The nature of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers as an international movement is apparent in its wide spread beyond Egypt. Research findings on the Society published in the early 1950s presented important analysis of the spread of Muslim Brothers-associated movements throughout the Middle East and wider Asia. Richard P. Mitchell indicated the existence of brothers in Syria, Palestine and other parts of the Middle East, while an Egyptian scholar, Ishak Musa Husaini also pointed out the tendency of the movement to organise international networks around the world.[16] Today, the society of Muslim Brothers is among the most influential groups in the Arab world and other Muslim countries.
Many supporters of the Muslim Brothers themselves acknowledge the existence of their movement throughout the world, in more than seventy countries in the Middle East, Asia, Europe and the United States.[17] Most local offshoots are committed to its central figures and doctrines but retain their own administrations and organizations. Therefore, the influence and existence of the Muslim Brothers in Indonesia is not an isolated phenomenon.
According to Hilmi Aminuddin, head of the Consultative Council of PKS (2004-2009) the adoption of a model with reference to the Muslim Brothers is an effort to institutionalise the unity of faith (aqidah) and thought (fikrah); in this, the name of the movement is not important.[18] Some Muslim Brothers-associated movements take the form of legal political parties, such as in Jordan, Yemen and Indonesia, while many others have formed more social organizations. In the case of Indonesia, a Muslim Brothers scholar based in Qatar, Yusuf Qardawi has stated in one of its books that the Jemaah Tarbiyah-backed party is part of the Muslim Brothers mission in Egypt.[19] However, the community of Jemaah Tarbiyah itself has never claimed organisational links with the Muslim Brothers. Hidayat Nurwahid, a former president of PKS said, “we don’t want to claim be identical to the Muslim Brothers because this movement is so great. We are afraid to claim it as it may jeopardise the image of the Muslim Brothers. We just work for the sake of Islam.”[20]
Nevertheless, although the members of the Jemaah Tarbiyah do not explicitly claim to be a part of the Muslim Brothers, their way in conducting Islamic training and their religious orientation are similar.[21] Nor do they try to deny their association with the Muslim Brothers. According to Rahmat Abdullah, not all organizations affiliated with Muslim Brothers use the formal name of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, for the name does not mean anything if they do not comply with the genuine character of the Muslim Brothers. On the other hand, there are many associations that prefer to name themselves something else, even while the essence of their struggle is the same.[22] For Abdullah, the name is not important, what matter is the essence of the organization, which must be in accordance with the movement’s ideals.[23]
As the Muslim Brothers are not recognized, indeed are repressed by the government of Egypt, the movement has turned to spreading its international network.[24] In 1954, under the regime of Gamal Abd al-Nasir, hundreds of Muslim Brothers activists were jailed, its six leaders were executed and finally it was outlawed.[25] Nasir continued to suppress Muslim Brothers activities, to arrest thousands of people and hundreds were sentenced and tortured. Three leading activists, including Sayyid Qutb, were hanged in Cairo in 1966. In 1971, when Anwar Sadat came to power he released the Brothers from jail. But fearing similar repression by the Sadat regime, many activists left Egypt. In fact, in 1982, Sadat repeated what his predecessor had done to the Muslim Brothers. He ordered the arrest of hundreds of its members and its leaders.[26]
It was through certain activists of the Muslim Brothers who found asylum in Saudi Arabia and Western countries that an international organisation developed. Muhammad Qutb fled to Saudi Arabia while Sa’id Ramadhan went to Switzerland. Mustafa Masyhur, after his release in 1971, went to Germany and organised international representatives for the Muslim Brothers in exile.[27] In 1996, Masyhur was elected as supreme leader of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt. All of the local offshoots, either in the Middle East, Europe, United States or Asia are theoretically under Egyptian leadership.[28] However, in practice they develop autonomous agendas depending on their local social, political and cultural conditions.
Moreover, observing the models employed to spread their ideas, which are predominantly similar to those of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, it appears that Jemaah Tarbiyah has emphasised its international and global orientation rather than local interests. Its adoption of the Muslim Brothers ideas and religious practices make it distinct from existing Islamic organizations and groups in Indonesia. The frequent use of Arabic words, (instead of English or even local languages) in the fields of politics, economics and daily activities are some indication of its distinctiveness. These terms, such as siyasah (politics), musharakah (cooperation), hizb (party), iqtisad (economics), ma’ishah (income) and rabat (benefit) are common. The most popular term used by Jemaah Tarbiyah is ikhwan (brothers) which has two forms, ikhwan (brothers) and akhawat (sisters).[29]
So international influences on Jemaah Tarbiyah have been evident, though they have not entirely overridden local dynamics. Of course, the international dimension is more apparent than the local when we consider the distinct ideas of the movement. A careful study of the intellectual formation of Jemaah Tarbiyah reveals a process of adoption of new ideas quite different from current trends in existing Islamic parties and organizations in Indonesia.
