In order to gain insight into Indonesian student activism with a developing interest in Islam, it is helpful to consider Azyumardi Azra’s categorisation of three orientations.[18] The first of these are students of high religious and spiritual inquiry. They consider the Islamic circles on campus, the halaqah as suitable to their spiritual needs. They attend regular meetings organised by senior students and are able to develop close contacts with one another and consider themselves and their fellow Muslims as one family. There is a practice of sharing material goods and a sense of security in these newly Islamic environments. Spirituality, piety, the regular observance of Islamic duties, solidarity and togetherness are the features that draw students to join these circles.[19] New students coming from remote areas or villages who have no family in the city feel that these kinds of activities help them to find friends. Since their involvement within the group is highly motivated by religious needs and security, friendships become easier to build.[20]
Their interactions with the group are not confined to attending to their own religious needs; they are soon also challenged to spread the ideas they have gained to their fellow Muslims on campus. They do not limit their activities to the mosque but often meet in the small prayer rooms located in the faculties and departments within the universities. They ask their friends to observe the daily prayers while on campus and invite them to join their religious circles. Topics for discussion are not only religious but are often related to students’ academic needs. For instance, they feel encouraged when facing assignments and examinations since these are also considered to be tasks that will be rewarded by God.
A second group of students are those of Muslim upbringing who are more inclined towards Leftist associations. They are not necessarily from families with a Communist background; rather the majority have been raised in devout Muslim families. Like the first group, who tend to be affiliated with religious activities of a different orientation from their parents, this group has begun to distance itself from formal religious activities. It is more interested in activities such as the People’s Democratic Party, Partai Rakyat Demokrat established in 1994. Both first and second type of students signify the emergence of a new trend in which the children of faithful Indonesian Muslims no longer follow their parents in their approach to religion.[21]
The last group of students are those who are similar to the first category but prefer to gain organisational and political experience, rather than spiritual accomplishments. They join the Islamic organizations that have established branches in their campuses, such as HMI, PMII, and PII because they also provide political opportunities for the future. Through connections with their mentors, they often find jobs more easily. This type of student wants to develop both an understanding of Islam and organisational skills. However, we might state generally that most Islamic campus organizations focus their activities on organisational and political advancements; they are unable to fulfil students’ interests in spiritual dimensions.
Students who have not been satisfied with the extra-campus organisations have sought alternatives to fulfil their spiritual needs and finally join the first group. Since the existing Islamic organisations on campus have been unable to respond to all the spiritual needs of some students, the halaqah groups have been able to gain an advantage.
The halaqah groups, later on known as Kelompok Tarbiyah (Tarbiyah Group) or Jemaah Tarbiyah, have advanced a more organised dakwah to attract students. Through their campus predication, the most successful Islamisation processes on secular campuses have taken place since the 1990s. The prestigious state universities of Java, such as the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB), University of Indonesia (UI), Gadja Madah University (UGM), Bogor Institute of Agriculture (IPB), Airlangga University (Unair) and the Sepuluh November Institute of Technology (ITS) have become strongholds of Jemaah Tarbiyah.
Those who have sought remedies against profane activities have found that the idea of a total Islam as an all-encompassing way of life meets their spiritual demands. In so far as their campus activities and lives had alienated them from religious practice, they felt themselves distanced from the benefits of religious guidance. They have compensated for this by involving themselves in Islamic predication. Through predication activities they have developed a sense of brotherhood and solidarity that they believe they could not find in other groups. One activist of Jemaah Tarbiyah told of his memory during his initial contact with this group
I felt secure and at peace when I gathered together with members of Jemaah Tarbiyah. The feeling of brotherhood, caring and togetherness which was developed among the ikhwa>n made me feel at home.[22]
In addition, the political ambition of HMI, PMII and other student organisations to gain influence were perceived by Muslim activists as merely set to achieve a short-term goal. They were more interested in power and access into the bureaucracy after graduating from university rather than inspired by the spirit of dakwah. Many Muslim students viewed the involvement of HMI alumni within the system ineffective, since they did not bring any change to colour the system with Islamic ideas – in other words, they had been co-opted by the regime.[23]
Thus the dynamics within the state universities became an important reason for Jemaah Tarbiyah activists to introduce their Islamic ideas. Students of the prestigious institutions were seen to have more potential to bring about social and political change in Indonesia, and efforts to cultivate the seeds of activism on the campuses were believed to be the fastest ways to bring about change in the society.[24] In contrast, the campaign of Islamic renewal, which is more favourable to secular ideas, only draws a limited following in secular campuses. While the secular campuses have proved to be fertile soil to receive the seeds of non-liberal Islam, religious campuses, such as the State Institute of Islamic Religion (IAIN) predominantly support the ideas of the renewal associated movements led by intellectuals, such as Nurcholish Madjid.[25]
The explanation for the prevalence of Islamist groups in the secular campuses and their scarcity on the IAIN lies in the gap between secular and Islamic educational institutions. There have been schisms between these two tertiary sectors, in which students from the secular universities tend to underestimate the qualities of students from the IAIN. In return, students from the IAIN often consider their counterparts in the secular universities ignorant about Islam. Islamic student organisations, such as HMI, PMII and IMM, which are supposed to bridge the gap, cannot perform well since they are not able to reconcile their own differences in terms of religious and political orientations. Many Muslim students are critical of the division between traditionalists and modernists, for example.
