Jemaah Tarbiyah was originally a purely religious movement but it has remained by no means without political motives in the long term. My study of its fundamental doctrines and principles of operation reveals that since the very beginning, Jemaah Tarbiyah has had a systematic and clear political orientation, even if it had not then been put into practice. Mahfudz Sidiq, a student activist of Jemaah Tarbiyah in the 1980s and currently the head of the PKS faction in DPR RI illustrated the political nature of the movement
When I joined Jemaah Tarbiyah in the mid 1980s, we had no aim to establish a political party. However, the main discourse was to develop a framework for Islam that included politics. In those socio-political conditions, Islam was considered as the antithesis of existing Indonesian political practice. Islam provides an alternative, but not necessarily a political party.[76]
In fact, not all cadres of Jemaah Tarbiyah initially supported the establishment of the political party in 1998. A survey circulated among 6000 cadres asking whether Jemaah Tarbiyah should establish a party or a mass organization produced surprising results. About 68% of respondents supported the establishment of a party, 27% of respondents preferred to form a mass organization and the remainder wanted Jemaah Tarbiyah kept to be as an informal movement.[77] Many members of PKS committees whom I interviewed revealed that they initially did not support the setting up of the party and would have preferred a mass organization.[78] One of the reasons in favour of forming a political party was in order to not provoke confrontation with the mainstream Islamic mass organizations: NU, Muhammadiyah, and Persis.[79] However, only Muhammadiyah and Persis members in the grassroots level felt close to PKS; members of NU were then still reluctant to join.
It was the growing student interest in politics that pushed Jemaah Tarbiyah towards taking a more politically explicit role. Through their political experiences within the campuses, the members of Jemaah Tarbiyah have been able to play a significant role in responding to political events outside. They have organised protests against the government on issues that varied from religious demands, such as the issue of women’s head covering, to the more politically focussed, such as demanding that President Soeharto step down.
The unique character of Jemaah Tarbiyah lies in its attitude to dakwah and politics. In general, the group makes no distinction between the two. As a political party, the religious agenda of PKS is much more closely intertwined with its politics rather than is the case with other parties. Through the political party, huge public gatherings (tabligh akbar) are organised, combining both religious and political issues. Furthermore, most of the political activities are self-funded through professional arrangements of religious charities. Members of the party are obliged to pay religious dues, zakat, [80] infaq [81] and shadaqah [82] regularly to the party. Other Islamic parties like PKB, PPP and PBB, for instance, also use the religious services of NU for supporting party candidates, but not in such an integrated way as PKS. PKB has not organised the regular religious gatherings (pengajian) or the collection of donations as extensively as PKS has done.
Since there is no separation of the religious and the political in the party, the activists of the PKS prefer to consider it merely an extension of the field of dakwah. They distinguish their party from others in Indonesia by calling it Partai Dakwah (the Dakwah Party). So even though it is a political organ, it carries out the holy duty of dakwah within the broadest context. In order to manage and organise its constituents throughout the archipelago, PKS has divided Indonesia into four dakwah territories, or Wilayah Dakwah (Wilda). These are Wilda I for Sumatra, Wilda II for DKI Jakarta, Banten, West Java and Kalimantan, Wilda III for Central Jawa, Sulawesi and Papua, and Wilda IV for the East Java, West Nusa Tenggara and East Nusa Tenggara.[83] Each Wilda head is expected to appear as a religious and political figure among the people of the regions.
The principle of integrating religious and political activities is not an unusual one for PKS. They believe that Islam is an integral system guiding human beings to win prosperity on earth and in the hereafter. Prosperity itself can be achieved by individual and collective efforts to develop spiritual qualities for the triumph of Islam. The party should function as a vehicle to meet the needs of the people in attaining material and spiritual prosperity.[84]
In order to accomplish the mission of the dakwah party, dakwah should be managed in a professional way and follow a strategy, which is termed the shiyasah al-da’wah (the politics of predication). The effectiveness of the dakwah programme lies in its contribution to political, cultural and religious changes in society as well as within the state. Such changes are needed to ensure that society and the state are always under the guidance of the teachings of Islam.
