The presence of many pesantren in Jombang has given rise to the emergence of various local kiai leaderships. It has also socially fragmented Muslim life in Jombang. The influence of a certain kiai can be so strong for certain Muslims that they cannot give loyalty to another kiai. This close relationship between a kiai and his followers is stronger than the relationship between a kiai follower and NU. The strength of NU in Jombang depends on the support of the kiai in the pesantren.

The fragmentation of Muslim society in Jombang becomes apparent in times of conflict. A conflict results in closer affiliation with certain kiai and consequent distancing from others. Despite the importance of the sources of conflict, it is also necessary to note society's perception of the conflict itself. I will return to this matter later in Chapter VI. The conflict among the NU elite in Jombang actually first occurred in the early 1960s. The conflict was attributed to and influenced by the existing local NU leadership, and the extent of the conflict was dependent on the way the main NU leader handled it.

I will briefly discuss some of the conflicts which have occurred among the NU elite in Jombang, including the conflict which emerged after NU launched its ‘back to khittah’ policy. This discussion not only aims to show that conflict among Muslims in Jombang has been a common phenomenon but also to explain why such conflicts take place. The first conflict among the NU elite in Jombang occurred in 1963 when NU was under the leadership of Kiai Masduqi Zein, who assumed the leadership in 1952. The conflict, which was marked by Muslim protests against, and sharp criticism of Kiai Masduqi Zein, was resolved by his replacement by Kiai Musta‘in Romly, the head of the Pesantren Darul Ulum. Kiai Masduqi Zein was accused of recommending to the local government that some investors be allowed to provide gambling-like game at a ‘Jombang fair’ in 1963 (Mochtar, 1989:138).

Another conflict occurred at the end of the 1960s when NU under the leadership of Muhammad Baidlowi. Muhammad Baidlowi, the grandson of the NU founder, Kiai Hasyim Asy‘ari, assumed local NU leadership in 1966. He was confronted by another local NU faction headed by Nawawi. Nawawi, who was supported by some members of society, challenged Muhammad Baidlowi's legitimate leadership. This challenge, however, was not based on any identifiable reason but simply aimed to topple Muhammad Baidlowi. Nawawi's action was merely based on his feeling that he had every right to assume NU leadership and was more appropriate than Muhammad Baidlowi^[25].

Muhammad Baidlowi was associated with the Pesantren Tebuireng, while Nawawi was from the Pesantren Denanyar. Both Muhammad Baidlowi and Nawawi received some support from Muslims in Jombang. Their family backgrounds encouraged this support. A pesantren has certain followers, and it is very likely that both received support from those Muslims affiliated with each of their pesantren. According to some sources, both received support from some NU leaders at the national level. The support for Muhammad Baidlowi stemmed from his being a legitimate NU leader, chosen by a local NU conference, while the support for Nawawi was based on familial relationship with some of the national leadership in Jakarta. Although Muhammad Baidlowi also received support from some kiai in the NU national leadership in Jakarta, his leadership was legitimate since he had been chosen through the conference. Such endorsement had not been received by Nawawi.

This dispute over the local NU leadership in Jombang also extended to PPP. As PPP leadership in Jombang was dominated by the NU component, the competing groups led by Muhammad Baidlowi on the one hand, and Nawawi on the other, felt every right to represent NU in the party. Both tried to assume the PPP leadership. The result was that PPP also had two leaderships. The PPP leadership which represented Muhammad Baidlowi's NU faction was headed by Badawi Mahbub, while that which represented the Nawawi's NU faction was led by Nawawi himself. The emergence of this ongoing conflict in the leadership of NU in Jombang was atributed to the fact that NU was very politically oriented at that time. It was common for those who occupied a certain position in NU to occupy certain positions in PPP. Accordingly, any conflict occurring at the local NU leadership would also affect the leadership of PPP. 