Nonetheless, the ability to accommodate an international idea and to combine it with its Indonesian context has made Jemaah Tarbiyah far from a totally foreign movement. It has not broken its connections with older traditions. Often accommodation is made of some traditional religious practice in order to maintain links with mass organisations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. Muslikh Abdul Karim, an activist of Jemaah Tarbiyah who spent years attending religious trainings at the traditional NU Pesantren of Langitan, East Java and gained his doctoral degree in theology from the University of King Abdul Aziz, Saudi Arabia, described his attitude toward his previous association, NU
When we came to Saudi Arabia we were different from our fellow Indonesian Muslims. In Saudi Arabia, most students are either sponsored by M. Natsir of DDII or M. Syaikhu of NU. Such students keep their own religious identity. Those who were affiliated with NU stay with NU members. We did not do such thing. We were about fifteen students, and we had left our identities behind [NU or Muhammadiyah] because we took them off at the Jakarta airport. We were sponsored by the Institute of Arabic and Islamic Studies of Ibnu Saud [LIPIA] in Jakarta. We decided not to identify ourselves either with NU or Muhammadiyah. But we still practised our traditions as NU members.[30]
However, it was not only Jemaah Tarbiyah that was influenced by the Muslim Brothers movement; other Islamic movements during 1980s also had connections either directly or indirectly with them. This influence was mostly received through printed media and organizational relations and there were also some individuals who built direct connections with the Muslim Brothers leaders. For example, the Malaysian Youth of Islam, Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM) was the best channel in the dissemination of Muslim Brothers’ ideas through its relations with international Muslim youth organizations. Some Indonesian youth organizations, such as HMI and PII attended an international meeting organised by ABIM.[31] Bruinessen has argued that ABIM served as a trans-national agent connecting HMI with the Muslim Brothers and the Pakistani Jamaat Islami; however, the role of Indonesian figures such as Imaduddin, a lecturer in the Institute of Technology, Bandung, in transmitting Muslim Brothers’ ideas to ABIM in the 1980s is another example. Imaduddin became the mentor of ABIM during his visit in Malaysia. Then, in 1983, the leader of PII, Mutammimul Ula, attended an international workshop held by IIFSO in Malaysia, where he was attracted to the usrah model and tried to apply it in Indonesia when he returned.[32]
The simplest way to see the connections between the Egyptian and Indonesian Brothers is by analysing the nature of the movement and the social and political circumstances in Egypt, from which the central movement grew. Our first analysis deals with the model of Sufi leadership which - albeit not totally - has been adopted by the society.[33] The second focus is on the political constraints faced by the movement in its home country. We will then consider the question of how the relationship developed with Indonesia and ask: how independent are the offshoots?
We will see that although both the Egyptian and Indonesian Brothers are intellectually and ideologically connected, they have developed autonomous relations in which the branches are not tightly in step with the central movement’s agenda. Since the central movement does not operate directly through top-down or vertical relations on practical issues, and while local dynamics surrounding the movements play a significant role, new movements under international influence display a heterogeneity in nature.
The most appropriate way to describe these connections is by framing them within a theory of Sufi links and networks. This is because the founder of the Muslim Brothers himself, Hasan al-Banna, grew up within Sufi traditions. The common use of terms by members of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt and Jemaah Tarbiyah in Indonesia, such as murshid (guide), ikhwan, and wazifah (dhikr, the remembrance of God) are derived directly from Sufi traditions. Similarly, tarbiyah itself was deliberately applied by al-Banna out of admiration for the Sufi teaching model. Thus the nature of the Muslim Brothers leadership has reflected the very basic nature of Sufi organization, while the tenure of murshid is a lifetime appointment[34].
For centuries, the Sufi orders have proven their power, spreading far and wide from their original places of birth. The principles of Sufi organization, beyond the central leaders and their structural and intellectual connections, are maintained in order to preserve the originality of the teachings and genealogies; but they do not necessarily espouse a shared agenda. Therefore, the Muslim Brothers’ international offshoots are local expressions that rightly follow the socio-political and religious dynamics of their countries
We tried to adopt the ideas of ikhwan, but not precisely as in Egypt or Syria. We saw that the ikhwan’s ideas on Islam were genuine and up to date that suited to a modern movement. But their application in Indonesia has conformed to Indonesian circumstances.[35]
So as a Sufi-influenced movement, the Muslim Brothers enjoy spiritual and intellectual connections among their members that are not confined by territory. In the earlier stages of development, the embryos of the Muslim Brothers tended to carry out their activity following Sufi models. They avoided involvement in any political activites which might endanger or jeopardise the movement’s existence. The teacher-pupil learning model was applied to recruit members and to develop commitment. As the followers reached a certain level within the membership, they were requested to practise certain formulas of prayer and ritual. They were also required to attend regular weekly meetings in order to receive supervision and guidance in the rituals and codes of conduct. These meetings (halaqah) ensured the process of supervision between the teacher and his followers.
However, the mixture between spirituality and political activism developed by the Muslim Brothers has driven the branches to be involved in the political processes in their own countries. When the movement grows to a significant size, it may appear to be a political institution in struggling for its ideals, in turn reforming the government of the day in accordance with its Islamic principles.