The writings of the Jemaah Tarbiyah activists focus mainly on the issue of the “politics of dakwah.” Dakwah must be carried out systematically, following well-prepared steps and phases that have been set by the movement. Dakwah cadres are not only required to convey religious messages to the wider members of society but they are also supposed to form “literate and educated groups” who clearly understand the essence of being Muslim and who will act in accordance with the goals and missions determined by the dakwah initiators. In general, steps to Islamise the state by the Jemaah Tarbiyah are best described in four stages. These phases are standard guidelines for all active members of the movement in order for it to achieve its long-term goal of the “Islamisation” of Indonesia.
The first stage in creating cadres in Jemaah Tarbiyah is through special training, initially informal, with an emphasis on ideological internalisation. A strong cadre base is vital to achieve the movement’s goals. It is through individuals who have internalised the teachings of Islam that a further process of Islamisation in all its aspects is likely. The slogan that Jemaah Tarbiyah espouses is derived from a saying of a prominent leader of the Muslim Brothers, Hasan al-Hudaibi, “uphold Islam in your heart, and it will grow strong within your society.”[85]
Yet the phase of “ideology building” among new members (mihwar tanzim) is not an easy one.[86] This stage best describes the condition of Jemaah Tarbiyah during its initial development in Indonesia during the New Order. Most activists experienced difficulty in maintaining communications and contact with others. They could not easily liaise with their fellow members, since the government was suspicious of any movements they saw as threatening the stability of the nation. Jemaah Tarbiyah members were forced to maintain secrecy and to avoid contact with other Muslims.
The pioneers of Jemaah Tarbiyah newly returned from their studies in the Saudi universities, however, succeeded in establishing contact with fellow Muslim student activists on the Indonesian campuses. Since the mid-1980s they have been able to train many cadres, the majority from university backgrounds. The reason to target students in the secular universities as the backbone of the movement was prompted by the fact that such students were more open to new ideas that were different from traditionalist and modernist orientations. These students were not deeply rooted in the Islamic traditions of their parents, and the campus milieus loosened their attachment to any previous religious affiliations. New ideas brought back by the Saudi graduates and introduced into Tarbiyah provided an alternative vehicle for young Muslim activists to struggle for Islam.[87]
The success of Jemaah Tarbiyah in generating strong cadres has also provided a strong base for PKS. PKS is the only real cadre party in Indonesia. Their strength of character has been evident in some of their activities involving thousands of participants. For instance, they often prove that they can hold demonstrations and stage political campaigns of mass participation without violence or anarchic behaviour.[88] Numerically, too, the solidity of mass support for PKS is the result of a long process of Tarbiyah training since the 1980s. Tarbiyah training has created thousands of cadres with strong ideology, so that the movement has become widespread throughout the Indonesian archipelago.[89]
The dynamics of halaqah, influenced by Sufi patron-client relations, differs from the methods of caderisation of other Islamic student groups, such PMII,[90] HMI and PII. During the cadre phase, members are requested to make selective recruitment through the halaqah. A successful halaqah is one which continues to grow and constantly generates more groups of halaqah. However, the essence of halaqah is not a matter of the recruitment of cadres in terms of numbers alone; careful consideration must also be given to cadres’ qualities and expertise.[91] For instance, the religious and educational backgrounds of prospective cadres are important considerations as to whether or not to include them in the movement. Candidate cadres with a high level of education who hold vital positions in the work place or in society are more favourable than those who have only basic schooling. In addition, those who have been involved with terrorist organisations are to be excluded, since it is Jemaah Tarbiyah’s policy not to recruit or even make contact with them.[92] It actively discourages its members from communicating with such groups for any purpose, including business activity and social interaction.[93]
The chief concern is to selectively enlist potential cadres who will guarantee the movement’s interests in the future. Because of the secret nature of the recruitment process in the past, when Jemaah Tarbiyah was under surveillance from the regime, many members segregated themselves from wider society. However, when the regime’s surveillance was lifted and there was more freedom to express ideas, the model of secret recruitment changed. Now, under the banner of PKS, all recruitment is open to the public. Members of halaqah are allowed to invite non-members, including non-Muslims, to attend halaqah. These non-member guests are usually asked to share their own knowledge and expertise with the members.[94]
