The political aspect of the kiai's leadership needs attention since it reveals the pattern of patronage in his relation with society, and how his power is clearly discernible. The centrality of the kiai's authority and power in society (discussed in Chapter IV) raises the assumption that his influence is not confined to social relations but is also applicable in the field of politics. This assumption is evidenced by the fact that during a general election, for example, the contesting parties tried to use the kiai to increase their share of the vote. The influence of the kiai was indeed obvious among devout Muslims who often follow their political lead. But Muslims' submission is not without reservation, since they also have basic principles which they use to examine whether or not the political steps of the kiai are religiously legitimate.

Looking at the research findings of other researchers (Geertz, 1965 and 1959; Horikoshi, 1976 and Mansurnoor, 1990) it is evident that the kiai's role in moulding society and in inducing the socio-political action of its members is critical, since the kiai is a leading figure in Islamic society in Java. Deference to the kiai is actually reinforced by the culture of Indonesian society. There is an unequal relationship between the kiai, as patron, and his followers as subordinates or clients. The patron is seen as a source who can fulfil the material and spiritual needs of his followers and, in turn, command their respect. In his research in West Java, Jackson (1973) understood this pattern of relationships to be sustained by what he called ‘traditional authority’. This authority is the authority of the patron^[17] who influences and arouses emotion from his followers. They will do their utmost to retain the esteem of the patron. This pattern of relationships is loosely entrenched among some village people in Indonesia and is often utilised to serve political interests since society can easily be mobilised just by mobilising the higher echelon of the patrons. The political affiliation of the patron is commonly adopted by his client. In addition, any change in political attitude made by the former will result in a similar change in the political attitude of the latter. One would expect from this pattern that obedient followers would comply with any request for support from their kiai, even if this was for the government party. Some followers would do this without question because they believe that the kiai can foresee what ordinary Muslims cannot.

In Jombang, the case of Kiai Musta‘in's joining Golkar preceding the 1977 general election showed how a kiai's political example was followed by some followers, and at the same time it indicated how he was powerless in encouraging other followers to follow his lead. In most cases, the kiai who left the Islamic party and then joined another party (non-Islamic one) was not followed by his followers. Kiai Musta‘in's case showed that a large number of his followers established another tarekat organisation and remained supporters of PPP rather than following his political example.

As the kiai is a charismatic leader, whose words have traditionally been followed by Muslim villagers, it should be recognised that the increase in the number of devout Muslims who did support Golkar could be attributed to the kiai's support for this party. In Jombang, despite the increase in PDI's votes in the 1992 general election, the number of kiai supporting Golkar is actually increasing. This is a result of NU's policy of ‘back to khittah’. In the 1977 general election, only Kiai Musta‘in and his close fellows voted for Golkar^[18] in Jombang. Even other kiai of the Pesantren Darul Ulum led by Kiai Musta‘in persisted in supporting PPP until NU launched its ‘back to khittah’ policy in 1984. The kiai of the three major pesantren (Tebuireng, Darul Ulum and Denanyar) openly gave their support to Golkar in the 1987 general election. It should be acknowledged that this situation contributed to the change in the electoral pattern of Muslims in Jombang and to the decrease in PPP's votes in the 1987 general election. The increase in Muslim support for Golkar^[19] in present day Jombang was due to the influence of a number of kiai who increasingly supported this party. Ibu Hindun, for example, was a former Muslimat (NU's Woman organisation) leader in Ngoro district and a former fanatical supporter of PPP. She transfered her support from PPP to Golkar in the 1987 general election when a few leading kiai in Jombang encouraged Muslims to leave PPP and support Golkar^[20]. Ibu Hindun has continued to be a Golkar supporter ever since. Although in previous elections it was impossible for her to vote for Golkar for religious reasons, she now feels comfortable with her decision to support Golkar in the last two general elections (1987 and 1992).

