The study of state oppression and the Muslim response in Indonesia reveals a clear relation between the regime’s oppression and Muslims’ confrontational reaction. During the New Order, the regime’s political suppression of Muslims was exercised to different degrees. The regime distinguished between tolerated and non-tolerated actions, and its measures vis-a-vis resistance groups varied. The regime handled them with armed force, intimidation and imprisonment, close surveillance and co-optation. Muslims response also played through a spectrum of resistance, from violent activity to civil disobedience or loyal opposition.
However, the repressive policies of the regime also became a determining factor of social movements in calculating their actions. Repression greatly increased the cost of collective action. In the case of Jemaah Tarbiyah, the strict surveillance of the regime over their citizens reduced the movement’s capability to expand its material and organisational resources. In their lack of feasible means to oppose the regime, the activists began to avoid confrontation and to detach themselves from involvement with radical groups. Commitment to a strategy of reform within the system became the viable alternative. They devoted their activities to studying basic and practical Islam.[46] Nonetheless, this change in strategy from confrontation to predication did not take place in a vacuum. It was a younger generation of Indonesian Muslims who introduced this strategy in order to keep the ideals of the movement alive. They were young Indonesian Muslims who had graduated from universities in Saudi Arabia since the mid 1980s.
The arrival home of those Middle Eastern graduates who had had direct contact with prominent activists of the Muslim Brothers in Saudi Arabia energised student religious commitment and affirmed their non-political activities at some universities in Indonesia. To transfer the ideas of Hasan al-Banna to Muslim students, they established Islamic circles (halaqah) on the campuses. They did not support the regime’s “Sole Principle” but countered it by studying and practising Islam in a way that could indirectly challenge the stance of the regime.[47] By embracing the concept of total Islam, in time they succeeded in planting Islamic ideology among Jemaah Tarbiyah cadres, without direct physical confrontation with the ruling power.
The non-revolutionary approach of Jemaah Tarbiyah also attracted many student activists from Islamic resistance groups. In this sense, Jemaah Tarbiyah did not represent a resistance movement, as some authors have described it.[48] Rather, Jemaah Tarbiyah persuaded oppositional groups to leave unproductive confrontation and to focus on cultivating cadres and enhancing their understanding of Islam. This resulted in some of the young generation of NII-associated groups, the Masyumi network and the Islamic student movements (HMI MPO and PII) changing their orientation and converted to the Muslim Brothers-influenced movement. Through their interaction with Jemaah Tarbiyah, these other activists were able to soften their radical orientation in championing Islam and to channel it into a more organised form that would have a long term impact.
It was the case that after the arrest of certain NII activists in the mid 1980s and the escape of some of its leaders to Malaysia, recruitment to NII declined. Many Muslim youths and students, who in the past had been interested in NII, shifted their allegiance to Jemaah Tarbiyah. This was chiefly brought about by the influence of Hilmi Aminuddin, head of the Consultative Board of PKS, who was also the son of a prominent Darul Islam figure, Danu Muhammad.[49] It caused some NII activists to accuse Aminuddin of damaging the growth of NII, particularly among the Indonesian students and the youth.[50]
Aminuddin himself denied his involvement with NII. Instead, he introduced a new strategy to preserve the dakwah during the era of oppression. However, Umar Abduh made the claim that Hilmi Aminuddin was the Foreign Minister of Darul Islam during the leadership of Adah Jaelani in 1980s.[51] He was arrested and held in military detention without trial in 1984 but was released in the same year. He went to a Middle Eastern country to continue his study, where he met with activists of the Muslim Brothers.[52] It seems that Abduh’s claim about Aminuddin’s role in DI is questionable, since he had never joined NII. He was imprisoned because he was found in possession of and had distributed a confidential government document containing an intelligence report, which was intended to discredit Islamic groups.[53] What is more, formal documents released by the government and media coverage regarding the issue of DI and Komando Jihad, for instance, did not mention a figure named Hilmi Aminuddin.[54]
So there is insufficient evidence of Aminuddin’s involvement with DI or NII. Even though his father was a DI leader, Aminuddin denied any relationship with either DI or NII activities. He said, “He was my biological father but not my ideological one.” The Jemaah Tarbiyah’s stance towards radical groups in Indonesia is very strict. It will not recruit any cadres who belong to NII, because this could cause future problems for the movement.[55]
