Table of Contents
In this chapter, I will tentatively address a difficult issue: what we should make of blasphemy today, in a society like Australia?[1] My discussion falls into three parts: considering blasphemy under the headings of truth, ridicule, and play. I also discuss some different dimensions to the character of the offence. I conclude with a discussion of some particular problems about blasphemy posed by the fact that we are living in a pluralistic society, in the face of which I make some specific — but inadequate — recommendations. I am happy to call them ‘inadequate’ just because my aim, at the end of the paper, is to open up what seem to me some difficult problems rather than to resolve them.
In my preparatory research, I came to the conclusion that the more that one looks at some of the issues connected with blasphemy, say, at their history, the more complex they turn out to be. The consequence is that if, as in the present chapter, one is trying to speak in general terms, one becomes acutely aware of just how thin the ice is upon which one is treading. As a result, it is bound to be the case that, in addition to provoking the kind of critical reaction that I am intending to provoke, and which I am hoping will lead to a fruitful response to the issues which I am setting out to raise, I may also provoke all kinds of gnashing of teeth on the part of those who have specialised knowledge on issues that I deal with very briefly. All that I would say in my defence is that I am acutely aware of my fallibility and, as a former student of Karl Popper’s, I am aware of the need for criticism, which I look forward to receiving in due course.
Let me start by saying a very little about a key problem. It is: What is the character of blasphemy as an offence, and why was it thought appropriate to punish it? My concern here will not be with its legal status,[2] but with what the underlying concerns have been. There seem to me to have been several lines of argument. I will mention but five.
The first, as, say, we meet it for example in Leviticus 24, 16-18, is that the punishment, even with death, of the blasphemer is simply seen as a command of God, which is to be followed as such.
The second is that blasphemy is understood as a substantive offence against God. Here, humans who make accusations of it, and uphold the law in relation to it are, as it were, acting in His defence, or in defence of His reputation.
The third is slightly convoluted. It is that blasphemy is understood as something which, if unpunished, will threaten those who do not punish it with the judgement of God. Punishment of the blasphemer is, here, seen as a reaction to the threat of the collective punishment by God of those who fail to punish blasphemer.
The fourth is the idea that an attack on religion is problematic because of what are thought to be its social consequences, i.e., the destruction of civil order. This played a significant role during one period of British law, as is illustrated by the following statement by Lord Chief Justice Hale:
…to say, religion is a cheat, is to dissolve all those obligations whereby the civil societies are preserved, and that Christianity is parcel of the laws of England; and therefore to reproach the Christian religion is to speak in subversion of the law.[3]
Finally, there is a more typically modern understanding. This is the notion of blasphemy as an offence against the sensibilities of believers, and, further, as something which because it so offends, is problematic because it is liable to lead to a breach of the peace.
Let me now move to the discussion of blasphemy, as such. I need briefly to explain why I am discussing the issue of blasphemy under the three heads to which I have referred: truth, ridicule and play.[4] I do so because, historically, one can note people as having been charged with blasphemy for activities that fall conveniently under these somewhat different headings, and I wish to argue that the issues that they raise are somewhat different, too.
Historically, one element in blasphemy has been a simple contesting of the truth of various religious claims. This, for example, was one element in the charges against Thomas Aikenhead at the end of the seventeenth century and against G. W. Foote in the latter part of the nineteenth. In earlier times, people who had wished to contest the truth of Christianity, were sometimes punished — but for impiety. In the context of an orthodox Christianity feeling under threat from Socinianism and Deism,[5] Aikenhead’s youthful mixture of contestation of and irreverent comment about Christianity was taken horribly seriously, and he was executed.[6] Foote, the editor of The Freethinker in the 1880s, combined denial of the truth of Christianity, and fierce argument to that effect, with the use of ridicule.[7] In the context of one of the trials of The Freethinker, Lord Coleridge declared:
I lay it down as law, that, if the decencies of controversy are observed, even the fundamentals of religion may be attacked without a person being guilty of blasphemous libel.[8]
This is generally accepted in Western countries today; but, for example, it may be contentious for some Muslims. Foote, however, did much more than this. And that takes us to the second category, of ridicule. One of the features of The Freethinker were various hostile cartoons about the life of Jesus, and more generally illustrating in a satirical manner various themes from the Bible. The latter included an unsubtly illustrated version of the verse from Exodus 33, verses 22-3: ‘And it shall come to pass…that I will put thee in a clift of the rock…and I will take away my hand and thou shalt see my back parts’.[9] The Freethinker’s cartoon, as the previous quotation from Lord Coleridge implicitly indicated, raises the issue: Is the use of ridicule as part of an attack on religion acceptable?
