The new doctrine of the timing of threats, and Labor’s emphasis on the defence of the Continent, started a process of change in the structure of the Defence Force. But it was slow and hardly radical. There was resistance at different levels. Politicians in office are reluctant to mothball low priority equipment when the Opposition and media will protest about loss of jobs. When they had been a long time in office, as the Coalition had, they might be admitting past procurement mistakes of their own.

The Services, for their part, continued to table requests to replace whatever equipment they possessed with technologically advanced equipment being developed by the Americans and Western Europe to match the Soviet Union. The beguilingly innocent expression ‘up-date’ was part of the Service jargon. There being no incentive for a Service to drop out of competition with the other two for a place in the programme, only effectively disciplined priorities in a programme endorsed by the Minister could, if wisdom and foresight prevailed, mould the components into a force called for by the endorsed strategic outlook.

Along with his second budget in July 1974, Barnard presented Labor’s first five-year Defence Programme for the years 1975–79. He endorsed the methodology of the system initiated by his Coalition predecessors. There remained the passage of the reorganisation legislation still in the hands of the draftsmen. Even without it, the authority belonging to the Minister for Defence was now beyond question; but the interpretation of the processes for deciding the priorities, along with subjects such as continuity in management of each of the major weapons procurement projects, remained to be dealt with.

As to the content of the budget, and of the new programme beyond it, the share of the Defence Vote going to manpower continued to rise under Labor’s expansionary decisions on pay and to conditions of service, and the increase in the regular Army, which had consequences for other elements of the programme. Capital expenditure—the foundation for the future—remained low in the budget. It was possible to move a greater share into Defence facilities around the country. As an example it was necessary, because of the paucity of effective port facilities along our vast coast, to give the Navy adequate facilities for berthing and provisioning for its short-range vessels patrolling the north and northwest. I had myself observed, during a visit to Cairns, the inadequacy of the berths adjacent to a mangrove swamp and of the on-shore facilities placed in a Chinese laundry.

While preparing for the 1974 budget and in later months, contacts with colleagues in other Departments made me aware of the disputes and constitutional crises developing elsewhere. They included the so-called ‘loans affair’ and the disquiet over the fiscal profligacy of the Treasurer, Dr Cairns, as inflation grew, while he remained determined to finance all of Labor’s social objectives. In contrast, Defence, while subject to the various experiments imposed on us that I have described, was sheltered from the acrimony developing elsewhere, particularly as the assault from the Labor Left abated. Our discussions were internal to the portfolio and involved few Ministers other than our own to bring them under control. Whitlam’s support of Barnard was an advantage for what we hoped to achieve.

As for myself, I did not try to ingratiate myself with Labor Ministers and had not done so when they were in Opposition. Some Public Service colleagues were more ready than I to try to demonstrate their political sympathy. Unlike others, I declined to attend Labor Party conferences. I had acted similarly when the Coalition Ministers were in Government. I believed that talking to unofficial groups of private Members of Parliament to satisfy the dissatisfactions of Caucus with their leaders was not a requirement of a public servant. I recognise that being so stiff-necked added to a reputation for aloofness and denied me the opportunity to dispel false ideas about my being wedded to the policies of the previous Government.

Barnard’s budget statement described equipment decisions that reflected his view of where our strategic interests lay. He told Parliament that we needed to pay primary attention to ‘the surveillance and patrol of surrounding maritime areas’ along with concepts and doctrines and the build up of forces with ‘a better capability for independent actions in our own neighbourhood’. The Navy was to get more patrol boats, and the Air Force acquisitions relevant to the objective. Under this programme, the Navy’s prospect of acquiring a blue-water modern aircraft carrier disappeared over the horizon on a reckoning of absence of strategic need. (Its champions nonetheless were to be rewarded a decade or so later.)

The July 1974 defence debate was notable in two ways. One was the participation of the Leader of the Opposition, Fraser, to criticise the withdrawal of concerns for events in distant places. His shadow Defence Minister, Killen, provided more entertainment than content on the Opposition’s policy intentions, save for a warning that the new defence organisation would have to be scrapped in war. There remained the differing emphases—on the one hand on capabilities needed for the ultimate defence of the continent; and, on the other, those needed for deployment in support of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations area and other places where security was deteriorating. With hindsight, it can be said that Fraser’s insistence on the need to deal with distant threats (consistent with his views in 1970) was a forewarning of what to expect if he became Prime Minister. But I cannot claim to have given Opposition views much attention when immersed in steering Labor’s programme, with no expectation of them losing office in the short run.

It was satisfying to me that the Coalition no longer based the case on the need to attract the support of the Americans under ANZUS. The idea of a more self-reliant attitude, and the expectation of acting alone if necessary, seemed to be taking hold. For example, Bill Morrison (shortly to become Minister) drew on the 1972 Defence Review issued in Fairbairn’s time to urge acceptance of the responsibility for defending the continent as the priority.