The Jemaah Tarbiyah is one of the few groups which have been able to channel students’ interests in religious activities, and in fact their dakwah has helped create this Islamic intensity. Its focus on dakwah has enabled Jemaah Tarbiyah to recruit new cadres who are not interested in politics. In the 1980s, after the implementation of NKK/BKK, students kept themselves at a distance from the political parties and were more interested in taking part in discussions of academic issues and the basics of Islam. The growing development of the activism of the Campus Predication, Aktifis Dakwah Kampus (ADK) under the Body of Islamic Campus Predication, Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (LDK) that expanded its network throughout the secular campuses in Java and the Outer Islands strengthened the role of students in dakwah activities.
Islamic student movements in the secular universities were also a major component of the demonstrations which brought down Soeharto. They organised themselves into a front, the Indonesian Student Action Muslim Union, Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (KAMMI). Along with other Student Executive Bodies from secular universities in Java they poured on to the streets to launch strikes against the regime. How could KAMMI and other elements of campus predication, mainly members of Jemaah Tarbiyah, organise huge demonstrations and establish their networks throughout the secular universities in Indonesia? These actions were not merely the result of spontaneous reaction but of a long-term process of caderisation within the campuses. They had a long history before they emerged as a huge and organised power to challenge the existence of a crumbling regime.[26]
Imaduddin Abdurahhim, a lecturer at The Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) is an important figure who deserves our consideration. He is from a Modernist background; his father was a prominent leader of Masyumi in Sumatra who graduated from al-Azhar University, Cairo. Imaddudin founded the Institute for the Struggler of Dakwah, Lembaga Mujahid Dakwah (LMD) in 1973, and through the LMD many students from non-religious universities attended his “mental training sessions” and finally developed dakwah programs of their own on their campuses.[27] Indeed, the alumni of LMD became key activists in many universities.
Imaduddin had been a Muslim activist while still a student at ITB, when he was involved with the Islamic Students Association (HMI). It was he who proposed the establishment of ITB’s mosque, the Salman al-Farisi, named after an important figure from the stories of the Prophet Muhammad’s companions. The first president of Indonesia, Soekarno, gave the mosque its name. Imaduddin, an engineer by training, was appointed as secretary of the committee of the project.
In 1963 Imaduddin went to the USA to pursue his studies towards a master’s degree at the University of Iowa. During his stay there he became involved with international Islamic propagation, making contact with other Muslim students from various countries.[28] His Islamic orientation and his vision of struggle became more international in scope.[29] It was also in the USA that he established his first contact with Muslim Brothers who were students in the university. Imaduddin developed this contact until he finally became a member of Muslim Students Association (MSA) of the USA and Canada.
After his return home to Indonesia in 1966 he was appointed chairman of the Central Board of Islamic Education and Propagation (PB LDMI, Lembaga Dakwah Mahasiswa Islam) a campus missionary institution under HMI. Through LDMI Imaduddin became close to Nurcholish Madjid, then chairman of HMI. During the time Imaduddin was chairman of LDMI he was sent to attend an international seminar organised by the International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations (IIFSO), which finally led him to be elected secretary-general of this organization. Now he enjoyed interaction with Muslim leaders from around the world.[30]
Imaduddin set up propagation training or Latihan Mujahid Dakwah (Training for Islamic Propagators) at the Salman Mosque of ITB in 1973 after a visit to Malaysia, which lasted two years. In Malaysia, besides working under the Ministry of Education to prepare the conversion of a certain polytechnic institution into a university, he helped to activate the Young Muslim Organization (ABIM) for the propagation of Islam. His presence in Malaysia influenced the dynamics of the Islamic activities of many organizations, particularly ABIM, so that even Anwar Ibrahim himself, as chairman of ABIM, considered Imaduddin as his teacher.[31] Imaduddin’s aim was to use mosques not just as places of worship but also as centres to educate young Muslims who might be hoped to become leaders in the future.[32] The training attracted many students, not only from ITB but also from other universities in Java and Sumatra. The first training even involved student activists from the cosmopolitan centres of Jakarta and Yogyakarta.[33] In fact, the Salman mosque of ITB subsequently became a centre for the training of Muslim activists in the secular universities.