Third, and of particular significance in our current context, is what I will term the playful or aesthetic use of blasphemy. By this I mean blasphemy committed not as part of a disagreement with, or an attack on religion (although it is not clear that it would be used in such a manner by a devout religious believer), but, instead, as used for literary or artistic effect. An obvious example here is Salman Rushdie’s playing with themes from Islam to literary effect, in his Satanic Verses. We may here, similarly, consider the work of art, Piss Christ, and also, say, in a much more minor key, parodies of the Creed, and so on, produced by William Hone for political purposes in the early nineteenth century.[10] The key idea here is that religious material is played with, or used for effect, in ways that believers could reasonably find offensive, but where the motivation of those making use of this material is not to attack religion. With this before us, let me now turn to the body of the paper, and to the issue of truth.
Truth seems to me usefully looked at in terms of the kinds of consideration that John Stuart Mill advanced in his On Liberty. I should state explicitly that my concern, here, will be with the social consequences of epistemological fallibilism[11] rather than with the specifics of Mill’s views; Jonathan Riley has argued powerfully that Mill’s own arguments are best seen in the wider context of his social philosophy, and that seen in that light, Mill is to be taken as arguing for a more liberal view than that which is presented here.[12] If it is being claimed that various religious doctrines are true, then some kind of case has to be made for them. What is involved here, may seem to get us into the territory of various traditional arguments for the existence of God, such as the ‘cosmological argument’. But what is actually offered in the context of religious proselatisation may be rather different.
Now if any such claims are being made as to the truth of religious doctrine, we get straight into the issues which J. S. Mill discussed.[13] He argued that all of our knowledge is fallible, and that if we are aiming for truth, our best course of action is to submit our claims to open critical scrutiny. In this context, he was then able to develop arguments against the suppression of opinion. To Mill’s argument, it might be objected by the believer: ‘but our religious views are not fallible’. However, those who agree with Mill can respond: ‘but you have certainly not furnished us with telling arguments that show you views to be anything but fallible.[14] And your tendency, across history, to kill or to imprison those who have objected to your claims, does not exactly speak for their strength — for if the arguments were strong, why should they require support from the hangman or the jailor’.[15]
It seems to me that, here, the case for allowing the public contestation of religious doctrines is unanswerable. Not only is the Millian case a powerful one, but since the Reformation we have lived in a society in which religious truth is contested. If there are Catholics and Protestants — to say nothing of Muslims and Jews, and also non-believers — who are members of a single society, then clearly there is disagreement about religious truth.[16] Indeed, the very beliefs of these groups implicitly or sometimes even explicitly involve the view that the other religious beliefs are incorrect. If we are living in a society that is pluralistic in this sense, the notion that the discussion and the contestation of religious ideas should be suppressed would seem an absurdity. (It is, however, worth noting that Jewish criticism of Christian claims, particularly its claims about itself as a supposed fulfilment of the Old Testament, was frequently suppressed.[17] ) Given that all the groups to whom I have referred — contemporary Judaism apart — are universalistic and attempt to convert others, this is surely an invitation to contestation.[18]
Today, Christendom accepts the case for openness of argument. (Although one wonders sometimes what the more dogmatic believers would do, if they could get their hands on the reins of enough political power.) It is not clear that this case for openness of argument is accepted by all Muslim clerics. Attitudes there, at least in terms of the views of some clerics, seem closer to those that were common in Western countries several centuries ago, although there are, of course, also liberal Muslims. There is also room for debate as to just what is supposed to be accorded what kind of protection, and it is quite another matter what anyone actually becomes concerned about (the Rushdie case had strong political elements to it). At least in principle, to voice disagreement about some key issues is problematic, even if all that is involved is intellectual engagement. Of course, in practical terms, no Muslim is going to be able legally to take action against Christian ministers who may say things within their religious congregations that are at odds with Islam. Further, Muslims have, I think, to face the fact that if they choose to live in a society like Australia, they are living in a society in which the open intellectual contestation of their beliefs — whether by sceptics, or by those who favour other religions — will take place. Further, if such contestation is conducted along the ‘decent’ lines that Lord Coleridge suggested, other citizens will expect that those engaged in such contestation will, if necessary, receive full protection from the law.
[1] I would like to thank Geoff Stokes for conversation and for some most useful comments on a draft of this paper, from some of which I was not able to benefit on this occasion, for reasons of space, and also to David Wall and the editors for some useful criticism and suggestions.
[2] On which, see Reid Mortensen, 1994, ‘Blasphemy in a secular state: A Pardonable sin?’, UNSW Law Journal, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 409-31. A useful brief overview of blasphemy laws in different states and territories is provided at: http://www.caslon.com.au/blasphemyprofile2.htm.