In brief, the application of the ‘back to khittah’ policy and the adoption of the Pancasila by PPP have resulted in a change in Muslim electoral behaviour in Jombang. This situation has made the pattern of Muslims electoral behaviour more complex in terms of kiai influence. As the kiai mainly reinforce the religious commitment of the electoral behaviour of Muslims, the 1987 general election marked the diminution of the kiai's (as an institution) influence in general. Some Muslims were hesitant to accept the encouragement of certain kiai to support Golkar. This is so because there were some other kiai who continued to encourage Muslims in Jombang to persist in supporting PPP. A significant number of Muslims in Jombang therefore continued to support PPP in the 1987 elections, disregarding their kiai (penggembosan supporters) who asked them to support Golkar. But it should be noted that most of those who changed their support by voting for Golkar in the 1987 and 1992 general elections were following their kiai, while a few were affected by their disappointment with PPP leadership under Naro. The latter's decision was sustained by the encouragement of some kiai to support Golkar. This gave their decision legitimacy.

After the introduction of the ‘back to khittah’ policy, the political steps of a kiai would only be followed by those Muslims who are very close to him and shared his political perspective. But it should be noted that there are also followers who are very close to the kiai but have a different political standpoint. Therefore the kiai support for Golkar does not necessarily mean that all their followers will support this party. In the same way, when kiai support PPP, some of their followers may support Golkar or PDI. In the past there was a more direct correlation between the followers' intentions to vote for an Islamic party and their kiai's encouragement to vote this party. In present day Jombang it is not rare for followers to have different political standpoints from their kiai. Some followers continued to support PPP in the 1987 general election although their kiai urged them to leave the party. On the other hand, a few followers of a kiai supported Golkar in the 1987 general election leaving their kiai who persisted in supporting the former Islamic party, PPP. In the first case the followers based their persistent support for PPP on the assumption that this party still represented the politics of the umma. They kept to a religious commitment to support the former Islamic party. In the second case the followers based their preference on the fact that there was no Islamic political party which obliged them (morally) to support it. It can be said that, in general, a large number of Muslims in Jombang based their support for either PPP or Golkar in the 1987 and 1992 general elections on their own preference and not because they were following their kiai's footsteps.

Nevertheless, it should be recognised that the kiai still played a role in Muslim electoral behaviour although its role was confined to ‘triggering’ a Muslim's decision to vote for a particular political party. According to one respondent, “saya puas kalau pilihan saya cocok dengan apa yang dianjurkan kiai saya” (I am satisfied if my choice of a party is compatible with what is recommended by my kiai). The continued presence of charismatic kiai with widespread influence throughout the villages in Jombang is a contributing factor to the influence of the kiai as a group on Muslim electoral behaviour. There were a few cases in which both a Muslim's preference which was based on both religious commitment and the kiai's influence strongly affected political behaviour in present day Jombang. When some Muslims were asked by their local kiai to support a certain political party which did not fit with their choice, they tried to get guidance from more senior kiai. The kiai as an institution was still seen as important in deciding electoral behaviour. In this case, a senior kiai's influence would be greater than that of a junior kiai in affecting and giving emotional satisfaction in regard to politics.

One example of this from my research was that of a devout Muslim respondent who went to another kiai in Magelang of Central Java, around 400 km from Jombang because he was dissatisfied with the local kiai's encouragement to support the government party in the 1992 general election. The respondent greatly respected his local kiai because he had been one of his obedient followers. On this occasion, however, his kiai's advice ‘tidak pas di hati’ (did not fit with his heart), since his moral intuition consistently urged him to support PPP. Because of this dilemma he tried to get advice from a more senior kiai who had higher religious authority than his local kiai. This senior kiai recommended that he support the party which had a symbol that would not break down until the ‘hari kiamat’ (the apocalypse day). The symbol alluded to by this kiai was the star, the symbol of PPP. Compared to the banyan tree (the symbol for the government party) and the head of the wild buffalo (the symbol of PDI), the star would continue to exist for much longer. The kiai's metaphor was thus interpreted as recommending him to support PPP. The respondent was satisfied with the advice of this senior kiai. Not only did it follow his moral intuition (in supporting PPP) but it was also religiously legitimised by the more senior kiai ^[21]. For this respondent the legitimacy of the kiai was very important in regard to difficult political matters, including his desire to support the former Islamic party. What is evident from this case is that the kiai's advice was needed by his follower to sanction his political actions, since there was no difference between political organisations after PPP adopted secular ideology, the Pancasila.