Cadres formed in the first phase commit themselves to uphold the movement’s ideals. The Jemaah Tarbiyah doctrine of Islam as an all encompassing system of life, as formulated by Hasan al-Banna, becomes their guideline.[95] Though they may have come from different religious backgrounds or social affiliations, they are expected to subvert these to the movement’s mission. The movement requires their adherence and observance, and in order to join Jemaah Tarbiyah the cadre needs to take an oath of allegiance (bay’ah).[96]
According to the PK database of 1999, since the establishment of Jemaah Tarbiyah activities in the 1980s, about 30,000 cadres, mostly student and university alumni, have joined the campaign for the party in the 1999 general elections. The party gained about 1,436,565 votes. It claims that during the 2004 general elections, numbers of active members of PKS reached more than 300,000 full time workers for the party.[97] Furthermore, the increase in the numbers of cadres has had an impact on the party’s performance in the general elections of 2004, even though external factors, such as campaign programmes that have allied the party with the urban grassroots, have also played a part in this success.
The members of Jemaah Tarbiyah recognise that significant changes towards a more “Islamic” society cannot be built solely on cadres; the movement must also muster mass support.[98] Needless to say, they also maintain that the process of Islamising Indonesian society and the state must be gained through gradual and non-violent ways. Creating committed cadres is simply the first step in influencing the masses.
Thus Jemaah Tarbiyah is well aware of the need for interacting with and influencing broader sections of society. Once the strong cadres have been formed, the group moves to the second phase of its strategy, preparing to socialise its ideas and aims to the people in general. This stage is called “the phase of socialization” (mihwar sha’bi) in which popular acceptance is sought. If the first stage emphasises building the character of cadres, this second stage moves forward to examine to what extent Tarbiyah ideas will be accepted or rejected. Cadres are expected to present as exemplars to all people from various backgrounds. If earlier they have considered non-members of the movement as “others,” they are now required to display a common interest with all of society. It is crucial that they develop the skills of good communication.
At the same time, cadres are still required to recruit new members so far as possible. Activists introduce the movement’s aims to members of the elite and to prominent figures in society. The role of such figures becomes an important consideration. For instance, in the past, Nurcholish Madjid received harsh criticism from many activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah. A sharp debate between Nurcholish Madjid and Daud Rasyid (of Jemaah Tarbiyah) in 1992 resulted in a strong rejection of the ideas of Madjid among Jemaah Tarbiyah members. Others of Jemaah Tarbiyah, such as Abu Ridha, Hidayat Nurwahid and Didin Hafiduddin also joined in the attack on Madjid. Interestingly, relations between Madjid and Jemaah Tarbiyah improved, in particular after Madjid was invited by the Justice Party to be a keynote speaker during the opening ceremony of its National Meeting (Musyawarah Nasional) in 2000. Madjid himself, in order to draw the interest of Islamic parties (since he intended to stand as a presidential candidate in 2004) affirmed he did not mean by the slogan “Islam Yes, Islamic Party No!” to reject the existence of an “Islamic party” per se. On the contrary, he admitted that his earlier rejection of an “Islamic party” during the 1970s was prompted by his criticism, as a young Muslim, of the then Islamic parties that were mostly corrupt.[99] Jemaah Tarbiyah activists were able to accept Madjid’s change of attitude as normal when referred to the example of one of the founders of Islamic jurisprudence, Muhammad Ibn Idris Al-Shafi’i (d. 820) who held both al-qawl al-qadim (the old opinion) and al-qawl al-jadid (the new opinion) to make new ruling.[100]
Social services and community assistance have become the movement’s chief instruments in attracting the masses. In this, it is supported not only by its core cadres but also by outsiders sympathetic to its objectives. It has also subsequently established a number of non-governmental organizations (NGO) that focus on social, educational and cultural activities. It has established a number of educational and religious institutions to support the process of recruitment from various levels of society, such as the educational tutoring centre of Nurul Fikri in 1984, the Islamic higher education of al-Hikmah in 1987, the Islamic missionary institute of Khairu Ummah in 1989 and the contemporary Islamic and social studies of Sidik in 1992.