Imaduddin’s growing popularity among students and his rising criticism of the government led the New Order regime to increasingly scrutinise his activities.[34] He not only maintained a close relationship with DDII activists but also made outspoken attacks on the personality of Soeharto and his family. He even accused Soeharto and his family of accumulating wealth taken from the people. In his eyes, Indonesia was full of injustice and ruled by an authoritarian president.[35] As a result, in 1978 he was charged with propagating anti-Pancasila ideas and seeking to overthrow the regime. Finally, he was sentenced to jail for 2 years.[36]
Imaduddin admitted that his vision of Islam was not only influenced by the literature of the Muslim Brothers leaders in Egypt but also Abdul A’la al-Maududi of Pakistan.[37] While Imaduddin succeeded in establishing the LMD, he did not carry out any usrah activities within the formal structure of his organization. When he was sentenced to jail, his cadres ceased the struggle. Nonetheless, it is important to note that his moral training sessions and the LMD are reportedly acknowledged by Muslim activists to be the forerunners of the campus dakwah model, spreading from ITB to numerous other campuses in Indonesia.[38] His monumental training handbook, Kuliah Tauhid (Lectures on Religion) became a major reference and was circulated in almost all of the campuses in Java and in some in Sumatra, Kalimantan and the Eastern parts of Indonesia.[39] In Jakarta, many alumni of LMD returned to their campuses and established Islamic study groups. In UI they introduced various programs in each faculty under different names, such as the Integrated Study of Islam, Integratif Studi Tentang Islam (ISTI) in the faculty of economics, the Integrated Islamic Study, Studi Islam Terpadu (SIT) in the Faculty of Letters and the Forum of Study of Fundamental Islam, Forum Studi Dasar Islam (Fondasi) in the Faculty of Science.[40]
In 1979, not long after his detention, the Studi Islam Intensif (SII) was established and halaqah were formed as alternative activities replacing the LMD.[41] At the same time, the involvement of the large student associations such HMI, PII and many others on the campuses were restricted by the government after through the policy of NKK/BKK. Since the 1980s, initial efforts by SII at ITB coincided with the creation of other Islamic circles and study clubs, including the Muslim Brothers-influenced Jemaah Tarbiyah. Better-structured materials of the Muslim Brothers were introduced to students, emphasising the need to develop individual morality and piety.[42]
Many alumni of LMD who had already established their Islamic activities in some secular universities embraced Jemaah Tarbiyah and implemented more structured teachings from Hasan al-Banna.[43] They learned these systematic teachings of the Muslim Brothers under guidance of Middle East graduates. Some pioneers of Jemaah Tarbiyah who had graduated from Saudi Arabia, such as Hilmi Aminuddin and Abu Ridha helped to introduce the ideas of Hasan al-Banna in ITB, UI and IPB. They focussed on Islamic predication by maximising the use of prayer rooms and organised other activities for students and staff. They were known among students as aktifis mushallah, or prayer room activists.
It is something of a paradox that the government’s restraining of political dakwah activities in Indonesian society at large inadvertently inflated dakwah activities on the campuses. Since any political dakwah conducted through the Friday prayers and public sermons was monitored and restricted by the Soeharto regime, many Muslim activists found that dakwah on campus was the safest way to preserve their struggle for Islam.[44] In most cases, all social and religious activities, private or public, had to be endorsed by stamped letters from authorised agents of the regime.[45] These authorised parties, including the rector, dean and members of a special committee for Islamic activities in the university consistently monitored students’ activities. For instance, the authorised party on campus required that students submit the names of preachers before permission was given for guest lectures or sermons. The rector of the university was indirectly responsible for endorsing or rejecting any preachers from outside campuses and preachers of radical or hardline orientation would not be permitted to deliver sermons in the university-based mosques or at any religious gatherings held by students. As a result of the state’s monitoring of public prayers and sermons (pengajian), Muslim students preferred to use their own prayer rooms to attract students to perform the daily regular prayers.
Since the public space for propagating Islam was restricted, students read printed materials and circulated them to their fellow students in secret. In fact, from the 1970s onwards, the circulation of translated books written by Muslim Brothers activists has been remarkable: hundreds of Muslim Brothers books were translated to Indonesian. In the early emergence of Jemaah Tarbiyah in the mid 1980s the works of Sayyid Qutb and Sayyid Hawwa became alternative books for cadres because they were seen as providing a new spirit of Islamic activism.
The implementation of the government policy of “normalisation” of campus life, Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus (NKK) in 1979 and the ensuing tight surveillance of student activities by the rector and deans of faculties weakened the political activism of students. In addition, the policy of the “Sole Principle” of Pancasila in 1984 imposed by the government had an impact on the ability of extra-campus organizations to build connections with students. Having realised that any resistance towards the regime was futile and easily contained, Muslim students in the 1980s focussed their activities on Islamic predication, putting aside political and social issues for the moment. For that reason, study clubs, rather than demonstrations and public orations (mimbar bebas) attracted students, and small circles were preferable to large gatherings. Thus the tarbiyah model of the Muslim Brothers became an alternative for students in conducting dakwah as well as preserving idealism within the campuses.[46]
In order to survive in these circumstances, the Jemaah Tarbiyah activists carried out their dakwah by establishing halaqah that focussed on practical issues. They were not alone in choosing this course of action, fearing government scrutiny at a time when the regime did not hesitate to crush political resistance, particularly from Islamic organizations. Many Muslim student activists who did not agree with the government’s imposition of the Asas Tunggal set up massive networks of Islamic circles on the campuses that limited their programs of study of basic and practical Islam.
Having been exiled from public space, and in order to develop their ability to resist the government, activists carried out religious training secretly in small and private spaces. They did not use the campus mosques, choosing rather the modest prayer rooms located at the level of faculty or department[47] or conducting their activities in university rented accommodation around the campuses.
