Despite being less significant in their role in Muslim electoral behaviour, the kiai generally have an important role in Indonesian politics. This role has been performed since the period of Dutch colonialism in Indonesia. The importance of their role lies in their being the religious leaders of Indonesian Muslims, so that their influence is embedded in society. The Indonesian kiai used to be grouped into an Islamic political party, which on some occasions challenged government authority since their basic concern was “…to preserve a comprehensive Islamic community in contrast to the secular outside world of the national system” (Horikoshi, 1976:375).
The kiai and the government both have power in relation to society, and they use this to bargain and profit from each other. From the government perspective, the kiai's power is strong enough to influence society's socio-political actions. This is because they occupy the position of religious legitimator; and a Muslim society, such as in Indonesia, needs the legitimacy of the kiai to conduct their worldly affairs. The different perspectives of the kiai and the government in looking at various problems of society often provoke a situation where their relationship is marked by disharmony or even tension. In Indonesia, this tension commonly occurred because the government needed the kiai, and ‘ulama in general, to obtain political support from the Muslim society. It also sought the legitimacy of the kiai for its worldly policies that impinged on the religious domain.
The Indonesian kiai have held a leading position in the society since the coming of Islam to Indonesia. Since the formation of the Islamic kingdom in early Indonesia, some prominent kiai have been involved in governmental matters. However, the relationship between the kiai and the Indonesian government has fluctuated. In essence, the existing views of this relationship derive mostly from the salaf ‘ulama (lit. earlier ‘ulama). For most of the time, association with the government has been viewed pessimistically. There exists a common perception that becoming part of the government is not good, since once it occurs one will be exposed to things less religiously acceptable. The line between ‘acceptable’ and ‘not acceptable’ is nonetheless clearly defined. Any kiai who actually approached the government would become a target of gossip and be humiliated as kiai keceng [30].
The closeness of the kiai to the government can be identified through certain actions, such as involvement in the GUPPI (Joint Effort for the Development of Islamic Education), or membership in Golkar. The reaction of kiai and Muslim society in general against those kiai who are regarded as a part of the “government's machine” remains negative. This can be seen from the reaction of Jombang society and Muslims in East Java in general to Kiai Musta‘in[31], former leader of the Pesantren Darul Ulum. When he supported the government, he was not only left by a large part of his followers, but also by his fellow kiai. Kiai Musta‘in was accused of being kafir [32] (an infidel) because of his cooperation with the government. He was hence judged unsuitable, for example, to lead (be an imam in) prayer. Even Kiai As‘ad, the current head of the Pesantren Darul Ulum, and a colleague and member of Kiai Musta‘in's close family, was humiliated by his santri when he led the prayer, since the students were disappointed with As‘ad's joining Golkar. In an evening prayer, the santri said ‘Golkaaaaaar’ loudly, instead of ‘Amiiiin’ when As‘ad finished reciting al-fatiha [33]. The same experience held true for other kiai who joined Golkar.
As the relationship between the kiai and society has long been institutionalised through patron-client norms, the Indonesian government is aware of the decisive position of the kiai in influencing people's socio-political actions, and in guiding them to adopt certain ways. The government has been trying to incorporate the kiai into its machinery by establishing a formal institution called the Majlis Ulama Indonesia or MUI (Council for the Indonesian ‘Ulama) from the national level down to the district level. The original objective of this institution was to bridge the gap between the government on the one hand and Muslim society on the other. In a more practical way, however, the institution is often criticised for being a government tool to legitimise its programs. However, only a small number of kiai have accepted recruitment into this government corporate body. The majority of them remain independent.
It is the kiai in MUI who usually deliver national fatwa related to the dilemmas posed by a Muslim society. MUI, for example, was the first group of the ‘ulama to suggest that ‘family planning’ was religiously permitted, when most of the ‘ulama in Indonesia encouraged Muslims not to participate in the program. In spite of MUI closeness to government, however, the ‘religious advice’ delivered by them is not simply on behalf of the government. Their ‘religious advice’ is based on decisions made for the sake of the Muslim society itself. The ‘religious advice’ concerned with family planning, for example, was not only given because the program is a government program but also because Islamic rationale recommends that the Muslims participate in this important program for the prosperity of ‘Islamic society’. The fact that family planning is a government program is just a coincidence.
