Table of Contents
There are two viewpoints concerning the relationship between religion and political behaviour (Hammond, 1979:20). One argues that religious membership and the activities of members with distinctive values and orientations have a formative influence on political behaviour. The other suggests that the political preference of any group in society does not need to be motivated by its religious beliefs and that any relationship in this sense is ‘spurious’. Scholars who hold the first view take religious loyalty into consideration in their examination of political participation. Religious loyalty and affiliation are regarded as factors that affect the political behaviour of society. This perspective further suggests that religious group membership is a source of identity which differentiates one group from another, since such involvement can provide members with particular norms and values that form a particular group culture. In democratic countries, people's advocacy of their religious aims can be realised through politics, since the system allows political parties to function as the means through which people can articulate their interests, including religious interests. Thus, a religious political party constitutes a means of bridging religious ideals and the reality experienced by believers. Through such a party, believers can articulate their religious ideas to regulate their worldly lives.
This chapter tries to analyse the relationship between the religious affiliation of Muslims in Java and their political actions. It stresses the role of ideas which affect socio-political action. The analysis will focus on voting behaviour which gives support to a particular political party in general elections. In Jombang, the Islamic political party was dominant in core kecamatan of the regency. The results of the 1955 general election indicate that together NU and Masjumi obtained an almost 50 percent share of the votes in Jombang. In the 1971 general election, although the share of the votes of these Islamic parties decreased compared to that of the 1955 general election, they were significantly dominant in five kecamatan. In these kecamatan, the Islamic parties received more than 50 percent of the votes. The basic questions being considered are: why do Muslims give support to one political party and not to others, and what makes certain political attitudes legitimate from their perspective? In looking at the pattern of support given by Muslim society in Jombang, analysis will also focus on the role of the ‘ulama or kiai who are assumed to be dominant and able to induce socio-political action within society to determine how far their charisma influence political action.
Before discussing the role of Islam and of the kiai in Javanese politics, I would like to give a general history of the Islamic political party, PPP, which was established in 1973. As I am going to discuss the electoral pattern of behaviour, I need to describe the place of Islamic parties in Indonesian politics. PPP was resulted from the merger of four Islamic political parties which took part in the 1971 general election. It was hoped that it would accommodate various political interests of Muslim society in Indonesia. As the character of the party has been discussed in a previous chapter, I will briefly focus here on its development in the context of the government's general political agenda. To this end, I should highlight two aspects: the nature of government politics and how Islam was viewed especially by authority.
The New Order government under Suharto, who came to power in 1966, is very different from the Old Order government under Soekarno. The New Order is more concerned with economic development. This concern has had definite implications for Indonesian politics since the emphasis on development necessitated particular political circumstances conducive to economic growth. The effort to pursue this growth has meant that other aspects of Indonesian development have been neglected. Politics, therefore, did not develop in a natural sense but was used to ensure programs of economic development. Accordingly, government politics was in general characterised by an emphasis on security and aimed at achieving political stability.
Armed with ‘the ideology of development’ and seeking stability, the government has presented itself as a strong political regime which is repressive in many respects. Repression has been seen as a necessary element in the march towards economic development. The state has tried to monopolise power, and has imposed control over potentially disintegrative and destructive social and political forces. The government learned from the experience of the Old Order, whose instability mostly derived from politics. That was why the main concern set in motion by the New Order government was to engineer people's socio-political lives.
Among government fears of possible dangers which might disturb the socio-political order was fear of Islamic political parties and other Muslim groups. Fear of Islamic radicalist movements, such as Darul Islam [1] (1948–1962), had forced the Suharto government to be strict and repressive towards any political movement backed by religious ideas. The government had reasonable grounds to be worried, particularly about any political movement by Indonesian Muslims, since attempts to have Islamic ideology applied in the Indonesian state, for instance, have been made by both separatist movements, like Darul Islam, and also by Muslim political leaders. Such attempts were made openly, for example, when members of BPKI (the body which investigated measures to prepare for Indonesian independence), which was dominated by those with a secularist nationalist cast of mind, included debate on the place of Islam in the Indonesian state (Jenkins, 1984:6). This idea, which was still nurtured by some Islamic leaders in the 1970s, was used by the army for its own political ends to exert pressure on Muslims. In any political turmoil, for instance, Indonesian Muslims became objects of government accusations that they were supporters of the idea of Islamic state, which was regarded as subversive. McVey (1971:139) points out that:
the long years of warfare against Muslim rebellion encouraged a tradition of army distrust of militant Islam, and the many Javanese officers of abangan persuasion were strengthened in their objection to Muslim aggressiveness.
Determination to preserve social order, together with a fear of the idea of an Islamic state, led the government to put increasing pressure on political parties. Political parties were forced to regroup into only two parties, under leaders acceptable to the government. In addition, they were undermined by the government which cut off their base support through implementation of the ‘floating mass’ program of depoliticisation, especially in rural areas (Crouch, 1980:659).
The New Order government stance in relation to Muslims, expressed by its fear manoeuvered through its politics, was an overreaction. According to Jenkins (1984:11), the government “…ignored the great changes that were taking place among Muslims… as …many of the younger Muslim intellectuals had left the idea of an Islamic state behind them”. The exaggerated stance of the government has been politically perpetuated. It has also been sustained by the political stance of groups other than Muslims. Since Muslims are the majority, and account for about 90 per cent of Indonesia's population, political groups other than Muslims, which also fear the existence of an Islamic state, have given tacit support to the military stance against Muslim dissidents. One Indonesian scholar is anonymously quoted by Jenkins, as saying:
it is a fact that there is enough combustible material in our society to keep alive the fear of Islam. What kept Soekarno in power so long? It was the fact that the abangan, the Catholics and the Protestants were more afraid of Islam than of the Communists. The same groups support the army and I think that fear is being manipulated for power reasons. Many seriously fear it [Islam] but a leadership that would know how to handle the Muslims and had closer cooperation with them would be able to reduce the fear to more manageable proportions (Jenkins, 1984:12).
Although the government was successful in excluding Muslim political leaders from national decision-making as well as from any reasonable opportunity to increase their power, the persistence of political Islam in Indonesia was apparent during 1970s. The effort to eliminate or to weaken political Islam was contrary to the aspirations of a large segment of the Indonesian people.
Conflict between the regime and Indonesian Muslims was seen soon after the 1977 general election. Based on its experience during this election, the government increased its pressure upon political parties, forcing them change their ideological base to Pancasila. This policy resulted in a decrease in the strength of political Islam and pushed it into a weak position. The political parties[2] were also disturbed by internal conflict. Both PPP and PDI had been experiencing ongoing internal conflicts since the second half of 1970s. Continuous internal conflict finally came to the point where government involvement at reconciliation it was inevitable. This situation impacted greatly on Indonesian politics. Since Golkar has been in power, the government involvement in the internal conflicts of other political parties created an unconducive situation for the development of politics in Indonesia. It gave the impression that political parties could indirectly be managed and engineered by the government, and that the government was ‘the reconciliator father’. This further enhanced the culture of paternalism which has long been a feature of Indonesian life. The elites of the parties tended not to be critical of the government. Even when the government refused candidates proposed by the parties, they could do nothing, so the government could easily control parliament. This decreased role of political parties in Indonesia also seemed inevitable since the military's political role was so strong (Almond, 1978:49– 69). Sundhaussen (1978:50) in his analysis of the military in Indonesia said:
The weakness of the political parties almost matches that of the parliament. First of all, parliament is fully controlled by the government through the military and Golkar factions. In addition, the few supervisory functions formally left to parliament often are abused and circumvented by those in the center of power.
In addition, before the internal conflict characterised the political parties' existence, and before the government introduced its policy of ‘floating mass’ launched in 1975 and of ‘Azas Tunggal’ (sole ideology) applied in 1985, both of which particularly cut off political Islam in Indonesia, the government has made efforts to engineer bureaucracy since 1970. The government introduced a concept of ‘mono-loyalty’, by which all civil servants in all departments had to have one loyalty, that is loyalty to the government. The application of this concept has gradually undermined support for the Islamic political party from civil servants.