Similarly, the “family of the Crescent and Stars” (Masyumi) have gone through significant changes. Since the 1950s and 1960s its leaders have focussed their activities almost entirely on the political sphere and neglected the development of the social and intellectual aspects of Islam, including predication. The ban on Masyumi and the marginalisation of political Islam by the regime encouraged the younger generation of Masyumi to be concerned with Islamic thought and predication. The ideas of the Muslim Brothers and Islamic revival have become major issues for them.[56] It was M. Natsir, president of DDII and a former leader of Masyumi, who opened up opportunities for Indonesian Muslims to interact with the ideas of the Muslim Brothers of Egypt. Natsir himself was known to have established close contact with Muslim Brothers activists.[57]
DDII is one of the channels of recruitment for Jemaah Tarbiyah. Initial contact with ikhwan (member of the Muslim Brothers), or Muslim Brothers’ ideas through publications and books have enabled the activists of DDII to join Jemaah Tarbiyah. It is not clear, however, just when DDII activists made their initial contacts with the Muslim Brothers. In fact, several years before 1960, a number of Masyumi leaders had studied in Cairo. Even Hamka, a prominent modernist leader, although only on a brief visit to Egypt, became familiar with the Muslim Brothers’ literature and used the Qur’anic exegesis written by Sayyid Qutb Fi> Z}ila>l al-Qur’an as the main reference for his famous Qur’anic interpretation, Tafsir al-Azhar. He regularly urged Indonesians to read the works of Muslim thinkers such as Sayyid Qutb. Among those Indonesians who had interacted with Qutb were Muhammad Rashidi, the former first Minister of Religious affairs, Kahir Muzakkir, the founder of Sunan Kali Jaga University and Professor Fuad Fachruddin.[58] They were the pioneers who brought the ideas and thought of the Muslim Brothers to Indonesia.
The government’s policy of restricting students’ political activities in the 1980s helped Jemaah Tarbiyah to expand its influence on the campuses. Since preachers from outside had to be endorsed before being permitted to give lectures in the university, hardline preachers were refused permission to deliver sermons in the mosque-based universities or at religious gatherings held by students. Being restricted in public spaces, Muslim students focused their activities on private and small spaces, such as the prayer room situated in their faculty or department. Feeling the lack of Islamic preachers, Muslim student activists started to support predications by creating more cadres to serve as trainers in Islamic circles. Even though not supported by competent preachers, the tarbiyah model, of self-sustaining cadres, helped to accelerate a massive Islamic predication within campuses.
As a result, DDII has not been entirely able to consolidate the followers of Masyumi or to gain the attention of the broader Muslim community. Newly established Islamic parties associated with Masyumi gained poor results in the 1999 and 2004 general elections. Even more so, the Crescent Star Party, Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB) the only party to be formally recognised as representing the Masyumi “family”, did not reach the electoral entry threshold in the 2004 general elections. In contrast, many successors of Masyumi have joined with PKS and even become leading figures within the party. Abu Ridha, for instance, the Middle Eastern graduate sponsored by DDII, is a famous figure within PKS inner circles and is considered to be the first DDII cadre to initiate and to activate a dakwah program following the Muslim Brothers model. Many of the younger generation of DDII, such as Daud Rasyid,[59] Mashadi,[60] and Didin Hafiddudin[61] followed the same path as Ridha, while Jemaah Tarbiyah has developed into an independent organization no longer dependent on DDII as its patron. In the University of Indonesia, for instance, since the establishment of the Arif Rahman Hakim Mosque in 1968, its committees developed close contacts with Masyumi figures, particularly in the matter of finding preachers for Friday sermons and other gatherings. However, after the 1990s, it has not relied on DDII support because of the Jemaah Tarbiyah-associated missionary body, Lembaga Dakwah Khairu Ummah (LDKU), which has proved able to take over DDII functions.[62]
Within the Islamic student organizations, HMI MPO and PII also contributed cadres for the consolidation of the initial movement of Jemaah Tarbiyah. After HMI MPO developed as an illegal organization, most of its training programs and activities were carried out in secret and were underground in nature. The spirit of anti-Asas Tunggal enabled many of its activists to interact with other resistance groups and made it more radical in its orientation. It developed good relations with DDII figures, so that many funds coming from Middle Eastern donations were channelled by DDII and allocated to HMI MPO.
