Most people in Jombang relate the split in the Tarekat Qadiriyah Wa Naqsyabandiyah to politics. To join the government party was seen as deviating from the politics of the umma, which at that time, from a Muslim perspective, had to be articulated through the Islamic party, PPP, since it was deemed to be the only party trying to articulate Muslim aspirations. As the perception of the necessity of Muslims to affiliate with PPP was very strong, it is easy to see how Kiai Musta‘in's political steps could delegitimise his position in the eyes of the umma. The formation of the Jam‘iyah Ahli Thoriqoh Al-Mu‘tabaroh An-Nahdliyah by NU confirmed this demotion of Kiai Musta‘in and the withdrawal of NU's recognition of his tarekat organisation.
Some people who were disappointed with Kiai Musta‘in's action tried to discredit him. Various stories undermining Kiai Musta‘in's position emerged. According to an informant, there was even someone within his family who tried to discredit him and encouraged tarekat followers to forsake him. Whether it was true or not, such an insult seems credible because of the conflict which emerged after his joining Golkar. The informant told me further that such actions by a family member and other kiai only occurred after Kiai Musta‘in joined Golkar; it had never happened before.
The failure of Kiai Musta‘in to retain control of his tarekat and its members did not result from processes within the tarekat itself but rather was caused by external worldly matters. There was no fundamental problem in regard to Kiai Musta‘in's tarekat in terms of its religious legitimacy. This is especially evident when we relate those events to the more recent socio-political situation in which some kiai have not only allowed their followers to support political parties other than PPP, but have encouraged them to vote for Golkar[13], leaving PPP. Of more interest, however, is how the tarekat followers, especially those in the Tarekat Cukir see the leadership of the Tarekat Qadiriyah Wa Naqsyabandiyah (formerly led by Kiai Musta‘in) today. The latest murshid is Kiai Dimyati Romly, who succeeded his brother, Kiai Rifai Romly, who died in a car accident in December 1994. I will focus my discussion on Kiai Rifai's leadership since Kiai Dimyati's leadership is new and when I did my field work, this tarekat was still led by Kiai Rifai.
My fieldwork indicates mixed reactions. Despite the fact that NU formally tried to exclude the Tarekat Qadiriyah Wa Naqsyabandiyah led by Kiai Musta‘in from its umbrella[14], by establishing the Jam‘iyah Ahli Thoriqoh Al-Mu‘tabaroh An-Nahdliyah, the legitimacy of the Kiai Musta‘in's tarekat was still recognised since it was formed by NU's kiai. Some prominent tarekat figures, however, expressed concern about this tarekat. This concern not only related to the murshidship of Kiai Musta‘in which was deemed defective after he joined the government party, but also to the way his murshidship was obtained or passed on from the former murshid, his father[15]. A former khalifa of Kiai Musta‘in, suggested that the chain of murshidship of the Tarekat Qadiriyah Wa Naqsyabandiyah (Tarekat Rejoso) had been broken. The tarekat is less mu‘tabarah because one person in the chain of its murshidship was missing. The chain of murshidship of the Tarekat Qadiriyah Wa Naqsyabandiyah acknowledged by the NU's kiai is different from that introduced by Kiai Musta‘in after 1977 (See Sukamto, 1992)[16].
Kiai Musta‘in in an effort to develop his tarekat and at the same time strengthen his position, had published some materials in the form of calendars and others publications. The publication indicated that Kiai Musta‘in was given ijaza irshad directly by his father, Kiai Romly. In the opinion of some other kiai, however, Kiai Romly never gave ijaza irshad to his son because the latter was still very young. The ijaza irshad received by Kiai Musta‘in was passed on from Kiai ‘Usman who received ijaza irshad from Kiai Romly.