From my examination of the existing political situation in Jombang, I assume that no kiai has a very wide influence there. This is because the political standpoint of some kiai and the formal NU leadership are in opposition to devout society at the grassroots level. A large number of devout Muslims still hoped that their kiai would remain affiliated with PPP. Although the party is no longer Islamic, they still have a psychological attachment to it, not only because it was the party which they supported for a long time but also because it was very close to their aspirations (almost all PPP leaders in Jombang were NU members). Some followers thus felt the need to reformulate their relationship to their kiai, since the latter were sometimes regarded as deviating from ‘Islamic politics’, as conventionally conceptualised. Thus it is common for a follower to have a different political orientation from his kiai, though in other ways their relationship remains as before. The follower still gives his allegiance as he should. The same situation holds true for the relationship between those kiai who were inclined to support PPP and their followers who were NU members disappointed with PPP leadership. This situation has resulted in the development of a degree of political liberation or of maturation, since the political choice of the society during the election, for example, was based more on individual choices than their kiai's influence. The political standpoint and attitude of society towards certain political parties was not dominated by the politics of the kiai, since no one kiai has overarching influence in Jombang.

Despite this fact, the existing political situation has led to uncertainty for a few Muslims. They were hesitant about which party they should vote for since the kiai gave different advice. One result of this is that a few members of the umma became Golpis ^[22] (Golongan Pilih Semua, the group which voted for all political parties). They chose all three contestant parties, which means that their votes were not valid. Another result was a variation among individual voters in regard to their support at the three different levels of election^[23]. In contrast to the first group, whose votes were not valid, the second group could vote for PPP at the national level, for Golkar at the provincial level and for PDI at the regency level. This tendency will be clearer when we relate it to the assumed reality that people in Indonesia commonly vote for the same party at these three levels of parliament.

Although the encouragement of some kiai to support the government party was not followed by a large number of members of society, since it contradicted their ideas about politics, one still needs to consider the kiai's political role in regard to the tarekat followers. This is necessary since the kiai, the murshid and his khalifa ^[24], have a special place in the lives of tarekat followers. Obedience to the master, especially the murshid, in the tarekat is strongly stressed. Since the murshid is the person who can bestow baraka, a situation sought by every Muslim, one might assume that his political example would be copied by his followers. But I found that such obedience is not absolute. Some followers accept that it is not possible to follow all the murshid's advice. “We just perform what we can in regard to the murshid steps or his encouragement”, a tarekat follower told me.

Some tarekat followers even tried not to relate their political behaviour to their obedience to the murshid. In their opinion, the question of obedience to the murshid is separate from following his politics. In addition, their murshid never asked them to support or affiliate with a certain political party. The murshid gave them free choice in regard to political action. Such statements, however, seem to contradict the facts, since the leader of the Tarekat Rejoso, in his speech in 1991, tried to guide his followers, and even asked them to support Golkar in the 1992 general election^[25]. The same held true with the leaders of the Tarekat Cukir in Jombang. Although they did not publicly ask members of this tarekat, they encouraged them strongly in all social encounters to vote for PPP in the 1987 and 1992 general elections. Nevertheless, not all members would be influenced by such a political message. Those who were reached by such a message might not act as they were asked because they maintained that there was no relation between obedience to the murshid and individual political choice.

In addition, the tarekat as an institution should be differentiated from those who lead it, on the one hand, and their followers, on the other. The tarekat as an institution is different from the elites who manage it; and both are different from the followers. The majority of its followers know little about politics and do not have much political interest, although they would be aware of their obligation as Muslims in politics. It is thus very likely that murshid encouragement to support a certain political party would not be accepted by his followers if the latter felt unprepared to give support. However, I am sure that if the particular murshid had asked his followers to support PPP as happened among followers of the Tarekat Cukir, such a request would have been accepted without question, since of the three contesting parties PPP was the only Islamic party and, although since 1985 it was no longer an Islamic party, all of its leaders were Muslims.

