While the Committee continued to meet—in about 17 meetings in all—I decided I should sit down with the four Chiefs and deal with them directly. My report describes the main matters that arose. In my discussions I gave way on some matters recommended to us. An example was the idea of moving the Service Chiefs of personnel into the Defence Department.

It was surprising that (as far as I recall) the Chiefs did not challenge my intention to continue to keep strategic assessments under departmental control; nor my intention to have departmental control of the staff examining Service equipment and manpower bids, to ensure their conformity to strategic need and to a balanced force structure. The challenge on the second was to build up and remain continuous, as I shall later record.

All the Chiefs had the right to go to the Minister with any complaints; as far as I know none did. It was helpful to me that my colleague as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Admiral Smith, was trusted by Barnard. I surmise that the absence of any complaint from him would have been reassuring to Barnard that Service interests were properly considered.

For the Chiefs a major recommendation, with which they all concurred, was that the chief military officer in the Department of Defence (already of superior rank) be given for the first time legal power of command over the three Services, while providing that the Chief of Staff of each Service would be responsible to the Minister ‘through’ the renamed Chief of Defence Force Staff. The single-Service Chief would be acknowledged as ‘the professional head of his Service’ and have command of it, subject to certain stipulations.

I took the opportunity to employ symbolism to reflect the concept that a common purpose must govern the activities of the three Services. I restored to usage the compendious title ‘Australian Defence Force’ which the 1915 Defence Act had declared to be composed of ‘three arms’. Fraser’s 1970 statement, for example, had not once used the term. In due course (after my time) the commander had his title changed to the unambiguous ‘Chief of the Defence Force’.

With the Department now planned to contain a commander of all the Services, and the Service Departments and the Service Boards to be abolished, the three Departmental Secretaries (or Chief Officers) would disappear likewise. The Audit Act, and the many regulations stipulating financial controls, called for substitute appointments. The history of Defence administration and the known views of governments from both sides of politics clearly required that the function be vested in the sole remaining First Division public servant—the Secretary of the Department of Defence.

Whereas in each Service Board this officer operated in conjunction with a three-star Service Chief and four or five officers at two-star level, I had to propose an arrangement for relations between two individuals to share the administration of the Defence Force. Some questions of principle had to be disposed of. I had no hesitation in riding off course the idea that had previously surfaced in the Army of having the Chief of Defence Force Staff solely responsible for representing the Department to the Minister, converting a Department of State into a de facto military headquarters.

But the Secretary could no longer have his powers and duties identical with those of civilian Departments under the Public Service Act. Behind these organisational challenges lay some deep-seated tensions in some areas between civilians and Service officers carrying out their respective duties. I needed to recognise this in proposing the new administrative arrangements—a subject to which I shall return later.

In the discussions some Chiefs were more constructive (whether in support or in criticism) than others. One I went to see privately in his office to remind him that the Government’s call for reforms in the system called for ideas and cooperation from him no less than from me.

Discussion gradually reduced the areas in contention. The Chiefs were reluctant to accept abolition of the Service Boards, even though achieving a commander of the Defence Force with access to the Defence Minister. I held to the view, already explained above, that their existence would be inconsistent with the new line of command and, in addition, obscured accountability. Most accepted the idea when they were reassured that there would be no objection to their setting up their own advisory committees, when the Chief assumed direct responsibility for activities previously controlled by their two-star officers and for which they had been accountable to the Service Board.

There were reservations (particularly from the Air Force) about my concept of some Service officers being appointed to serve under the Secretary in policy positions in a ‘two-hatted’ arrangement—responsible to the Secretary in respect of financial and other policy directions, and to his Service Chief in respect of his operational priorities. One example I proposed was in the area of supply. Another concerned the construction activities of the Services in their bases, ports, airfields and training establishments. I argued that being answerable to two persons was already a fact in the Services. Other issues debated are recorded in the Tange Report.

With the disappearance of the Service Departmental Secretaries, it would be necessary to establish the relationship between the Chief of Defence Force Staff and the Secretary of the Defence Department, both housed together and responsible to the Minister. My proposal was

The ‘two streams’ of administrative control became, when incorporated in legislation in 1975, the so-called ‘diarchy’ at the centre of the organisation under the Minister. As I shall show, it lived through opposition and misunderstanding, and it administered the newly resurrected ‘Defence Force’ through several decades that followed. At the time of writing, several modifications have since been made by Coalition Ministers.

My conception of the way the system would work was that practices in the relationship would vary according to the actual content of matters arising for decision or report to the Minister. They could be predominantly military (such as satisfying training or morale concerns); or predominantly financial (such as purchasing or contracting practices). One or the other of the two officers would act, in effect, as primus inter pares, by taking the lead in formulating the decision, with the other invited to concur.

Personalities would affect the relationship, as they always had done in past associations among those sharing authority. It would be for Ministers to take this into account when selecting individuals for appointment to the two offices.

I recognised that the obligation on the Secretary to support the Services needed to be confirmed. It would not be sufficient to rely on what new legislation said. Legislation allots authority, but does not specify in what ways it is intended to be used or not used. (This was later confirmed after reading the stark legalese of the 1976 Defence Reorganisation Act.) I proposed that the Minister issue directives to the Secretary stating the responsiveness expected of various parts of the Public Service structure to meet the priorities of the Chiefs; and requiring that duty statements reflect the duty. All integrated Service officers would continue to be subject solely to their Chief in respect of discipline. The Chief of Defence Force Staff would have his functions and responsibilities spelled out in regulations.

I now turn to some observations on the general question of civilian–uniform relations in our defence system.