There are two political events that brought a significant change in Jemaah Tarbiyah’s development. Firstly, political openness (keterbukaan) initiated by Soeharto’s regime in the early 1990s resulted in the accommodation of Muslim oppositional groups. Nonetheless, Islamic state motivated-groups were still unlikely to be integrated within the Indonesian political system because of their rejection of participation in a non-Islamic system. Secondly, the collapse of the Soeharto regime in 1998 opened up more opportunities for Islamic groups to publicly advertise their existence. Even those who opposed the implementation of Pancasila as Sole Principle were still allowed to form organizations based on their respective ideologies. Islamic ideology, then, has reappeared within political and social discourse in the form of the freedom to establish political parties based upon it.

The willingness of the Soeharto regime to accommodate Muslims from the politically marginalised groups can be viewed from two perspectives. Firstly, Soeharto designed political openness in order to fulfil his own agenda to secure his power and protect his interests, including those of his family. The Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals, Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI) was created to accommodate Islamic forces and to compel them to conform to the regime’s agenda.^[85] Secondly, the growing Indonesian middle class group came from Muslim backgrounds that changed state-society interaction so that the regime would make significant concessions for them.^[86] The process of santrinisation within middle class ranks and the professionals impressed the regime, since these new Muslim intellectuals were in fact different form earlier ones.^[87]

Internal conflict within the regime itself was another reason for Soeharto to open up political opportunities for Muslims. In permitting political openings, he did not mean to introduce a fully democratic system in his time. Nonetheless, a loosening of the censorship of the press, the release of certain dissidents and the toleration of political protests, demonstrations and criticism signified the era of keterbukaan.^[88] In fact, Muslim activists and groups mainly benefited from these opportunities to create rapprochement with the government; whilst the regime needed to include Muslim powers under Soeharto’s supervision, since serious division between Soeharto and active or retired ABRI officers loyal to L.B. Murdani brought some kind of disability to the regime’s power.

It seemed however that only Islamic groups, which downplayed their orientation of political Islam were able to welcome the regime’s political openness. Other groups that maintained their call for the establishment of an Islamic state remained excluded. Finally, many Muslim activists who previously rejected the idea of Asas Tunggal subsequently supported the regime’s inclusion policy.^[89]

The shift in the regime’s attitude, which began in the early 1990s, had to some extent reduced the oppression and surveillance over Islamic organizations and illegal underground activities. State and Islam relations were no longer viewed in terms of suspicion and hostility. The cultural and historical roots of conflict, as suggested by Allan S. Samson,^[90] immediately dispersed. This era was signified by a new relationship between the State and Islam. Instead of following a pattern of oppression, resistance and co-optation, it offered a new momentum for Muslim groups to express their political identities and orientations. For instance, the authorised party still allowed some members of HMI MPO and PII to carry out their activities, as long as they did not display their organization’s banner in public areas. Formerly they had faced military oppression and dispersal.^[91] In addition, in 1993 President Soeharto formally launched a national program to support the dissemination of short Islamic training (Pesantren Kilat) for students at the elementary, high school and university levels.^[92] State officials in the provinces and at the district level formally supported this policy.^[93]

Lastly, the economic crisis experienced by Indonesia in the mid 1990s, which brought about the collapse of the Soeharto regime in 1998, changed every prediction about the fate of politics in Indonesia. Soeharto had to step down, but he did not ensure that his successor could continue his mission and more importantly, protect him and his family. In fact, B.J.Habibie, his vice president, who became the next president, was only able to hold power for less than two years. This was because of a huge demand by the public for a “genuine” general election that finally resulted in formation of the 1999-2004 parliament members who elected Abdurahman Wahid, who was not favourable to Soeharto as a president.

Soeharto’s resignation in 1998 led groups in Indonesia to freely express their political and religious identities within the democratic system. When during the New Order’s governance most Islamic resistance movements showed an enthusiasm to destabilise the power of the regime and even to replace the existing rule, after the ruin of the regime, political Islam groups started to participate in national events. These new political events have since opened up the possibility for further participation and cooperation between Muslim groups and the government.

The only Muslim groups that did not benefit from this political opening were some that originally represented counter state movements. They could not integrate with the government agenda, since their doctrines required the whole nature of the Indonesian state to be Islamic. Because Indonesia is not an Islamic state but a secular one, they could not participate in the political processes unless all became Islamic. When Jemaah Tarbiyah organised its members and formed a political party, other Islamic groups such as Hizbut Tahrir and Salafi groups also started to establish formal mass organizations. Non-violent NII groups also reinstated their existence to struggle for the implementation of shariah in Indonesia and in local regions, for instance, the Council for Indonesian Fighters, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) and the Committee for the Preparation and Upholding of Islamic Law, Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariah Islam (KPPSI) were founded in Central Java and South Sulawesi respectively. Other violence oriented movements, such as NII and JI suffered from political change and became the targets of Indonesian intelligence operations for combating terrorism.

Furthermore, the era of political openness since the 1990s and the fall of the Soeharto regime in 1998 offered more opportunity to alter the tone of relationships between the state and Islamic forces. Suspicion and hostility in the most powerful elements in Indonesia, such as the regime, the army and Islam, reached an understanding that lifted political constraints on Muslims. Jemaah Tarbiyah also benefited from the change from political constraint to the political inclusion of Muslims.

The commitment of Jemaah Tarbiyah to maintain its reform and gradual approach to the struggle for Islam has gained momentum. The establishment of the Justice Party with its Islamic ideology is its only means for manifesting its belief and ideas about Islam and for testing them in a challenging political game. The reform approach is mainly supported by activists coming from the university campuses. In the next chapter we will discuss the internal significance of these campus activists within PKS.