In addition, it is also important to note that MUI often produced ‘religious advice’ which is opposed to government programs. One example is ‘Porkas’, a fund raising program for sports in Indonesia administered by the Ministry of Social Affairs. Under this program, donors received a ticket for a lucky number in return for their donation. MUI declared this program as religiously prohibited, even though their ‘religious advice’ was delivered after the ‘Porkas’ had been in operation for a couple of months. MUI suggested that the government ban ‘Porkas’.
Nevertheless, many educated Muslims do not have a completely favourable impression of MUI. MUI is still suspected of being a tool of the government to legitimise its policies. Such suspicion is understandable, since the formation of MUI at all levels was marked by the recruitment of kiai more favourably disposed towards the government, and constitutes a part of the corporate structure of the government. A large number of kiai who are not involved in MUI are cynical about MUI; and some people looked down on those recruited as tools of the government. Recent critics mocked MUI by called it as ‘Majlis Ular Indonesia’ (the Council for Indonesian Snake).
The relationship between the kiai and the government in Java has been marked by tension. Since the government is the party with the most power, it keeps trying to use various means not just to defeat the kiai but also to recruit them onto its side in supporting its political policies. MUI is especially important for establishing the legitimacy of government politics and the validity of its administration. One way that it tried to counter the kiai's politics was to impose some restrictions on da‘wa [34] activities conducted by the kiai. The government at the district level often delayed giving permission, and sometimes did not give any permission for such ativities. The government's restrictions on these religious activities seem to derive from the fact that in the past these religious sessions (da‘wa) were often used by anti-government kiai to give sharp criticism of and to provoke an unpopular situation for the government. This provided the government with a pretext not only to restrict preaching activities but also on some occasions to ban them. A purely religious ritual that I observed in a village, conducted by members of Sholawat Wahidiyah, was almost cancelled just because permission had not been given by the provincial police office. This sufi order is actually included among those that support the government. Nevertheless, it still needed to get formal permission from the government for its ritual.
In addition to such restrictions, other stricter steps taken by the government are concerned with pressuring the kiai to give their support to the government political party during general elections. Even though the pressure was imposed on the kiai at village or district level, it was done with the permission of the government at the regency level. In the 1971 and 1977 general elections, such pressure was evident. As reported by some mass media, the kiai living in less ‘devout-villages’ received serious physical threats[35]. As the government officials had to win the election by any means at their disposal, despite the fact that the Muslim society did not generally support the government party, the support for Golkar from such an important figure as a kiai becomes a necessity since the kiai's role in the general election would be critical. Some camat (district head) in Jombang therefore encouraged the village heads under their authority to recruit the local kiai into the village administration. A camat in the southern region of Jombang, Bareng, for example, proudly mentioned that he had no serious problems in terms of popular support for the government during the election because he had appointed some local kiai to the administration of critical villages[36].
It would be inappropriate, however, to analyse the relationship between the kiai and the government only through the difference in the institutions in which they play a part. The difference in their institutions or in the roles which they play are not the main factor that gives rise to the non-harmonious relations that often occur between them. The relationship, instead, can be seen in the context of the existing socio-political situation. We have seen, for example, the difference in the kiai attitude towards the government between the years when they were struggling through an Islamic political party and their attitude after the elimination of the Islamic political party. In the former, the relationship between the kiai and the government was marked by tension. The kiai not only had a different perspective from the government's, but they were also grouped into a political party. This demonstrated their disagreement with the government and they were, therefore, accused of opposing the government. The persistence of the kiai in defending Islamic principles as far as they were articulated through PPP gave the impression that they were a radical group that could not easily be defeated by the government. For example, they had even staged a ‘walk out’ from the parliamentary assembly, an action uncharacteristic of Indonesian political culture.
