C. Signs

Following the penetration of cultural studies and the humanities by the legacy of Saussure, Peirce has now been ‘re-invented’ by a diverse group of scholars but not exclusively associated with the university of Chicago (cf. Sebeok 1997). Semiotics has become widely known as the ‘science of signs’ or, if not a science, it is a method of unveiling signification in the production of signs (Eco 1979: 32, 1999: 12). Saussure and Peirce, the two founders of semiotics, were interested in the nature of signs in our lives, but they developed different theoretical frameworks. Saussure is better known as a structuralist while Peirce is, according to his followers, a proponent of pragmatics (Parmentier 1987, 1994 and 1997).

Saussurean structuralist semiotics focuses on the binary relation within signs between a ‘signifier’ and a ‘signified’, though there is no compulsory relation between the form of the signifier and its signified reference. The meaning of signs is derived from ‘differences’ or contrasts within a wider, total, synchronic, or timeless system. The Saussurean view has provided researchers in various areas with an explicit theoretical framework and the results, in many instances, have been marvellous. In the study of culture, Lévi-Strauss (Levi-Strauss 1968-1977) is the most prominent descendant of Saussurean semiotics. The utility of binary logic is seen most clearly in his famous essay on “The Story of Asdiwal”. Lévi-Strauss developed linguistics-based Saussurean semiotics into structuralist anthropology by drawing on aspects of Russian formalism in his analysis of the story. The result is a schema or model. Unlike Saussure, who was deeply concerned with linguistic models, Lévi-Strauss goes further by proposing a model of social behaviour or social structure. A structure in Lévi-Strauss’s view is similar to Saussure’s concept of ‘deep structure’ in language which provides a ‘schema’ or a cognitive framework for the ordering of meaning. In other words, Lévi-Strauss and Saussure are more interested in studying the structure of phenomena on a synchronic level (langue) than phenomena in use (parole). Pragmatic semiotics (the study of phenomena in use) is derived from the theory of signs introduced by Peirce. He stresses the importance of semiosis in which signs can grow as human culture grows. Unlike Saussure who freezes the sign in synchronic analysis, Peirce locates signs within process and points explicitly to the importance of the ‘interpretant’. This view is very important in understanding the complexity of culture, particularly in the post-modern and post-colonial period where Saussurean and Lévi-Straussean views of cognitive patterns are challenged by the rapidity of social and cultural transformations. For Peirce, the sign is accordingly fluid rather than frozen.

To comprehend Peirce’s semiotics we have to know his main doctrine of the sign. According to Peirce, “A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity…” (Noth 1990: 42) Accordingly, there are three conditions that permit a phenomenon to qualitfy as a sign. First, it should be come to our perception. Second, it should refer to a referent, and third, it should be interpretable or generate interpretation. Furthermore, signs should be anchored in a context and in time. The Saussurean paradigm omits agency or the subject in the process of semiosis, but Peirce opens the way to research on the interpretations made by people. (Rochberg-Halton 1986: 45-70)

Later theoretical investigation reveals that a process of signification not only deals with the conventionalised relation between signifier and signified but also other kinds of relations which provide the framework for other unintentional signs, both linguistic and non-linguistic (Eco 1979: 190-216). In other words, a process of communication cannot always be assumed to have just a ‘sender’ and ‘receiver’. The signification can be actively engaged without the existence of a sender. In this regard, Clifford Geertz (1973) asserts

…what Lévi-Strauss has made for himself is an infernal culture machine. It annuls history, reduces sentiment to a shadow of the intellect, and replaces the particular mind of particular savages in particular jungles with the Savage Mind immanent in us all (1973:355).

In his Religion of Java (1960/1976) Clifford Geertz answers the shortcomings of Saussurean structuralism by utilising local knowledge. Unlike Lévi-Strauss and Saussure, he focuses on parole rather than langue. The variants of Javanese religion are a fabulous example of his phenomenological framework. If we follow structuralist semiotics, the main project in Pamijahan would focus on linear and contrastive analyses of signs, finding the regularity underlying the system of signs functioning in the area. It would be like studying a building by making inventories, classifications and generalisations in order to get a view of the structure behind the building. This project would not be interested in the ‘cultivation’ of signs where the building might later be used by other tenants, or be sold, or even be neglected. Yet, in reality there is much opportunity for the owner of the signs and for the receiver of the signs to negotiate or to make transactions regarding the building, or structure. This does not mean that our knowledge of the formal regulation of the building is unnoteworthy. It is just a choice we make.

There is no room in this volume to detail further the intersections and disjunctions between the views of Saussure and Peirce. I am not concerned with the debate about the nature of signs but rather will refer to their work in general terms for the important insights it gives into the signification process in the society of Pamijahan. The utility of Peircean semiotics in studying culture, to some extent, has been drawn upon by Turner (1967) and Geertz (1976) even though these masters of ‘cultural performative’ and ‘interpretative’ analysis do not mention explicitly the connection between their analytical frameworks and Peirce’s work (Parmentier 1997: 13-14). Both Turner and Geertz apply an analytical framework that to some extent displays triadic concepts similar to those of Peirce (Colapietro 1996, Mertz 1985). Accordingly both Turner and Geertz can also be located in the domain of pragmatism where the problem of ‘subject’ or ‘agency’ is central. Geertz’s fascinating ‘thick description’ is seen as a preliminary semiotic project in anthropology. As argued by Parmentier (Parmentier 1997), Geertz’ interpretative study is lacking in the area of epistemology.

His work does not advance the technical grasp of semiotic anthropology. His work does not advance the technical grasp of the types and classification of sign relations; his ethnographic demonstrations fail to explore the structure of semiotic codes as presupposed systems of interpretants. …his focus on textually mediated self-understanding neglects the powerful ways that symbols can be manipulated to constrain, confuse, and control the understanding of those not in a privileged position in a society. The Geertzean program of a ‘natural history of signs and symbols, an ethnography of vehicles of meaning (1983:118) is only the prologue to a full-fledged semiotic anthropology (Parmentier 1997, 13-14).

To follow Parmentier’s argument, Geertz’s interpretive legacy does not provide the student of culture with a strong analytical tool. In my view, Geertz (especially 1993 and 1973) is able to fill a gap in the Saussurean tradition by accessing local knowledge, making it a cultural category that can be compared and tested by other scholars or researchers. However, Geertz’s lack of explicit analytical unities (Geertz 1973) makes his interpretative program difficult to imagine for the student of semiotics or anthropology. His famous categorisation of the variants of Javanese religion is a good example of how problematic this issue can be. Recent studies argue that what has been drawn by Geertz in the Religion of Java, the santri, priyayi, and abangan categories, are not strict iconic or indexical signs referring to certain domains in Javanese culture but rather ‘fluid’ and ‘cultivated’ signs (Bachtiar 1992). In my perspective, this gap can be filled by pragmatic semiotics where signs flow through the times.

If customs, or tali paranti are seen as signs, they can be examined in terms of three semiotic levels. The first is as signs as people understand them. The second is the position of the signs in relation to other signs in the same cultural framework. The third is the way signs are used in everyday life. Turner’s ‘ritual forest’ (Turner 1967), for instance, to some extent reflects the triadic dimension of the Peircean sign: icon, index, and symbol (see also Rochberg-Halton 1986; Parmentier 1997).