The Nurul Fikri Foundation has helped high school students to enter university, training them to successfully answer the entry tests. Besides its secular subjects, the foundation also has provided students with religious instruction and encouraged them to support Islamic activities on campus once they have gained admission. Many alumni of the foundation have become student activists affiliated with PKS.
The Islamic higher education institution of al-Hikmah was set up to prepare university students in Islamic subjects. Initially it was a type of traditionalist educational centre, founded by Haji Hasan. It was Hasan’s son, Abdul Hasib, who graduated in Saudi Arabia in 1987 who developed it into a formal institution. Abdul Hasib is currently a member of the Consultative Board of PKS. Students from secular universities in Jakarta, such as UI, IKIP and Trisakti University, have attended evening classes in al-Hikmah. It has been responsible for many activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah establishing similar institutions in other regions where secular campuses also exist.[101]
The Khairu Ummah foundation is a predication institute (lembaga dakwah) established by some senior members of Jemaah Tarbiyah. It aims to provide preachers and Friday lecturers for campuses and community mosques in Jakarta. It also sends preachers to give lectures in Islamic training organised by Muslim students and other Islamic gatherings in commercial offices and business centres. Activists of Khairu Ummah also often serve audiences outside Jakarta and other areas outside Java.[102]
Abu Ridha, Al-Muzammil Yusuf and Habib Abu Bakar al-Habsyi established the Study and Information for Contemporary Islamic World, Studi dan Informasi Dunia Islam Kontemporer (SIDIK).[103] This centre aims to provide social and political studies for members of Jemaah Tarbiyah. Through SIDIK, news of events in the Islamic world have been passed on to students in universities and Islamic communities as well, through printed media, audiovisual material and seminars. SIDIK also contributed to political analysis in preparing for the establishment of PK in 1998.
Jemaah Tarbiyah continues to enter political institutions. This is the “stage of political penetration” (mihwar mu’assasi) in which it introduces political education and training to its cadres, even though they have known from the beginning that the movement makes no hard and fast distinction between religion and politics. The problem was once that they did not previously know whether the movement would transform itself into a political party or a religious mass organization, such as NU and Muhammadiyah.
The application of this third stage is again a further elaboration of a concept of al-Banna to exert political influence on the existing government. Even though al-Banna did not recommend establishing a party, the concept of Islam as a universal and complete system encompassing all aspects of human life has been translated by Jemaah Tarbiyah activists as a reason to participate in the political process through a political party. Al-Banna himself said that Islam is a combination of inseparables: state and nation, rulers and people, morality and strength, love and equity, civilization and constitution, knowledge and justice, income and natural resources, effort and wealth, jihad and dakwah, and army and knowledge.[104]
Since then many activists who had previously devoted their energies to religious training and dakwah activities have become keen to be involved in political issues. Jemaah Tarbiyah activists on campus in the 1990s became more familiar with day-to-day student concerns, ranging from labour issues to national political problems, alongside their previous religious interests. Of course, their involvement in political activities has not been achieved without preparation. Eep Saifullah Fatah, a former Islamic activist at the University of Indonesia, reports that in 1994 the Jemaah Tarbiyah cadres began to run political training in tandem with the regular religious programs. According to Fatah, the training aimed to raise the political awareness of the members and prepared the way for the next step of “Islamisation.” A number of prominent political scholars and experts, such as Arbi Sanit and Deliar Noer were invited to give lectures.[105] Jemaah Tarbiyah activists then not only read books on Islamic subjects but began to read more widely into politics, sociology and philosophy.