[3] Quoted by Mortensen, ibid., p. 411.
[4] There is also of course the issue of blasphemy as expletive; but this I will not discuss here. For a rather different classificatory approach, see Anthony Fisher and Hayden Ramsay, ‘Of Art and Blasphemy’, 2002, Ethical theory and moral practice, vol. 3, pp. 137-67.
[5] Socinianism, named after Lelio Francesco Maria Sozzini (1525–1562), was a sixteenth and seventeenth century religious movement, which called into question the deity of Christ, and emphasised, by contrast, the unity of God. It is sometimes regarded as an early form of unitarianism. Deism, a loose movement influential in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, while accepting the existence of God and his role as a creator, rejected revealed religion in favour of a sceptical and rationalistic approach, and also rejected the idea that God subsequently intervened in his creation.
[6] See, notably, Michael Hunter, 1992, ‘“Aikenhead the Atheist”: the Context and Consequences of Articulate Irreligion in the Late Seventeenth Century’, in Michael Hunter and David Wootton (eds.) Atheism from the Reformation to the Enlightenment, Oxford: Clarendon Press; and also W. Cobbett, T. B. Howell et. al. (eds), 1819, A Complete Collection of State Trials, xiii, London, pp. 917-40. For background, see also the other articles in the Hunter and Wootton collection, and also J. A. I. Champion, 1992, The Pillars of Priestcraft Shaken, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[7] Foote’s fascinating Prisoner for Blasphemy, London: Progressive Publishing, 1886, is available on the internet at: http://homepages.ihug.co.nz/~freethought/foote/blasphemy/0bcontents.htm. Foote is discussed at length in Joss Marsh, 1998, Word Crimes, Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press.
[8] Quoted in Marsh, ibid., p. 160.
[9] It is reproduced in Marsh’s Word Crimes, ibid., p. 142.
[10] For some discussion of which, see Marsh, ibid.
[11] That is to say, that aspect of Mill’s views about toleration, that stems from the stress that he placed on the idea that human knowledge was fallible, that currently accepted views may not be correct, and so on.
[12] See Jonathan Riley, 2005, ‘J. S. Mill’s Doctrine of Freedom of Expression’, Utilitas, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 147-79.
[13] It is striking from the discussion in Hunter and Wootton, that at times the production of apologias for the truth of Christianity against imagined opponents gave rise to people taking the imagined opponents’ case seriously and finding it telling.
[14] For critical discussion of claims to infallible knowledge in the Shi’ite tradition of Islam, compare the work of Abdolkarim Soroush, 2002. Some of his essays are available in English in his Reason, Freedom and Democracy in Islam, Mahmoud Sadri and Ahmed Sadri (eds), London etc: Oxford University Press.
[15] Clearly, an argument might be made for the suppression of material on the grounds that it might mislead the immature. But it is not clear that, for example, the history of the suppression of heresy or of Jewish objections to Christianity, can really be placed in that category.
[16] This oversimplifies, in that there was, historically, the recognition of a kind of pluralism within Islam, as in the milet system of the Ottoman Empire (cf. http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2004-03-25-ivanov-en.html), and also in Christendom at such times as Jews were not being persecuted. In addition, in the period immediately after the Reformation, a system was adopted in which the religion of a country was simply settled by the choice of the ruler.
[17] Cf, for example, Richard Popkin ‘Jewish Anti-Christian Arguments as a Source of Irreligion from the Seventeenth to the Early Nineteenth Century’, in Hunter and Wootton (eds) Atheism from the Reformation to the Enlightenment. Isaac Troki’s Faith Strengthened, for example, something that it is tempting to say should be compulsory reading for all evangelical Christians, is currently difficult to obtain in printed form (although a version is now available on the internet at: http://faithstrengthened.org/). It is striking that Hans Joachim Schoeps was able to remark in the ‘Foreword to the Second Edition’ of his The Jewish-Christian Argument: ‘This book made its first appearance in 1937, behind closed doors, as it were, for the authorities at that time in power in Germany allowed its sale only in Jewish bookstores and to Jews. Then, when it was noticed that it was a “dangerous” book, it was prohibited completely.’ See his The Jewish-Christian Argument, London: Faber, 1965, p. xiv. See also Richard Popkin, 2006, Disputing Christianity: The 400-year-old Debate over Rabbi Isaac Ben Abraham Troki's Classic Argument, Amherst, N.Y.: Humanity Books.
[18] At the very least, if one is offering arguments that are supposed to convince others, this opens up the possibility of contestation; for example, to the effect that the arguments are not valid or are not telling.