This monograph contains four case studies of Australian regional force projections—an evacuation contingency deployment (Fiji in 1987), a brief armed peacekeeping operation (Bougainville in 1994), an unarmed peace support intervention (Bougainville in 1997–98) and a major multinational armed stabilisation intervention (East Timor in 1999).^[6] It focuses on competence at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of command. It is a critique. However, it contains empathetic and constructive criticism that makes a case for change—an important role of analytical military history.

It is reasonable to ask, ‘What is meant by proficiency in the functions of force projection?’ For the purposes of this monograph, proficiency is the capability and capacity for prompt, strong and smart military action that results in the strategic effects specified by the Australian Government. The underpinning of proficiency begins with maintaining generic military capability—force structure, modernisation, readiness and sustainability. There should be sufficient warning for orderly assignment of forces as well as their thorough specific force preparation. Preparations should be well-resourced, well-coordinated and well-informed by inputs, such as reconnaissance and intelligence as well as political and cultural information. These preparations (which include assembling and loading personnel and matériel on ships, road transport and aircraft) should be followed by protected deployment that enables personnel and their equipment and stocks to arrive with best effect—on time, fresh and ready for employment. Command and sustainment arrangements should facilitate effective, efficient, intelligent and safe employment of forces to achieve desired results. These arrangements should also facilitate a rate of effort and force rotation that maintains the required tempo of operations. After operations and campaigns, force elements should redeploy safely, and reconstitute efficiently.

This monograph sets each case study within the context of Australian military strategy and the strategic level of command, but does not comment in detail.^[7] Strategic level sources are still classified and there is insufficient space in one monograph to discuss the strategic level satisfactorily as well as to examine the operational and tactical levels of command in detail.^[8] Yet the absence of deep analysis of Australian political and military–strategic processes does not diminish the significance of this monograph. Within the context of force projection and the impact of the Information Age on military operations, the importance of understanding challenges facing lower levels of command has increased. Those operating at the cutting edge defeat hostile forces or create desired effects. Their success or failure often determines operational and strategic success or failure. In conventional land warfare, a divisional attack involving thousands of troops and employment of battlefield manoeuvre and significant firepower is, ultimately, a contest between opposing junior leaders and small teams. In maritime and air warfare, opposing commanders of vessels and their crews and pilots (either individually or in combination with their aircrew) decide outcomes. During land-based peacekeeping operations, junior leaders and small teams establish a deterrent presence and, guided by rules, engage hostile individuals, small teams, groups and crowds who threaten public order with carefully calibrated coercion and possibly lethal force.^[9]

The Information Age has elevated lower levels of command. Since the Vietnam War, media representatives have broadcast images and stories from the tactical level instantly to a worldwide audience. Scores of commentators then analyse, explain and critique such developments. As a consequence, there can be substantial political and strategic repercussions if all does not go well at the tactical level. Tactical tipping points—the moments or short periods when tactical contests have significant political and strategic ramifications—are not new. What is new is that the media create tipping points by broadcasting tactical level setbacks or behaviour that would have gone unnoticed in earlier times.

There is also insufficient space in this monograph to discuss and compare Australia’s projection of military force with allied force projection or that of other island nations. Both the United States and Britain have and continue to develop rapid joint force projection. The Americans constituted a Rapid Deployment Force in the early 1980s,^[10] while the British established a joint rapid response force and a permanent joint headquarters in the late 1990s.^[11] There have been differences of opinion about these initiatives.^[12] This monograph neither joins this debate nor compares the proficiency and efficacy of Australian force projection to the efforts of other nations.

This monograph does, however, fill some of the gaps in the history of Australia’s post-Cold War military operations, in general, and force projection, in particular. Though well covered by the media during their initial phases, Australian regional and international military operations in the late 1980s and during the 1990s have not received significant historical attention.^[13] Few historians have published histories of individual peacekeeping and post-Cold War operations.^[14] Aside from David Horner and the author, few have published authoritative accounts or attended to the operational and tactical levels of command in detail.^[15]

The emphasis is on land force projection.^[16] The navy and the air force are intrinsic mechanisms of Australian force projection of maritime and air power.^[17] Navy and air force higher commands can prepare and deploy vessels and aircraft into Australia’s sea and air space, the northern archipelago and the South Pacific, and around the world as long as there are secure ports and airbases to operate from and logistic resources to sustain them. The roles of maritime and air force elements are generic, well-defined and determined by the design and capabilities of individual vessels and aircraft, as well as their groupings.

