The debate about Islamic politics has not yet given the final picture of the form of such politics. This is so since there is no explicit text either from the Qur'an or the hadith which mentions a certain format of politics. Nevertheless, from the experience of some countries claiming to be Islamic and of Indonesia itself, the concept and the form of an idealised Islamic state has been promoted by Muslim thinkers and leaders several times. Nasir of the Masjumi and Wahab Chasbullah of NU clearly conceptualised the ideal form of an ‘Islamic’ state. The former once suggested that:

How such a conceptualisation was applied can be seen through the struggle of Islamic political parties on the Indonesian political scene and by the way Islamic leaders pursued what they idealised^[2]. The formation of Islamic political parties was indeed aimed at articulating the political interests of the umma. Islamic objectives were hence stated clearly, either by Masjumi or NU^[3], as their primary ends which sustained their political struggles. It is important to note that what was done by Islamic political parties after Indonesian independence was a continuation of what Indonesian Muslims had done during Dutch colonialisation. The difference between Dutch colonialism and Indonesia independence in relation to the situation of Indonesian Muslims changed only the method of their struggle. The essence of their objective remained the same, that is ‘izzu al-Islam wa'l-Muslimin (for the sake of Islam and Muslim society). During the exploitative Dutch colonialism, the political struggle of Indonesian Muslims was aimed at confronting the Dutch^[4] who distorted Islam and its culture, while after Indonesian independence, Islamic politics was focused on realising Islamic ideals as they were conceptualised. 

However, the long struggle of Muslims against the Dutch was not resolved by the application of Islamic politics during the time of Indonesian Independence, since the political situation was not conducive to the realisation of such ideals. It was rather marked by the decline of Islamic politics itself^[5]. The political situation during the Soekarno government gave the impression that Islam had not received a reasonable share of Indonesian politics^[6]. The same held true during the New Order government in which Islam was even further weakened. This was so not only because the New Order government claimed to be non-ideologically oriented and tried to prevent any ideological conflict, but also because of the recurrent internal conflicts among Muslim groups in PPP. The Islamic political party, PPP, was therefore pushed into a very weak position. The government's efforts to weaken Islamic politics culminated in the introduction of the ‘Asas Tunggal’ (sole ideology) in 1985, which ordered all socio-political organisations to use Pancasila as their ideological base.

Following the decrease of Islamic politics, the early 1990s was marked by a change in the government's standpoint on Islam in general. The government tended to be more accommodating towards Indonesian Muslims and its strict policy changed dramatically. The government, for example, promoted or gave full support to the formation of Ikatan   Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia (ICMI, All Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals). It is interesting to note that a few Ministers of the Suharto government are also ICMI members; and the top leader of ICMI is the Minister for Research and Technology, Prof. B.J. Habibi.

On the Muslim side, the change has been more significant. Muslim society, which up to the early 1980s had been marked by an attitude of what was called by Western observers, opposition, gave increasing support to the government in the third decade of its reign. Islam, which was political, is now more cultural (Ali, 1994). This change is not only shown by ICMI, which received full support from the government, but also by various other Islamic organisations, like NU and Muhammadiyah. The change in Muslims' politics has hence been quite obvious. The participants in the change are drawn from two levels, that is the level of the Muslim intellectuals or middle class and the grassroot Muslims in general. The change at the intellectual or middle class level actually occurred in the early period of the New Order government. It was marked by the slogan “Islam Yes, Politics No” echoed by Nurkholis Madjid^[7]. The change at the grassroots level clearly occurred after the government's promotion of de-Islamisation^[8] of politics had prevailed. Since the kiai is the socio-political interpreter whose informal leadership is deeply embedded in Muslim society, the change at the grassroots level was attributed to a change in the kiai's standpoint on politics^[9]. The change really occurred after the kiai introduced the concept of free political affiliation for Muslims and accepted the Pancasila, in place of Islam, as their organisation's ideological base.

As Indonesian kiai have secularised politics, the political ethos of Indonesian Muslims, which used to be ‘Islamic’^[10], has been undermined. The significance of the change in kiai politics is the concomitant change in the ethos of Indonesian Muslim society. This change of ethos is marked by the breaking of the formal link between Islam and politics. As politics in this sense is no longer intertwined with Islam, there is no longer any moral obligation for a Muslim to affiliate with a certain political party. As a result, there is an increasing number of Muslims in Indonesia who now do not hesitate to support or affiliate with Golkar or PDI, actions which some years ago would have been deemed as having religious consequences. Some kiai have now even become supporters of the government and its political party^[11]. 

Since the change in the Muslims’ perspective on politics is marked by a change at the grassroots level, it is socially significant. The adoption of the Pancasila by NU's kiai for their ideological base, replacing Islam, and their encouragement of free political affiliation for Muslims have replaced the traditionalist Muslim perspective on politics. The Muslim efforts to promote the politics of Islam, which have long been pursued, have been replaced by a wider perspective which is more nationalistic in character. I mean by this that most Muslim leaders are now inclined to consider politics in a wider context^[12].

