A great power concert in Asia, however ineffective, is preferable to an Asia dangerously divided between two rival blocs, however internally effective these blocs may be. But for a flawed but still valuable concert to operate, almost all of the participating countries would have to give up something. In other words, in order to win, one would have to lose. Let us look first at the great powers. The United States has to give up the idea that it can maintain primacy in Asia. A great power concert means that the United States will have to share hegemony, including with China. It will need to soften its emphasis on a network of military alliances with other maritime democracies in the region.

China probably has rather less to lose, but it still has to relinquish something. It will need to abandon any ideas that it will be the single leader of Asia. Unlike the SCO, of which Beijing is the natural leader, a great power concert means that China will need to share power, and not just with the United States but with India, and, hardest of all, with Japan as well. This means recognising Tokyo’s right to a seat at the big table.

But Japan may itself have a lot to lose in a concert. An alliance of democracies would be a big win for Japan, providing Tokyo with significant status and an unprecedented chance to boost its role in regional security affairs and to work alongside other democracies which want to see Japan play that bigger role. But, in the concert, Japan will have continually to regulate its diplomacy with China sitting across the table. This will help manage the development of its new international personality in a way that Japan will sometimes find uncomfortable.

Some of the smaller and medium powers in the region may have even more to lose from a concert—at least in the short term. Australia is simply not big enough to qualify for a seat at the really big table that a great power concert would involve. By some calculations of Australia’s short-term diplomatic interests, this can make the alliance of democracies attractive as a way of boosting Australia’s profile. But, in the long-term, that alliance would encourage a hostile division between the United States and China and between Japan and China. This would run counter to Australia’s interests in making sure that the China-US balance does not turn ugly, and that a major conflict between China and Japan is also avoided. For that reason, a concert which includes all three of these giants, as well as India, is in Australia’s long-term strategic interests. But this would probably mean a less prominent role for Australia in some of the important diplomacy of the region.

Australia still has an important role to play, often behind the scenes. China regards Australia as a strategic economic partner. The United States regards Australia as one of the closest allies it has anywhere in the world. And Japan regards Australia as an emerging security partner. With those sorts of linkages, Australia can encourage these three powers to seek the Asian concert which involves them all, however shaky and ineffective this may turn out to be. And this means continuing to support the Six-Party Talks process, even if it does not lead to a completely denuclearised North Korea. (Had the Talks dealt with North Korea’s nuclear weapons issue quickly, its full potential as a bridge to an Asian concert might well have been overlooked.) Canberra regards the freezing and disablement of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program as important outcomes to work towards. But the possibility of great power collaboration over the longer term in Asia, with the Six-Party Talks acting an important step along the way, is, in this author’s opinion, the more important prize.