Chinese philosopher Xong Shili (1884–1968) said that ‘what remains unchanged transcending all changes is benevolence. Knowing only what is changing without knowing what remains unchanged, the humankind will never enjoy peace’.[38] Albert Einstein said that ‘everything has changed except our manner of thinking’. Both Xong Shili and Einstein are right. This has been, is and will be one of the most important tenets of commonsense. The best way, and perhaps the only viable way, to discuss the future security architecture for East Asia is to start from commonsense.
A new world of closer and closer global interdependence is coming. With increasing interdependence, the common interests of major countries are enlarging and deepening. This is the objective and the true reality. The sources of difference or conflict are either subordinate or subjective, and in most cases they are merely distorted perceptions or opinions. In order to bridge the gap between distorted perceptions and true reality, we need new definitions and concepts regarding power and international relationships. If factors such as global warming, and the outbreaks of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and the H5N1 and H1N1 influenzas tell us something or anything, it is that as long as we breathe the same air, we have to share the same destiny. Nothing is more important than this common destiny. The potential supply of global and regional security exceeds our collective security requirements, thanks to the asymmetry between the military expenditure of the only superpowers and of major powers, and humanitarian assistance. The gap between global security requirements and the capacity to supply this security is a matter of will rather than of capacity—a matter of how to use force rather than of no use of force. Nonetheless, the gap between supply and requirement is growing. People in Africa, who have suffered so much for so long, are still suffering. Africans are forgotten, even though the continent’s resources are not. Against this backdrop, pretending to be ‘tough’ to other major powers under the guise of so called ‘realism’ is itself unreal, and so short-sighted. Realism is an anachronism in a global era.
William Fulbright, former Chairman of the US Congress foreign relations committee, said that we should see the world as others see it:
Today we need a leadership that recognizes that the fundamental challenge in this nuclear hi-tech era is one of psychology and education in the field of human relations. It is not the kind of problem that is likely to be resolved by expertise—even the sophisticated expertise of our most gifted military thinkers, who delight in exotic weapons systems and strategic doctrines that threaten the solvency of the richest nations as well as their physical survival. The attributes upon which we must draw are the human attributes of compassion and common sense, of intellect and creative imagination, and of empathy and understanding between cultures.[39]
It will be in everyone’s interest to jointly explore a shared vision based on common interests. Mutual strategic confidence will flow from taking every opportunity to maximise the common interest. It will also be in everyone’s interest to explore positive scenarios to balance the established worst-case scenario. We should and must be extremely cautious in applying the concepts of worst-case scenario and hedging in military planning. These strategic planning tools may be useful, but over-use of them may lead to unpalatable consequences. Judging from the lessons of the US-Soviet arms race, the United States and the Soviet Union needlessly wasted resources on a tremendous scale.
What is worse, the risks involved were much higher than the potential benefits that were realistically on offer. Only by guiding military policies on the base of common interests, and by exercising strong discipline to suppress the dominance of worse-case scenarios, will we be able to avoid strategic confrontation.
It is encouraging that some Americans have similar thinking. Ashton Carter and William Perry put forward the term ‘responsible hedging’. They
point out that since Chinese military leaders cannot predict the future, they will prepare for the worst even as they hope for the best. Hedging is contagious. During the Cold War, hedging and worst-case-scenario assumptions led to a dangerous and expensive arms race.[40]
The final report of the Princeton Project on National Security pointed out that any new national security strategy ‘should be interest-based rather than threat-based, and grounded in hope rather than in fear’.[41] Richard Haass is right in saying that ‘most global issues require global responses’. No single country, no matter how powerful, can contend successfully on its own with transnational challenges. An effective multilateralism is based on keeping a respectful distance from the core interest of other major powers:
The goal of U.S. foreign policy should not simply be to maintain a world defined by U.S. military superiority. … To have a chance of succeeding, the U.S. will need to view other major powers less as rivals and more as partners. The U.S. will have to accept some constraints on its freedom of action.
All of which brings us to the fundamental argument about opportunity:
The question is what Americans and others make of this moment. Time, resources, and potential have already been squandered. A different foreign policy, one based on promoting the world’s integration while the opportunity to do so still exists, is urgently necessary.[42]
China’s President, Hu Jintao, instructed China’s military to regard making a major contribution to the maintenance of global peace and the promotion of common development as one of its historic missions. This is China’s historic offer to the world and should not be refused. We Chinese are grateful to Australians when something bad happens to overseas Chinese in the South Pacific region; it has been Australia that has taken the lead and made a vital difference. We understand that China has its share of responsibility for regional and international affairs, and a duty to behave similarly. This is the commonsense approach for China-Australia security relations. We can see no reason why China and Australia cannot be closer security partners. If partnerships among all the major powers in Asia-Pacific region can be forged in this spirit, a future security architecture based on common interests and a shared vision will begin to take shape. In any case, what matters is what is remembered and emulated, not what is hated and resisted.[43] What matters is not to be more powerful or to be number one. What matters is what you do with your potential—create or destroy. What matters is to give rather than to take. Benevolence is humanity, which truly decides the greatness of any nation.
[38] Translated by the author from Xong Shili, Tenet for Reading Classical Chinese (Du Jing Shi Yao), The Chinese People University Press, Beijing, 2006.
[39] J. William Fulbright, The Price of Empire, Pantheon Books, New York, 1989, p. 232.
[40] Carter and Perry, ‘China on the March’, p. 16.
[41] Forging a world of Liberty Under Law: U.S. National Security Strategy for the 21st Century.
[42] Haass, The Opportunity: America’s Moment to Alter History’s Course, pp. 17, 22, 26, 32 and 202.
[43] Donald W. White, The American Century: the Rise and Decline of the United States as a World Power, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1996, p. 438.