In addition, the informal activities developed by some members of HMI MPO which were focussed on cultivating good Muslim character, rather than developing their political sympathies, encouraged them to incorporate new Islamic ideas from the Middle East. Many members of HMI MPO seemed to prefer Hasan Al-Banna’s teaching, besides the knowledge of other modernist thinkers, such as that of Jamaluddin al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Ridha.[63] Because of that it is understandable that some members of HMI MPO joined PKS rather than other Islamic parties.[64] This is the case with former chairman of HMI MPO, Tamsil Linrung, who became a member of parliament for PKS. Other HMI activists were elected as PKS members of parliament (2004-2009), such as Abdul Hakim, Nasir Djamil, Nursanita Nasution and Suswono, while many others have occupied positions of leadership in PKS, especially in the Province of Yogyakarta, which has become a stronghold of HMI MPO.
Similarly, after PII opposed the policy of Pancasila as Sole Principle in 1985, its activities were monitored and restricted by the government. In 1987, PII was formally banned. In order to maintain the recruitment of members and to promote Islam as the basis of ideology, under the leadership of Mutammimul Ula, its chairman from 1983-1986, PII introduced the training of cadres. This was adopted from the Muslim Brothers’ model of usrah, after Ula attended leadership training held by the International Islamic Federation of Student Organization (IIFSO) in Malaysia.
Under heavy repression by the regime, usrah was found to be the most effective model for PII in transforming its ideas and recruiting new members. It was Mutammimul Ula who also persuaded his members to join Jemaah Tarbiyah. He himself formally joined Jemaah Tarbiyah after his chairmanship of PII expired. He met with a Jemaah Tarbiyah activist, Zainal Muttaqien, in Hartono Marjono’s house.[65] When Jemaah Tarbiyah announced the establishment of its political party, the Justice Party, Mutammimul Ula was one of the founders. He was elected a member of parliament (1999-2004) and was re-elected (2004-2009) by PKS. Other members of PII who have been elected as members of parliament (2004-2005) are Abdi Sumaithi, Aboe Bakar, Hidayat Nurwahid, Luthfi Hasan Ishaaq, Makmur Hasanuddin, Refrizal, Wahyudin Munawir and Zuber Safawi.