Aware of the lack of appropriate preachers for handling the increase in the Islamic circles, Muslim student activists started to build programs aimed at creating more cadres to serve as trainers. Even though these were not supported by professional preachers, the Tarbiyah model of self-sustaining cadres helped to accelerate a massive Islamic predication within the campuses.[48] Students were awakened to their responsibilities and started to search for long-term solutions for the prosperity of Islam.
Through independent training that did not rely on preachers from outside campus, Jemaah Tarbiyah has been able to provide more cadres, better acquainted with religious terms and doctrines, to assume more initiative in religious activities. They have been able to produce their own qualified preachers who are not only able to lead the religious circles but who are also confident in delivering sermons in public gatherings, including the Friday prayers. Equipped with their non-religious expertise as well, they are well received by those who take pride in the status of the secular universities. At the Arif Rahman Hakim Mosque of the University of Indonesia, for instance, from the 1970s until the mid-1980s, most of the Friday sermons were delivered by DDII preachers, but since the early-1990s, many Jemaah Tarbiyah’s activists have been able to replace them.
It has become evident that these Mushallah activists not only target the penetration of religious institutions by controlling the religious education section (Kerohanian Islam, Rohis) at the university and faculty level and by establishing the Forum for Islamic Studies, Forum Studi Islam (FSI) within the faculties, but they have also started to gain influence over politically oriented campus organizations. They won control of Student Senates, Senat Mahasiswa(SM) and established the intra-campus student movement, KAMMI. Such organs within student politics have contributed to strengthening the political role of Jemaah Tarbiyah in student affairs and in national politics.
If Imaduddin placed explicit emphasis on the rejection of Pancasila as an un-Islamic ideology, the Jemaah Tarbiyah activists avoided talking about such issues. In the Bogor Institute of Agriculture (IPB) during the 1980s, for example, Jemaah Tarbiyah established the religious section, Kerohanian Islam (Rohis) that trained Muslim students in an understanding of the most fundamental Islamic teachings and practices. Activists of Rohis on campus also played a significant role in assisting certain lecturers with courses on Islam. Through these tutorials on religion they were further able to set up their networks of Islamic circles.[49]
The non-political nature of the Jemaah Tarbiyah training and meeting circles has attracted wide attention among students. However, its apolitical attitude at that time by no means passed without criticism. Many other Muslim student activists severely criticised the government repression of students and Muslim activists, while accusing members of Jemaah Tarbiyah of lacking the courage to stand up for the truth before the tyrants.[50]
As has been suggested by van Bruinessen, Jemaah Tarbiyah, despite its important role in building individual good character, also manifested an inner rejection of the Pancasila state and of un-Islamic practices in modern Indonesia.[51] However, Jemaah Tarbiyah did not reject the state existence of Pancasila but carried this spirit of rejection against the imposition of it as the “Sole Principle” upon all political parties and mass organizations as well.[52] It must also be said here that Jemaah Tarbiyah’s disagreement with government policy was not merely the rejection of Pancasila. What Jemaah Tarbiyah really disagreed with was the policy of the government of disregarding other ideologies that were perceived to be in contradiction with Pancasila. Of course, the regime had its own interpretation of Pancasila, which it sought to enforce. The Soeharto regime never ceased to try to impose its self legitimising understanding of Pancasila onto the broader context of Indonesian society at large.[53]
Since the 1990s the members of Jemaah Tarbiyah have expanded their influence by penetrating and controlling formal Muslim student activities within the campuses. They have been able to make good their existence through the establishment of autonomous activities under the supervision of the deans of faculty. In turn, they were authorised by faculty and to carry out Islamic activities. For instance, they organised celebrations of the Prophet Muhammad’s birth, collected funds for charities and set up new Islamic circles as well. In the Faculties of Humanities and Medical Science at the University of Indonesia they established the Forum for Islamic Studies and Practices, Forum Amal dan Studi Islam (Formasi) and the Forum for Islamic Studies, Forum Studi Islam (FSI) respectively. In almost all faculties of state universities they founded similar forums under the generic name of the Forum of Islamic Studies. Since then, religious activities have developed and won wide influence among students.[54]
The existence of these faculty based organizations within the universities has attracted new students to join their programs in numbers. Beginning at the freshman year, the members of the FIS successfully provided alternative Islamic training sessions. These take a form similar to that of the traditional Islamic boarding schools (pesantren), while they may differ in terms of length of study and the way in which course contents are presented. Although most training sessions are held during the weekends and campus holidays, they are always sited in interesting venues, such in the villas of the mountain resort of Puncak, West Java. Such training appeals to new students who are happy to spend their holidays in recreation and enhancing their religious knowledge and practice.
The expansion of FIS in the faculties has necessitated the establishment of a broader organization to manage all Islamic organisations under the umbrella of one body at university level, the Campus Predication Institute, Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (LDK), particularly to respond to the need for broader activities, aimed to build contacts with various bodies of student predication on other campuses. At UI, Nuansa Islam Campus (Salam) was founded in 1997. At IPB and ITB, activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah who were involved in the Forum for Islamic Studies coordinated their activities through the organisation called the Council for Mosque Cultivation, Dewan Kemakmuran Masjid (DKM) al-Hurriyah, established in 1997 and the Family of Islamic Students, Keluarga Mahasiswa Islam (Gamais) ITB, established in 1991 respectively. At UGM the Shalahuddin Congregation (Jamaah Shalahuddin) has become a significant organisation affiliated with Jemaah Tarbiyah. Thus, activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah who organised themselves in LDK have begun to participate in a broader network of inter-campus predication, the Forum for Coordination of Campus Predication, Forum Silaturahmi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (FSLDK).
