-religious figures. For instance, in 1980, some former Masyumi leaders joined the petition of the Group of the Fifty (Kelompok Petisi 50) criticising the government’s announcement of intent to suppress oppositional forces in Indonesia. To strengthen their power to destabilise the regime, veterans of Masyumi sought secular as well as religious alliances. Nonetheless, Masyumi’s disillusionment with the regime was mainly expressed in non-violent ways, using spoken and written media. Their resistance usually faded when the regime became ready to accommodate their political interests.
Because the criticism of the former activists of Masyumi had persisted and circulated through religious sermons and gatherings since the 1970s, the regime began to regulate all religious gatherings and to prohibit the raising of political issues during the Friday sermons. Military officers were under order to take necessary action whenever violations of this regulation occurred, and such violations would bring about prosecution or a sentence to military detention. Many Muslim preachers suffered from this restriction and some were sentenced to jail for years. Many hard-liner preachers were banned altogether from delivering sermons in mosques. Members of the Islamic Preachers Corps, Korp Muballigh Islam (KMI) an organization founded by a former leader of Masyumi, Syafruddin Prawiranegara, were known for their harsh terms in criticising the government. Mawardi Noer, Abdul Qadir Djaelani, A.M. Fatwah, and Tony Ardi were among members of KMI who were sentenced to jail for years.[29]
In contrast to the NII group, this group of political discontent, represented by activists of DDII, did not demand the establishment of an Islamic state. However, since their existence posed a threat to the regime, it did not hesitate to repress them. DDII consisted of many elements, ranging from moderate to radical figures, and it often received the indirect impact of its activists’ radical actions. DDII was often associated with hardline groups. For instance, many members of NII were activists of the DDII. Despite their position as Darul Islam leaders, both Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir were members of DDII committees in Central Java.[30] The loose membership of DDII permitted any Muslims to join as long as they shared the same ideas on political Islam.
But it remains a fact that the regime succeeded in silencing all openly active oppositional movements. With a combination of reactive and pre-emptive action, it was able to repress its political rivals even before they were able to organise vital organizations. Not only did Islamic state-oriented movements experience bad treatment, but also many activists of DDII and KMI suffered from the regime’s severity. Professor Oetsman al-Hamidy, an ex-military figure and a rector of Higher Education for Islamic Predication, Pendidikan Tinggi Dakwah Islam (PTDI) was 72 years old when he was sentenced to jail for a harsh sermon attacking the government. He stated during the trial.
Now, in 1985 public criticism of the government by a Muslim preacher is considered to be a subversive action. Its perpetrator is threatened to jail for life. It is very frightening.[31]
The pre-emptive approach of the regime also resulted in restrictions on all political Islam-oriented groups who expressed their struggle within the legal system. Even Muhammadiyah, “long considered the most secularly inclined of the Islamic groups” expressed its pain about the unfair attitude of the government.[32] In its official newspaper, Mertju Suar dated 4 April 1968, it stated its frustration with the regime’s attitude towards Islam
Mr. President! We will support you and we will do our best so that you will succeed in your mission, although we know that we will be continuously slandered as followers of Darul Islam, anti-Pancasila, and so on. In fact, we do not expect that you will have much confidence in our [Muslim] leaders because it has been widely publicised through the [Christian] mass media that the Muslims are a hindrance to national development and modernization, and that the Muslims are merely disseminators of magic amulets and the like.[33]
However, the government’s policies toward these groups of political discontent differed from those of NII. The regime still applied selective targeting in containing their resistance. Leading figures and core activists of modernist groups usually became subject to the regime’s suppression, while many sympathizers and followers were still able to carry out their activities, as long as they did not openly attack the regime. In short, the government’s obsession to control all political rivalries did not end along with the decline of radical groups and the demise of political discontent. The regime continued to ensure its control of all individuals and mass activities to follow the Sole Principle of Pancasila.
By imposing the idea of a collective ideology, the regime created an authoritative and legitimising identity with Pancasila as the Sole of Principle (Asas Tunggal). The regime decided that Pancasila, as the only authorised ideology in Indonesia, would force all the people’s activities to be in accordance with its spirit. Even more, the regime seemed to be intending to impose Pancasila as a standard of personal and communal values for its citizens, replacing the role of religion. As a result, immediate resistance came from Muslim communities who regarded Islam as their chosen way of life.
