It became clear as the months went by that the McMahon Government had become hostage to its doctrinal attachment to ‘forward defence’ and to the associated deployments in Malaysia and Singapore. This was exploited by the Democratic Labor Party in particular, but also by an opportunistic Singapore Government. That Government had earlier demanded rent for premises occupied by the Australians sent to defend them, as well as reciprocal use of bases in Australia. When McMahon visited the two countries in June 1972, with an election imminent, his mind remained in Australia. His principal interest seemed to be to obtain a public affirmation, from his hosts, for use with the Australian media who accompanied him in the aircraft and others back in Australia, that both countries wanted our forces for the present. He seemed a rattled man. He stumbled repeatedly while recording an interview for a Sydney radio station, with John Bunting (the Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Department) and I doing our best to point out his misstatements of facts or policy. He was good-natured to his advisers and did not mind being corrected.
During the return flight, while the Prime Minister spent time at the back of the aircraft with the media, I recorded in my diary:
Australia is now governed in almost continuous press conference. No discussion of substance about the purpose or consequences on a matter of foreign policy or external defence in this part of the world seems possible without reference to how the press in Australia will react.
McMahon was like a bird hopping from branch to branch over a loaded gun.
He was invariably considerate to me. We met informally on occasions. I often met Ministers at funerals burying their departed colleagues. On such an occasion, and others, McMahon said he regretted being outwitted (‘kept in the dark’, as he put it) in his wish to appoint me as Secretary when he had the Foreign Affairs portfolio. But I could not honestly reciprocate his admiration.
In my area of administration there was drift and frustration. On 27 October I entered in my diary:
The past week has seen some cases of an unnecessarily large number of senior executives—in our case two Generals and myself—pursuing enquiries or waiting about while more urgent problems burned because of a … lack of a sense of the importance of things, the addiction to trivia, and the plain confusion of mind which fails to communicate promptly and clearly.
I suggested to Fairbairn that he should move to establish a review of the organisation of the Defence Group of Ministers and Departments. Not surprisingly, he said that McMahon would not want to open up such a controversial matter. After Labor’s victory was announced on the night of Saturday 2 December 1972, I obtained Fairbairn’s approval to give Barnard his classified briefing at his earliest convenience. Even though uncertain as to the policies I would be implementing (if still in the job), I recorded in my diary my relief at escaping from months of frustration and unproductive effort.