Table of Contents
Indeed, the victory of Islam is due to the success of the ummah. The success of the ummah rests on its youth of good character and morality - Anonymous Muslim scholar.[1]
The important status of university students in Indonesian society has encouraged political and religious groups to establish their influence upon them. For students, being involved in political activities has provided them with political careers in return. Realising this, the focus of Jemaah Tarbiyah, since the beginning, has been to attract students in prestigious secular campuses since they offer the greatest opportunities in terms of vertical and horizontal mobilization.[2] For activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah, students are their greatest assets in the duty of the Islamisation of Indonesia and for the victory of Islam.
Most activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah who were elected members of the Indonesian national parliament representing the Prosperous Justice Party in the 2004 general elections hail from secular campuses. During their study life, members of Jemaah Tarbiyah in the 1990s were able to control student governments and other intra campus organisations. Their role reached its peak of significance when they succeeded in mobilising huge demonstrations involving thousands of students from various campuses to topple Soeharto in 1998. How has Jemaah Tarbiyah been able to control the campuses and use campus predication to serve its interests? Does success on campus also bring the same victory for Jemaah Tarbiyah in controlling and influencing the Indonesian state?
This chapter attempts to analyse the significance of the secular universities as strongholds of Jemaah Tarbiyah in providing political cadres for its party, PKS. The presence of the campus Islam activists who have dominated the membership and leadership of PKS have had a significant influence over PKS politics. They have contributed to making its political policies pragmatic. Their experience during their involvement in student senates and other intra-campus organisations since the 1990s, in particular their interaction with different cohort groups can account for this realistic approach.
The 1960s was an era of high student mobilisation. The key body was the Indonesian Student Action Union, Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia (KAMI), established on 25 October 1965, supported by student organizations and endorsed by the Minister of Higher Education and Science, Dr. Syarif Thayeb. KAMI succeeded in uniting student elements in the struggle against the Communist party and its sympathisers.[3] The good rapprochement between the military and campus organs, such as the Minister of Higher Education and Science, rectors, lectures and students, resulted in the cooptation of student activists. Inevitably, the student activists of the 1960s lost their significance as agents of change. Their spirit of struggle declined after they succeeded in overthrowing the regime of first President Sukarno. During the period of consolidation of Soeharto’s New Order which followed, some students chose to return to campus whilst others continued their political careers and joined the government.[4] The student movement of 1966 became a core component of the New Order regime and figures of historical memory commemorated by associations of the “generation of 1966”.[5]
The extra-campus organizations which had previously supported KAMI showed their ineffectiveness after they regrouped under the supervision of the New Order regime.[6] In July 1970, through an initiative of the government, most extra-campus organizations such as HMI, GPI, PMII, GMKI, Pemuda Anshor and other organisations under the auspices of the ruling party, Golkar (Golongan Karya) led by Abdul Ghafur formed a committee for the preparation of an umbrella youth organisation. In 23 July 1973 the Committee of Indonesian National Youth, Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia (KNPI) was set up to organise all extra-campus organizations with government assistance.[7]
However, student activists of intra campus organizations began to evaluate their role in voicing the interests of the people in general. The Student Council, Dewan Mahasiswa (Dema) began to re-activate their function of criticising the government’s policies. Since the mid-1970s, Dema succeeded in replacing the role of extra-campus organizations and received firm recognition among students,[8] which allowed Dema to become an arena for Muslim and Leftist activists to gain influence over students.
The most influential Dema at the level of national politics were those of the Indonesia University (UI) and the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB). In its meeting on 1-5 November 1973, Dema UI stressed its commitment to give voice to the people’s aspirations. This led Dema UI to play an active role in criticising the government.[9] The case of Malari in 1974, abbreviated from Malapetaka Lima Belas January or the Tragedy of January Fifteenth, signalled the increasingly critical attitudes of students towards the government. The Malari incident was a reflection of the students’ frustration with the regime’s economic policies which had allowed extensive foreign involvement in Indonesia’s economic affairs, causing an unprecedented riot that resulted in the destruction of over a thousand of Japanese vehicles and foreign-owned buildings. Immediately after the incident, the government issued a decree (SK No. 28/U/1974) through the Ministry of Education and Culture to block the influence of the Student Councils. It required all students to attain formal approval from university rectors in order to hold gatherings on campus and to coordinate all activities outside campus through KNPI.[10]
Another important issue for student activists in the 1970s was the statement by a national student consortium of Student Councils in Bandung made in October 1977, which demanded the application of Indonesia’s Constitution and Pancasila in a pure and consistent manner (murni dan konsekuen) and called for the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) to hold a Special Session (Sidang Istimewa) to ask President Soeharto to account for the abuse of Pancasila.[11] Student willingness to criticise and mobilise against Soeharto gathered momentum. In Bandung, the Bandung Institute of Technology’s Student Council issued what they called as “the White Book of the 1978 Student Struggle” accusing Soeharto of abusing his power and deviating from the Constitution and Pancasila.
