Towards the end of 1973 Barnard made an extensive overseas tour. He included Washington, a visit to which is essential for any Defence Minister. In his case it was to set down some anxieties and negotiate some changes in certain agreements.

Before the visits in January 1974 for discussion with US Defense Secretary James Schlesinger and the Pentagon, Barnard had already arranged some changes, readily conceded, with the newly arrived Ambassador, Marshall Green. Green was a unique appointment—the most senior career man to occupy the Embassy, having been an Assistant Secretary in the Department of State. Some close to him let it be known that the more important post of Japan would have been his preference. Previous American Ambassadors had owed their appointment to favours to the political party of the President—usually money but in the case of William Battle in the 1950s, friendship with John Kennedy. Battle had been one of the few exceptions to a line of unrelieved mediocrity in occupancy of the post. Green was certainly not in that category, but his appointment was no compliment to Australia. Green was sent because of apprehension about Whitlam’s policies and Nixon’s resentment at the statements of some of his wilder Ministers.

In the event, I doubt that much calming influence on Washington was needed from Green once Whitlam made his intentions clearer. Indeed one high-ranking American told me that Green was given to sending somewhat alarmist reports to Washington. This of course is a fairly normal practice of competent trouble-shooters who are disappointed by the meagre trouble upon which to apply their skill. Nevertheless, when the man to take over as Acting Prime Minister during Whitlam’s frequent absences abroad, Dr Cairns, became the new Deputy Leader elected by Caucus, one can assume some heightened concern based on his earlier statements on American policies.

Barnard was received in Washington with a cordiality that probably owed something to his status as Deputy Prime Minister. I did harbour a cynical suspicion that the Americans were out to impress (just as in earlier days we had seen lavish and generous British hospitality as a form of ‘duchessing’ of Australian Ministers). The Americans in official talks are business-like and not given to time wasting. Their day starts early and ends late; and the superpower has a stream of official visitors. But their entertainment in elegant historic venues is stylish and generous (but with a bias towards fruit juice as a beverage). US Secretary of State Dr Henry Kissinger attended a reception for Barnard, which I was told he rarely did for such visitors.

Following the preliminary work with Green in Australia, Barnard and Schlesinger agreed on changes wanted by Barnard in the North West Cape agreement, limiting the land occupied and appointing an Australian Deputy Commander.

There was a good airing of views on the international security situation, and clarification of one Australian action that worried the Americans. Australia had suspended visits to some ports by American nuclear-powered warships. (Whether they carried nuclear weapons was a separate matter and in any case not for discussion, because of the American policy of declining for security reasons to confirm or deny the presence of such weapons in any particular location.)

The suspension was intended to last until Australian scientists had surveyed the ports to ascertain what berths (or what ports) occupied by such ships contained a risk to vulnerable populations (or institutions such as hospitals) in the event of an accident (such as collision) that released irradiated matter, such as steam, into the atmosphere. We were not fobbed off by the US Navy, present at the talks, continuing to tell us disingenuously that they berthed their vessels without hesitation on the Hudson River alongside Manhattan Island. The characteristics of wind direction and some other factors were unique to each location and each needed to be assessed as a prerequisite to giving a safety all clear. The chances of accident were remote but the assessment had to be made and reported to Parliament.

Barnard explained all this, but I thought I detected some scepticism in Schlesinger (who had formerly been in charge of American nuclear energy programmes). I took him aside privately to assure him that Australia’s new Labor Government was not in this matter moved by some obscurantist fear of nuclear power generation as such, or confusion with nuclear weaponry. We had a Parliament to be satisfied by Australian rather than American scientists. This was a political reality in Australia. While Schlesinger said teasingly that he suspected there was a bit of obscurantism at work, he did not pursue the American objection to our suspension of visits.

But not so the US Navy—or at least part of it. Approaching the lunch table I was accosted by the formidable and testy Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, creator and guardian of America’s devastatingly powerful sub-surface nuclear strike capability, and notoriously defiant of control by his nominal superior, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt. The Admiral abruptly dismissed my explanation about the need to satisfy Parliament in our democracy saying that, if we did not want the US Navy to defend Australia that was fine by him and, as a coup de grace, after listening to us he saw no reason why they should be shouting us lunch. As between umbrage and laughter, I thought the second was the better.

But Schlesinger was more diplomatic than his blunt sailor. Barnard was able to reach useful understandings on other subjects as well. They included clarification of the agreement on the Naval Communications Station.

Barnard had further exploratory talks about the acquisition of the American patrol frigates—the first launching of which was late in 1979.

Barnard made two other journeys overseas. With a need in prospect to order a replacement for our front-line fighter, Barnard decided to examine Sweden’s Viggen. It was not high in the Air Force’s preference. Perhaps sympathy with the country’s Social Democrat Government may have been an influence, just as the Labor Government felt some affinity with West Germany’s Social Democrats. While in Sweden I was offered a flight to neighbouring Denmark to visit my distant relatives but put the temptation behind me. Barnard visited some other defence plants in Britain.

He took on this long flight a BAC-111 aircraft from the VIP flight. Given its seating capacity he was able to include wives of officials and his own family. Despite our exclusive occupancy, it was not a restful flight. The machine was restricted to about four hours in the air and it landed us in odd places at odd hours for refuelling. By a similar flight, accompanied by his officials and their wives, Barnard visited Indonesia to deliver a patrol boat and later visited the Air Force units at Butterworth and other places in Indonesia as we returned to Australia. Barnard treated his senior officials and uniformed officers like family.