The process of “Islamisation” for Jemaah Tarbiyah is not limited to the dakwah programs but includes a highly structured progression in expertise. When the cadres have successfully passed through the first stage, they proceed to the next. The success of their political experiments on the campuses has prompted them to find a more explicit political vehicle to achieve the movement’s goals. The activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah are expected to play a role as politicians. The politicians of PKS should be able to present themselves as professional and clean figures in the People’s Representative Assembly (DPR). They should be able to restore the bad image of some politicians and demonstrate a high standard of personal morality. In addition, the political party serves as a vehicle to further influence the policies of the government by drafting policies of a more apparent Islamic nature.[106]
The establishment of Partai Keadilan in 1998 indicated that the stage of political penetration had begun. Nonetheless, at this stage cadres were still permitted to join other political parties of similar vision and ideology.[107] The reason was that dakwah should not be confined to any one political institution.[108] But some Jemaah Tarbiyah figures maintained that cadres could only possibly join social missions or professional organizations, and not another political party, as the group had already established its own.[109] As it turned out, few members of the Jemaah Tarbiyah actually gave their allegiance to parties other than their own. This was because Jemaah Tarbiyah considered PK as the only political party for their activists.
After the stage of political participation, cadres are encouraged to enter the state bureaucracy and to bring about changes in policy toward more Islamic goals. If the stage of building a political institution allows the movement to bring its cadres into the legislative body of the state, the next stage is more practically aimed of placing cadres in government organs. This is called “the era of the state” (mihwar dawli).[110] The movement has no ambition to foment revolution or to take power but rather to exert influence through the active participation of its best cadres in cabinet and other governmental positions.
The commitment of the movement to abide by constitutional law is without question. It believes that the only way to bring change is through natural and constitutional means, in which the people and the state organs freely accept it. Of course, “change” here is the transformation of the state towards becoming more Islamic in nature. Does this stage entail the establishment of an Islamic state?
In general, both the ideals of Jemaah Tarbiyah and its political vehicle, PKS are on common ground about the nature of the state. The state and its leaders merely carry out their duties to God, in whom resides ultimate authority. The state should not violate the rules of God or pass laws that are in contradiction with the laws of God. In addition, the role of the leaders of the state should be solely to provide the people’s necessities. The task of the state for PKS activists is
Reforming it to be a “truly Islamic state” so that it will serve the interests of the people and function as a servant of the people for their sake and welfare.[111]
It appears so far that for PKS, the question of a formal Islamic state is not part of its political platform. A truly “Islamic” state need not necessarily be an Islamic state by name but should represent the Islamic virtues, such as accountability, love and care, justice, modesty and probity in spending funds.[112] However, this does not mean that the party rejects the idea of an Islamic state altogether. Some members of PKS still envision an Islamic state of some form or another. Some still insist that “if not an Islamic state, then what kind of state do Muslims need?”[113] This issue is likely to be a major obstacle against PKS’ expansion of its political influence in the future; there is real suspicion and a sense of threat that has developed among non-Muslim groups and other sections of the Indonesian people.
In order to bridge the disjunction between their Islamic ideals and political realities, some activists of PKS are prepared to compromise the idea of an Islamic state by stating that as long as the state realises universal virtues and functions to meet the needs of the people, such a state may be considered to be Islamic.[114] The chairman of PKS, Tifatul Sembiring has insisted that the Republic of Indonesia is the final form of the state for Indonesians.[115] The possible synthesis between small members of Jemaah Tarbiyah’s insistence on a formal Islamic state and PKS’s realistic approach of Islamisation needs further experiment in Indonesia’s consolidated system of democracy. The contribution of all groups and communities that make up the nation must be considered.
By carefully following its steps in Islamising society and the state, Jemaah Tarbiyah and its political party have developed confidence in achieving their ideals. If the ideologues of Jemaah Tarbiyah have succeeded in solving the theological disputes over the issue of politics and Muslims’ involvement in an un-Islamic system, their solutions to internal obstacles in accepting democracy should reach the same outcome. Their argument in accepting democracy is very simple.