According to this framework, the kiai no longer see politics as the only avenue through which Islamic messages can be conveyed or its ideals pursued. The Islamic leaders, therefore, do not necessarily involve themselves in the formal structure of Indonesian politics as they did according to the former perspective. So, rather than thinking of Islam as a source of political ideas, the Islamic leaders now tend to consider and focus their thinking more on the prosperity of Muslim society. They concentrate on creating a favourable situation for the benefit of society, rather than imposing ‘Islamic politics’ on the Indonesian political scene. The way to spread and develop Islam, in the opinion of an educated Muslim, should not be restricted to politics. Rather, it must be emphasised through what is theoretically called the institutionalisation of Islam into people's daily lives. The politics of Islam does not necessarily mean the politics by which Islam is strictly applied to all aspects of their life, as would be the situation in the formation of an Islamic state or the application of Islamic law to the society. The politics of Islam, instead, should be directed toward the creation of a favourable situation for Muslims in their everyday lives. Muslims at the grassroots level, in the view of a young Muslim intellectual interviewed, must be lifted from poverty. They should be provided with facilities that can help solve their economic problems. Also they have to be provided with a secure political situation, since politics in Indonesia has often disturbed their lives. Such a situation is needed for the development of Islam itself, since in such a situation Islamic preaching can take place smoothly.

The question is how could the kiai who formerly introduced the religious necessity for Muslims to affilate with an Islamic political party now free themselves to affiliate with any political party? As I mentioned, Kiai Bisri Syansuri, preceding the 1977 general election, maintained that it was compulsory for Muslims (wajb) to support and vote for the Islamic party, PPP. Although this political message did not explicitly prohibit Muslims from voting for another party, it implied such a meaning. The concept of wajb in fiqh (lit. Islamic jurisprudence) means that those performing the wajb would receive a reward, while those not performing it would be sinful. Although the interpretation of the religious necessity (wajb) to support the Islamic party varied among NU's kiai ^[13], this political message was formal in the sense that it was delivered by the kiai representing NU in PPP. The question is: how could the kiai have aspirations that at one time were different from those at a later time. How could a position previously prohibited now become encouraged? There is no single answer to this kiai ‘religious justification’. What is certain is that the kiai's change in attitude was based on the Islamic norms or precepts which they understood. At least we need to understand how the kiai see politics and what the general framework sustaining this perspective is. A good example of the change in the kiai's politics was provided by a younger kiai whom I interviewed. This kiai asked his senior colleague about his political stand of supporting the government party especially in the 1987 general election. The senior kiai answered that he was ‘isis’, a Javanese term to express ‘feeling hot’. Because of so many stressful situations, this kiai felt as though he was in a very hot summer. So he needed to get a cooler and more comfortable situation by moving into another party. Such a statement of course related to the situation of the former Islamic political party, PPP, which was coloured by an internal conflict between its constituent groups so that such a situation was unfavourable. So it was better for this kiai to join another party since the spirit of Islam underlying PPP was discarded by the partial interests of its factions. The perception of this senior kiai on politics can be understood by recourse to his perception about life, the framework through which the kiai see wordly activities such as politics. Wordly life in the kiai's perception is less important compared to religious life^[14]. It exists to strengthen religious life. He did not need to take it as serious as his spiritual life. As politics was a worldly matter, there was therefore no difficulty for him to shift from one political orientation or affiliation to another, as expressed by his joining the government party when he felt that the situation in PPP was not favourable.

In addition, the change in kiai politics was also contextual. Thus it did not occur without the influence of the political situation surrounding it. The most important factor was the lack of an Islamic political party. According to one kiai, the change in the kiai politics was possible because one of the important prerequisites was removed. The religious obligation to support PPP therefore ceased after the party ceased to be Islamic. In their opinion al-hukmu yaduru ma‘a ‘illatihi, which means that from the Islamic perspective, the legitimacy of the law concerned with certain things or behaviour is dependent on its cause. If the cause has changed, the legitimacy of such law also changes. This perspective is basically a guidance for kiai in deciding things under the domain of fiqh. One example is that the prohibition of eating something in a normal situation is waived in an emergency. The change in anything from fiqh perspective is very possible, and very much dependent on the situation. In practice, this principle has become a perspective for the understanding of socio-political problems as well. The inconsistency in attitude, or, in more appropriate words, the fluctuation of the politics of the kiai should therefore be understood by reference to this principle. Especially in relation to politics, which is often seen to be filled with opportunistic situations, the change in the kiai's attitude should therefore be understood as more paradigmatic, not merely opportunistic^[15]. From the fact that fiqh  provides the kiai with a general framework by which they can move from one paradigm to another in politics, the world of kiai must be dynamic.

This evidence indicates that despite being regarded opportunistically by some critics, the kiai's change in politics was based on certain norms conceptualised by Islam and on their understanding of these norms. Because the kiai are the guardian of Islam, they always base their politics on an Islamic perspective. The kiai often use Islamic concepts^[16] as the guide and the framework in their thinking. Therefore, the kiai can be hard and uncompromising when they are faced with things contradictory to Islam. But they can be most accommodating when things are acceptable to the Islamic point of view. As the Muslims in Jombang are devout enough to use Islam in their politics, the political change brought about by the kiai was acceptable since it was sustained by religious arguments.