In Jombang, there are two streams of tarekat, which have a large number of followers, that is the Tarekat Qadiriyah Wa Naqsyabandiyah which is coordinated by Jam‘iyah Ahli Thoriqoh Al-Mu‘tabaroh Indonesia and the Tarekat Qadiriyah Wa Naqsyabandiyah coordinated by the Jam‘iyah Ahli Thoriqoh Al-Mu‘tabaroh An-Nahdliyah ^[26]. The discussion above relates to the followers of the former who did not follow their murshid's support for Golkar. They did not agree with the political views of their murshid, and it is very likely that they^[27] voted for PPP in the elections. Despite their political standpoint, they continued to give their allegiance to their murshid. In their opinion, there is no need for absolute obedience in matters relating to an individual's basic rights, as in politics. This means that, although the murshid encouraged the followers to support the government party, the final decision lay with the followers. Since the sympathies of a large number of kiai in this tarekat were with the government party, those followers who supported Golkar in the 1977 and 1982 general elections (when PPP was the Islamic party) probably based their decision to do so on the perceived need to follow the kiai's advice. In this case, their political attitudes were based on the notion that one's political action did not have any relation with being a Muslim. In other words, voting for Golkar or PDI was not sinful as some other Muslims felt it to be. This tendency is similar to that among kiai followers outside the tarekat.

In brief, the recent change in the pattern of support for political organisations contributes to a decrease in the kiai's influence in relation to politics. In addition, it also led to variations in voting pattern among Muslims in Jombang. Some followers did not need to follow their kiai who supported Golkar. Other followers could not help being in opposition to their kiai when they continued to support PPP. This tendency occurred especially during the last two general elections. It needs to be noted, however, that this deviation from the kiai's political lead was greater among followers whose kiai supported Golkar. This was because devout Muslims commonly felt more comfortable to affiliate with PPP rather than Golkar. They continued to do so even after PPP ceased to be an Islamic party. On the other hand, followers who deviated from their kiai who continued to support PPP in the 1987 and 1992 general elections were mostly disappointed with PPP national leadership.

Based on these findings it seems that the changing influence of the kiai in politics must be attributable to other factors. The influence of the kiai relates to society's ideological understanding which is formed by society's interpretation of the necessity to pursue religious ideals. In the past, this understanding obligated a Muslim to behave politically in a certain way, that is to support the Islamic political party. Ideological understanding can constitute an interpretation, especially by the kiai, of the existing ideals conceptualised in the Qur'an. It is hence normative and actualised in a set of moral concepts which affect the behaviour of Muslim society. The moral impulse is stronger when an Islamic political party exists. It nonetheless needs to be noted that the unavailability of an Islamic party does not necessarily cause the moral impulse to cease. This is because it is the Muslims’ interpretation of Islam, rather than the Islamic party, which gives rise to the moral impulse. However, since an Islamic party is a means by which Muslims can pursue their ideals, its very establishment can be said to result from a moral impulse. The change in the kiai's interpretation of politics has affected Muslims’ interpretation of the existing political understanding. This change provided an opportunity for individuals to interpret the existing order, rather than being influenced by structural factors, such as the kiai's  influence^[28]. Muslims were given the freedom of political choice, and it is therefore understandable that they then decided which party to vote for by themselves, not by following their kiai.

If this change can lead to political maturation, variations in voting pattern of individual Muslims, especially among a few who voted different political parties at the three levels of election also led to situation that was not conducive to the development of politics itself. Looking at the political culture of Indonesia, which can largely be subsumed under the term ‘parochial’ (see Almond, 1978) this variation in voting seems unusual. In addition, the system of elections in Indonesia is based on party voting, rather than voting for a particular candidate, so that voting preference is based on loyalty to a party. Voting preference reflects the ideological orientation of the party. Since the pattern of voting is grounded on ideological preference (allegiance), it is therefore very probable that society would vote for the same party at all three levels of parliament. The fact that this sometimes does not occur indicates that there has been a revolt by a few people who were dissatisfied with the existing political situation of the Muslims in Indonesia. Such a revolt is also expressed by those followers who hold different political attitudes from their kiai.