The decrease in the kiai political influence is attributable to the general change in the socio-political situation among Jombang's population. Variation in kiai's politics, as expressed by their support of various political organisations and the disassociation of Islam from politics is the decisive factor which has contributed to the decrease in the kiai's political influence. This decrease was also the result of the lack of charismatic kiai in Jombang comparable to Kiai Hasyim Asy‘ari, Kiai Wahab Chasbullah and Kiai Bisri Syansuri^[29]. The availability of a very charismatic kiai not only contributed to the unity of the kiai as a group but was also influential on the electoral behaviour of all Muslims in Jombang. Every Muslim in present day Jombang relies on his own local kiai. When his political standpoint is different from that of the kiai, he will follow his own common sense rather than following the kiai. He dares to be different from his kiai partly because the kiai does not have a very strong charismatic influence. Muslims in Jombang have no influential figures other than their local kiai nor is there a charismatic kiai with sufficient influence to make all Muslims respect and listen to him. 

The survey I conducted in four districts of Jombang shows that no kiai is known well by all respondents. When I asked the respondents to mention five kiai well known to them, most named very local kiai. By local I mean that most respondents did not mention kiai living outside their own districts. In addition, not all respondents could name five kiai. Some mentioned only four, and a few respondents only mentioned three. The survey of 182 respondents revealed only eight kiai who were widely known, being mentioned by more than ten respondents across at least three villages where I conducted the survey. These kiai are Syamsuri Badawi, Rifai Romly, As‘ad Umar, Yusuf Hasyim, Muchtar Mu‘thi, Shohib Bisri, Mahfudz Anwar and Makki Ma‘shum (see Table 7.1).

(Source: questionnaire)

Table 7.1 shows that, in general, most kiai were best known by respondents from the same district. Kiai Syamsuri Badawi from Cukir, for example, was mentioned as a well known kiai by 41 respondents who in fact came from the same village as he did. The eight kiai named above, however, are different in that they are also known by some Muslims in other districts of Jombang. They are, with the exception to Kiai Mahfudz Anwar, the kiai who have supra village influence, Muslim figures with either provincial or national reputations. Syamsuri Badawi, for example, is a national member of parliament from PPP, while As‘ad Umar is a member of parliament from Golkar at provincial level.

In addition to the fact that no kiai is mentioned by all Muslim respondents, there are some interesting points to note from the data I collected. First, there is an exception to the general tendency that a kiai is especially well known to Muslim society in his own village or district. This exception is Kiai Rifai, who was the only one of the eight kiai well known to more respondents in other villages than in his own village. In Table 7.1 we can see that Kiai Rifai was mentioned by 52 respondents from Cukir, while in his own district (Peterongan) he was mentioned by only ten respondents. Secondly, some NU top figures were less mentioned in certain villages, and in many respects were even not mentioned at all. Kiai Sholeh is a senior kiai among NU kiai in Jombang, but he was only mentioned by one respondent. In addition, it is interesting that Kiai Sulthon, the President of NU in Jombang, for example, was only mentioned by six respondents from three villages. His position as the NU president might imply his familiarity to all Muslims in Jombang. The same holds true of local NU chairman, Kiai Abdurrahman Usman. This kiai, who assumed local NU leadership in 1993, around four months before my survey was conducted, was not even mentioned by one respondent, although he had been teaching at Pesantren Tebuireng, and before assuming local NU leadership had been a young active kiai.

It seems that there is another factor which contributes to a kiai's familiarity to Muslims in Jombang. Holding a formal position in NU therefore does not guarantee that a kiai will be known to all Muslims. The same happens in the tarekat. Kiai Makki, for example, was only mentioned by six respondents from Cukir, yet as a murshid of the Jam‘iyah Ahli Thoriqoh Al-Mu‘tabaroh An-Nahdliyah centred in Cukir village (District of Diwek) he should at least be well known to most respondents from Cukir, although he himself comes from another district. Two other murshid of this tarekat, Kiai Hisyam and Kiai Sholihin, were each mentioned by only one respondent.

Despite the popularity of the eight kiai mentioned above compared to other kiai in Jombang, no one kiai is really well known by all Muslims in Jombang. The majority of the kiai are only well known to Muslims in their own district. Although the lack of a very charismatic kiai has contributed to the decline in the kiai’s political influence on inducing Muslims' political action, the kiai as an institution is still generally regarded as important. The pattern of the kiai's relationship with his society remains strong. The process of modernisation, which has introduced secular values and produced anxiety in regard to Muslim religious lives, has raised the hope of the Muslim population that the kiai will become more active in their religious lives. In addition, as Muslims still base their actions on the Qur'anic norms, their attachment to the kiai persists, since the kiai is the person who best understands the Qur'an. Kiai leadership hence continues to be expected by Indonesian Muslims.

The data in Table 7.2 indicates that the Muslim population's continued trust in the kiai, despite the decrease in his political influence. Of the 182 respondents whom I interviewed, for example, 71.4 percent suggested that the kiai is the most suitable person to lead an Islamic organisation. Only 3.8 percent of respondents recommended that an Islamic organisation be led by an intellectual. The remaining respondents, accounting for about 13.2 percent, said that anybody was acceptable to lead an Islamic organisation as long as he was a capable Muslim. Nevertheless, these findings do not mean that kiai and ‘ulama in general are not vulnerable to the development of society. In an increasingly modernising society, their leadership needs continually to adjust to the current situation to remain relevant.

n = 182

(Source: questionnaire)

^29a There are 4 organisations through which the respondents affiliate with. These are NU, Muhammadiyah, LDII and Pangestu. ‘Others’ means other than those organisations mentioned in the Table. This meaning holds for the same “Others” in Table 8.1, 8.3 and 8.5.