This kiai's opinion is not held by the followers of the Tarekat Rejoso, who see the situation from a different angle. According to a version of events suggested by one follower, the murshidship of Kiai Musta‘in and his tarekat are absolutely legitimate. In his opinion, Kiai Musta‘in received the bai‘a three times from his father, Kiai Romly, the murshid of the Tarekat Qadiriyah Wa Naqsyabandiyah at that time. The rest of the bai‘a were done by Kiai ‘Usman after the death of Kiai Romly. Kiai ‘Usman was a khalifa of Kiai Romly, whose duty was giving bai‘a to the tarekat followers. In this follower's opinion, Kiai ‘Usman was not a murshid and did not have the right to hold a murshidship (even though he was the senior khalifa), since the murshidship cannot be obtained by just any follower. The murshidship, this follower explained further, is inherited (like the authority of a King is inherited by his son); and it was Kiai Musta‘in who had the right to receive the transfer of murshidship from his father. This transfer of authority (ijaza irshad) occurred when the father was on the point of death. According to this follower, the father said: “..‘In (a diminutive for Kiai Musta‘in) teruskan tarekat ini” (lit. “Musta‘in, you go on with this tarekat”). It is this exchange, in this follower's opinion, which decisively legitimised the murshidship of Kiai Musta‘in and his tarekat. This follower went on to suggest that conflict occurred because of the uncontrolled action of Kiai ‘Usman. Kiai ‘Usman was assumed to have wanted to be a murshid. He felt it was appropriate to achieve murshidship since he was the most senior khalifa of Kiai Romly, Kiai Musta‘in's father. However, it seems that this follower did not know that the NU's kiai had accepted Kiai ‘Usman as one of the murshid of the Qadiriyah Wa Naqsyabandiyah order before Kiai Musta‘in joined Golkar.
This follower suggested further that the transfer of murshidship must be performed by the former murshid for his successor, the former giving authority for the latter's succession. It is not legitimate for a senior khalifa to receive directly a murshidship after the death of a former murshid. In his opinion, Kiai ‘Usman, Kiai Adlan and Kiai Makki (Makki is one of the three curret murshid of the Tarekat Cukir) who at that time constituted the senior khalifa of Kiai Romly had no right to succeed to the murshidship. They did not receive the authority of Kiai Romly to lead this tarekat. Although this opinion may not be representative of all Tarekat Rejoso followers[17], it gives an indication of their view on both their own tarekat and the Tarekat Cukir. Such an opinion seems common among Tarekat Rejoso followers. It is doubtful, however, whether they dare to say that the murshidship of the Tarekat Cukir is not legitimate. In the tarekat tradition, no overt action should be taken in regard to perceived errors in ‘grey’ areas, especially if these impinge on the murshidship domain.
Based on the evaluation of Kiai Musta‘in's tarekat, tarekat followers in Jombang cannot help but hold a view on the leadership of Kiai Rifai, the successor of Kiai Musta‘in. Certain questions remain unanswered concerning the succession of the leadership in this sufi order[18]. Firstly, there was no ijaza irshad given by Kiai Musta‘in to anyone to continue the leadership. The continuation or the legitimacy of a tarekat is, among other things, sustained by the transfer of authority from the existing murshid to his successor. The successor's legitimacy to the leadership is formally performed through ijaza irshad. He can then be called the murshid. In other words, Kiai Rifai, who held the leadership of the Tarekat Qadiriyah Wa Naqsyabandiyah (Rejoso version) was not promoted in the normal way. In the tarekat world the chain of murshidship is usually decisive, defining the legitimacy of the tarekat itself. Because of this, the Tarekat Rejoso, could be regarded as non-legitimate.
Nevertheless, according to a reliable source, Kiai Rifai actually received a symbolic ijaza irshad. The ijaza irshad which sustains the leadership of Kiai Rifai is said to be based on some hints made by Kiai Musta‘in. For example, it is believed that Kiai Rifai was often asked by Kiai Musta‘in to substitute for him in leading solat (the prayer), when Kiai Musta‘in was not able to perform it. Some followers thought that Kiai Musta‘in's request was an indication that he was counting on Kiai Rifai to continue the leadership of his tarekat. However, such hints, in the opinion of Kiai Musta‘in's wife, were not very significant.
Whether the murshidship of Kiai Rifai is legitimately strong or not, his followers treat him as they should treat the murshid of the tarekat. The same holds true for his khalifa. A senior khalifa who received bai‘a from Kiai Romly acknowledges that he does not have any idea whether or not Kiai Rifai received an ijaza irshad from his brother, Kiai Musta‘in. For him, what is important is that he is now able to continue what was asked of him by his teacher, who was the father of Kiai Musta‘in and Kiai Rifai. His teacher asked him to build umma religiousity through the tarekat. In other words, this khalifa is not concerned about the status of the murshidship of Kiai Rifai. What is important for him is to develop the tarekat by performing its rituals.