The Nawawi leadership of NU, commonly called ‘NU-Bangladesh’^[26] finally ended by itself. Not only was his leadership not legitimate, since it was not established through a conference, but also at the grassroots level, the majority of NU members and sympathisers were in favour of the legitimate leadership of Muhammad Baidlowi. Nawawi's support was limited to a few NU figures. In addition, the government did not recognise the PPP leadership of Nawawi. The NU leadership in Jombang during the 1970s was thus under Muhammad Baidlowi's control, and PPP was headed by Badawi Mahbub, Muhammad Baidlowi's man.

Although NU domination of the local leadership of PPP in Jombang continued, and the party was not disturbed by any internal conflict between its various components due to the fact that more than 95 percent of the PPP leadership derived from NU, the conflict at the national level between members of the NU and MI factions at the beginning of the 1980s, gave rise to conflict among the NU elite in Jombang. The conflict was again marked by the emergence of two NU factions. The first was led by Muhammad Baidlowi, who promoted Kiai Syamsuri Badawi as his successor, while the other was headed by Kiai Shohib Bisri, who was appointed temporarily by NU provincial office in Surabaya.

Until the first half of 1986, NU in Jombang was still under the leadership of Muhammad Baidlowi. Since Muhammad Baidlowi was close to PPP, due to his being appointed as one of the national PPP leaders in 1984 (under Naro), his leadership was not supported by the NU elite in Jombang. This was due to an NU policy which suggested that an NU leader should not simultaneously occupy positions (‘rangkap jabatan’: hold dual positions) in PPP and NU. They should choose to manage either NU or PPP. Muhammad Baidlowi, who held an important position in PPP at the national level, however, continued to lead NU in Jombang. He then organised a local NU conference in June 1986, without the acknowledgement of the NU leadership at provincial level. The conference was held at Muhammad Baidlowi's house and chose Kiai Syamsuri Badawi to be NU top leader in Jombang^[27].

As Muhammad Baidlowi was regarded as having violated NU policy on ‘rangkap jabatan‘, the NU provincial office did not recognise Muhammad Baidlowi's leadership. It then appointed Kiai Shohib Bisri to assume NU leadership temporarily, and asked him to make all necessary preparation for a conference. Kiai Shohib came from the Pesantren Denanyar. His temporary appointment was not only an indication that he would be the next leader of local NU, but also hinted that the conference organised by Muhammad Baidlowi, which had chosen Kiai Syamsuri Badawi, was not recognised by the NU provincial office. Kiai Shohib then held another conference in 1986, and was chosen as a local NU head. His nomination for the leadership was accepted by the NU leadership at the provincial level. Kiai Shohib's support derived not only from NU activists who were dissatisfied with PPP leadership under Naro, but also from former Nawawi supporters, who had opposed Muhammad Baidlowi's leadership in the early 1970s. Nawawi had been defeated by Muhammad Baidlowi in his attempt to topple Muhammad Baidlowi's leadership of NU. These subsequent actions by Nawawi supporters indicate their continued opposition to Muhammad Baidlowi.

Like his predecessor, Kiai Syamsuri Badawi's leadership of NU continued regardless of the disapproval of the NU provincial office. It also continued the close relationship with PPP. Since PPP was more or less identical with NU, all the party's activities were centred in the NU's office. The NU office had been the office of PPP since its formation in 1973. The rivalry of Syamsuri Badawi and Shohib Bisri can be seen by their efforts to seize the NU office at Gatot Subroto street. The office was used simultaneously by Syamsuri Badawi and PPP. Shohib Bisri supporters then asked to use it. As the office was owned by NU, and the local NU leadership recognised by the provincial and national NU leadership was that headed by Shohib Bisri, the office was returned to Shohib. Before this, Shohib Bisri's leadership had been centred in the Pesantren Denanyar, his pesantren. It is important to note that it was Shohib Bisri's leadership of NU which then continued, since it was legitimised by the central office's acceptance. In contrast, Syamsuri Badawi's leadership of NU, which was not legitimised by the central office's acceptance, ceased.