The reason why Jemaah Tarbiyah was able to maintain its survival under the oppression of the Soeharto regime was its faith in the idea of Islamic reform, developed through a process of continuous cultivation, or tarbiyah. Jemaah Tarbiyah activists believed that Islamic reform should follow evolutionary, not revolutionary steps. The movement requires its activists to believe that the only way to promote the ideas of Islam at the level of society and the state is through a difficult struggle that offers definite results (s}a’bun wa tha>bit) a long process that preserve the original ideology (ta}>wil wa as}>il) and a slow change that guarantees success (ba>t}i’ wa ma’mun).[66] According to this approach, any response to the regime’s oppression must not be through confrontation, but rather through predication and internal cultivation.[67]
It was the deliberate strategy so that Jemaah Tarbiyah’s activists both avoided radical confrontation with the regime and kept its activists away from the regime’s targets of oppression. Confrontation and resistance of the regime’s power were replaced by a resolve to enhance the spiritual and religious qualities of Muslims through mental training.[68] As a result, since its emergence in Indonesia in the mid 1980s, no activist from Jemaah Tarbiyah occupying a central position in PKS has been jailed.[69]
This strategy of passive resistance focussed on the individual cultivation of spirituality and character has had two side effects. Firstly, it implicitly opposes the ideological hegemony of the regime and secondly it reduces further radicalisation among Muslims, particularly the youth. Jemaah Tarbiyah applied this strategy to preserve the very existence of the movement. Through education and predication, they believed that some day all Indonesian Muslims would accept Islam as their whole way of life, even though they might at first feel alien to the true teachings of Islam. For instance, in 1982 the Ministry of Education issued a decree forbidding female students from wearing head-scarves at schools. Many female cadres of Jemaah Tarbiyah in high schools were not allowed to attend class or even female students at ITB were not allowed to attend practical work or examinations.[70] Some Muslim organizations raised protest against the school policy and demanded the lifting of the prohibition on girl students wearing the scarves. Most activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah kept calm and did not go on the streets in protest because they were confident that when the time came, people would accept their way of dressing. Finally on 16 February 1991 the Minister of Education and Religious Affairs signed a decree which allowed female students wearing head scarves at schools.[71] Hidayat further explained:
At that time we did not want direct confrontation with the government. We just needed to encourage our cadres to adopt Islamic thinking and practice.[72]
In addition, efforts made by the activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah to strengthen their personal spiritual practices and religious knowledge served as a protection from infiltration or influence from radical groups. The success of Jemaah Tarbiyah in recruiting cadres during the 1980s and 1990s not only expanded its membership but also reduced the number of radical groups on the campuses. The presence of Jemaah Tarbiyah provided an alternative, more productive way of struggling for Islam. When an extremist understanding of Islam had prevailed on the campuses and Rahmat Abdullah, one of the pioneers of Jemaah Tarbiyah, was very concerned.
In the 1980s there were many students who dropped out of university because of their rigid and extreme understanding of Islam. They considered that what they learned at university made no contribution towards the development of Islam. The English language was perceived as the language of the infidels and architecture was in violation of the Prophet Muhammad. There was a hadith saying that whoever built a two-storey building would be crushed by the angels. As a result of these excesses, many Muslim students became too lazy to study, turned to a kind of escapism and even refused to wear the gifts of shoes that were bought by their parents.[73]
Abdullah further elaborated his concern
This issue was very naïve, but was exactly as it happened at that time. Here Jemaah Tarbiyah functioned as a bridge between hardline and soft line orientations. If we did not think of saving them from that situation, the dakwah of Islam would be blamed for their role in hampering the national development program of Indonesia. We started to give them sensible arguments to change their orientations. Their resistance towards the regime was accumulative and reached the situation where they even rejected wearing clothes that were associated with the regime, such as batik shirts and dress coats. Such was the repressive attitude of the regime towards Islamic groups and they reacted to its repression in radical ways and with physical confrontation.[74]
However, the success of Jemaah Tarbiyah in avoiding the regime’s oppression appeared suspicious to other Islamic movements in the 1980s. There were indications of Jemaah Tarbiyah’s rapprochement with the regime. First, it was suspicious that most of Jemaah Tarbiyah activists remained beyond the reach of oppression and intimidation. The Islamic Youth Movement (Gerakan Pemuda Islam-GPI) a militant youth group previously affiliated to Masyumi, for instance, accused Jemaah Tarbiyah of playing a role in the capture of hundreds of suspected militants in 2003. “It was not understandable that within a short time, the National Intelligence Bureau of Indonesia caught three thousand militant figures,” said one of activists from GPI.[75] The role of Suripto, a former member of the National Intelligence Bureau, in supporting the establishment of PK, strengthened such allegations. Suripto was a former staff of the National Intelligent Bureau in 1967-1970. Second, LDKU, an Islamic missionary program affiliated with PKS, used the house of Soeharto’s son, Bambang Trihatmodjo, in Menteng, Jakarta.[76] So it was argued that Jemaah Tarbiyah received funding from the Soeharto family.