If we define democracy as the sovereignty of the people whilst all of the umat Islam are hostile to democracy and politics, we, as the majority of citizens will loose the opportunity to rule our country and we will let the country be ruled by others. We have to use democracy to reclaim our power.[116]
The political actions of PKS are based on the premise that there is no shortcut to achieving its distant objectives.[117] These must be attained through the disciplining of cadres and a gradual transformation of society. And democracy has provided the way to achieve this goal.[118] Similarly, the pragmatic and flexible approach of PKS in the arena of practical politics is evident in its stance towards the implementation of shariah law in Indonesia. This is a further issue that is subject to scrutiny and fierce debate among Indonesian Muslim scholars and politicians.
[76] Interview with Mahfudz Sidiq, Jakarta, 8 October 2003
[77] Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia (Bandung, Mizan, 2002), 269.
[78] Nurmahmudi Ismail, Hidayat Nur Wahid and Mahfudz Sidiq, for instance, were among respondents who preferred the establishment of a mass organization. However, they have become leading figures in the Prosperous Justice Party.
[79] Interview with Sholeh Drehem, Surabaya, 13 March 2003.
[80] Zakat is one of the five pillars of Islam. Muslims with the financial means are obliged to a give certain percentage. For instance, from a monthly salary, one is obliged to deduct about 2.5%.
[81] Infaq means dispensing moneys or gifts and is more voluntary than obligatory.
[82] Shadaqah means charity. Both infaq and shadaqah carry similar meanings but the former is a gift that can be dedicated to any specific purpose, such as building a mosque or other public facility, while shadaqah is mainly dispensed to the needy.
[83] Interview with Aus Hidayat, Depok, 13 March 2003.
[84] See DPP PK, Kebijakan Dasar Partai Keadilan 2000-2005 (Jakarta: Pustaka Tarbiatuna, 2000), 11.
[85] Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan, 111.
[86] Takariawan, Rekayasa Masa Depan, 9.
[87] Interview with Mustafa Kamal, Jakarta, 13 December 2005.
[88] Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan, 269.
[89] Interview with Mustafa Kamal, Depok, 11 June 2003
[90] The Indonesian Islamic Student Movement, Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (PMII) was founded in 1960 and is affiliated with NU.
[91] Aminuddin, Strategi Dakwah Gerakan Islam, 48.
[92] Memet Sosiawan, member of the Central Board Committee of PKS in charge of organising dakwah activities in East Java said that this policy aims to prevent infiltration by terrorist groups (Mojokerto - East Java, 6 December 2005).
[93] Ibid.
[94] Interview with Mustafa Kamal, Jakarta, 13 December 2005.
[95] Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan, 117.
[96] Ibid.
[97] PKS Online, 1 June 2005.
[98] Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, 53.
[99] See Republika, 19 August 2003
[100] Interview with Nurmahmudi Ismail, Depok, 8 May 2003.
[101] Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan, 168
[102] Ibid., 161
[103] Ibid., 169
[104] Al-Banna, Risalah Pergerakan 2, 162.
[105] Tempo, 18 January 1999.
[106] Takariawan, Rekayasa Masa Depan, 92.
[107] Ibid.
[108] See Mahfudz Sidiq, “Peran Serta Da’wah dalam Politik” (Paper presented at the Square House Building, University of New South Wales, 9 August 2002), 7.
[109] The organization must be neither an ideological nor a political one. See Aminuddin, Strategi Dakwah Gerakan Islam, 151.
[110] Takariawan, Rekayasa Masa Depan, 117.
[111] Ibid.
[112] Ibid.
[113] Ridha, Negara dan Cita-Cita Politik, 132.
[114] Ibid., 111.
[115] See “Tifatul Sembiring: Paranoid Syariat Islam,” Gatra, 6 May 2006.
[116] Interview with Ahmad Musyaffa, Jakarta, 19 April 2003.
[117] See Martin van Bruinessen, “Post-Soeharto Muslim Engagements with Civil Society and Democratization,” in Indonesia in Transition: Rethinking ‘Civil Society’, ‘Region’, and ‘Crisis’ (Jakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2004), 58.
[118] Ibid.