FSLDK held its first national conference 1986, which aimed to coordinate and unify Islamic campus predication at various universities in Indonesia.[55] As an umbrella of campus predication throughout the universities, FSLDK became an important organ through which Muslim activists could disseminate their ideas.[56] For instance, after the Eighth Conference of FSLD in Makassar, South Sulewesi in 1993 the book written by a scholar of Hizbut Tahrir, Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani (1909-1977) entitled Kitab Mafahim, became a standard text read by activists of LDK in many universities.[57] However, since the book was introduced through an elite top-down process, it could not last for long. In its Tenth Conference in Malang in 1998, Jemaah Tarbiyah activists were able to take control the leadership of FSLDK.[58]
Since the activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah do not dominate all Islamic campus activities, a number of conflicts with different movements have often arisen. We need to examine how splits and competition among new Islamic movements operate in the process of recruitment of new members. The conflict involves three main groups, the Jemaah Tarbiyah, the Salafi group and Hizbut Tahrir. As stated by Ismail Yusanto, a spokesperson of Hibut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) Islamic movements in Gadjah Mada University (UGM), for instance, have maintained a long rivalry for the control of the intra-campus organisations. When a particular movement has gained control over students in an institution, they would not invite in preachers other than their own. For instance, since the early 1990s, Yusanto has been given no opportunity to lecture to student gatherings. But more recently, after Jemaah Tarbiyah established its political party in 1998, he was often called on to give Islamic lectures in UGM because pragmatic members of Jemaah Tarbiyah have created the opportunity for Hizbut Tahrir in UGM to consolidate with them.[59]
In Surabaya, where three state secular universities operate, before the establishment of PK, most Islamic activities had been organised by Jemaah Tarbiyah activists. However, after the involvement of their members in politics, Salafi groups and Hizbut Tahrir have started to put down roots and have managed to lessen the role of Jemaah Tarbiyah in campus predication.[60] As before, many of the younger generation of Muslim students criticised HMI for its political inclinations and its competition to win political careers, now many students in campuses also have begun to criticise the obvious political inclinations of Jemaah Tarbiyah. Halaqah have been fuelled with a rhetoric that aims to defend the political decisions of PKS.[61]
However, for those students who are politically minded, memberships of Jemaah Tarbiyah brings opportunities to follow a political path that might lead them to occupy positions of leadership in PKS, or even to be elected members of parliament. In fact, many former student activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah have now been elected members at the district and national levels.
Besides the Forum for Islamic Study, another set of important campus organizations currently under the control of Jemaah Tarbiyah is the Student Senate, Senat Mahasiswa (SM) of the secular state universities, which has become the Student Executive Body, Badan Eksekutif Mahasiswa (BEM). This body comprises the central leadership of students, organising and managing activities at the campus level that may involve student executive bodies at the faculty level in turn.
The Student Executive Body is very much influenced by the dynamics of national politics, in so far as it leads students to be directly involved in political action. Its leadership is very important for certain students with aspirations of further political progress. It influences national politics, and the activists themselves, in the political games of the Indonesian leadership configurations. For this reason, there is competition to take over the leadership of this body, not only by the students, but the government also tries to exert its influence upon it. In fact, the elections of this body always entail political consequences at the level of campus and of the state.
The control exerted by the regime over campus life has succeeded in diminishing students’ political and social activism and has led them to focus on academic activities and special interest study groups. Demonstrations against the development of the Kedung Ombo reservoir in 1989, for instance, was initiated by a study group that organised themselves under a committee of Kelompok Solidaritas Korban Pembangunan Waduk Kedung Ombo (Group in Solidarity with the Victims of the Kedung Ombo Reservoir Development).[62]
In 1990 the Minister of Education proposed a new form of student government called The Student Senate, Senat Mahasiswa (SM) under the control of the university rector. However, most student activists perceived this body as part of the regime’s intervention on student activism. The rector’s intrusive role within the activities of SM led students to organise their protests through ad hoc action committees, rather than using the formal organisation of the student senate.
Even though it no longer had a significant influence on national issues, the student senate was still an important organ of impact on internal student issues. Rivalry among activists of Islamist, Leftist, Nationalist and Christian fronts often occurred over recruitment and to secure their positions in SM. In the Faculty of Letters of the University of Indonesia (now the Humanities) during the 1990s, for example, activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah were prevented by the head of the student senate of the Faculty from forming an intra-campus organisation. This was because the committees of the senate were predominantly Leftists.[63] In fact, the Faculty of Humanities, UI, was a Leftist stronghold.[64] In order to be able to establish an Islamic organisation there, Jemaah Tarbiyah activists turned to working with other nationalists to run for the annual student senate elections.