As widespread unrest developed among student activists, the government issued a decree, the Normalization of Campus Life, Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus (NKK) in April 1978 to limit students’ rights of expression, assembly and association which led to another policy of the Coordinating Body for Student Affairs, Badan Koordinasi Kampus (BKK). The Minister of Education, Daoed Joesoef, issued a statement directing students to be involved only in activities related to student welfare (i.e. educational facilities and material and spiritual well-being), student interests (arts, sports, journalism, outdoor recreation and campus community pursuits) and student thought and reasoning (study clubs and seminars).[12] The policy of NKK/BKK was effective in ending student involvement in political issues. Subsequently, in 1984 the government issued the policy of “Sole Principle” (Asas Tunggal) that was perceived mainly by Muslim activists as aimed at breaking the ties of the Islamic extra-campus organizations and the Islamic parties with students on campuses.[13] Under these conditions the activities of both extra- and intra -student organisations indeed declined.[14]
Muslim student activists also indicated their reluctance to join Islamic parties after the government forced the only Islamic party, the Development Unity Party, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) to use Pancasila as its political basis in 1984. In general, the attitude of Muslim students in responding to the policies of the New Order varied. Nurmahmudi Ismail, a former activist of Jemaah Tarbiyah at the Bogor Institute of Agriculture, Institut Pertanian Bogor (IPB) and ex-president of the Justice Party, described two orientations in students’ responses to the government co-optation in the mid 1980s. A first group still believed that there was a need to struggle for the sake of Islam through the political party system, even though the party was under the control of the government at the time. A second group felt deeply disillusioned with the party and could not see any good intentions whatsoever in the Muslim activists who joined the PPP. According to this second group, they were no different from government puppets. The Jemaah Tarbiyah activists, as represented by Nurhmahmudi Ismail, were counted among those who were doubtful the role of PPP. From 1987 they began to express their disenchantment by not voting in the general elections.[15] Ismail further stated
I was one of those who were disenchanted with the PPP. I decided not to vote during the general elections, and most of us chose this way.[16]
Throughout the Soeharto era, the regime gradually reduced the influence and political role of student organizations and pushed them to focus on academic activities. Soeharto attempted to control student activism and broke its ties with its political patrons. Instead, the regime gave an opportunity to the ruling party, Golkar, to establish its political influence in the campuses. Thus it was that during the reign of Soeharto that many students resolved to devote their time to studying and to turn away from political activities.
Nonetheless, political reasons aside, ideological and religious factors became important for students for action in student organizations. The decline of extra-campus organisations after the implementation of NKK/BKK in 1978 caused a rise in religious student activities. The emergence of the Islamic study groups was also coincidental with the emergence of Christian and Leftist student movements in campuses. The Christian organisation at UI, Persekutuan Oikumene Univiersitas Indonesia (POSA UI), established in 1981, was able to organise its congregations at the faculty and university level. The Leftist-oriented students also developed similar study clubs. They were in competition for the control of student governing bodies and other strategic intra-student organizations within campuses. They were often involved in clashes, collaboration and even in agreements for sharing power within student activities. This resembled Realpolitik in the broadest sense, because they had to resort to all kinds of practical politics for their own interests.[17] In fact, their combination of religious activities and political experiments on campus would come to be considered important preparation in developing their political careers in the future.
[1] Quoted from Mahfudz Sidiq, Risalah Dakwah Tulabiyah: Kajian Komprehensif Manhaj Dakwah Tarbiyah di Kalangan Pelajar dan Mahasiswa (Jakarta: Pustaka Tarbiatuna, 2002), 13.
[2] Sidiq, Risalah Dakwah Tulabiyah, 3.
[3] The extra-campus organizations that comprised KAMMI were HMI, GMNI, SEMMI, SOMAL, PELMASI, and MAPANTJAS. See Arbi Sanit, “Gerakan Mahasiswa 1970-1973: Pecahnya Bulan Madu Politik,” in Penakluk Rezim Orde Baru Gerakan Mahasiswa ’98 (Pustaka Sinar Harapan:Jakarta, 1999), 45.
[4] See Abdul Mun’im DZ, “Gerakan Mahasiswa 1966 di Tengah Pertarungan Politik Elit,” in Penakluk Rezim Orde Baru, 41.
[5] Edward Aspinall, “Political Opposition and the Transition from the Authoritarian Rule: the Case of Indonesia” (Ph.D., diss., the Australian National University, 2000), 160.
[6] Generally student organisations are divided into intra- and extra- campus organisations. Intra-campus refers to student organisations established in campuses with no organisational links with other organisations off campus, while the extra-campus groups have their own offices outside campus but also establish branches on campus.
[7] See Arbi Sanit, “Gerakan Mahasiswa 1970-1973”, 48.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid., 52-53.
[10] See Richard Gordon Kraince, “The Role of Islamic Student Activists in Divergent Movements for Reform during Indonesia’s Transition from Authoritarian Rule, 1998-2001” (Ph.D. diss., Ohio University: 2003), 89.
[11] Ibid., 91
[12] Ibid., 96.
[13] Interview with Nurmahmudi Ismail, Depok, 8 May 2003. See also Harold Crouch, “Islam and Politics in Indonesia,” in Politics, Diplomacy and Islam: Four Case Studies (Canberra: the Australian National University, 1986), 21.
[14] Irene H. Gayatri, “Arah Baru Perlawanan Gerakan Mahasiswa 1989-1993,” in Penakluk Rezim Orde Baru, 65.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Interview with Mustafa Kamal, Jakarta, 23 December 2005.