The evidence tells a different story and the allegations seem to be the misunderstanding of Jemaah Tarbiyah by other Islamic groups of the 1980s, many of which mostly failed to survive under the heavy-handed measures of the regime. Suripto himself has intensively interacted with activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah since the 1980s.[77] In 1990 he represented Indonesian Muslim community to send humanitarian assistance to Bosnia. Since then Suripto who was an activist of the socialist movement during his study in Padjajaran University in 1964 became closer to Muslim activists.[78] In addition, since the 1990s, many activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah who graduated from the State Universities, mainly from University of Indonesia in Jakarta have become professional staffs in the Bimantara, a national business group managed by Soeharto’s family. Preachers from LDKU often have been invited to deliver sermons and lectures in Bimantara mosque in Jakarta.[79] Even though the activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah did not suffer from intimidation and torture, they were kept under surveillance by intelligence officers.
We were so careful not to let the regime demolish our dakwah activities. We also suffered from the restrictions, as did most Islamic movements, but we did not react aggressively. To be honest, we were unable to contact and communicate with other activist groups because of tight surveillance from the regime.[80]
Jemaah Tarbiyah developed a strategy to keep its activists from making contact with radical groups. The event of the “one million” gathering in 2000 held at the National Monument of Jakarta when a NII activist, Alchaidar, declared in his speech the urgency to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia became a sensitive issue among members of Jemaah Tarbiyah. Earlier, through PK, they had supported such action but after Alchaidar’s speech, PK immediately withdrew its support, declaring that Alchaidar had no relationship with PK.[81] All efforts were aimed at the survival of PK’s political struggle
Our group is immune from radical activities and groups because we strictly avoid them. Before, we had personal contact with them but then we finally realised that we had a different agenda and orientation. We left them and kept our distance because the regime apparatus launched its operations without compromise. When many Muslim activists from a particular group were arrested during training sessions in Puncak, West Java, we did not get arrested, even though we held similar training there. We always emphasise the need to protect our movement from radical influences. Rather than recruiting cadres with radical backgrounds, it is better to train and educate ordinary people with no Islamic knowledge at all.[82]
This long process of educating the people to understand Islam has proved to be the best way for Jemaah Tarbiyah to carry out a gradual process of Islamisation in Indonesia. Any impatience to Islamise Indonesian society and the state will only lead to destruction. A clear conviction, such as “we have a step by step strategy in carrying out our ideas” has distinguished Jemaah Tarbiyah from radical groups in Indonesia.[83]
However, the ideology of Islamic reform was not the only reason for Jemaah Tarbiyah to confine its activities to religious and non-political activities. Social movement theory emphasises that political constraint and opportunity also compel a movement to avoid confrontation.[84] Since the regime had tightened its grip over all civil society groups, any effort to oppose the government policies was risky. The decision of Jemaah Tarbiyah not to take part in demonstrations against government policy was influenced by this condition to a certain extent.
[46] Interview with Aus Hidayat, Depok, 13 May 2003.
[47] Interview with Sigit Susiantomo, Surabaya, 17 March 2003.
[48] The book by Andi Rahmat and Mukhammad Najib, Gerakan Perlawanan dari Masjid Kampus (Surakarta: Purimedia, 2001) and Ali Said Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan:Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia (Bandung, Mizan, 2002) emphasise the role of Jemaah Tarbiyah as a resistance group towards the regime.
[49] See Umar Abduh, Al-Zaitun Gate: Investigasi Mengungkap Misteri Dajjan Indonesia Membangun Negara Impian Iblis (Jakarta: LPDI, 2002), 29.
