Before presenting a framework to assist in the understanding of social relations between the kiai and his community or between the former and society at large, let me first discuss the general picture of social and interpersonal relationships among Javanese. It is widely accepted that Javanese society acknowledges differences between individuals in their social status and that this has become the norm that governs social relations among Javanese (see Guinness, 1986). Social status is largely defined by age, wealth and occupation, so that an older Javanese in a village, for example, will receive respect from a younger person, just as wealthy Javanese receives homage from the poor. The same holds true for a highly educated individual who will receive respect from less educated Javanese.

Although differences in social status are in fact more complicated and overlap in practice, Javanese social life is typified by the operation of such norms of differentiation. A Javanese is socialised into such norms at an early age. The system works efficiently, especially in rural areas where most people know each other, so that the “social location” of any individual Javanese is easily identified. This culture of social difference among Javanese is perpetuated and institutionalised by the operation of the informal control of social sanctions. The concept of wis Jawa (finally become Javanese), for example, reflects the existence of idealised behaviour which requires compliance by any Javanese; and the “culture of shame”, moreover, encourages a Javanese to conform to such an idealised norm of behaviour. A Javanese villager will feel ashamed if he or she does not comply with the requirements of established etiquette. A wealthy villager, for example, should not only receive respect from the poor but should also behave in certain accepted ways^[1]

In line with such notions of differences in social status, the ‘ulama, especially the kiai, in Javanese villages receive high respect from society. Compared to other local elites, like wealthy farmers, the kiai, who usually run a pesantren, have a more respected position. This has made him a leading figure in society. His leadership, moreover, is in fact not confined to the religious sphere but also extends to the political field. His success in these leadership roles has resulted in his being regarded as a man of great worth who can easily induce social action. The kiai have therefore long been a powerful elite.

Two main factors have contributed to the kiai's powerful position. First, the kiai is a knowledgeable person from whom villagers learn Islamic knowledge. His erudition and higher level of knowledge of Islam mean that the kiai always has followers, both informal audiences, who always attend his pengajian or lectures, and his santri, who stay at pondok around his house. Secondly, it is common for a kiai to come from a well-to-do family. Even though it is not rare to find a kiai who was a poor ‘ulama at the time he commenced teaching Islam, as evidenced by the small size of his first pesantren building, the average kiai is classified as coming from a rich family. These two factors have led to the kiai being seen as an elite figure in a Javanese village. The santri and his obedient villagers, as his followers, constitute human resources which sustain his position and his leadership in society. Furthermore, the economic resources he usually owns have made villagers and his santri dependent on him in many senses. Through his wealth, a kiai creates a pattern of patronage which ties him to certain people in his community. Because of his huge land holdings, he can employ villagers to work either as labourers or as land tenants. In addition he strengthens his relationship with his santri by allowing some of them, who come from poor families, to work on his land (see Fox and Dirjosanjoto, 1989). In modern pesantren the patronage is evidenced in a different pattern. The kiai may recruit his former qualified santri or other members of society to work in his university and other modern educational institution. These santri receive a formal salary. The kiai, for these people, is a person who can provide economic subsistence, and a patron who can be a good friend in need. It is not accidental, however, that in few cases these santri were fired because they did not fulfil what was needed by the kiai family.

Having these two human and economic resources at hand, the kiai has become a respected person in a village. As the pattern of relationship between the kiai and villagers is not based on egalitarianism, the former often receives an exaggerated amount of respect from the latter. This unequal position is not only because the former has a higher social status, as conceptualised by Javanese culture, but also because he is a leader who has a wide network. The kiai who runs a pesantren will automatically get support from people from the surrounding villages and other cities. Since most of the kiai are also involved in politics in a more general sense at a higher level, their position in the eyes of society goes unchallenged.

Furthermore, it is important to add that a kiai is often endowed with an ability which is unusual to ordinary Muslims. The extraordinary ability is commonly found in individual kiai even before they commence their kiaiship. It is often evident when they are very young and still learning Islam at certain pesantren. It is a truism that a kiai candidate often has what is called ilmu laduni, that is knowledge acquired without learning. Such knowledge, which may precede one's kiaiship or be shown after becoming a kiai, gives legitimacy to the kiai's leadership. It seems as though God has given a sign to choose him as an Islamic leader. It is thus understandable if a kiai becomes a charismatic leader, since he is deemed the holder of divine authority, which in turn has made him very different from society at large.

