Slowly the External Affairs and Defence Departments worked more closely together. In 1957 the Secretary of External Affairs was made a full, as distinct from an invited, member of the Defence Committee. This was also the year that the Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Department (then Allen Brown) joined the Committee, which was to have consequences for External Affairs authority in later years. External Affairs assumed chairmanship of the Joint Intelligence Committee, recognising it as the prime source of political intelligence, while the Joint Intelligence Bureau in Melbourne assembled military intelligence of a static kind. Preparation of material for meetings of the ANZUS and Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation Councils necessitated joint work, although some continuing problems remained in ensuring that the conclusions of meetings of the military Chiefs in these organisations were presented in a useful way to the External Affairs Minister for his Council meetings. I earlier described the external security situations that demanded joint appreciations between the diplomatic and defence arms of government. As the decade progressed, the growth of the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia, the Communist Party of Indonesia) and the growing bellicosity of Indonesia’s President Sukarno in respect of Dutch New Guinea and, later, the ‘Confrontation’ challenge to the birth of Malaysia, required many meetings of the Defence Committee in response to calls on it from Ministers. Beyond all this was the dangerous escalation of the confrontation between the nuclear powers, on which the Committee offered the best judgement it could on the information given us. While some academics offered analytical judgement on the effectiveness or otherwise of deterrence of the Soviet Union, I do not think the Australian Ministers were equipped to understand the complexities of the issues. Nor do I believe that any Australian position other than an offer of diplomatic support would have weighed with the United States.

Through the Defence Committee I made many associations and some lasting friendships with the top levels of the Services and with their British, American and New Zealand counterparts during their consultations. At other levels productive work developed with the Defence Department’s Gordon Blakers, whom I considered to be one of the wisest and most experienced contributors to strategic thinking. Day-to-day cooperation outside the more stifling committee procedures accelerated when the Defence Group moved up to Canberra. Other Defence officials who contributed to memory and continuity were Gordon Poyser and Don Clues. Service officers working in these areas had less continuity because of the Service necessity of rotating officers. A more stable appointment at senior level was that of Rear-Admiral Alan McNicoll (later Sir Alan when he was appointed Chief of Naval Staff). External Affairs staffing in this area also needed to be improved. I had the customary Public Service problem of what to do with officers who did not measure up.