[1] There have been numerous attempts to review the copious literature on military coups (see, for example Lowenthal 1974; Hoadley 1975; Nordlinger 1977; Perlmutter 1980; Ball 1981; Valenzuela 1985; Kennedy and Louscher 1991). We will not repeat that exercise here, though some features of the debate will be highlighted.
[2] Among a number of studies which broadly pursued this theme, major contributions included Shils (1962); Pye (1962, 1966); Finer (1962); Johnson (1962); Halpern (1963); Riggs (1964); Janowitz (1964); von der Mehden (1964); Huntington (1968); Zolberg (1968); Daalder (1969); Dowse (1969); Lefever (1970); Bienen (1971, 1983); Lissak (1976); Perlmutter (1977, 1981); more recently see Crouch (1985) and Chazan et al. (1988).
For some dissenting views see Lee (1969); Welch (1974a); Mazrui (1976). Mazrui in particular saw the military, in Africa, as likely to ‘retraditionalise’; similarly see Crouch (1979) on the ‘neo patrimonialism’ of the military in Indonesia.
[3] In an earlier paper, Finer (1982) presented a ‘morphology of [32] military regimes’, ranging from ‘military-supportive civilian regimes’, through ‘indirect-military regimes’, to ‘military regimes proper’, based on an analysis of ‘who governs’. Also see Luckham (1971) and Bebler (1990).
[4] Also see Finer (1962, 1985); Lee (1969); Lloyd (1973); Bienen and Morell (1974); Heeger (1977); and Perlmutter (1981); however cf. Luckham (1991: 2): ‘The more one looks at [the military], the more it decomposes like the vanishing smile of the Cheshire cat, into the turbulent social and political forces that swirl around it. Yet the more one seeks to explain its role in relation to those forces, the more its military specificity is brought (like the smile) back into focus’. Even Bebler, having introduced the idea of a civilian-military continuum, argues against those who deny the perceptual validity of the civilian-military dichotomy, that ‘in every society, at any given moment, there is a demarcation line considered as “normal” by the leading political forces’ (Bebler 1990:265). (Also see Nordlinger 1977:xii.)
[5] An early review of this literature is contained in Lowenthal (1974).
[6] More recent discussions of the ‘new professionalism’ of the military in Southeast Asia are contained in Soedjati and Yong (1988) and Selochan (1990).
[7] Some recent tendencies are discussed in Sarkesian (1981); Stepan (1988); Goodman, Mendelson and Rial (1990:Part III); Zagorski (1992); Burk (1993), and Ashkenazy (1994).
[8] Thus, although Finer observes that most military regimes have very short lives, he also notes that: ‘Few civilian successor regimes have lasted more than ten years’ (1985:29).
[9] Cf. Luckham (1991:10): ‘Rather than analysing coups as such, we might do better to consider them as part of a much wider process of transformation: firstly as a subcategory of a broader class of regime changes or political transitions; and secondly as one among several different channels through which military power can influence politics’.
[10] In context, Huntington appears to equate ‘state’ with ‘government’; the significance of distinguishing ‘state’ from ‘government’ is discussed below.
[11] Also note von Clausewitz (1832/1968:405): ‘… subordination of the military point of view to the political is … the only thing which is possible’.
[12] For a recent statement of this theme, drawing primarily on US experience, see Johansen (1992).
[13] See, for example, Albright’s (1980) critique of Huntington’s ‘conceptual framework’ on the basis of the experiences of sixteen communist states. On civil-military relations in communist states, also see Perlmutter (1982) and Herspring and Volgyes (1978).
[14] Cf. Sundhaussen (1985). Sundhaussen begins with the proposition that ‘South-East Asian armies have failed to follow the trend in other regions to withdraw to the barracks’, and seeks the explanation for this (following the lead of Huntington 1968:237) largely in cultural terms: ‘… there has never been a significant democratic tradition among the people of South-East Asia … Thus the principle of civilian supremacy over the military … was hardly ever a focal point in the politics of these countries’ (ibid.:270, 277-78).
[15] In the 1994 Freedom House ‘Comparative Survey of Freedom’, on scales of 1-7 (best to worst) for political rights and for civil liberties, Burma scored 7 and 7 and Indonesia 7 and 6. See Freedom Review 25(1) 1994.
[16] ‘Paramilitary forces’ are a major concern of Janowitz (1977) and ‘military civic action’ is the subject of a volume by de Pauw and Luz (1991). The role of officially-recognised ‘vigilantes’ in the Philippines is discussed in May (1992).