The regime made it known that any other ideologies were considered subversive by the government and were to be monitored and contained. Thus, in the regime’s eyes, there was no discrimination between Islamic groups and communists, since both ideologies were seen as rivals to the official ideology. Conversely, Pancasila, particularly within its first principle of “Belief in One God”, was understood by the regime as implying an indirect warning that not only communist ideology but also Islam was unacceptable.[34] However, not only Muslim organisations opposed this government initiative but many Christian, Catholic, Hindu and Buddhist groups conveyed the same concern - that each had its own a basis of conformity and loyalty to its own religion, while at the same time being good guardians of Pancasila.[35] Among broader social and mass organizations, the Muslim organizations mostly rejected the government’s proposal, though finally they came to accepting it with caution.
Muslim student and youth organizations formed a special group of Muslim resistance. They rejected the implementation of “Sole Principle” imposed on all mass organizations by the government. These groups wanted the government to accommodate other ideologies that might be incorporated within exclusively religious organizations, as long as they were not in violation of the ideology of the state. The status of Pancasila as the fundamental basic value for society and nation was indisputable, even among Muslim communities. Yet serious problems would arise if the government forced all mass organizations to replace their own basic identities and values with Pancasila.[36]
However, though the government still tried to impose their Sole Principle some organizations persisted in practising their own lines of thought. The government banned organizations that did not conform to government policy. A Muslim student organization called The Islamic Student Association-the Protector Committee of the Organization, Himpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia-Majelis Penyelamat Organisasi (HMI MPO) and a high school student association, Indonesian Islamic Students, Pelajar Islam Indonesia (PII) were among the more stubborn guardians of Islamic rather than the New Order ideology.[37]
In 1983 a National Congress of HMI was held in Medan, through the Junior Minister of Youth and Sport Affairs, Abdul Ghafur (a former chairman of HMI, Jakarta branch) the government pushed the organization to endorse Pancasila as the Sole Principle. At that time, new legislation regulating mass organizations had not yet been issued and was still in the process of endorsement by the legislative body.[38] In responding to the government’s intervention, the participants of the congress split into two factions. The first faction wanted to comply with the government in order to avoid political oppression; a second faction tried to oppose the government’s interference and postponed taking a position on the issue until the relevant bill was formalised. However, after committee meetings that claimed to represent the interests of the organisation, held in Ciloto, West Java, 1-7 April 1985, the committee issued a statement expressing HMI’s approval of the regulation to enforce Pancasila as the Sole Principle of all mass organizations. The decision of HMI to adopt Pancasila as its ideological basis was ratified through the 1986 National Congress of HMI in Padang.
This acceptance of Pancasila by HMI Central Board resulted in criticism from other HMI branches in the provinces and at the district level. On 15 March 1986 in Jakarta some activists of HMI who opposed the decision of the Central Board of HMI established a counter organization, named Council to Save the Organization, Majelis Penyelamat Organisasi (MPO) and Eggi Sudjana was elected as the chairman. This new council claimed to protect the spirit of HMI and accused the pro-Pancasila group, based in Diponegoro, Jakarta, of deviating from their true ideals. Consequently, the chairmen of HMI branches that supported the establishment of HMI MPO were expelled and replaced by committees favourable to HMI’s Central Committee. In contrast, HMI MPO declared itself a rival to the official HMI and held a congress to de-legitimate the existence of the former committees. In so doing, not only had HMI MPO split from the Central Committee but it had also transformed itself into a radical and militant movement opposing the regime’s policies.
Another aggressive group opposed to the government policy regarding the “Sole Principle” was PII. PII was established in 1947 in Yogyakarta, and initially aimed to bridge the gap between students in pesantren and public schools.[39] However, in its development, PII turned to represent an organisational wing of the modernist political party, Masyumi. This was because since the 1960s, in particular after the banning of Masyumi, many of its former activists wanted to use PII as an alternative vehicle to preserve the Masyumi spirit among students and to continue the struggle to oppose the regime. However, PII itself went into decline, mainly after the government had implemented its policy of the Sole Principle of Pancasila and prevented all social and youth organizations from maintaining affiliations with political parties. When the government issued the Asas Tunggal policy, PII immediately rejected the use of Pancasila as the basis of its organization. PII was outlawed and its activities came under strict surveillance by the regime. As a result PII began to run its activities in secret, as an underground movement.