When their candidate was elected by a decent majority, the activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah were allowed to establish an organisation on campus. In 1990 the Forum for Islamic Implementation and Study (Formasi) was formally established in the Faculty of Humanities of UI. In 1993, activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah, through Formasi, participated in the student elections and succeeded in placing their cadre as head of the student senate. Mustafa Kamal was elected as the head of SM and became the first Jemaah Tarbiyah cadre to hold such a position and in other faculties, a number of activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah were also elected as heads of the student senates. In 1994 a cadre of Jemaah Tarbiyah, Zulkieflimansyah, was elected as the head of the student senate of UI, securing the highest position of the student senate at the university level.[65] Subsequently, most student senates of prestigious secular state universities such as ITB, IPB, UGM and many others have come under the control of Jemaah Tarbiyah.
The success of Jemaah Tarbiyah in securing positions in the student senates at the levels of faculty and university in certain prestigious universities forced nationalist and Leftist students to become marginalised. In 1996 the Forum for Communication of Student Senates in Jakarta, Forum Komunikasi Senat Mahasiswa Jakarta (FKSMJ) was established as a counter against the domination of Jemaah Tarbiyah activists. The aim of this organisation is to oppose formal organisations within campuses which prevent students from involvement in grassroots issues. This forum chiefly represents the student senates of the private universities, because of Jemaah Tarbiyah domination of the state universities.[66]
During the demonstrations in 1998 to topple Soeharto, when most of heads of student senates from state universities such as UI, IAIN Syahid, UGM, Unila,[67] Unair,[68] Unibraw,[69] IPB and ITB joined KAMMI to launch a huge demonstration in the Al-Azhar Mosque of Jakarta on 10 April 1998, members of FKSMJ were absent.[70]
Through intensive communication among campus predication activists in 1998, the activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah were able to establish an intercampus organization that played a significant role in the demonstrations calling for the resignation of President Soeharto. The Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union (KAMMI) was established in 29 March 1998 after activists of student Islamic predication held a tenth intercampus meeting under the Forum for the Coordination of Campus Predication Institution, Forum Silaturahmi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (FSLDK) in Malang, East Java.
The decision to establish an intercampus organization was not formally endorsed at the FSLDK national conference in Malang, but certain members proposed it after the meeting closed. The coordinator of the centre for communication, region I, of FSLDK (Sumatra, West Java and DKI Jakarta), Mohammad Basyumi, issued a press release stating that KAMMI was not representative of FSLDK but an individual initiative.[71] The founding of KAMMI was announced by the head of LDK of the Muhammadiyah Malang University (UMM), not by the coordinator of national FSLDK. It seems that the rejection by some members of FSLDK was triggered by the fact that activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah had led the way to the establishment of KAMMI. Even though FSLDK has been dominated by Jemaah Tarbiyah, activists of FSLDK have represented various streams of Islamic groups, but in small numbers.[72] In fact, mushallah activists affiliated with Jemaah Tarbiyah have dominated the memberships of FSLDK.
At the level of student organisation, KAMMI has offered an alternative Islamic student networking that bridges the gap between the religious and secular campuses in Indonesia. Before the establishment of KAMMI in 1998, the absence of Islamic extra-campus organizations within the secular campuses led Muslim student activists to organise their activities independently. They developed contacts with some secular universities and did not attempt to engage with activists from Islamic higher education institutions. This fact that Islamist groups have developed on secular campuses but have few roots in the IAIN is the result of the absence of extra-campus organizations. KAMMI has represented a new Islamic student organization that was expected to take the initiative in developing closer relations with the Muslim activists of Islamic institutions. The former chairman of KAMMI, Fahri Hamzah, explained the three important tasks of KAMMI
First, it would conduct networking in campus mosques throughout Indonesia. Second, the group would elicit support from Indonesian students who were studying outside of the country, in order to rally international support. Large Indonesian student populations in Germany and Japan in particular produced quite active KAMMI branches. Third, it would attempt to forge connections with other groups, including the students of rural Islamic boarding schools – traditionally an extremely important source of political power in Indonesia.[73]
In general, KAMMI has tended towards a centrist stance on issues related to student and Muslim affairs. For instance, when the Reformation movement in Indonesia had just began in May 1998, many student movements openly demanded the resignation of Soeharto. KAMMI, through its chairman, Fahri Hamzah took a softer line. Hamzah asserted that “if Soeharto changes and comes to the forefront of reform, it is not impossible that we would support him.”[74] For KAMMI, the critical dimension of reform was not merely change of regime but rather moral, political and legal reform of the total system.[75] However, when the huge wave of students and national leaders, including Amien Rais, demanding Soeharto’s resignation gained momentum, KAMMI supported the majority stance.