The relationship between the kiai and his community (the umma) is bound by religious emotion which makes his legitimate power more influential. The charisma which surrounds the kiai's actions also imbues the relationship with emotion. Since the kiai has become the avenue through which people in villages solve their problems, which are not just those confined to spiritual but also to wider aspects of their lives, people also endorse the kiai as their leader and representative in the national system (cf. Horikoshi, 1976). His success in performing such an important role “…tends almost inevitably to lead to his being regarded not merely as a mediator of law and doctrine (of Islam), but of holy power itself” (Geertz, 1962:238).

Under these conditions, the kiai in a Javanese village has a very strong influence on society and plays a crucial role in inducing social and even political actions. But his important position and role are not confined to the village level. As can be seen through the NU, especially when it was a political organisation comprising a variety of members, including intellectuals and politicians, the centrality of the kiai's position was evidenced by his having the highest prestige and influence compared to the professional politician (Samson, 1978:201). The approval of the kiai guarantees popular support for a political party since the kiai in general “…are believed to be acting legitimately in their utilisation of power so long as they act for God” (Samson, 1978:201).

The relationship between the kiai and society is similar to that between ‘ulama or saints in other societies of the Islamic world (see Bruinessen, 1992:246– 249). This similarity may be due to the fact that Muslims share concepts and religious experiences which have created the same style of leadership. The idea influencing the establishment of such a pattern is found in Islamic precepts. The kiai's respected position basically derives from the fact that Islam emphasises the importance of knowledge, which should be pursued by all Muslim. In the Qur'an and hadith (the tradition of the Prophet), it is always stressed that seeking for knowledge is a necessary part of Muslim life and that knowledgable Muslims have a higher status before Allah^[2]. It is no exaggeration to say that this notion has encouraged Muslims to seek knowledge. Thus, possession of scientific curiosity has become part of Muslim duty, and those who succeed in obtaining such needed knowledge will be appreciated by society. This perspective has given rise to the creation of a culture which appreciates the ‘ulama since he is a man who has acquired such knowledge.

The establishment of the sufi order in North Africa almost always begins with the society's acceptance of the presence of an ‘ulama (see Gellner, 1969). What is interesting to note from the sufi leadership as well as ‘ulama is the fact that the relationship between the leader and his society is cemented by close emotional ties. The intimate relationship between the ‘ulama and his society derives from the society's perception that the former leadership is the real leadership, and that the ‘ulama is the expert who can understand and explain the precepts of the Qur'an. It so happens that most of the saints or sheikh (leader) of the sufi orders in North Africa are ‘ulama who have a geneological linkage with the Prophet Muhammad. Their leadership is thus regarded as legitimate. Apart from the fact that genealogy plays an important part in society's recognition of one's ‘ulamaship, the Islamic concept of ‘ulama as waratha al-anbiya (those who inherit prophecy) is of great significance. It is this conception which encourages Muslims in Jombang to accord high respect to the kiai and to submit to his leadership. Furthermore, such a belief has endowed the kiai with certain symbolic attributes which make him different from the rest of society. The kiai, for example, is conceived of as having grace or baraka which is simply given by God due to his being close to God.

The discussion helps explain why the ‘ulama in Islamic countries and the kiai in Java receive high respect from society and occupy powerful positions. Their central position is nonetheless very much dependent on societal recognition. In certain regions, like Madura, society's acceptance is based on genealogy, which means that a kiai should come from a kiai family (Mansurnoor, 1991). Another factor is performance by the kiai. This is decisive in preventing him from losing his popularity. The kiai's power and position therefore depend entirely on the continued recognition of society, which means that ‘ulamaship and kiaiship are not merely inherited but also need to be achieved.

In addition to similarities, it is important to acknowledge that ‘ulamaship and the social relationship between an ‘ulama and society can vary from one country or region to another. In Java, for example, the emotion which characterises society's relationship with its ‘ulama is more discernible than in other regions of Indonesia. Thus, at very minimum, one would expect some variation in the nuances of meaningfulness of such relations. This notion is of great importance in understanding Muslim society in general. Muslims in Java and their relations with their ‘ulama should thus be treated, analytically, differently from those in other regions in order to avoid misleading generalisations. The difference which marks ‘ulama relations with their society in various regions results from different factors which influence and shape such relationships. It is also related to the existing situation when Islam was introduced to those regions. It is commonly suggested that the coming of a religion into a society not only results in changes in the belief system of that society, but also in shifts in some aspects of that religion as adopted by that society. This is so because the religion is locally coloured by cultures of that society. These two process, that is the adoption of a new religion and subsequent changes to that religion, are commonly found when a world religion, like Islam or Christianity, spreads and is accepted by a local people. As the Islamic concepts written in the Qur'an are revealed in more general terms, it is common for them to be localised or nativised when they are accepted by local people without destroying their essential meaning. It is therefore understandable that Islam in various regions is marked by differences in practice and others aspects of local culture.