In the case of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt and Indonesia, the latter are autonomous from the central leadership of the movement in Egypt. It is reasonable that the offshoots do not try to associate with the central movement in dealing with their domestic affairs, while still preserving the transmission of ideas.
It is not odd among the Sufi orders that branches outside the central order disassociate themselves from the patron merely for reasons of security. For instance, during the 19th century, the Sanusiyyah order in Indonesia changed its name to the Idrisiyyah order in order to avoid confrontation with the Dutch colonial government.[36] The former order had been known for its fiercely anti-colonial attitude in Africa, its home territory, whilst in the case of Indonesia such an affiliation would have put its existence in jeopardy. The Indonesian form of the Sanusiyyah order became more cooperative with the colonial regime than its patron in the Africa. However, both orders still maintain their connections in terms of their spiritual network.
In addition, the political constraints experienced by the Muslim Brothers in Egypt have influenced the nature of its relations with the offshoots outside Egypt. The strict surveillance maintained over their veterans and leaders has meant that they are not able to set up proper communications with their offshoots. They struggle in facing government restrictions and experience great difficulty in maintaining their survival in Egypt. Whilst many young cadres have been sentenced to jail, the government has kept the older leaders under domestic surveillance and has restricted their contact with the outside. Therefore, rather than appearing as a political party, the Muslim Brothers in Egypt have worked intensively to provide social services, thus strengthening the role of the movement in society.
Undoubtedly, the limited access to leaders open to their followers, and particularly foreigners, has weakened the society of the Muslim Brothers. It has not been possible for them to think of spreading their influence outside Egypt, nor to structurally organise the branches according to central orders. Nonetheless, the position of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers vis-a-vis their fellow Muslims internationally is still very important. Their spiritual leadership is respected around the world. The General Guide in Egypt serves as a spiritual supervisor who no longer actively instructs his orders to broaden the membership. He plays the role of a wise consultant, the same role that is usually enjoyed by the murshid in almost all Sufi orders. The international assistance of a murshid ‘am, also known as the muraqib ‘am (supervisor) functions to supervise members’ behaviour in accordance with the original teachings of the Muslim Brothers.
[16] See Richard Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 173; see also Ishak Musa Husaini, The Moslem Brethren: The Greatest of Modern Islamic Movements (Westport: Hyperion Press, 1986), 73.
[17] See http://www.meta-religion.com/Extremism/Islamic_extremism/muslim_brotherhood.htm.
[18] See Hilmi Aminuddin, Strategi Dakwah Gerakan Islam (Jakarta: Pustaka Tarbiatuna, 2003), 149.
[19] His statement in Indonesian is the following, “di samping itu juga berdiri Partai Keadilan yang merupakan perpanjangan tangan dari gerakan Ikhwanul Muslimin Mesir…” For further details see Yusuf Qardhawi, Umat Islam Menyongsong Abad 21, trans. Yogi Prana Izza and Ahsan Takwim (Solo: Era Intermedia, 2001), 92.
[20] Republika, 3 September 2000.
[21] See “Ikhwanul Musliminnya Indonesia?” Sabili, 1 Agustus 2001.
[22] As stated by Rahmat Abdullah, a senior member of Jemaah Tarbiyah in his interview in Hidayatullah , August 2001.
[23] Ibid. In his statement in Hidayatullah, Rahmat emphasized the important of Islamic conduct and deeds in accord with the essence of the Muslim Brothers, rather than any similarity in name. He implicitly stated that although PK did not use the Moslem Brotherhood name, it did not mean that PK did not share the same vision and agenda with them.
[24] Aminuddin, Strategi Dakwah Gerakan Islam, 149.
[25] Barry Rubin, Islamic Fundamentalism in Egyptian Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 12-13.
[26] Ibid., 21.
[27] See “Catatan Wafatnya Mustafa Masyhur,” EraMuslim.com, 15 November 2002
[28] Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, trans. Carol Volk (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1994) , 110.
[29] The term ikhwan, is not new but Jemaah Tarbiyah has made efforts to promote its use among Indonesian Muslims who are more familiar with the term “sahabat.” According to Mustafa Kamal, a member of Indonesian national parliament from PKS (2004-2009), adopting ikhwan initially was aimed to strengthen the solidarity and brotherhood, while subsequently it developed a more specific meaning, referring to members of Jemaah Tarbiyah. Interview with Mustafa Kamal, Depok, 11 June 2003.
[30] Interview with Muslikh Abdul Karim, Depok, 9 September 2003.
[31] See Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism,” 133.
[32] Interview with Mutammimul Ula, Jakarta, 16 June 2003.
[33] Further details on how the Muslim Brothers adopted the model of Sufi leadership and Sufi terminology will be elaborated in chapter VI.
[34] Brynjar Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: the Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942 (Readings: Ithaca Press, 1998), 9.
[35] Interview with Ahmad Mudzafar Jufri, Surabaya, 17 March 2003.
[36] This Sufi order now has developed its influence among Indonesian Muslims in Sukabumi, West Java.