A further conflict was the one among members of the Jam‘iyah Ahli Thoriqoh Al-Mu‘tabaroh An-Nahdliyah. As this tarekat was formed as a reaction against Kiai Musta‘in, who joined Golkar, its formation hence reaffirmed NU's political orientation which by that time was articulated through PPP. That meant that NU's tarekat should affiliate with PPP. This situation made the Tarekat Qadiriyah Wa Naqsyabandiyah affiliated with the Jam‘iyah Ahli Thoriqoh Al-Mu‘tabaroh An-Nahdliyah, commonly called Tarekat Cukir, appear as though it was PPP's tarekat. This was indicated by the fact that this tarekat often used PPP's symbol in its big religious activities. However, when NU changed its politics in 1984, some members of the Tarekat Cukir in Jombang were disappointed with the tarekat's continued close affiliation with PPP. They began to conduct separate religious activities at locations other than those used by the Tarekat Cukir. This was done to show that NU's dissociation from PPP should be followed by its tarekat's dissociation from the party. Although only a small number of followers joined these activities, this situation indicated the beginning of a split in the tarekat, which mirrored the conflict among the NU elite in Jombang. The initiator of this splinter group was Kiai Zamroji. Since he did not receive popular support from tarekat members, however, his idea to have a group which was different from the Tarekat Cukir failed.

In present day Jombang, conflict seems to have disappeared from the stage. However, it has left a situation unfavourable for NU development. The elite of the Tarekat Cukir continue to be closely affiliated with PPP and its elites. They feel uncomfortable with other local NU leaders who, in contrast, are more comfortable to be close to Golkar. In their preparations to attend the NU national congress in West Java in 1994, for example, local NU leaders in Jombang preferred to approach Golkar's leaders rather than PPP's. They also felt more comfortable asking for travel funds from Golkar's fraction of the local parliament rather than PPP's^[28].

In brief, conflicts among the NU elite in Jombang have been very common. These conflicts have always involved politics, in the sense that they followed any change in the field of politics. This is especially evident in the conflict which followed the application of NU's ‘back to khittah’ policy. This conflict had wide social consequences. I will return to this matter in the next chapter. Several factors contributed to the conflict among the NU elite in Jombang following the application of the ‘back to khittah’ policy. Firstly, the conflict was triggered by the application of NU's policy of rangkap jabatan (lit. dual position), which prohibited NU members from occupying leadership positions in both NU and in PPP simultaneously. They were advised to take either a position in the party or in NU. It was very common for an NU activist also to be a PPP activist. He could hold a position in NU and in the party. The policy aimed to disengage NU members from PPP and to consolidate NU. It was hoped that those who were recruited into the NU administration would give full attention to the development of NU. At the time, many NU activists were more concerned with the party's problem than NU's. However, as the disappointment with the behaviour of Naro, the national PPP leader, was great among NU activists, the policy of ‘dual position’ was exaggeratedly applied in Jombang. The activists not only condemned other NU activists who occupied positions in both NU and PPP, but also any NU member who was affiliated with the party.

The second factor contributing to conflict was the lack of acceptance of different political affiliations within NU. Such differences have traditionally led to fragmentation. Take the case of Kiai Musta‘in. The difference between his and other kiai's politics led to an organisational split. Political difference typically result in the development of an ‘in and out-group’. Disappointment with Naro, for example, led to those holding positions or active in PPP being regarded by NU activists as the out-group. A third factor was the continued hostility of Nawawi's supporters towards the leadership of Muhammad Baidlowi when NU launched its ‘back to khittah’ policy. Since Muhammad Baidlowi remained close to PPP and tried to control the NU leadership by promoting Kiai Syamsuri Badawi, Nawawi's supporters used his conflict with the NU elite to expel him.