It was necessary to put aside changes that could only be made when the legislation had been promulgated. But it would have been disastrous to leave matters in limbo for a year, while staff remained uncertain of their future and the disaffected in the regional Service Commands (where most outspoken criticism resided) encouraged the various lobby groups to try to force a re-think on the Government. Accordingly we developed a plan for an interim reorganisation, to be put into effect in chosen areas as soon as staff could be found. While the preparation of my report had imposed a burden on a few (mainly me), the preparation for full integration and reorganisation involved massive changes in legal authorities, preparation of duty statements, directives, documentation setting out chains of financial control and much else. The burden on civilian and military staff in the Department during 1973 was substantial. All of this was superimposed on the normal daily activities of the Department (budgetary and otherwise), as well as various requirements arising from our international associations described elsewhere in this memoir.

Until such time as the new command arrangements became law, the Services continued to be governed by their Boards and, the positions of Departmental Secretaries having been abolished by an impetuous government decision (referred to elsewhere), I had to accept their former responsibility. For practical reasons, I obtained approval to have the three individuals appointed as special deputies to act as my agents on the respective Boards.

Once the new Act was promulgated, each of the Services had to review and change its command structure. It was necessary for each Chief, now in sole command and made entirely responsible for what went on in his Service, to have the backing of specialist advisers, revised lines of command and, perhaps most importantly, effective arrangements for coordination and cooperation. For example, the Air Force, because of its highly advanced technology and given the vulnerability of air safety as well as combat readiness to any shortcomings in the association of engineering maintenance with the supply function and its vast inventory, had some perplexing problems to address. In the Air Force and in the other Services, time had to be allowed for careful review by suitable teams during 1975. The absence of any immediate threat made it possible to proceed slowly.

While awaiting the passage of the reorganisation legislation, I went ahead with changes not dependent on legislation. There were also changes in the top military staff due to retirements. Admiral Sir Victor Smith retired after five years as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, being replaced by General Sir Francis Hassett (who became the first Chief of Defence Force Staff in 1976). He was followed by General Sir Arthur MacDonald, and he in turn by Admiral Sir Anthony Synnot (who was my co-administrator when I severed my connection with Defence in August 1979).

I made changes in the civilian staff. An early objective was to get effective control of the tasking and priorities of the Defence scientific and technical laboratories. This purpose was assisted by the energy of Farrands as Chief Defence Scientist, who also contributed more than his predecessor (Wills) to defence policy decisions.

Much of their work was of the highest quality in the opinion of the American and British with whom they shared much advanced and innovative research. Yet some parts of the system had grown up primarily serving the production and repair activities of defence factories when all were part of the Supply Department. They tended to act for the Services as problem-solvers, and the connection with the policy objectives of the Department of Defence was tenuous. The appointment of a Chief Defence Scientist in the Department had been one of the half-baked reforms of 1958. Without any control over the laboratories dispersed around Australia or any organic link with the fast-moving technologies and new research findings, the occupant of the post in Canberra had become a rather detached science guru, expected to offer off-the-cuff opinions on weapons acquisitions and maintenance problems. Under my changes he was given new line authority, through appropriate procedures; and in later years there were more radical changes to the management of this important part of our national defence capabilities.

I also drew some of the scientists into becoming analysts in Canberra in the enhanced role of systems analysis of Service bids for new weapons systems and platforms.