The following example also demonstrates KAMMI’s middle position in responding to issues of political and religious controversy and of how KAMMI tried to place itself as a moral guard between radical action and moderation. On March 1999, when many Islamic groups, including PK, PBB, PPP and other Islamic organisations in Yogyakarta marched in the streets to condemn the tragedy of Ambon, which had caused the death of many Muslims, and to call for jihad to protect their fellow Muslims, KAMMI as an organization was absent.[76] Even though most of its members joined the march, the organization did not come to an agreement to show its formal support for any jihad that involved military action. Instead, KAMMI initiated a rehabilitation team to support the Muslim refugees by providing essential supplies.[77]
Since most KAMMI activists are also members of Jemaah Tarbiyah, their relations with PKS are obvious. In many cases, even though it claims to be an independent organisation,[78] KAMMI serves as the student wing of PKS. It also provides opportunities for its activists to pursue political careers. Most former chairmen of KAMMI hold important positions of leadership in PKS and some have even been elected members of the national parliament. Fahri Hamzah, the first chairman of KAMMI and Andi Rahmad, his successor, have been PKS representatives in the national parliament (2004-2009) whilst Haryo Setyoko, a general secretary became a deputy general secretary of the Central Board of PKS (2000-2005).
Nonetheless, KAMMI does not always try to follow the policy of PKS. In responding to the issue of the government’s hike in oil prices in 2004, KAMMI displayed a different opinion. In the beginning, PKS through its representative in the national parliament opposed government policy, considering that the negative impacts on the little people were bigger than the benefits.[79] During the Rapat Paripurna (general meeting) between DPR and the government on 14 March 2004, PKS withdrew its previous decision to oppose the government’s proposal.[80] One of the members of PKS, Nursanita Nasution even blatantly stated that PKS would have never accept a policy to raise the oil prices for the people.[81]
However PKS then changed its stance. After a long and heavy discussion in parliament, PKS dropped its decision and supported the proposal of the government, with some notes that the government was required to ensure that compensation funds for petro-fuels (Bahan Bakar Minyak, BBM) should be directed towards reducing the economic burdens of the people. In addition, PKS demanded that the government take strict measures to solve big coruption cases.[82] In contrast, KAMMI took a different direction and continued to pressure the government through demonstrations. KAMMI expressed its disappointment towards PKS for its ambiguity in supporting the people’s interests. KAMMI complained to PKS during the DPR meeting discussing the issue of oil prices and carried in a free-range chicken as a symbolic gift, in the hope that PKS would not act “chicken” (ayam sayur).[83]
Jemaah Tarbiyah activists had drawn public attention to the condition of the Indonesian people after the resignation of Soeharto in 1998. Cadres of Jemaah Tarbiyah who were the heads of university student senates and Islamic intra-campus organisations, together with the activists in KAMMI, had launched demonstrations to topple Soeharto. They also collaborated with other student groups in guarding the agenda of the political reformation of Indonesia. However, the cooperation between Islamist groups and other student groups did not last long after most members of KAMMI and its affiliates showed their support of B.J Habibie to replace Soeharto, whereas nationalist and Leftist student groups rejected him.
In the event, the end of the Soeharto regime changed the orientation of student activism. Students have started to re-establish their connections with political parties and have opened up their political opportunities, while many parties make intensive approaches to student activists. The secular campuses have become more dynamic in terms of competition and rivalry among various religious and political interests, in order to secure important positions within the student governing bodies. The success of the activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah in securing central leaderships of student senates has strengthened the role of the secular campuses as a source of political caderisation. Rama Pratama, a former head of the Student Executive Body of UI and Fahri Hamzah, a former chairman of the Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union (KAMMI) were among the leaders of a huge demonstration against Soeharto in 1998, and have subsequently been elected members of the legislature of the Prosperous Justice Party.
[18] Azyumardi Azra, “Kelompok Sempalan di Kalangan Mahasiswa PTU: Anatomi Sosio Historis” in Dinamika Pemikiran Islam di Perguruan Tinggi: Wacana tentang Pendidikan Agama Islam (Jakarta: Logos, 1999), 224.
[19] Interview with Muhammad Irwan, Surabaya, 12 March 2003.
[20] Ibid.
[21] See “Comparing Islamic Leftist and Rightist,” The Jakarta Post, 21 September 2002.
[22] Interview with Muhammad Arif, Padang, 19 June 2003.
[23] Mahfudz Sidiq, KAMMI dan Pergulatan Reformasi:Kiprah Politik Aktifis Dakwah Kampus dalam Perjuangan Demokratisasi di Tengah Gelombang Krisis Nasional Multidimensi (Solo: Era Intermedia, 2003), 72
[24] Jemaah Tarbiyah activists believe that in order to be successful in carrying on the dakwah, the support of qualified cadres is crucial. See Ahmad Satori Ismail, Tarbiyah dan Perubahan Sosial (Jakarta: Pustaka Tarbiatuna, 2003), 9.
[25] Azra, “Kelompok Sempalan di Kalangan Mahasiswa PTU,” 224.
[26] See Sidiq, KAMMI dan Pergulatan Reformasi, 113.
[27] Interview with Marfendi, Padang, 23 June 2003.
[28] Ulumul Qur’an 2 no. V (1994), 86-94. For further details also see Gatra, 7 October 1995.
[29] V.S. Naipaul, Among the Believers: an Islamic Journey (New York: Vintage Book, 1982), 373 .
