The proof of concept phase of the Indian space program was characterized by the use of foreign space systems, configuring the ground system to suit national needs and conditions as well as working closely with the potential user community. We illustrate the nature of the activities in this phase through three examples.

The first is an experiment to develop, test and manage a satellite based instructional television system, to demonstrate the utility of satellite television for mass communication with a specific emphasis on remote rural areas communications. Known as the Satellite Instructional Television Experiment (SITE), it used the American Satellite, ATS-6 specially moved over Indian Ocean to conduct this experiment in 1975–76. The responsibility of design, development, deployment, operation and maintenance of ground equipment was entirely that of India and it involved nearly 2400 direct reception television stations in six clusters. India also undertook development of instructional programs, in the areas of family planning, agriculture, national integration, primary education, and teacher training. While departmental boundaries are often difficult to cross in a bureaucratic system, in a multi-disciplinary project such as SITE, it often became necessary to work across conventional boundaries and sort out the interface problems. SITE gave very valuable inputs as to how TV, a new extension tool can be integrated into the existing organization of the user agencies. Social research and evaluation design was also carried out for impact survey of target populations. Further, the experiment helped arriving at cost estimates for a national operational satellite system.

The second example related to the Satellite Telecommunication Experimental Project (STEP). This project, undertaken primarily to understand the issues of interfaces between space and ground systems for communication, was conducted with a Franco-German satellite, Symphonie. STEP helped in concretizing our initial thinking on ‘Disaster Warning Systems’, radio networking concepts and transporatable terminal developments, and provided vital inputs to the planning of INSAT.

The third example relates to space based earth observation system. Landsat, launched by USA in 1972 provided an unique opportunity to test out the utility of a satellite based earth observation system for obtaining timely, accurate and precise information of earth resources. The exercise of establishing ground systems, integrating space based data with conventional aerial and ground based data and working closely with user community, such as the Geological Survey of India, Agriculture, Forestry and Water resources users provided several crucial insights for planning the future operational remote sensing systems.

In summary, the proof of concept demonstrations enabled evaluating the potential of the vantage point of Space for addressing the country’s developmental needs and issues of scalability at the national level. An important outcome was the evaluation of uniqueness of space in providing new services, or for assessment of their superiority vis-à-vis conventional approaches. Further, this phase enabled a short turn around time and a low cost strategy for evaluating the concepts, the systemic issues including technologies, the institutional frameworks and the user interfaces.

The experimental phase was identified with a strategy to derive an end-to-end experience in the realization of space systems where the potential of its use at the national level had already been clearly demonstrated in the proof of concept phase. Here the strategy took due cognizance of the fact that space systems are inherently complex, carry high risks and are investment intensive. Further the creation of a heritage in hardware, human resource and methods are critical to develop confidence for operational systems. There was also a need to minimize the impact of probable early failures in the public mind and the political system. This phase additionally facilitated competence building at the core level, helped in the detailed evaluation of issues for scaling the effort to the national level and set the rules relating to the overall practices in system engineering. The overall demonstration of the systemic approach in this phase paved the way for the country to create national systems at a much larger scale with bigger and more sustained investments. We briefly discuss the nature of two satellite missions, Bhaskara and Apple, that were accomplished based on these considerations.

The Bhaskara Satellites (two of which were built and launched in 1979 and 1981), were earth observation satellites with a low resolution of 1 Km operating in two spectral bands. The Bhaskara program at a cost of Rs.60 million, and spread over six years gave valuable experience of building imaging camera systems, realizing satellite platform to take pictures from space, receiving the image information and processing these on the ground through appropriate ground infrastructure. Further, the mission enabled evaluating application interface methodologies with users in resource areas such as vegetative cover, geology and hydrology.

The Ariane Passenger Payload Experiment (APPLE) conducted in 1981, provided experience in satellite communications, including building of a body stabilized geosynchronous satellite. The involvement of the user agencies early in the program, had a very significant influence on the adoption of the satellite communication technology in operational communication systems of India in the subsequent years.

The experimental phase also saw some very significant progress in the design and development of launch vehicles. Systematic efforts in building capabilities, studies of configurational options, issues of phasing the program, development of relevant infrastructure were all part of both the proof of concept and the experimental phases. The strategy for developing the launch vehicle was dictated by the country’s decision to have autonomy in accessing space. Before going for the realization of a full-fledged launch capability, the need to have a phased development was recognized as necessary both for building competence and for developing the needed confidence. Successful realization of India’s first launch vehicle SLV-3, with a modest payload capability of 40 kg and initiation of the augmented capability version ASLV with 150 kg payload capability took place in this phase. Valuable experience and inputs from both SLV-3 and ASLV, provided the basis for planning, configuring and implementing strategies for the current operational launch vehicles, the PSLV and GSLV (Gupta 2006).

The proof of concept and experimental phases together accounted for an expenditure of 8 per cent of the total expenditure as on 2006 (constant price basis).