While heavy-handed policies were applied in response to NII activities, and to some extent also applied to politically discontented groups of the modernist factions, less firm measures were directed at the opponents of Asas Tunggal. The pre-emptive and selective measures applied by the regime were mainly directed at Islamic youth associations (HMI MPO and PII) to limit their influence within student movements. Even though, the regime did not physically oppress members of both organisations but their activities were under total surveillance. In fact, after the mid 1980s, there were two focuses of the New Order intelligence and security operations: Islamic communities and student movements as well as the labour movements.[40]
The government’s total control of its citizens was achieved by the success of the regime in applying constant surveillance over civic space.[41] This surveillance was aimed at detecting any signs of opposition that might undermine the regime’s authority. The tight supervision almost destroyed all underground resistance groups. The regime also began to encourage its people to engage in self-censorship and awareness, for intelligence officers might be anywhere at any time, watching all activities.[42] A Jemaah Tarbiyah activist described the situation
In the eyes of the regime, we served as potent challenges and it kept us under surveillance. Certainly, the situation was dreadful as there was no way to escape from this surveillance.[43]
The government’s restraint on political activities and censorship of Islamic predication had inadvertently stimulated dakwah activities on the university campuses. Because the regime’s prohibition on delivering religious sermons containing political issues, many activists found that campus predication was the only safe way to preserve the idea of political Islam. However, surveillance over campus mosques also occurred because of the regime’s suspicion of student political activities. Campus mosques were no longer safe places for oppositional groups. An activist of the University of Indonesia and the Arif Rahman Hakim Mosque in Jakarta believed that intelligence officers monitored the mosque and had planted “wiretap devices” (alat penyadap).[44]
In general, all activities, social or religious, private or public, had to be endorsed by stamped letters from relevant authorities.[45] As a result of the state’s monitoring of Friday and public sermons (ceramah agama) many activists started to indicate their resistance on using pamphlet and circulating anonymous letters. But the power of the regime to control its people was enormous. No matter how secret or disciplined the group might be in conducting its activities, if it dealt with political or sensitive issues, it could not escape government surveillance. Many underground activities were detected and raided. The capture of usrah activists associated with Darul Islam in the mid 1980s in Cental Java, for example, proved that the regime was easily able to identify and locate its opponents.
The regime’s indiscriminate targeting of rivals prompted many activists to change their strategy. The usrah model applied by the Muslim Brothers in Egypt became an alternative way for Islamic groups to avoid confrontation with the regime. Hence, Jemaah Tarbiyah, committed to working for the spirit of reform within the system, emerged in the mid 1980s.
[1] Interview, anonymous, Jakarta, 12 March 2003.
[2] See “Beragam Jalan Menempuh Dunia,” Tempo, 3 April 1993.
[3] Guy J. Pauker, “Indonesia in 1980: Regime Fatigue?” Asian Survey 21 no. 2 (Feb, 1981), 241.
[4] R. William Liddle, “Media Dakwah Scriptualism: One Form Islamic of Political Thought and Action in New Order Indonesia” in Toward a New Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought (Tempe: Arizona State University, 1996), 344.
[5] For details see Dewan Rakyat, October 2003.
[6] Asas Tunggal, the Sole of Principle, is a part of the regime’s policy to impose the state’s ideology to its citizens.
[7] Allan A. Samson, “Army and Islam in Indonesia,” Pacific Affairs 44 no. 4 (Winter, 1971-1972), 545.
[8] Pauker, “Indonesia in 1980: Regime Fatigue?” 241
[9] Robert W. Hefner, “Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesian Middle Class,” Indonesia 56 (October 1993), 3.
[10] See Mohammed M. Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement,” in Islamic Activity: a Social Movement Theory Approach (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004), 68.