[30] Nurhayati, Djamas “Gerakan Kaum Muda Islam Masjid Salman” in Gerakan Islam Kontemporer di Indonesia (Jakarta: Ikapi, 1996), 265. Djamas suspected that Imaduddin’s first interaction with MB ideas was during the time that he was actively involved in the International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations (IIFSO). However, long before he held a high position in the IIFSO, Imaduddin was active in Islamic propagation during his first departure in 1963 to the US where he made contact with the Muslim Student Association (MSA), the Muslim Brothers-influenced student movement in the USA. See Muslim Executive and Expatriate Newsletter 3 no. 1 (2000). See www.islamic-path.org.
[31] Ulumul Qur’an 2 no. V (1994), 86-94.
[32] Muslim Executive and Expatriate Newsletter 3 no. 1 (2000).
[33] Ibid.
[34] Naipaul, Among the Believers, 363.
[35] Ibid. 377.
[36] Ibid., 364.
[37] Ibid., 374.
[38] ITB was considered as centre for Islamic revival and accused by the government of being a source of Islamic radicalism during the 1970s and 1980s.
[39] Interview with Mustafa Kamal, Depok, 11 June 2003.
[40] Sidiq, KAMMI dan Pergulatan Reformasi, 71.
[41] Djamas “Gerakan Kaum Muda Islam Masjid Salman,” 265
[42] Interview with Abu Ridha, Jakarta, 11 October 2003.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Although the bans on lectures and radio programs against the aims of the state were repealed in 1978 and there was a change towards the “normalisation” of the people and religion in that year, this regulation was used as a new stage in the surveillance of the activities of dakwah Islam. However, as long as religious activities did not turn into political criticism or agitation against the regime, they were allowed to be held.
[45] Merlyna Lim, “Cyber-Civic Space in Indonesia: From Panopticon to Pandemonium?” IDPR 24 no. 4 (2002), 367.
[46] See Sidiq, KAMMI dan Pergulatan Reformasi, 113.
[47] The moving of the University of Indonesia (UI) in 1987 from Jakarta to Depok near Bogor, for instance, represented the government’s aim to prevent students from engaging in dissident political activities by weakening the role of the Dewan Mahahiswa as centres. Instead, the activities were rolled back into the faculties because of the distance of one faculty from another.
[48] Sidiq, KAMMI dan Pergulatan Reformasi, 113.
[49] Interview with Nurmahmudi Ismail, Depok, 8 May 2003.
[50] Interview, anonymous, Depok, 9 May 2003.
[51] Martin van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia”, South East Asia Research 10 no. 2 (2002), 133.
[52] Hidayat Nurwahid, the former President of PKS and the Chairperson of MPR RI emphasized that in the 1980s he did not reject Pancasila but he opposed the imposition of the Sole of Principle. See Tempo, 19-25 June 2006.
[53] See Ramage Douglas, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance (New York, Routledge, 1995), 24-31.
[54] See Abdul Aziz, “Meraih Kesempatan dalam Situasi Mengambang: Studi Kasus Kelompok Keagamaan Mahasiswa Univesitas Indonesia,” Penamas no. 20 (1995), 3.
[55] See Rifki Rosyad, “A Quest for True Islam: A Study of the Islamic Resurgence Movements among the Youth in Bandung, Indonesia” (Master thesis, the Australian National University, 1995), 56.
[56] See Ismail Yusanto, “LDK: Antara Visi, Misi dan Realitas Sejarah Perkembangannya,” www.fsldk.20m.com.
[57] See “Banyak Jalan Menuju Kehidupan Islami,” Suara Hidayatullah, August 2000.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Interview with Ismail Yusanto, Canberrra, August 2004.
[60] Interview, anonymous, Surabaya, 24 May 2005.
[61] Interview, anonymous, Surabaya, 12 March 2003.
[62] Edward Aspinall, “Students and the Military: Regime Friction and Civilian Dissent in the Late Suharto Period,” Indonesia 59 (April 1995), 32.
[63] Interview with Mustafa Kamal, Jakarta, 13 December 2005.
[64] Ibid.
[65] Ibid.
[66] See Kontan Online, 16 November 1998.
[67] University of Lampung, Sumatra.
[68] University of Airlangga, Surabaya, East Java.
[69] University of Brawijaya, Malang, East Java
[70] Muridan S. Widjojo and Moch. Nurhasim, “Organisasi Gerakan Mahasiswa 1998: Upaya Rekonstruksi,” in Penakluk Rezim Orde Baru, 366.
[71] Sidiq, KAMMI dan Pergulatan Reformasi, 104-105.
[72] Interview, anonymous, Jakarta, 23 May 2003.
[73] See Kraince, “The Role of Islamic Student Activists,” 169-170.
[74] Ibid., 183
[75] Ibid., 184
[76] Ibid., 238
[77] Ibid., 240
[78] See “Profile Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia,” Kammi.or.id.
[79] See a press release issued by FPKS, 4 Maret 2004
[80] See a press release issued by FPKS, 15 Maret 2004.
[81] Keadilan Online, 18 Maret 2005.
[82] See press release of PKS, 21 Maret 2005
[83] See “Tertunda, Pencarian Dana Kompensasi BBM,” Kompas, 8 March 2005.