From this khalifa's perspective we can see some variations among the attitudes of the tarekat followers in regard to murshidship. There are a number of factors which affect the attitude of Kiai Rifai's khalifa. Firstly, there is a tendency among the khalifa to avoid any chaos or confusion on the part of the followers which could occur if they knew the details of the murshidship of Kiai Rifai. This viewpoint encourages some khalifa to support the leadership of Kiai Rifai. Secondly, khalifa support Kiai Rifai's leadership as an indirect means to protect the reputation of Kiai Musta‘in. In so doing they are defending the controversial (political) decisions made by Kiai Musta‘in, which were so criticised by some colleagues and much of society. The support of Kiai Musta‘in's successor is an indirect justification of Kiai Musta‘in's political actions[19]. Thirdly, Kiai Rifai did not change any ritual practices, especially the wird, in the tarekat. Despite doubts about his murshidship, therefore, the khalifa regard such practices as religiously positive. While the leadership of Kiai Rifai might not be legitimate from the tarekat perspective, attending the rituals held by his tarekat and practising its wird in general still incur pahala (rewards from Allah).
The decrease in number of Tarekat Rejoso followers after Kiai Musta‘in joined Golkar occurred gradually, since most of them did not have sufficient information about Kiai Musta‘in's political action from the tarekat perspective to alter their opinion of the tarekat. The followers’ interpretation of Kiai Musta‘in's defection depended on their allegiance to certain khalifa and other kiai. The followers’ attitudes towards Kiai Musta‘in and his tarekat was very much affected by the perspective of the khalifa. Since there were two groups of khalifa, those who stayed loyal to Kiai Musta‘in and those who left him, the followers’ view were also of two kinds. When the conflict between Kiai Musta‘in and the majority of other kiai occured, some of his followers did not automatically leave him. It took some time for them to be convinced. Their decision was dependent on and supported by explanations from various sources, including the khalifa, the majority of whom were motivated by politics. This explains why those who left Kiai Musta‘in share no single unanimous reason to justify their actions. A common reason given by them, and their kiai who are now the Tarekat Cukir followers, concerns Kiai Musta‘in's joining Golkar. Other Tarekat Cukir followers are even doubtful if they had a reason for leaving the Tarekat Rejoso. The majority even confirm that the Tarekat Rejoso is legitimate, without any defect. Their decision to join the Tarekat Cukir was just based on the fact that this was the decision of NU.
The various reasons given by different groups of Tarekat Cukir followers can be illuminated by recourse to recent socio-political developments. When Kiai Bisri Syansuri launched a fatwa nationally, making it a religious obligation for Muslims to support PPP, all kiai in Jombang were expected to support the Islamic political party of PPP. Kiai Musta‘in's joining Golkar hence triggered some internal problems in the kiai world and Muslim society in Jombang and East Java. This factor must have been significant in inducing ‘the action of leaving’ of some of Kiai Musta‘in's followers. However, when this fatwa was cancelled by the NU's ‘back to khittah’ decision made at its conference in 1984, allowing its members to affiliate with any political party, the political reasons undermining the legitimacy of Kiai Musta‘in's leadership were invalidated. Very few Tarekat Cukir followers would dare say that there is a defect in the Tarekat Rejoso. One follower[20] suggested that all tarekat are good since they are a means to reach Allah. In general, therefore, it should be acknowledged that there is no real religious basis which delegitimises the Tarekat Rejoso. If its illegitimacy was due to its murshid joining the government party, it became legitimate again when NU launched its policy of ‘back to khittah’. If the prohibition of NU members against supporting non-Islamic parties was based on religious factors, the encouragement to support the ‘back to khittah’ policy, which allows NU's members to affiliate with any political party, is also supported by religious factors.
Thus no follower of the Tarekat Cukir regards the Tarekat Qadiriyah Wa Naqsyabandiyah led by Kiai Rifai as not mu‘tabarah. This perspective, however, is not shared by other kiai. A former khalifa of Kiai Musta‘in who left him because of the omission of one person in the murshidship chain of this tarekat, contends that he still cannot accept the leadership of the Tarekat Qadiriyah Wa Naqsyabandiyah (at that time led by Kiai Rifai) since it was menyesatkan (misleading). “Saya kasihan dengan ummat” (I feel sorry for the umma). In his opinion, the legitimacy of a tarekat is not only sustained by the correct wird and other rituals performed by the followers, but also by the legitimacy of the murshid who leads the tarekat. If the murshid is not legitimate, the rituals conducted in his tarekat would not incur any baraka. This kiai quoted other kiai who mentioned the possible bahala (disaster) which could befall the umma due to the illegitimacy of the murshidship. According to this view, the illegitimate nature of the Tarekat Rejoso derives from two factors, the improper action of Kiai Musta‘in in omiting one link in the chain of the murshidship and the absence of direct ijaza irshad from Kiai Musta‘in to Kiai Rifai. Because of this fact, this former khalifa of Kiai Musta‘in is hesitant to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Tarekat Rejoso.