[50] Interview, anonymous, Depok, 11 June 2003.
[51] See Abduh, Al-Zaitun Gate, 29.
[52] Ibid
[53] Interview with Hilmi Aminuddin, Jakarta, 23 December 2003.
[54] See “Kliping Komando Jihad,” Pusat Sejarah ABRI, 1978-1980.
[55] Interview with Rahmat Abdullah, Jakarta, 11 May 2003.
[56] Martin van Bruinessen, “Geneologies of Islamic Radicalism in post-Suharto Indonesia,” South East Asia Research 10 no. 2 (2002), 125.
[57] Interview with Ahmad Mudzafar Jufri, Surabaya, 17 March 2003.
[58] See Fred R. von der Mehden, Two Worlds of Islam: Interaction between Southeast Asia and the Middle East (Gainesville: the University Press of Florida, 1993), 88.
[59] He is the Al-Azhar -graduate who strongly opposes Nurcholish Madjid’s ideas of Islamic renewal.
[60] He is a Member of Parliament from PK (1999-2004) and former secretary of M. Roem, a leader of Masyumi.
[61] He was a DDII activist who was nominated by PK to be a candidate for Indonesian President during the 1999 General Election.
[62] M. Rasyidi was Chief Imam (imam besar) of the Arif Rahman Mosque in the 1990s. He was given the opportunity to deliver the first Friday sermon when the mosque was formally opened to the public. See Y. Setyo Hadi (ed), Masjid Kampus Untuk Umat & Bangsa (Jakarta: Masjid ARH UI and LKB – Nusantara, 2000), 23.
[63] Karim, HMI MPO dalam Kemelut Modernisasi Politik di Indonesia, 141.
[64] See Syahrul Effendi D. “Dimana HMI Berada dan Mau Kemana?” Portal Perjuangan HMI MPO, 25 January 2005 or see http://www.hminews.com.
[65] Interview with Mutammimul Ula, Jakarta, 16 June 2003.
[66] See Muhammad Sa’id, “Tarbiyah Suatu Kemestian,” in Tarbiyah Berkelanjutan (Jakarta: Pustaka Tarbiatuna, 2003), 45-52.
[67] Interview with Sigit Susiantomo, Surabaya, 17 March 2003.
[68] Bruinessen, “Geneologies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia,” 132.
[69] Interview with Aus Hidayat, Depok, 13 Mei 2003.
[70] Rifki Rosyad, “A Quest for True Islam: A Study of the Islamic Resurgence Movements among the Youth in Bandung, Indonesia” (Master thesis, the Australian National University, 1995), 91.
[71] Ibid.
[72] Interview with Aus Hidayat, Depok, 13 Mei 2003.
[73] Interview with Rahmat Abdullah, Jakarta, 11 Mei 2003.
[74] Ibid
[75] See “Dinas Rahasia Susupi PKS,” Dewan Rakyat, 1 October 2003, 19. Dewan Rakyat is monthly magazine published by former activists of HMI and PII, such as Ferry Mursyidan Baldan, AM. Fatwa, Eggi Sudjana.
[76] See “Cikal Bakal PKS,” Dewan Rakyat, 21.
[77] See “Sosok Yang Jadi Sorotan,” Saksi, 31 December 2003, 75-76.
[78] Ibid.
[79] Interview, anonymous, Jakarta, 24 May 2003.
[80] Interview with Budi Darmawan, Canberra, 24 May 2004.
[81] See Irfan. S. Awwas (ed), Dialog Internet: Aksi Sejuta Ummat dan Issu Negara Islam (Yogyakarta: Wihda Press, 2000), 65.
[82] Interview with Rahmat Abdullah, Jakarta, 11 May 2003.
[83] See Hilmi Aminuddin, Strategi Dakwah Gerakan Islam (Jakarta: Pustaka Tarbiatuna, 2003), 144.
[84] See Doug McAdam, et.al., ed., Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 42-48.