In this section I would like to describe briefly the conflict among NU leaders in Jombang. This conflict has a close connection to the conflict in the succeeding years, especially following the introduction of ‘back to khittah’ in the second half of the 1980s. Familial background contributed to this conflict. What is important in regard to this description is the fact that conflict among NU leaders is common, following the political dynamic of NU itself.

Although the primary objective of the formation of NU was to develop and maintain the ahl al-sunna wa'l-jama‘a, it had for some time also been used as a means of political struggle. At the end of Dutch colonialism in Indonesia, NU's ‘ulama, together with other Islamic organisations, established the Majlis Islam A‘la Indonesia in 1937 (MIAI: the High Indonesian Islamic Council). In addition, during the Japanese occupation (1943), NU joined the Majlis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia (Masjumi: the Consultative Council for Indonesian Muslims)^[21]. These organisations were a confederation which represented Islamic political interests. Although these organisations were originally mainly socio-religious in orientation, the increase in political activity at the end of the Dutch colonial period in Indonesia and the Japanese occupation made their members, including NU's kiai, change their orientations to be more political^[22].

NU involvement in politics seemed to be inevitable. The position of the ‘ulama at the forefront of Islamic society not only made them informal leaders who maintained ahl al-sunna wa'l-jama‘a but also made them political leaders, since in Indonesia the relationship between politics and Islam was quite strong. The ‘ulama's effort to develop ahl al-sunna wa'l-jama‘a were realised by the establishment of pesantren, centres of Islamic learning. It was natural for a great ‘ulama, like Kiai Hasyim Asy‘ari, to have a pesantren. On the other hand, the ‘ulama's interest in politics was realised by their involvement in an Islamic political party. Soon after the government encouraged the establishment of political parties at the end of 1945, around two months after independence, NU's ‘ulama, together with Islamic members of other organisations established an Islamic political party, Masjumi. In 1952, NU even announced that it was a political party after a conflict with another Islamic group in the Masjumi could not be resolved. As a political party, NU took part in the 1955 and 1971 general elections.

In 1973, however, the Indonesian government tried to reduce the existing ten political organisations which took part in the 1971 general election, to three. Four Islamic political organisations, NU, Parmusi, PSII and Perti, were merged to form the United Development Party (PPP). Other political organisations with nationalist, Catholic and Christian backgrounds merged to form the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). In contrast, Golkar, the organisation of professionals which won the most seats in the 1971 general election, merged with no other party. Although the merging of the Islamic parties into PPP was initially opposed by NU leaders, NU was at the forefront of the new party since it constituted the biggest component of the party. This was due to the fact that of the four Islamic parties, NU received the highest proportion of votes in the 1971 general election (18.5 percent compared to Parmusi, PSII and Perti which obtained 6.3, 2.3 and 0.7 percent respectively).

Although the formation of PPP was initially opposed by some Muslim leaders, it became a ‘blessing in disguise’. Its formation seemed to unify and strengthen Islamic politics. In the first general election after its formation, that is in the 1977 general election, PPP succeeded in increasing its votes by 1.2 percent compared to that of the four Islamic parties in the 1971 general election. Although the increase was small when compared to the votes received by Islamic parties in the 1955 general election, it gave a hope for Muslims in Indonesia that the party could represent their political interests.

However, the expectation that PPP was the medium for Indonesian Muslim politics may have been too optimistic, since the merger was a government policy which was not intended to unify the politics of Indonesian Muslims - but aimed at reducing general political conflict, which had frequently destabilised the existing government during the Old Order. In addition, the difficulty of accommodating the political interests of the party's various components made the party unable to function as was hoped. There was inevitable conflict within the party, a factor which contributed later to a weakening of the party. Any hope that Indonesian Muslims might have had to unify their politics through this party after its success in increasing its share of votes in the 1977 general election ceased after the emergence of an ongoing conflict between the NU and MI (former Parmusi) components, preceding the 1982 general election. The MI component, led first by Sudarji and later by Naro, tried to change the decision on the composition of PPP which underpined the formation of the party in 1973. This decision had made NU dominant both in the structure of the party leadership and in the representation of PPP in parliament. This conflict was resolved by the reduction of NU personnel in the party and the transfer of some of them to unimportant positions, after Naro assumed leadership of the party in 1984. Naro was trying to change the power composition of the party's components^[23]. For NU members, the leadership of Naro was an embarrasing incident, since it marked a decrease in their position in the party. Their dissatisfaction with Naro was due to the fact that he was seen to be disadvantaging NU. The great reaction of NU exponents at both the national and provincial level aimed not only at confronting Naro, but also NU's exponents who continued to occupy positions in PPP, signalling their acceptance of Naro. Nevertheless, Naro's position was stronger than that of his NU critics, since his leadership in the party was nonetheless accepted by the government.

This change in the pattern of power among the components of PPP gave rise to a change in NU's politics. NU, a dominant component of the party and the biggest political group among Muslims in Indonesia, withdrew itself from politics. At its congress in 1984, NU announced its intention to return to being a socio-religious organisation as conceptualised in 1926 when NU was established. This meant that NU was no longer politically oriented. This decision, widely known as ‘back to khittah’, also signalled NU's dissociation from PPP. In addition, NU allowed its members to affiliate with political organisations other than PPP. Such affiliation was, however, not organisational but was an individual matter.

The change worried other components of PPP, since the main source of support for PPP derived from NU. As a result, PPP national vote attainment in the 1987 general election decreased by about 42 percent (in Jombang it fell by 36 percent) compared to that in the 1982 general election. The decrease in PPP's attainment was a general phenomenon. It was experienced by almost all branches throughout Indonesia. This was because some NU exponents, who were supported by some kiai, tried to weaken the party. This manoueuvre, however, gave rise to internal conflict within NU at the local level, since weakening PPP meant confronting their own friends. The conflict, in terms of its scope, served to fragment the movement^[24].