[11] Ibid.
[12] See Tempo, 30 September 1978.
[13] For further details of radical actions in Indonesia during the New Order regime, see Candra June Santosa, “Modernization, Utopia and the Rise of Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia” (Ph.D. diss., Boston University, 1996). See also Harold Crouch, “Islam in Politics in Indonesia,” in Politics, Diplomacy and Islam: Four Case Studies (Canberra: The Australian National University, 1986), 27.
[14] See Sidney Jones, “Al-Qaedah in Southeast Asia: the Case of the ‘Ngruki Network’ in Indonesia” (Corrected on 10 January 2003),” Asia Briefing no. 20, 8 August 2002, 15.
[15] David Jenkins, Suharto and His General: Indonesian Military Politics 1975-1983 (Ithaca: Cornel Modern Indonesian Project, 1984), 57.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Umar Abduh, Pesantren AL-Zaitun Sesat? Investigasi Mega Proyek dalam Gerakan NII (Jakarta:Darul Falah, 2001), 32.
[18] See Tim Peduli Tapol, Fakta Diskriminasi Rezim Soeharto terhadap Umat Islam, trans. Mohammad Thalib (Yogyakarta: Wihda Press, 1988), 149.
[19] Umar Abduh, “Konspirasi Gerakan Islam & Militer di Indonesia” (Jakarta: Cedsos, 2003), 83.
[20] Yusuf Hasyim, a member of Indonesian parliament from PPP was vocal in criticising government actions toward the radical Islamic groups. See Suara Karya, 21 April 1981 and Kompas, 21 April 1981.
[21] Crouch, “Islam and Politics in Indonesia,” 27.
[22] Ibid., 15.
[23] Sidney R. Jones, “It Can’t Happen Here: A Post-Khomeini Look at Indonesian Islam,” Asian Survey 20 no. 3 (March 1980), 315.
[24] Tempo, 30 September 1978.
[25] Samson, “Army and Islam in Indonesia,” 547.
[26] After the Communist Party abortive coup on 30 September 1965 a great numbers of former members of the Indonesia Communist Party converted to Christianity. See B.J. Bolland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), 232-233
[27] This restriction was lifted when Soeharto began to accommodate Muslim interests in the 1990s. See Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratisation in Indonesia (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000), 109.
[28] See Jones, “It Can’t Happen Here,” 318.
[29] See Tim Peduli Tapol, Fakta Diskriminasi Rezim Seoharto, 94-112.
[30] Abdullah Sungkar was a former chairman of DDII branch, Surakarta in 1970s.
[31] See Tim Peduli Tapol, Fakta Diskriminasi Rezim Seoharto, 91.
[32] Samson, “Islam in Indonesian Politics,” 1014.
[33] Ibid., 1015.
[34] Pauker, “Indonesia in 1980: Regime Fatigue?” 232-244.
[35] Faishal Ismail, “Pancasila as the Sole Basis for all Political Parties and for all Mass Organizations; an Account of Muslim’s Responses,” Studia Islamika 3 no. 4 (1996), 31.
[36] M. Rusli Karim, HMI MPO dalam Kemelut Modernisasi Politik di Indonesia (Bandung:Mizan, 1997), 129.
[37] The socialist oriented movement, Gerakan Pemuda Marhaenis, also rejected the imposition of the Sole Principle. See Karim, HMI MPO dalam Kemelut Modernisasi Politik di Indonesia, 127.
[38] Ibid.
[39] See “Sejarah Kebangkitan dan Perkembangan PII,” PelajarIslam.or.id.
[40] Richard Tanter, “The Totalitarian Ambition: Intelligence and Security Agencies in Indonesia” in State and Civil Society in Indonesia (Clayton: Monas University, 1990), 250.
[41] Merlyna Lim, “Cyber-Civic Space in Indonesia: From Panopticon to Pandemonium?” IDPR 24 no. 4 (2002), 386.
[42] Ibid., 388.
[43] Interview, Hilmi Aminuddin, Jakarta, 23 December 2003.
[44] Interview, anonymous, Jakarta, 24 March 2003.
[45] Lim, “Cyber-Civic Space in Indonesia,” 367.