The operational phase, as described in section-4 called for certain unique strategies and decision making. Let me give a couple of examples in this connection. Encouraged by the lessons of the SITE experiment and recognizing the potential of a space-based communication and broadcasting system for meeting the developmental needs of the country (Kale et al. 1971), India decided to go for a space-based communication and broadcasting system. Taking into account, the time frame for indigenous design and development of an operational Indian National Satellite (INSAT) and recognizing the urgency to initiate services in this area, India decided to go for a bought out option for the first generation INSAT systems, even as we embarked on the design and development of the second generation systems. The four satellites of the first generation were thus procured, launched and operated for providing space based communication and broadcasting services for meeting national needs. The subsequent three generations of satellites, many of which are currently in service, were all designed and built indigenously. The strategy adopted was different in the case of earth observations. Although the then operating foreign satellites were used for developing the remote sensing applications in the country, the special requirements of earth observations, peculiar to our country as well as cost and strategic considerations called for an indigenous design and development route for the realization of operational remote sensing satellite systems. ‘Bhaskara’ missions provided the necessary confidence to undertake such an effort. The implementation of this strategy has resulted in India’s own world class IRS series of satellites.

Another example is about the decision, in the early phase itself, to de-couple the time frame for the development of the launch vehicles from their role in providing operational support for satellite launches. Considering the complexities and the longer time frames for the development of launch vehicles, India consciously decided to seek launch support services for operational satellites from outside agencies. Such a strategy enabled the timely establishment of space services and also provided specific inputs for sizing the launch systems for these classes of satellites. The present capabilities of PSLV and GSLV and their future versions are based on the evolutionary requirements coming out of the IRS and INSAT programs.

The above considerations, relating to the introduction of high technology systems for meeting developmental and other innovative service goals, therefore called for pragmatic strategies. This in turn required understanding and analyzing the complex interplay of several issues. First was a detailed assessment and evaluation of alternate approaches to arrive at the most optimal solutions. The second was to decide on exercising buy or build options taking into account the time frame for the introduction of services. In the case of buy options, a parallel indigenous development plan was created to achieve self-reliance goals.

Coming to the organizational systems (Kasturirangan 2001; Narasimha and Kalam (eds) 1988), experience from earlier experiments involving broadcasting, communication and remote sensing, and dealing with the user communities, provided valuable inputs for the creation of innovative formal institutional frameworks. In the case of remote sensing, the institutional framework involved setting up of the Planning Committee of the National Natural Resources Management System (NNRMS), which at the overall level is mandated to provide directions for the creation of space based remote sensing capabilities for the country. NNRMS consists of Secretaries of the line departments of the Government of India dealing with natural resources and is headed by a Member of Planning Commission. Such a structure enables the involvement of major user communities to address issues of ensuring the use of such systems in their own areas of thematic applications, while at the same time facilitating the incorporation of this new and powerful technique into conventional approaches. Similarly the INSAT Coordination Committee, with the Secretaries of the user departments (Information and Broadcasting, Communication, Information Technology and Science & Technology) working along with the Secretary of the Space Department, was created as an apex body to address the development of space communication, broadcasting and meteorology and planning their utilization. In the context of Space Science, the Advisory Committee On Space Sciences (ADCOS) represented by some of the leading space scientists in the country provides directions for space science research. The three structures identified above have no parallel, anywhere else in the world and have played a crucial role in sustaining the various space endeavours. Being user driven also means the beginning of a culture of accountability and transparency. Another important aspect is that the overall space program in India is overseen by a high level body, known as the Space Commission, chaired by the Head of the Space organization and reporting directly to the Prime Minister. This structure ensures that the space program derives strength from the highest level and that the policy directions are duly integrated by different government agencies.

Another aspect of the organisational strategy was to create an industrial base for supporting the space program (Dhawan 1983 and 1988) and for carrying out relatively routine operations, while the space agency concentrated on pushing the internal output up the value chain by enhancing the quality and content of research and development output. This also enabled us to progressively increase the strength of highly qualified professionals without increasing the overall size of the organization. Also, in successive five-year plan periods, the organization could deliver increasingly larger number of complex missions, as illustrated in the Fig. 1.

Fig. 1

There have also been instances where the justification for initiating a new activity based on measurable direct benefits is lacking. At the same time the intangible benefits that could come from some of these programs could be convincing or not so convincing. An interesting case in point is the recent Indian initiative for planetary exploration Chandrayaan-I (Kasturirangan 2004a). We had to go through an elaborate process of consultation and justification with the scientific community, academics, the political system and the public media before this mission was given the go ahead. The steps that were taken are shown in Fig. 2.

Fig. 2

This process, spread out over four years, culminated in the announcement by the Prime Minister of India on August 15, 2003 (India’s independence day) on the nation’s decision to enter the new era of planetary exploration. This is also a good example of a practice of ethics of decision making in science involving consultation of a large cross-section of society and ensuring transparency.