The concept of ‘monoloyalty’ which was introduced by General Amir Mahmud as the Minister of Home Affairs, aimed to avoid any internal conflict within the bureaucracy due to different ideologies such as occurred under Soekarno. To strengthen this effort, the government also set up KORPRI (lit. the Corps of Indonesian Public Servants) in 1971 with the purpose of enhancing “I'esprit de corps” among civil servants[3]. Since Golkar represented the government, supporters or sympathisers of Islamic and other parties were faced with a problem when KORPRI was formed. They had to choose between supporting their preferred party and the necessity of being loyal to the government, which meant supporting Golkar. Although the concept does not necessarily mean that civil servants are prevented from being members of any political party, it has had a psychological effect. This is because civil servants organised within KORPRI must indirectly be members of Golkar, since KORPRI is one of the pillars that sustains Golkar. In addition, there is a regulation suggesting that civil servants occupying certain positions must have a permit from their superiors, if they want to be members of political parties and functional groups (Indonesia, 1988:65).
Since the structure of KORPRI could hardly be more top-down, as shown by its executive council which comprises the Minister of Home Affairs, with all departmental Secretaries General and State Secretaries as its members, the government's important effort to stretch a web, which indirectly forces all civil servants to be Golkar members or supporters, has been effective. This happens not only because all the heads of government, from the national to the village level are automatically KORPRI chairmen, but also because all civil servants, through presidential regulation number 6/1970, as interpreted by Amir Mahmud, were denied the right to engage in political party activities.
Monoloyalty and its imposition throughout the bureaucracy has brought about great success for Golkar. Political parties, which during the Soekarno government received their support from their members or supporters in the government departments, suffered a large decline. PNI, for example, which had electorally been the strongest party in 1955 and had enjoyed the greatest bureaucratic base under Soekarno, suffered the greatest decline in 1971. According to Emerson (1978:107), “comparing the 1955 and 1971 elections, despite a 45 percent increase in the voting electorate, PNI lost a staggering 4.6 million votes”. It should be acknowledged that political parties during the liberal democracy period had grown strong enough to challenge the ruling authority on many occasions, and make the latter compromise with them to avoid tension. Accordingly, the 1971 election was a turning point for the power of political parties. In this election, N.U, one of the ‘big four parties’, which had enjoyed a strong bureaucratic base under Soekarno, also suffered a decline. Nevertheless, its decline was different from the PNI's, since NU still received support from its grassroots in villages in Indonesia. However, the government's efforts in ‘social engineering’ replaced many NU members and sympathisers in the Department of Religious Affairs, and made its entrenchment in that department less secure. For the first time, the Minister of Religious Affairs, who had traditionally been appointed from NU, was occupied by a technocrat Muslim, Professor Mukti Ali.
Thus political parties during the New Order no longer received support from civil servants. Also they have not been represented in the Suharto cabinet since the 1971 general election. The government bureaucracy linkage created through KORPRI is an effective way to weaken political parties. The appointment of village heads, for example, needs to be approved by district heads (camat), even though the former are conventionally elected by society. In addition, the government created ‘Dharma Wanita’, an organisation of civil servants' wives which can be used as political means to muster votes for Golkar in a general election, even down to the village. Through these bureaucratic networks, the government mobilises the masses.
Although the government was worried about Islam, it still needed support from Muslim society. Thus the government's pressure on Muslims aimed both to establish political stability in accordance with its economic development plan and also to gain Muslim support. The introduction of the ‘Azas Tunggal’, according to which all political and other organisations were obliged to use Pancasila as their ideological base, resulted in increased support from Muslim groups. This in effect dissolved the Islamic base of the Islamic party, so that for some PPP supporters to change their support to Golkar raised no problem.
Amidst the increased support of Indonesian Muslims towards the government party, the beginning of the 1990s saw a change in the government stance against Muslims in general. The government now tends to be more accommodative towards them. Nevertheless, this does not help Muslims to have a particular means for the realisation of their politics. PPP cannot remould itself as an Islamic party. Its position in politics continues to decline as expressed through its vote share in the last two general elections. Variation at the local level occurred in regard to PPP's political position, but in general it is not comparable to its position during the 1970s. In all regions in Indonesia, PPP's vote share declined significantly. In the next section I will discuss PPP politics at the local level in Jombang. I will look particularly at Muslims' support towards this party, and examine how their views developed after it changed its ideological base to Pancasila.