Today, however, the kiai's relationship with the government seems to be harmonious. Many kiai seem to show their sympathy for the government. They give full support to the leadership of Suharto[37]. Several reasons sustain these attitudes of the kiai. Firstly, the government is a leader just as are the kiai, and the former's legitimate authority needs to be supported as long as it does not represent a corrupt power. Secondly, the government in the most often stated view by the kiai has done a lot for Indonesian society. Since the majority of Indonesians are Muslims, the government has therefore actually benefited Muslim society.
This sympathetic attitude of the kiai has been balanced in return by the changed attitude of the government itself. The most salient change for the Indonesian Muslims resulting from the current government's attitude is a lack of strict monitoring of da‘wa activities. Currently in Java, seeking government permission for a da‘wa activity no longer involves a long process, especially if the project officers of the activity hold government party membership cards. This change in government attitude is felt by Muslims at the grassroots level, whose religious activities were often disturbed in the past by security officers[38].
In brief, what is interesting about this relationship is the major change in attitude on the part of the kiai with respect to the government. While in the past it very often happened that the government's offer of support was refused by the kiai, currently in Java such a situation would rarely occur[39]. Some kiai might be ready to accept any government offer of particular non-bureaucratic formal positions. Looking at the two reasons underlying the change in attitude of the kiai, we are faced with further questions since the reasons seem to have been taken for granted. If the government is deemed to be doing a lot for Muslims in Indonesia, the question is: why have these reasons only lately come to the surface? Is it not the case that such responses are, from a more modern perspective, concerned with the function of the state and the government? To answer this, it is necessary to look at the socio-political context underlying the change in the kiai's attitude. It should be noted that this change seems to have another dimension, indicating that the kiai are actually open to change and are responding to the current state of affairs. The change in attitude did not take place in a vacuum but rather was shaped by the socio-political situation.
The kiai have actually been pursuing certain strategies to reach their ideal for some time. The formation of the Islamic political party, PPP or NU (by the ‘ulama), were an indication that they had held ideas or plans which differed from the government's. However, the on-going government mistrust or suspicion of the behaviour of Islamic leaders, including the kiai, led to the former discouraging any idea of an Islamic state. The kiai's struggle through politics had thus come to a dead end. The government's policy of ‘Azas Tunggal’ held a significant consequence for the pattern of the kiai struggle for Islam, since it provided the conditions for the de-institutionalisation of Islamic political parties.
The kiai were aware of this consequence, but because there was no alternative, they could do nothing to prevent it. From this one might deduce that the change in attitude shown by the kiai stemmed from the fact that the avenue of Islamic politics was no longer open to them. The change was compensated by the fact that the government “has done a lot for Muslims in Indonesia”. The government in their opinion is no longer the other faction that needs to be suspected, but rather is a counterpart that must be supported. This helps explain why in the second half of the 1980s, there was no fissure marking the conflict between the kiai and the government. Hence, some kiai gave public support to the government. In 1992, a few months before the general election, a great number of the kiai in East Java publicly supported Suharto, proposing that he be elected for the next presidency. The same holds true in the current situation. Many kiai came to see Suharto in his palace just to give him implicit support. In June 1995, several kiai from Jombang and East Java, led by Kiai As‘ad Umar from the Pesantren Darul Ulum, gave political support to President Suharto's candidacy for another term in office (1998).
However, the current situation marks a change in position of the kiai in the eyes of the government. My informant gave me a cynical description. “In the past”, he said, “the government pursued the kiai. But in present day Jombang, the kiai pursue the government”. He suggested further, “If you go to a great kiai after you perform your ‘idu'l-fitr prayer, I am sure you will not meet him, because the kiai must see the bupati (the regent) in his house. In the past, the bupati came to see the kiai after the former performed ‘idu'l-fitr prayer”[40].
Although only a few such cases have happened, it becomes clear that there is a change in the social structure in relation to the ‘ulama-government relationship. Some santri suggested, therefore, that although some cooperation with the government is valuable, it is too risky to be too close to it. The kiai had better to be more preoccupied with their pesantren, and leave the politics to other NU activists.