The army has a number of more complex challenges. The first is to have forces equipped and rehearsed generically for warfighting as well as a range of likely contingencies. The second is to have sufficient time to conduct reconnaissance and to prepare. The third is to deploy force elements safely and effectively by land, sea and air after efficient loading. The fourth is to adapt to different and often complex and harsh operational environments. The fifth is to accomplish a variety of missions shaped by a number of stakeholders as well as to overcome or deter opponents. The sixth is to maintain a tempo of operations, level of sustainment and rotation to succeed for the duration of an operation or campaign. The seventh is to redeploy safely and reconstitute efficiently. The navy and the air force do not need the army except for securing and protecting threatened bases and providing some air defence. However, the army depends on Australian or allied maritime and air force elements, as well as commercial assets and capabilities, for force projection to hostile operational areas beyond Australian shores. Typically, land force elements rely on navy and air force elements for deployment and protection as well as for the means for sustainment, manoeuvre, additional firepower and possibly redeployment. One of the proficiency tests of Australian force projection is to synchronise maritime, land and air force elements effectively—sometimes called littoral power.^[18]

This monograph briefly describes the first century of Australian force projection between 1885 and 1985 before closely examining Australia’s first post-Vietnam War regional projection in 1987, Operation Morris Dance, two projections to the North Solomons Province (hereafter Bougainville), Operations Lagoon and Bel Isi, the eastern-most province of Papua New Guinea (PNG), in 1994 and 1997, and to East Timor in 1999 (Operations Spitfire and Warden). One of the intentions is to reveal what happened at lower levels of command when the Australian Government decided to take military action and the Defence organisation executed the functions of force projection. Another intention is to fill in parts of an operational story that authors sometimes omit. Within the framework of the 10 functions of force projection, the narrative structure of this monograph follows the generic chronology of most regional and international projections, beginning with warnings and responses, not just arrivals and subsequent employment.

Each case study does not cover all of the functions. Operation Morris Dance did not involve employment or sustainment of force elements. The operation was a contingency deployment that ended when forces were not required after being pre-positioned. Consequently, it does not examine whether specific force preparation, deployment and force protection arrangements increased or decreased risk after arrival. Nor does it analyse the effectiveness of force command, protection and sustainment over time. There was no force rotation or a need for well-protected and efficient redeployment. Force elements reconstituted efficiently because they returned to home bases with original personnel and matériel.

Operation Lagoon was also a brief operation. However, it was an armed peacekeeping operation that did test specific force preparation as well as other enabling functions and incorporated the additional complexities of joint and coalition operations. Operation Bel Isi had sufficient duration to test all of the functions of force projection over a year, not just a few days or weeks as was the case for Operations Morris Dance and Lagoon. Though unarmed, this operation was not without threats to life and property. Arrangements for force protection are still classified and are not examined here. Operations Spitfire and Warden cover all of the functions, but the emphasis in the monograph is given to those that were persistently weak on previous case studies (such as force command and sustainment).

While Australians expect that there will be risks when their governments decide to take military action, they also presume that their political, public service and military leaders will manage and minimise risk. They do not expect priorities and processes within both government and Australia’s armed forces to add to the inherent dangers of military operations. These processes did increase risk for Operations Morris Dance, Lagoon, Bel Isi, Spitfire and Warden. Given media magnification of tactical tipping points, deficient force projection could contribute to tactical setbacks and incidents that result in significant political and strategic embarrassment. Negative consequences may only diminish Australia’s regional and international reputation during peacetime, causing temporary political problems for governments. However, if Australia goes to a substantial military contest as part of an international military emergency or has to defend the approaches to the continent in a time of war, as was the case in 1942, the consequences could be disastrous.

In summary, this monograph contributes to Australian analytical military history through describing and analysing Australia’s proficiency in military force projection using case studies. It offers a new framework and narrative structure for examining Australian military intent and competence. It adds to and incorporates other accounts of contemporary regional Australian force projections, such as S.S. Mackenzie’s account of the adventures of the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force in 1914, Dudley McCarthy’s and David Dexter’s official histories of Australia’s projections during the Southwest Pacific Campaign during the Second World War and two accounts by the author of operations in Bougainville and East Timor in the 1990s.^[19] While the monograph describes the past, it also has potential to shape the future. C.E.W. Bean alluded to the contribution of military history and this type of monograph to the future when he said: